International power transitions, critical realism, and the rise of China by Crisp, Michael
1International Power Transitions, Critical Realism, and 
the Rise of China 
by 
Michael Crisp
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy  
Deakin University 
December 2012
2
3
4
5Abstract 
International power transitions have been the subject of much theoretical and policy 
debate. This thesis critically examines theories of power transition with reference to 
both the historical record and the rise of China. The aims are to (a) demonstrate 
weaknesses in existing theories, and (b) propose an alternative theory that will enrich 
our understanding and explanation of the rise of China, and advance the quality of 
policy debate and deliberation on this issue.  
The thesis first offers an internal critique of two contrasting theories: ‘power 
transition theory’ (PTT) and Mearsheimer’s ‘offensive realism’ (MOR). It is argued 
that existing theories of power transition have a limited capacity to (a) explain conflict 
and peace in past power transitions, and (b) assess the possible conditions for peace, 
order or conflict in prospective cases. The thesis next deploys an alternative 
philosophy of social science, critical realism, to extend this critique and guide 
construction of a new theory and methodology for analysis of power transitions. On a 
diagnostic level, critical realism’s critique of the positivist concept of causation 
highlights the pitfalls of relying upon historical regularities based on correlations. On 
the constructive side, critical realism allows us to identify and conceptualise a greater 
diversity of material and ideational sources of causation, as well as the interaction 
between them.  
The significance of the alternative theory is that it bases its explanation of power 
transitions on the principles of causal powers and natural necessity. By using these 
principles the thesis also provides an external critique of PTT and MOR. That is, the 
thesis rebuts the claim advanced by both theories that there is a probabilistic relation 
between shifts in material power distribution and the incidence of war and peace. 
Instead, this thesis argues that the onset of war or peace in a power transition depends 
on how key states variably perceive both their external security environments and 
their own interests. Although motivational causes are complex and case-specific, a 
general theory of international power transitions, conceived as the hierarchical 
revision of regional military-security orders, is feasible.
The general theory advanced here comprises a network of propositions about the 
ontological determinants (great power agents, domestic interest structures, 
geographical space, military and economic resources) and causal sequencing of power 
transitions. The theory sets out an invariant three-stage power transition sequence, yet 
specifies a greater variety of generic power transition conditions, processes and 
outcomes than previous theories. The theory can, for instance, specify conditions for 
consensually based transitions in geopolitical order, and for transitions that occur in 
maritime regions. The generic features of the theory supply the finite limiting 
conditions that are necessary for undertaking a defensible prognosis of prospective 
power transitions such as the rise of China. A further advance on previous theories is 
the provision of guidelines for investigation of motivational causes. 
In applying the theory to the rise of China, the thesis deploys an innovative 
methodology for evaluating the explanatory power of causal claims that operate in 
complex, multi-causal environments. Methodologically, the thesis also proposes a 
solution to the problem critical realism raises about the limited viability of prediction 
6in such open systems. For critical realists, agent-level motivational causes, or 
tendencies, are just as significant for their actual or potential material effects as 
quantifiable military and economic resources. Consequently, demonstrations of 
conflict logic (or its absence) between the existing territorial and strategic interests of 
East Asian powers can be conducted on a highly tangible basis. Using the alternative 
power transition theory to frame such simulations enables us to explore concrete 
conditions for future conflict or compromise on regional security order. Such an 
explanation of possibilities is potentially more empowering than prediction because it 
allows the key actors to see greater opportunities for choice and mutual adjustment of 
interest definitions. Such factors may help to avoid, or at least minimise, the scope for 
future conflict. The innovative theory and methodology advanced in this thesis thus 
has the potential to improve both the quality of general policy debates and decision-
making with regards to the negotiation of prospective power transitions, such as the 
rise of China. 
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9Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis critically examines theories of international power transition with 
reference to both the historical record and the rise of China. The aims are to (a) 
demonstrate weaknesses in existing theories, and (b) propose an alternative one that 
will enrich our understanding and explanation of the rise of China, and advance the 
quality of policy debate and deliberation on this issue.  
The thesis first offers an internal critique of two contrasting theories: ‘power 
transition theory’ (PTT) and John Mearsheimer’s ‘offensive realism’ (MOR). I argue 
that these existing theories of power transition have a limited capacity to (a) explain 
conflict and peace in past power transitions, and (b) assess the possible conditions for 
peace, order or conflict in prospective cases. The thesis then deploys an alternative 
philosophy of science, critical realism, to extend this critique and guide construction 
of a new theory and methodology for analysis of power transitions. On a diagnostic 
level, critical realism’s critique of the positivist concept of causation highlights the 
pitfalls of relying upon historical regularities based on correlations. On the 
constructive side, critical realism allows us to identify and conceptualise a greater 
diversity of both material and ideational sources of causation, as well as the 
interaction between them. The innovative theory and methodology developed in Part I 
of this thesis on the basis of critical realist insights is, in Part II, applied in a case 
analysis of the rise of China. 
The role of this introductory chapter is twofold. First, I establish the rationale and 
significance of the project through posing and answering two questions: (1) why do 
we need a new theory? and (2) why critical realism? After this, I present the structure 
of inquiry of the thesis according to its sequence of chapters. 
1.1: Why do we need a new theory? 
International power transitions have been the subject of much theoretical debate in the 
discipline of International Relations (IR) since the emergence of classical realism 
during the 1930s and 1940s. Since then, the most systematic and general theorising on 
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the topic has continued to occur within various realist paradigms, especially those that 
centre on an hypothesised causal relationship linking various forms of material power 
distribution amongst states to a greater or lesser probability for major war.  
This thesis challenges both the veracity and usefulness of these particular sorts of 
probability argument. Correlations between forms of material power distribution and 
conflict/peace may appear compelling on the basis of a positivist concept of causation 
that compares and weights causal claims according to event-regularity within 
obtainable data sets. Such arguments become undermined, however, when assessed 
according to the logic of an alternative, and as argued here, more sophisticated and 
well-founded philosophical realist concept of causation based on causal powers, 
natural necessity, and open-system dynamics. 
Even when presumed as genuinely probabilistic, the potential ‘technological’ 
application of such theories to guide and anchor analysis and make reliable prognoses 
about relevant real-world problems, such as the rise of China, is still highly limited. 
Sometimes, and especially in the case of PTT, this is partly due to problems in 
conceptual scope and coherence. More generally, the problem is that a focus on 
material conditions that emerge immediately prior to outbreaks of conflict can only 
ever provide insight about symptomatic conditions rather than generative causes, the 
latter of which involves questions about the sources of state motivation. When state 
motivation is actually theorised, however, it tends to be more generalised and 
simplified than is empirically warranted.  
The alternative theory that is developed and applied in this thesis does two things that 
give it both an explanatory and ‘technological’ advantage over existing theories. 
Firstly, the theory more clearly distinguishes features of the power transition process 
that are determinate, fixed and apply universally, from those that are variable and 
changeable across cases. On one hand here, we argue that it is possible to possess 
some general knowledge about limiting conditions, causal sequencing, and the causes 
of conflict or peace and stability in power transitions that is universal and definite in 
its claims. So long as such knowledge claims really are a correct or close 
approximation to reality, they are able to reduce more effectively the speculative 
component of future projection in comparison to the tenuous probability claims 
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advanced in the other theories. On the other hand, within the bounds of an invariant 
three-stage power transition sequence, the theory specifies a more variable (yet still 
fixed and finite) range of generic power transition conditions, processes and outcomes 
than previous theories. It can, for instance, specify conditions for consensually based 
transitions in geopolitical order, and for defining revisionist change in maritime 
regions. I argue that this range of precisely defined generic features and conditions 
provides a more accurate and reliable template of the possibilities for change in power 
transitions than found elsewhere in the literature.  
A second advantage of my alternative theory is that it provides guidelines and 
methods for investigating and causally conceptualising state motivations in all their 
complexity and variation, and for then relating such case-specific information back to 
the general features and categories of the theory. The theory, accordingly, functions as 
a disciplined guiding and ordering framework, rather than as a substitute, for the in-
depth empirical investigation of particular cases. Such a relating of the 
concrete/complex to the general/finite enables greater precision to be made in 
projections of future possibilities and options than is the case with existing theories.  
1.2: Why critical realism? 
If a key aim for the building of an alternative theory (and methodology) is to provide 
an improved basis for policy deliberations on the rise of China, then what value can 
the philosophy of critical realism contribute? At first glance, it might appear that 
drawing on critical realism is more likely to be a source of handicaps, rather than a 
facilitator of such an objective. There are at least three potential objections.  
Firstly, one could argue that given critical realism is a paradigm of social science that 
is currently not well known in IR and on the fringes of the discipline, drawing on it is 
not a particularly efficient way of getting one’s ideas known and understood. 
Secondly, given that a good quantity of the existing philosophical and theoretical 
literature of critical realism uses a language that is heavy and demanding, it might 
also be argued that this imposes a further unnecessary encumbrance on any real-world 
analysis aspiring to be policy-relevant.  
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A third possible objection might be that receptiveness to a theory and methodology 
based on critical realism could be narrowed further owing to the fact that its founder, 
Roy Bhaskar, is an avowed Marxist and socialist, and that the movement has tended 
more to attract those from the political left (Brown 2007). My response to this, firstly, 
is to note my own ignorance of Bhaskar’s Marxism during my initial readings of his 
works. Secondly, and as will become evident, the treatment of the subject matter to 
which critical realism is applied in this thesis, and the arguments developed, clearly 
do not bear any relationship to the traditional left-right political divide. 
I argue that the core of critical-realist philosophy, developed initially to correct 
common misconceptions and provide some more accurate alternative explanations of 
natural scientific practice (Bhaskar 2008 [1975]), should be viewed as largely 
apolitical in its foundations. Bhaskar subsequently used these improved conceptions 
of natural-scientific practice as a basis for critiques of positivist social science and 
relativist interpretative approaches, and to open up suggestive pathways for a new 
critical-realist social science (1998 [1979]; 1986). However, it was only with the 
introduction of his advocacy of science as a mission of ‘emancipation’ that Bhaskar’s 
Marxism began to overshadow and undermine the political neutrality of his initial 
body of concepts.1
This thesis does not follow Bhaskar down the latter path, and not just for reasons of 
maximising political neutrality. Bhaskar’s concept of emancipation requires accepting 
the idea, regarded here as logically implausible, that facts can sometimes secrete 
particular sorts of values (1998, 54-71). Instead, this thesis follows Sayer (2000, chap 
7 and 8) in favouring a movement from explanation to normative deliberation (or 
more well informed policy debate), rather than to emancipatory critique. Such a move 
enables studies that use critical realism to more effectively reassert the scientific 
objectivity of their analysis, and of the grounds on which they expect their 
explanations, and those of others, to be scrutinised and evaluated. 
Setting aside these objections, I argue that critical realism provides a genuinely 
progressive and (for the most part) coherent alternative to mainstream understandings 
                                                
1 While some preparation was made for the ‘emancipation’ argument in Bhaskar (1998 [1979], 54-71), 
it is the work that followed (Bhaskar 1986) that established this stream of critical realism. 
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of causation and causal explanation in IR. Equally, however, I hold that much of this 
paradigm’s potential to generate (or in Bhaskar’s words, to be the ‘midwife’ of) 
progressive developments in social-scientific theory and methodology (including for 
future-oriented analysis) remains largely untapped. To generate a new stage of 
progress, practitioners of critical realism need to more squarely confront and resolve 
the problems the paradigm itself raises about (a) the peculiar challenges of evaluating 
causal claims in multi-causal real-world environments where there is no recourse to 
experimental arbitration, and (b) the limited viability of prediction in such open 
systems.  
In addition then to building an alternative theory of power transition on the basis of 
critical realism’s progressive concept of causation, this thesis also proposes 
innovative methodological solutions to the above problems and demonstrates their 
utility through application to a case analysis of the rise of China. In the process of 
developing and justifying these innovations, it is necessary to engage in some 
measure of complex philosophical and theoretical discourse. If the understanding of 
causation, and methods of causal evaluation and futures analysis deployed in this 
thesis were readily explicable within existing mainstream IR paradigms, there would 
be no need for this. As this is not the case, and as certain aspects of the case analysis 
in Part II would otherwise likely be viewed (incorrectly) as ‘speculative’ and based on 
‘intangibles’ according to some mainstream paradigms; exposition of critical-realist 
critiques and concepts becomes necessary as both a means to shed such distortions, 
and as a discipline on the process of theory/methodology building and case analysis. 
I argue that the payoff for such efforts lies in a paradox. That is, the application of 
critical realism to critique and theory/methodology building undoubtedly adds, 
initially, to the complexity and abstraction of the analytical process. Yet, the result 
when well constructed and applied as a framework for case analysis is a level of 
clarified causal logic and integration – or de-mystification of real-world complexity –
that cannot be attained through direct empirical investigation alone. Nor, arguably, 
through an application of existing mainstream concepts of causation in IR. To 
whatever extent then that this thesis is judged as advancing clarity, critical 
discernment, and synthesis in understandings about the causal drivers and processes 
that underpin or relate to the rise of China; any deemed success in this regard is, in 
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large measure, the product of a disciplined internalisation of the critical-realist 
understanding of causation, and the particular theory and methodology developed on 
this basis. 
1.3: Structure of inquiry 
This thesis is structured in two parts. The aim of Part I (Chapters 2 to 5) is to critically 
establish the need for, and construct, an alternative theory and methodology for the 
analysis of international power transitions. Part II (Chapters 6 to 8) then applies these 
innovations to a prospective (or future-oriented) case analysis of the rise of China. 
Chapter 2 provides an internal critique of PTT and MOR. The focus is on consistency 
of logic and empirical fit within the subject matter addressed by the two theories. The 
IR theoretical literature is a broad one, and choices have had to be made in regards to 
critical focus. On the dynamics of change in international power hierarchies, the work 
of Gilpin (1981), for instance, might also be viewed as a prime candidate for such a 
critique. This option has been excluded on a number of pragmatic grounds.2
First is the need for efficiency and cogency in the development of key arguments. 
Between them, PTT and MOR provide for an efficient, clear yet comprehensive 
account of the strengths and limitations of employing a predominantly ‘materialist’ 
approach (see below) to the explanation of international power transitions. Second, 
PTT and MOR represent clear critical points of departure, as well as continuity, with 
previously dominant theoretical paradigms; from balance-of-power classical realism 
in the case of PTT, defensive neorealism in the case of MOR. The critique thus 
provides an efficient means of indicating the broader evolution of theoretical debate 
on the subject. Third, PTT and MOR have been directly and contrastingly applied to 
assessing the prospects for the rise of China to proceed peacefully or non-peacefully, 
and to making policy recommendations for how the US should handle the process. 
Thus, these theories have particular relevance for and provide a useful comparative 
point of reference to the issue that forms the special focus of this thesis. 
                                                
2 Gilpin’s work is nonetheless worth consulting as an example of a sophisticated synthesis of classical 
realist and neorealist perspectives on international politics.  
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Note that the term ‘materialist’ is, in this thesis, always meant as a shorthand for 
‘brute materialism’. Arguments in this thesis about the causal power of ideas and 
conscious agency are, in fact, just as potentially compatible with a purely materialist 
philosophy of existence as they are with one based on mind-matter ‘dualism’. Coined 
by Wendt (1999, 94-5), brute materialism refers to IR theoretical frameworks that 
limit their field of explanatory focus or value to physical variables (military 
technology, geography, population), economic resources, and generalised instinctive 
behavioural tendencies. Such a view is commonly sceptical towards either (a) the 
causal difference that culture and ideas make to states’ security and strategic 
motivations, or else (b) the possibility for allegedly ‘intangible’ ideas to be 
operationalised in genuinely scientific causal analysis. 
Chapter 3 introduces and deploys the conceptual framework of critical realism to 
advance arguments as to why this is a mistaken viewpoint. In doing so, the chapter 
provides the crucial pivot in Part I from critique to theory construction. Critical 
realism is used first to extend the critical examination of PTT and MOR, this time on 
the basis of an external critique. Chiefly, the chapter rebuts claims advanced within 
these theories that there is a probabilistic relation between shifts in material power 
distribution and the incidence of war and peace. Instead, it is argued that the onset of
war or peace in a power transition depends on how key states variably perceive both 
their external security environment and their own interests. Culturally derived ideas in 
the form of ‘interest structures’ are real and exercise a more determinate causal 
impact on the incidence of war and peace than the structures of material capability 
distribution posited in the other theories. After establishing the ontological basis of 
‘interest structures’, the remainder of Chapter 3 addresses key methodological issues 
involved in deploying them in ‘tangible’ causal analysis. In the process, the chapter 
develops innovative solutions to the unresolved problems raised by critical realism 
and mentioned in the previous section – that is, the problems of explanatory 
evaluation in open systems (absent a recourse to experimentation), and the limited 
viability of prediction in social science. 
Next, Chapter 4 develops the concepts used to build the alternative theory of power 
transition. The central concept dealt with is ‘revisionism’. Despite the importance of 
this concept in IR, and its centrality to the subject of international power transitions in 
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particular, it remains considerably under-examined, and inconsistencies in its usage 
persist. It has also become overly associated with history’s more radical and insatiable 
imperialist powers such as Nazi Germany and Napoleonic France. It is rarely 
associated with the rise of the US. Thus, a chief aim of this chapter is to thoroughly 
rework this concept in a more logically and empirically consistent, as well as value-
neutral direction. In the process, reference is made to several other mainstream IR 
concepts that are themselves redefined and adjusted to accommodate the alternative 
power transition model that emerges from this reappraisal of the concept of 
revisionism.  
To complete Part I, Chapter 5 synthesises the various components and arguments of 
previous chapters into a summary statement of the alternative theory. The aim is to 
clarify the theory’s core propositions so as to enable it to be both readily tested and 
operationalised for case analysis. Note that while this theory has been developed 
through a rigorous process of crosschecking for logical-empirical consistency across 
diverse historical cases; due to word length and time constraints, it has not been 
possible to include a fully systematic demonstration of the empirical correspondence 
and adaptability of this theory. Such a demonstration will be provided in a later study. 
The three chapters comprising Part II follow a sequencing logic and apply innovative 
methodological procedures that are developed and explained at length within Part I 
(along with some extra elaboration in the introductory sections of the chapters 
themselves). Chapter 6 begins with a unit- or agent-level interpretative analysis that 
identifies and explains the complex of interest structures underpinning contemporary 
Chinese grand strategy. The analysis of motivational causes in this chapter provides 
necessary materials and context for Chapters 7 and 8 that, in turn, explain and 
evaluate possibilities for Chinese revisionism. In addition to the use of various 
standard sources in English, the analysis also draws directly on source material from 
the Chinese language discourse on IR and Chinese foreign policy within China itself.3
The latter research component contributes some firsthand and novel insights into the 
                                                
3 These materials were accessed and obtained during a period of research at Fudan University, 
Shanghai from February to July 2008. 
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lines of debate in China about its grand strategic orientation, and the dialectical 
tensions that exist amongst some of its interest priorities.  
Chapter 7 applies my alternative model of power transition (which operates at the 
level of inter-state interaction) to a future-oriented analysis. The chapter asks whether 
contemporary Chinese interest structures are revisionist, and if so, what sort of 
revisionism applies to China? An innovative method of closed-system rational 
simulation is used together with the theory to demonstrate tangible possibilities for 
hierarchical change, as well as conflict and peace, implied in the interaction of the 
geopolitical interest preferences held by key actors. 
Chapter 8 subsequently tests and evaluates my arguments about potential Chinese 
revisionism and the possibilities for war and peace in East Asia. To this end, the 
chapter deploys another innovative methodology, referred to as inter-theoretical 
evaluation. Arguments advanced in my case analysis (and derived from my 
alternative power transition theory) are tested through critically relating them to the 
causal variables captured within three other theoretical theses that have been 
advanced to explain and/or predict the dynamics of East Asian security order. These 
include arguments about the causal role of: (1) the material balance of power, (2) 
economic interdependence, and (3) socialisation according to common international 
norms (in this case the ‘ASEAN Way’). Through further simulations, the analysis 
pinpoints and evaluates practical conditions under which the various arguments 
embody a zero-sum explanatory logic (that is, where one explanation is judged more 
or less plausible than another), or else can be combined as part of an integrated 
explanation. In doing so, the necessary conditions for the future validity of the various 
explanations (including their falsifiability criteria) are made clear and transparent. 
Finally, the conclusion (Chapter 9) summarises and reflects on the theoretical and 
methodological innovations advanced in this thesis. To finish, I then demonstrate the 
potential practical uses of these innovations to aid and refine the process of policy-
making analysis and deliberation for states involved in a prospective power transition. 
The demonstration is conducted with reference to the choices (dilemmas, trade-offs, 
and opportunities) that my case analysis indicates as confronting China and the US 
18
respectively as they lead and negotiate the much anticipated power transition in East 
Asia.   
19
PART I:  
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
20
Chapter 2: Two Mainstream Theories of Power Transition: A 
Critique 
This chapter examines how two mainstream IR theories have understood and 
explained the phenomenon of international power transitions. The first of these is the 
‘power transition theory’ (PTT) research program founded by A.F.K. Organski in the 
late 1950s. The second is the more recent theory of ‘offensive realism’ associated 
predominantly with the work of John Mearsheimer (hereafter MOR). This chapter 
develops an internal critique of the relative strengths and limitations of the 
explanations offered by these theories about the relationship between changes in 
international power structure and the incidence of war or peace. The focus is on 
consistency of logic and empirical fit within the subject matter addressed by the two 
theories. 
This chapter has three main sections. Section 2.1 focuses on PTT. After summarising 
the main features of this research program, two major limitations are identified. 
Section 2.2 then introduces MOR into the critique. The analysis is structured around 
three areas in which MOR better succeeds in formulating and applying a theory that, 
even more so, is predominantly materialist in orientation. In the process, key 
limitations of MOR are also identified. Section 2.3 then addresses the limitations of 
both PTT and MOR when applied towards understanding the rise of China. 
2.1: Power Transition Theory
Organski established the blueprint for PTT in World Politics (1958, chap 12). He 
applied the term ‘power transition’ to a phenomenon already generally treated by 
influential post-war classical realists such as E.H. Carr (2001) and Hans Morgenthau 
(2006). Despite such continuity, Organski presented his work as a challenge to 
mainstream depictions of the international system as a balance of power system. The 
balance of power has long been notorious for its varied and inconsistent usages 
(Wight 1978, chap 16). However, the usages that Organski had in mind referred 
specifically to the ideas of a mechanical tendency towards, or normative maintenance 
of, a general parity and equilibrium among major poles of power.  
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Organski claimed this notion of the balance of power (a) does not explain accurately 
enough the international historical record of the past 200 years (the industrial age), 
and (b) that periods of parity where they emerged were not the most peaceful, but 
especially war-prone (1958, chap 11). Organski acknowledges that the term balance 
of power is often used for any prevailing configuration of power, whether balanced or 
unbalanced. His dismissal of the concept’s utility derives from his preference for 
using the term to represent states of, or towards, parity and equilibrium alone, leaving 
distribution of power to function as the umbrella term instead (286-7). This is 
arbitrary though, and obscures the extent of continuity with authors such as 
Morgenthau. 
The essential difference between Organski’s alternative and the classical realist 
mainstream was the fixed attention to and rigorous modelling of a more select group 
of variables. Morgenthau had expounded a more diverse range of material, 
social/ideational4 and subjective perceptual causal variables. These were mixed 
together in the analysis (unsystematically and inconsistently at times) to embody a 
highly fluid range of contingent possibilities.5 As a consequence most core elements 
of PTT can be found in Morgenthau’s work, although without the same emphasis, or 
systematic and exclusive treatment.  
Morgenthau did, however, give similar priority to the idea that states, and especially 
great powers, can be identified as following either a policy of the status quo or 
imperialism (Morgenthau’s early but problematic equivalent to revisionism) (2006, 
chaps 4 and 5). Earlier, Carr (2001, chap 13) had also given priority to the role of 
interaction between satisfied and dissatisfied powers (terminology adopted by PTT) in 
driving processes of international change. Morgenthau’s multi-faceted schema of the 
domestically sourced attributes of national power further contributed to a mutable 
conception of power and order in international politics.6 This schema includes factors 
of national material potential and domestic governance that are emphasised with more 
singular focus in PTT.  
                                                
4 For discussion of the ‘proto-constructivist’ elements in Morgenthau see Little (2007, chap 4) 
5 On classical realists’ explicit arguments about complex multi-causality see Kurki (2008, 90-4) 
6 Morgenthau’s list of elements of national power include: geography, natural resources, industrial 
capacity, military preparedness (technology; leadership; quantity and quality of armed forces), 
population (distribution; trends), national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy and 
government (2006, chaps 9 and 10). 
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The normative preferences of both PTT and Morgenthau are also not as far apart as 
Organski makes them appear. In both perspectives, peaceful change is desirable and 
depends on compromise and accommodation, although the bases of these processes 
are articulated differently. For Morgenthau (2006, 558-68), compromise of non-core 
interests and a lack of conflict between defined core interests is emphasised; for 
Organski, integration of the rising challenger into the status quo international order.  
The foundations of PTT derive from two main sources (DiCiccio and Levy 1999). 
The first was Chapter 12 of World Politics, where Organski developed an alternative 
conceptual scheme to the balance of power. He claimed that his alternative was a 
better fit with the historical record of international politics in the industrial age. At 
this stage, Organski focussed on establishing his new theory through mainly 
qualitative critical analysis that posited a more satisfactory correspondence with 
selective and non-systematically evaluated empirical evidence.7 Organski introduced 
key variables that would become basic tenets of PTT, and expressed an intention to 
subject these propositions to more rigorous empirical testing.  
Development of methods through which the theory could be operationalised for 
testing ensued in the years following World Politics. In 1980, Organski, in 
collaboration with Jacek Kugler, published the results in The War Ledger. Much of 
the book was devoted to establishing the rationale for the selection of the measures 
through which the findings of empirical testing could be presented in the language of 
statistical correlation and probability.  
The initial formulation of PTT had not proceeded along the strict inductive lines 
favoured by many post-war behaviouralists in political science. That is, the deriving 
of testable hypotheses from correlations observed within collected data sets alone 
(Dessler 1991). In the intervening period from 1958 until The War Ledger, however, 
Organski had come to accede to behaviouralist and strong positivist standards for the 
empirical validation of social scientific theory. That is, if a proposition about a causal 
relationship cannot be expressed in terms of a quantitatively measurable regularity, it 
                                                
7 Two contemporary PTT theorists describe the analysis in World Politics as ‘classical argument’ 
(Lemke and Tammen 2003). 
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has no real explanatory value. One result of this was that the authors pushed their 
thesis linking the subjective satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the challenger state with 
the absence or incidence of war more to the margins.  
The War Ledger provided the ‘foundation for the empirical development of the power 
transition research program’ (DiCiccio and Levy 1999). While there have been some 
adjustments and extensions to the theory since, the book’s basic propositions remain 
at the core of the work of contemporary PTT theorists.8 Among the most important of 
these are:  
1. System-wide great power wars generally occur when a later-developing 
but more populous state catches up and reaches a state of material parity 
with the most powerful state in the international system, or a regional sub-
system. Parity is usually defined as equating to at least 80 percent of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of the existing dominant power. 
2. The incidence or absence of war in a transition period depends additionally 
on whether the emerging ‘challenger’ is satisfied or dissatisfied with its 
position in the international order and with the rules that underpin that 
system. Recent articulations of PTT present this as equally important as 
the relative power variable, despite its defiance of quantitative means of 
identification and definition (Tammen et al. 2000).
3. The long-term configuration of international power is determined by 
domestic potentials and national development trajectories, which even a 
major war will not disrupt. Referred to as the ‘Phoenix factor’, it is argued 
that rising powers defeated in a major war tend to bounce back faster than 
the victors. The hypothesis is that 20 years after the war, a defeated 
challenger will return to the level of GDP/capita they would have attained 
if the war had not occurred. 
PTT theorists have also employed their relative power measures towards predicting, 
or rather retrodicting, the severity and duration of historic major wars. In contrast to 
                                                
8 A good summary of the contemporary consensus among prominent PTT scholars can be found in 
Tammen et al. (2000). 
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the above points, there remains a lack of consensus and common findings amongst 
PTT scholars on these matters.  
The key strength of PTT is how it draws attention to the role of uneven development 
as a driver of long-term transformations in international structures of power. PTT is 
not the only IR theory to have linked differential national development with realist 
concerns of power hierarchy (Choucri and North 1975; Gilpin 1981). Organski was 
nonetheless one of the first to do this. Overall, there are numerous problems with the 
way in which PTT has been constructed as a general model of international politics 
that explains the causes of great power war. Two critical limitations of the theory are 
evident.  
(i) Limited explanatory value 
The first of these is the theory’s limited explanatory value. Indeed, the central 
proposition, and the one that absorbs most attention by PTT theorists, corresponds 
with intuitive common sense. That is, a rising state prepared to risk major war with 
the strongest possible rivals in the international system, will only do so if its relative 
material capabilities and potentials provide a realistic chance that it might prevail.  
Variance in empirical tests of PTT have led to abandonment of debates over the 
location of a single law-like war threshold, and to the positing of a ‘zone of parity’ 
instead. That is, anywhere between 20 percent less or 20 percent more of the material 
capabilities of the (previously) dominant power (Tammen et al. 2000, chap 1). As a 
quantitative model, however, potential explanations for why this is the case – such as 
subjective differences in how different regimes might perceive risk as well as their 
own relative advantages and disadvantages – are left unexplored.  
The zone of parity thesis points to an important condition that has often accompanied 
the outbreak of major great power wars. Such a tendency, though, however well 
correlated, is more of a symptom rather than a cause that would explain the impetus of 
the drive towards war. PTT theorists seem to recognise this themselves through their 
additional reliance on a distinction between satisfied and dissatisfied ‘challengers’. 
Despite the stated importance of this subjective and qualitative dimension, PTT’s 
conception of satisfaction and dissatisfaction remains underdeveloped. It is only in the 
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last two decades that efforts have been made to formulate empirical indicators for this 
variable. This is an issue that is not settled amongst PTT scholars apart from the 
general expectation that it be represented by an associated (or symptomatic) 
phenomenon that is quantifiable.9  
If a state is satisfied or dissatisfied with its position in the international system, in 
what sense is this so? If a state is satisfied or dissatisfied with the existing rules of the 
game, what sort of rules more commonly move a challenger to resort or refrain from 
moving towards a military solution? PTT provides no clear answers to these 
questions. 
(ii) Weak conceptual development 
The qualitative concept building of PTT is weak overall. A key issue affecting the use 
of other concepts in the theory such as ‘dominant powers’ and ‘challengers’, 
‘satisfied’ and ‘dissatisfied’ powers is the problematic definition of what a status quo 
consists of (Levy 2008). In PTT a status quo is invariably hierarchically structured in 
the shape of a pyramid, and reflects a normative order established and maintained by 
the dominant power of the day, whose interests it most closely serves.  
It is at this point that the identity of PTT in critical opposition to balance of power 
theories is shown to be most problematic. Not all international orders have operated 
like a pyramid. Indeed, PTT is greatly at variance with the historical record in not 
recognising the 19th and early 20th century European power structure as established 
and maintained on a collective basis through the shifting cooperative and adversarial 
interactions of five great powers. Britain, by far the most prosperous and industrially 
advanced state for much of the 19th century and dominant in the global maritime 
domain, was, with the maintenance of a relatively small land army, much more 
limited in its land power leverage on the European continent (Levy 2008). To the 
extent that order was maintained and system-wide war avoided for an entire century, 
it was done so formally or informally amongst the five great powers party to the 
Concert of Europe. 
                                                
9 The main surrogate variables and measures for satisfaction/dissatisfaction developed and debated by 
some PTT scholars include (a) extraordinary military build-ups, and (b) the similarity/dissimilarity of 
alliance portfolios (Kugler and Lemke 1996; Lemke 2002, 99-109). 
26
Some international orders in history thus have operated in the way that balance of 
power theorists describe. At other times, PTT’s pyramid conception is the more 
pertinent fit. This is particularly the case with the (peaceful) transition that occurred as 
the US gradually reached parity and then overtook the power of Britain in the Western 
Hemisphere in the late 19th and early 20th centuries – a process that involved these 
two powers alone.  
PTT indirectly captures at least one of the threads that contributed to the lead up to 
WWI – namely, the longer-term challenge of German power to Britain’s global 
maritime pre-eminence.10 However, the prospects of German Weltpolitik were 
conditioned by Germany’s ability or inability to secure itself against more local and 
immediate threats on the European continent. In this respect, Germany was unnerved 
by the mounting prospects that its existing position as the leading continental power 
would be gradually undermined by the rise of Russia in alliance with a France keen to 
wrest back Alsace-Lorraine. From this angle, the conflict can be viewed as a 
preventative war on the part of the leading power to reinforce and extend its lead, and 
counter any longer-term Russian challenge (Chan 2008, chap 4 and 5). PTT with its 
monothematic framework does not capture these extra crucial dynamics. PTT is also 
limited conceptually in capturing the radical revisionist and revolutionary challenges 
mounted by Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany. The regional status quos these 
powers challenged were not the child of any particular dominant power, but rather a 
multilaterally negotiated order, or collectively produced disorder, as was often the 
case during both the French revolutionary and inter-war periods.   
While historically problematic, the PTT conception is a pertinent fit when it comes to 
thinking about the rise of China within a US-dominated Maritime East Asia. Of the 
‘various international relations theories, power transition theory is probably the most 
widely used by scholars seeking to better understand the likely dynamics and 
consequences of the rise of China in the contemporary global system’ (Levy 2008). 
Given the problems of adapting the PTT conceptual scheme to significant parts of the 
                                                
10 I say indirectly because PTT theorists do not embed their analysis of Germany’s ‘challenge’ to the 
‘dominant’ Britain in any spatial geographic context. Rather, the power transition relationship is 
identified abstractly on the basis of comparative GDP/capita. See below.  
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historical record, the apparent relevance and fit of the scheme to a major real world 
challenge helps explain the continued longevity of the theory.  
The US has been the dominant strategic force in Maritime East Asia for the entire 
post-war period, and has played the dominant role in negotiating the terms and rules 
upon which the military-security relations of the region operate (Hara 2007). At the 
same time, if China’s GDP growth of the past three decades is sustained, there is clear 
potential, given considerations of population, for China to overtake the US in 
economic size during the first half of the 21st century. The question of whether China 
will emerge as a satisfied or dissatisfied power is also relevant (although is an 
imperfect terminology; see below). Evidence of this includes (a) trends of a sustained 
Chinese military build-up geared towards being competitive against US and other 
advanced regional capabilities, and (b) the consistent assertion of several sovereign 
territorial and maritime jurisdiction grievances with other states in the region.  
The terms ‘dominant power’ and ‘challenger’ thus are not so problematic when 
applied to contemporary and prospective US-China relations, so long as these terms 
specifically refer to the military-security dimension of the relationship. PTT scholars 
usually do not make this important specification. Instead, they tend mainly to define 
and identify the dominant and challenger powers through reference to relative 
GDP/capita, sometimes combined with an index for capturing political capacity to 
extract resources from society.11 And except for Lemke’s extension of PTT (2002, 
chap 4) to cover smaller power interactions at the regional or sub-regional level, PTT 
scholars have not specified any spatial geographical referents through which to define 
what a ‘challenge’ to the status quo is in the first place. These deficits have helped 
perpetuate an unaddressed logical oversight within PTT. This concerns the question of 
whether a state that surpasses even the most powerful country in GDP should be 
considered as a ‘challenger’ if it refrains from building any military force that can 
project and compete beyond its own borders.  
                                                
11 Organski and Kugler in The War Ledger (30-8) did make secondary use of composite indicators 
derived from the Correlates of War project, which do factor in military measures, as part of 
establishing GDP as their measure of choice. A number of subsequent PTT studies, while favouring 
GDP/capita as the more parsimonious expression of national capabilities, nonetheless have sought to 
strengthen their argument through demonstrating a close correlation between results using GDP 
measures with those using the COW composite indicator (Lemke 2002, 98-9).  
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In regard to the terms ‘satisfied’ and ‘dissatisfied’, Steve Chan (2008, chap 3) has 
done the most to dislocate the sense in which these terms correspond reliably to the 
‘dominant power’ and ‘challenger’ (or status quo and revisionist powers) respectively. 
Chan argues that both dominant and challenger powers have the potential to be 
satisfied or dissatisfied simultaneously over different aspects of their respective 
conditions. A dominant power in a unipolar system, for instance, might be overall 
quite satisfied with its position until a serious challenger comes along and upsets its 
previous sense of security derived from great advantage. If the strategic agenda of 
such a rising challenger overlapped and conflicted with the self-definition of the 
dominant power’s security requirements, this would stoke a sense of dissatisfaction in 
the latter, and perhaps renew own its quest to extend its strategic advantage. The same 
could be said about the erosion of the advantages of a leading power within a 
multipolar balance, as we saw with Wilhelmine Germany.  
Conversely, a rising challenger with an overwhelming potential power base (in terms 
of population, resources, advancing economy, stable political system), or who 
occupies a favourable geographic position, may be satisfied that its progress is 
assured so long as it does not provoke a fearful or premature counter-response from 
its neighbours. Such a power might not yet be fully satisfied if its long-term security 
were defined to require (at least) reaching a state of military parity with the dominant 
power in some areas beyond its borders. Nonetheless, such a power might develop 
patiently with a sense that time is on its side and assurance that it will not or cannot be 
impeded on its path towards a stronger and more influential negotiating position and 
strategic posture. Such a situation was operative in the case of the power transitions 
between the US and Britain in the Western Hemisphere, and then later across areas of 
the international maritime domain.  
In situations where both the status quo and revisionist powers are dissatisfied, or 
satisfied, or in differing ways and degrees simultaneously both satisfied and 
dissatisfied with their international position, it becomes difficult to usefully employ 
such a distinction. For this reason, the theory developed in this thesis avoids this 
terminology. Instead the issue is conceptually framed in terms of the conflicting or 
complementary interactions of identifiably status quo-oriented and revisionist powers, 
or amongst different revisionist powers. This alternative is both more consistently 
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adaptable to historical cases, and enables a more precise description and explanation 
of the problem of international order and change in power hierarchy. 
2.2: Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism 
Further limitations of PTT are shown through examining MOR. In his book The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), Mearsheimer succeeds better in formulating 
and applying a theory that is even more materialist in orientation. MOR is the more 
wide-ranging and inclusive of the two theories, in that his conceptual and explanatory 
framework is able to capture a greater spectrum of historical international power 
configurations and contingencies. Mearsheimer’s theory can accommodate both 
hegemonic and balance of power orders. Rather than PTT, however, Mearsheimer’s 
main point of both continuity and critical differentiation is with the original and 
formerly pre-eminent neorealist theory now known as ‘defensive realism’.  
The foundation of contemporary defensive realism was laid in 1979 with the 
publication of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics. Waltz’s book 
represented a reformulation of the traditional balance of power conception of the 
international system in even more systematic and mechanistic terms (reflecting 
especially the influence of rational-choice and systemic economic theories). Departing 
from the previously common approach of favouring what Waltz labelled 
‘reductionist’ unit-level and interactive accounts of international politics, Waltz made 
the case for an alternative ‘systemic’ approach. He attempted to show how the 
structural condition of international anarchy, and different distributions of power 
within anarchy (polarity), influence and constrain the strategic options and 
orientations of states.  
Since publication, Waltz’s theory has remained a common reference within the IR 
theoretical literature (Little 2007, chaps 6 and 7).  In addition to being a source of 
concepts underpinning contemporary neorealist theories and debates, the book has 
attracted much criticism. Such criticism usually concerns either (a) the limits of 
systemic theory in IR (neoclassical realists [Lobell et al. 2009] and liberal political 
economy approaches [Moravcsik 1997]), or (b) how not to do structural theory in IR 
(the constructivist critique about Waltz’s neglect of the socialising influence of 
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commonly accepted practices and norms in international politics [Wendt 1999, 96-
109]). Mearsheimer’s theory was formulated against the backdrop of two decades of 
intensive debate among these theoretical camps and within neorealism itself (Little 
2007, chap 7). Mearsheimer was thus in a position to capitalise on the improvements 
and conceptual extensions made by fellow neorealists in the intervening period 
(which encompassed the end of the Cold War), and fine-tune his own controversial 
arguments in critical response to the above debates. Drawing additionally on an 
extensive knowledge of international history, the result is one of the most formidable 
materialist explanatory accounts of international politics in the literature.  
Mearsheimer’s location within the neorealist paradigm is demonstrated by (a) his 
adoption of the Waltzian systemic structures of anarchy and the distribution of power 
(polarity) as central causal factors, and (b) his deliberate simplified generalisation of 
the motivation of states. Both Waltz and Mearsheimer aim to illuminate aspects of 
international politics that are unchanging and universal. Of the two, Mearsheimer’s 
account captures a much greater variability in international conditions and state 
strategies. This is because his model is less parsimonious than Waltz’s model, and in 
fact less parsimonious and more multi-causal than Mearsheimer himself often seeks to 
depict it.  
One essential difference is that Mearsheimer sees relatively more opportunities and 
incentives for powers to pursue expansion, and succeed at it. Waltz (1979, 126-7) 
emphasised that the operations of the balance of power tends to penalise a state with 
expansionary aims, or who accumulates too much of an unbalanced power advantage. 
Mearsheimer’s theory, therefore, while on one level aimed at illuminating processes 
deemed timeless and universal, also has within it the means to account for historically 
observable transformations in the international configuration of power. Thus, from 
certain angles, MOR can be analysed as a theory of power transition.  
PTT and MOR are both predominantly materialist accounts of international politics 
(see section 1.3 of previous chapter). Under the rubric of ‘materialist’, we include 
propositions that generalise about human nature and hence suggest an argument with 
an implicit (and in IR invariably unexamined) biological basis. That is, the instinctive 
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tendencies and reactions, or unconscious drives of material organisms.12 According to 
this definition, MOR, with its uniform conception of state motivation, is the more 
thoroughly materialist of the two theories. PTT as we saw identifies a key factor of 
state satisfaction or dissatisfaction that varies from case to case (albeit without really 
explaining or even precisely defining it). Thus the scope of its generalisations about 
human nature is comparatively limited.  
Mearsheimer’s theory represents an advance on PTT in regards to the conception of 
material variables and the modelling of the material context of international politics 
that is instructive here. The limitations, nonetheless, of Mearsheimer’s materialist 
focus are also necessary to identify. Such discussion will point the way towards a 
revised theory of power transition that better integrates the material with the 
cultural/ideational, and that more thoroughly accounts for the latter dimension. MOR 
represents an advance on PTT in three main ways. 
(i) A more coherent capabilities-based concept of power 
MOR brings a more coherent conception to the capabilities-based approach to 
understanding power shared by both theories. Key to this is Mearsheimer’s distinction 
between potential power (economy and population) and actual power (existing 
military capability) (2001, chap 3). PTT’s main focus is on the potential power 
dimension. It is only in the past two decades that a number of PTT theorists have 
realised the importance of accounting for the role of military development as a 
condition of power transition (Kugler and Lemke 1996).  
Traditionally, PTT did not seem to assume either way that a ‘challenger’ would 
translate its growing economic profile into military investments. And yet it is hard to 
accept the notion that an emerging great economy is a ‘challenger’, or even a great 
power, if they perpetually refrain from building any military power projection 
capacity that would influence the physical security environment beyond its own 
borders. For a theory whose key aim is to explain conditions conducive to major war, 
this had been a major gap in their model. While the work of some PTT theorists has 
been attentive to this issue (Kugler and Lemke 1996; Lemke 2002, 99-109), in terms 
                                                
12 On ‘human nature’ as a facet of materialist explanation, see Wendt (1999, 130-35). 
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of basic conceptualisation, adoption of Mearsheimer’s division between potential and 
actual power does much to clarify the matter.  
The approaches of both PTT and MOR to measuring potential power are broadly 
similar. Population and level of economic wealth and development are conceived as 
the key foundation of great power. Both models in establishing their economic 
indicators seek to capture and adjust for differentials in levels of modernisation, albeit 
through different means. In PTT, similarly advanced powers are compared principally 
in terms of GDP/capita (productivity). In cases where at least one of the countries 
being compared is at an earlier stage of industrialisation (and therefore not at parity in 
GDP/capita terms), an additional measure was developed to gauge the efficiency with 
which the state can extract and mobilise resources from society (usually measured in 
terms of internal taxation levels) (Organski and Kugler 1980, chap 2). A higher score 
on this measure is thus used to account and adjust for conflict situations in which a 
less modernised state proved competitive with more advanced or advantaged states 
(eg. the China-supported North versus the US-supported South in the Korean War) 
(1980, 86-100).  
Mearsheimer (2001, 62-7) also views GDP measurements as useful when the powers 
compared are at a similar level of economic development, but a poor indicator when 
they are not. While Mearsheimer uses GDP to compare potential power in the period 
beyond 1960, for the bulk of his historical analysis (1816-1960) he employs a 
composite indicator that ‘accords equal weight to a state’s iron and steel production 
and its energy consumption’ (2001, 67).  This is his way of attempting to capture 
qualitative differentials in mobilisable wealth and technological development.  
MOR thus follows a similar path to PTT in its attention to differential national 
development as a driver of shifts in international power distributions over time. 
MOR’s explicit treatment of the military dimension, or actual power, however, 
provides a simple but coherent solution to what has often been a substantial missing 
dimension within PTT. For Mearsheimer, a nation’s power at any historical moment 
is ultimately a reflection of the relative size and quality of its armed forces, and 
especially its land army (together with supporting air and navy forces). In gauging 
relative power conditions just prior to the outbreak of a major great power war, 
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Mearsheimer makes particular use of comparative land army personnel numbers, and 
the number of reserve personnel. These are treated in conjunction with a number of 
qualitative factors (not captured in quantitative measures this time) such as the quality 
of weaponry, strategy, organisation and the efficiency of the political administration 
in mobilising economic and social forces (2001, 133-5).  
The use of land power measures leads to a quite different assessment of the 
international power equation during the 19th century and in the lead up to WWI than 
that given by PTT. According to Mearsheimer’s measures, on the European continent, 
Britain cannot be classified as the dominant power of a hierarchy. Rather, with one of 
the smallest land armies amongst the European powers, Britain is depicted (more 
accurately) as a peripheral or ‘offshore balancer’ that could lend weight to a particular 
side or coalition in a conflict, but could not be a contender for primacy in its own right 
(2001, chaps 7 and 8).13 Mearsheimer’s land power measures also contribute towards 
a somewhat different characterisation of the relative power conditions correlated with 
major great power war (2001, chap 9). That is, such wars occur when a ‘potential 
hegemon’ emerges that, with the strongest and most efficient land forces (including 
reserves) and a potential power base that can be mobilised more rapidly and 
extensively than its competitors, is able to break away from the pack and contest for 
primacy within a geographic region (2001, 44-5).  
This thesis agrees with Mearsheimer that the military dimension constitutes the pre-
eminent attribute of international power, and therefore functions as the chief means or 
currency of a power transition. Military power, as the ultimate means of physical 
obstruction and destruction, plays the most essential role in the establishment or 
undermining of a sense of physical security and independent agency for states. The 
economic stability of a well-populated great economic power, for instance, without 
any military projection capacity of its own would be potentially vulnerable in the 
absence of a reliable external protector. It would open the potential for other, even 
less populated, states that do have such a capacity, to physically interfere with that 
power’s trade flows, or even its territorial integrity, to get their way in political or 
even economic disputes. A state with such potential vulnerabilities, or else complete
                                                
13 See especially the tables on page 295 and 303. 
34
security dependence, could not be considered a great power. It is thus accepted here, 
as in MOR, that to qualify as a great power, a state must be able to contend militarily 
with the most powerful potential opponent(s), at least within its own region (2001, 5).  
In defining state power, where I differ with MOR, and also PTT, is in the explanatory 
weight placed on the complex and variable motivational underpinnings that physical 
power accumulation depends on for both its attainment and maintenance (see Chapter 
4). In this respect a distinction is made between an internal and an external normative 
basis of power accumulation (or normative power). Internal accumulation refers to the 
factors impacting on the ability to effectively use power internationally such as the 
cohesion of a state and coalescence around shared objectives. External accumulation 
refers to the factors impacting on the security of any attained advantages beyond a 
state’s own borders – namely, the degree of external legitimation, alliance or 
resistance towards a state’s aims or attained position. While attention is given to both 
dimensions (and without neglecting the material basis of international power), special 
emphasis is given to the role of external legitimation in (co-) determining power 
transition outcomes – a factor neglected in both PTT and MOR.  
(ii) Inclusion of spatial-geographic variables 
The second advantage of MOR in comparison with PTT is that it adds greater 
coherence (and to neorealist theory also [Little 2007, 225-35]) by incorporating a 
more tangible geographic dimension. PTT theorists (with the exception of Lemke 
[2002]) are not always clear about whether they are talking about regional or global, 
continental or maritime balances of power. This has important consequences for 
thinking about relative capabilities and how a power transition is identified and 
defined. Mearsheimer removes the above conflations by proposing that all 
configurations of power are regional and continental. This is due both to the way in 
which geographic contiguity or separateness influences the relative security priorities 
and threat perceptions of states, and to what Mearsheimer refers to as the ‘stopping 
power of water’ (that is, ocean barriers). The latter is judged to increase security 
because of the much greater difficulties and costs of launching an amphibious 
invasion on the territory of another great power (2001, chap 4).  
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To make this step towards a regional conception of the balance of power, MOR 
makes a necessary distinction between the global nuclear balance and the 
conventional military balance – or the continuing independence of conventional 
strategic competition and potential for conventional war (if somewhat more limited) 
in a nuclear world (2001, 128-33). As will be addressed in Part Two of this thesis, this 
proposition is accepted here in regard to the region under special focus – Maritime 
East Asia. 
There are two ways, however, in which my conception of the geographic dimension 
differs from Mearsheimer. Firstly, regions need to be understood as much in political-
strategic terms as in geographic terms. In defining regions and sub-regions as part of 
my theory, I use the term geo-political region/sub-region to denote not just 
geographic contiguity, but also inter-subjective strategic value, and the particular field 
of relations and powers constituting the politics of a region at a given time.  
Part of the identification and definition of a geo-political region certainly involves the 
material dimension of mutual military reach. This factor has actually been explored 
systematically not by Mearsheimer but by PTT theorist Douglas Lemke (2002, chap 
4). In developing a concept of ‘region’ and accompanying quantitative measures for 
defining this variable, Lemke was the first within PTT to attend to the spatial-
geographic deficit in the theory. Lemke’s definitions of a region remain unsatisfactory 
though. For in choosing to focus on the interactions of smaller local powers and 
screen out or control for great power interference, Lemke arrives at a definition that 
requires all countries of a region to have the capacity to militarily reach each other’s 
territory and contend in warfare with the others.  
The result is the identification of a large number of sub-regions rather than regions per 
se (2002, 90-1). In the absence of genuine great powers or trans-regional 
superpowers, this is perhaps how strategic regions would be configured. However, 
this conception neglects the reality that in most cases, both presently and historically, 
it has been the strategic orientation, reach and capabilities of the great powers 
(whether in concert, through their rivalry, or as a unipolar hegemon) that have given 
definition and cohesion to the formation of identifiable strategic regions. Within the 
geopolitical region defined as Maritime East Asia in this thesis, for instance, the fact 
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of US unipolarity and US capacity to wage war and strategically influence all parts of 
this area throughout the post-war period has provided much of the strategic cohesion 
and definition to the region. Meanwhile in Europe during the Cold War, the 
adversarial bipolarity based around US and Soviet power defined the contours and 
scope of this geopolitical region and the sub-regional blocs within it.  
In defining a geopolitical region, as well as a power transition, the normative 
dimension of strategic value and interest definition is as important as military reach. 
Whether strategically governed by the preferences of a single great power, or the 
concord or discord between two or more great powers; geopolitical regions ultimately 
take the shape they do as a result of the relative strategic value and meaning placed on 
particular areas of geographic space by the main actors concerned.   
  
As a result of all these combined material and normative factors, the contours of geo-
political regions/sub-regions shift in historical time. For instance, prior to the process 
of German unification during the late 1860s we can speak of Germanic Central 
Europe as a sub-region of overlapping great power interests and influence, but not 
subsequently. Prior to the post-war developments of decolonisation and the 
establishment of the PRC (a strong China), East Asia as a geopolitical region had 
intersecting continental and maritime geopolitical dimensions. Subsequently though, 
apart from the Korean Peninsula, the geopolitical pivot in East Asia is now almost 
entirely maritime.  
This leads to the second geographical consideration that differs from Mearsheimer. 
That is, my theory of power transition is designed to encompass change in both 
continental and maritime hierarchies of power. Most importantly, my theory 
highlights the qualitative differences (and common ground) between strategic 
expansion that occurs in some form of international commons and that occurs on a 
populated continental land mass. MOR is based on the primacy of land power (2001, 
chap 4), whereas the dimension of the rise of China that most impacts on American 
interests (and the region of East Asia as a whole) is maritime. There is thus need for a 
theory of power transition and revisionism that incorporates and accounts for the 
particular attributes of this dimension. 
37
(iii) Greater empirical correspondence 
The third advantage of MOR vis-à-vis PTT is the capacity of Mearsheimer to tie 
much more of the historical record of the past 200 years of great power relations to his 
descriptive and explanatory apparatus. Both theories are similar in their striving for a 
parsimonious account of great power relations aimed at uncovering some simple yet 
essential underlying general tendencies and processes that are regular across historical 
time – somewhat akin to the elegance of general laws in the physical sciences. Of the 
two, PTT is the more genuinely parsimonious, as it focuses on modelling and 
empirically testing only a small number of variables.  
Mearsheimer also often, and quite famously, presents his theory in a deliberately 
simplified summary form and style (2001, 1-4; Mearsheimer 2006). On a number of 
occasions he has publicly expressed his admiration for simple and elegant theories 
that explain how the world works (Dahl et al. 2004, 389). Mearsheimer’s summary 
descriptions, however, belie the complexity of variables and qualifications that he 
often makes when applying these propositions to the extensive historical analysis he 
undertakes to test the theory. Indeed, it could be argued that in these summary 
statements, Mearsheimer provides a misleading caricature of his own theory, which is 
much more contingent and multi-conditional than he often depicts it. This actual 
complexity and variability is a strength in regard to MOR’s relative descriptive and 
explanatory power. By comparison, the cost of PTT’s more genuinely reductive 
model is a thinner account of a more limited range of historical situations.  
One of Mearsheimer’s major simplifying assumptions concerns the motivations of 
states. He assumes ‘great powers have aggressive intentions’ (2001, 34) and are 
primed by the anarchic nature of the international system to maximise power, seek 
expansion, and weaken rivals whenever possible. The ultimate security goal is to 
become a regional hegemon. When Mearsheimer says that his theory ‘involves 
primarily the clashing of revisionist states’ (2001, 168), this is the sort of definition of 
revisionism he has in mind.  
It is clear though from Mearsheimer’s historical analyses that his states are as much 
motivated by prudence as of expansion and aggression. Mearsheimer’s states are 
acutely tuned in to prevailing material power realities, and will usually only pursue 
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expansion if the right conditions prevail, which is actually quite rarely. States, and 
great powers with an obvious reserve of latent potential power no less, avoid any 
outward show of aggressive intentions and, in effect, contribute to the maintenance of 
the status quo order so long as the balance of power poses excessive risks to 
expansion.14  
Moreover, states that are separated from others by a major body of water, or whose 
material power base preponderates over all others in their region (Britain and the US 
are the paradigm cases), are depicted as being able to satisfy their security more easily 
than contiguous continental peers. Such ‘offshore balancers’ (both the US and Britain) 
and regional hegemons (US only) can afford to drop a militarily or territorially 
expansionist agenda (if they so choose) once their basic security is established beyond 
serious contestation (2001, chap 7).  
Mearsheimer also allows for the influence of ideology, although he suggests that in 
any conflict between ideological and balance of power imperatives the latter will 
usually prevail.15 More importantly, he also allows for a degree of subjectivity in 
strategic perceptions and choice among options in a given instant, and the difficulty 
often of ascertaining whether a given option is better than another. Actions taken by 
Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan for instance, although ultimately 
unsuccessful, are nonetheless depicted as not unreasonable (from a security 
perspective) under the circumstances they were made. According to his theory, 
Germany would have been expected, and probably ought to have gone to war in 1905 
during the first Moroccan crisis, when conditions were allegedly more favourable 
(2001, 209-24).  
Mearsheimer does narrow down, in light of his simplifying motivational assumptions, 
the basic or generic strategic policy options open to states. The main ones are 
balancing, buck-passing, and aggression (other sub-categories that fit into some of 
these categories include war, blackmail, bloodletting and bait-and-bleed) (2001, chap 
                                                
14 This theme emerges in Mearsheimer’s discussion of Imperial Japan, Germany post-unification, and 
Russia/Soviet Union (2001, chap 6). 
15 Mearsheimer is evidently not so confident on this score in regards to the liberal ideological 
tendencies of the US. Indeed, Mearsheimer’s refrain that not only do great powers act as MOR 
predicts, but should act according to MOR only makes sense if some states (namely the US) have some 
tendencies to act in ways that attempt to deny or circumvent offensive realist logic (2001, 11-2, 22-7). 
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5). Successful regional hegemons, of which the US is the only example in modern 
history, may become status quo powers. If a potential hegemon in another region is 
not effectively balanced by its regional peers, though, such regional hegemons will 
usually be motivated to step in with an offshore balancing policy. Mearsheimer 
explicitly disapproves of strategies such as bandwagoning and appeasement that 
concede power to others. But he acknowledges that some great powers have in the 
past chosen these options (2001, 162-4).16  
Mearsheimer’s select group of viable state strategies nonetheless contributes to the 
complexity of the analysis, especially given that they are applied to an assessment of 
material conditions and indicators that are more variegated than in any other 
neorealist theory. In addition to quantitative military indices, the strategic calculus of 
states is affected by many factors. These include: geographical factors of continental 
contiguity, separateness, and the stopping power of water; differences in potential 
power and economic development; levels of technological sophistication and 
technological breakthroughs (a qualitative material factor); the regional strategic 
configuration that is shaped at a given time by the number of great powers in the 
system (polarity); and the irreducibly subjective choices other states make in deciding 
whether to balance, buck-pass or bandwagon with an aggressor.  
When explaining how the Soviet Union came to produce more weaponry than 
Germany in WWII, Mearsheimer even slips in an argument about domestic politics. 
Similar to PTT’s political capacity argument, the crucial factor is located in the Soviet 
state’s relatively more efficient harnessing of the socio-economic system for total war 
(2001, 79-81). In other words, this is a more complex and multi-causal theory than 
appears on the surface and in the way the author often depicts it. This is a key reason 
why it is more consistently adaptable to the historical record than other neorealist 
theories and PTT. MOR quite simply has a more diverse and flexible suite of concepts 
and (largely material) conditions at its disposal. 
That said, Mearsheimer’s simplification and under-examination of the motivational 
dimension in his theory remains problematic. This leads to similar limitations to PTT 
                                                
16 As is common in MOR, however, Mearsheimer immediately qualifies his general disapproval here 
with a page sub-section titled ‘Conceding power for realist reasons’ (164-5). 
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in terms of the satisfactory location and conception of the causes of great power 
conflict. Problems in the approach of both theories to causal analysis will be taken up 
further in the following chapter. A number of preliminary points though can be made 
here on this issue and its implications.  
Both MOR and PTT give priority to illuminating the material conditions through 
which transformative events in great power politics such as power transitions and 
major war take place. To the extent that both theories recognise a motivational causal 
dimension, the preference of each when developing the empirical means to support 
their motivational propositions is to draw upon associated (or symptomatic) variables 
that can be quantitatively compared.  
In MOR, it is assumed that states will pursue expansion if they are presented with a 
set of material conditions that provide a reasonable opportunity for them to prevail. 
MOR’s conception of such material conditions is more variegated, flexible, and more 
given to qualitative description than in PTT. Yet, the emergence of the war-
precipitating potential hegemon is always identified primarily according to the 
relative quantitative weighting of its military and potential power profile, rather than 
according to the implied orientation of its strategic interest definitions and agenda. 
While the measures and conceptions of variables often differ from PTT, MOR’s 
method of explanation of the causes of major war based on correlation of material 
indices is overall convergent in approach with the latter. Indeed, this is the one area 
where MOR employs a (comparatively simple) statistical method (2001, chap 9), 
albeit always qualified in actual case analysis by some combination of other variables 
conceived within the theory. 
For the most part, there is nothing wrong and indeed some explanatory benefit in the 
attempt to gauge the connection between dissatisfaction or potential aggression with 
materially manifested patterns of behaviour. Expressions of dissatisfaction or 
aggression towards other states would count for little if the power in question lacked 
the material means to make good on their grievances or threats. Hence there certainly 
is value in continued debates over the best way to conceptualise and measure the 
material conditions that have commonly accompanied the path towards major war – 
both as a contribution to the explanatory equation in historic cases, and as an aid of 
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the perception of danger in prospective ones. Yet, the limitations of an exclusive 
focus on this approach need to be understood. There are both explanatory and 
practical/normative dimensions to this problem. 
In regards to the explanatory dimension, PTT has built in a greater awareness of the 
limitations of its thesis about the material conditions accompanying the outbreak of 
major war. PTT does not assume that a war will necessarily occur within a zone of 
parity, on an understanding (under-specified) that motivations and the perceptions of 
the benefits or liabilities of a given international order vary considerably. PTT 
scholars often acknowledge the limited explanatory scope of their model, 
recommending that it be complemented with theories of the preference formation and 
decisions of government actors, such as rational choice game theories (Tammen et al. 
2000, 41-2, 197-8; Lemke 2002, 38-9). Within MOR, it is possible to identify even 
more specific and mainly material conditions under which an overtaking form of 
power transition can take place (albeit uncommonly) without a war with the overtaken 
power.17 To the extent though that there are explanatory limitations to MOR, as well 
as PTT, it is on account of their practical consequences for the analysis and 
understanding of prospective cases of power transition – namely the rise of China – 
that they are considered here as so important to identify.  
2.3: PTT, MOR, and the rise of China 
For much of social science, explanatory theories are not purely of academic interest, 
but rather developed for application towards the solution of real world policy 
problems. Not surprisingly, the two theories under focus have in the past decade been 
used to generate policy recommendations, for the US in particular, towards the 
handling of several major long-term trends affirmed in their importance by both 
theories. Among these issues, the rise of China has received particular attention.  
In applying PTT to the rise of China, the main utility of the theory is its focussing of 
long-term potential power trends such that a zone of parity with the US can be 
anticipated at some point in the 21st century. In light of the ‘Phoenix factor’, PTT 
                                                
17 MOR’s explanation of the relatively smooth and peaceful late 19th and early 20th century power 
transition involving the US and Britain is discussed in the next section. 
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would caution against expecting that even war could set back long-term trends of 
power redistribution. PTT thus presents the rise of China as something that the US 
needs to be prepared to adapt to rather than resist. On this basis, a group of prominent 
PTT theorists, in a collaborative volume published in 2000 (Tammen et al., 153-81), 
recommended that the US needs simultaneously to: (1) find ways of conditioning and 
offering incentives for China to become a satisfied power; and, regardless of whether 
this works (2) to forestall or minimise the erosion of American power and influence 
by being better and quicker at absorbing Russia and India into the pro-US, pro-NATO 
strategic camp. The ideal aim would be to condition and eventually absorb China 
itself into this common ‘status quo’ network and value system.  
These PTT theorists did not consider whether Chinese satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
might be more related to the capacity of the US to accept some degree of change of
the status quo (such as the emergence of a state of, at least, parity with the US in 
military terms within Maritime East Asia). Or whether the expansion of a pro-NATO, 
pro-US strategic alignment to include Russia and a rising India might equally 
constitute a shift from the status quo. Besides a normative bias towards the US, these 
conundrums can be attributed to (a) the lack of a coherently specified concept of the 
status quo in PTT, and (b) the absence of a coherent and value-neutral complementary 
concept to the status quo – such as the reworked concept of revisionism developed in 
this thesis.  
This problem is also reflected in historical analysis, where the peaceful overtaking of 
Britain by the US in the Western Hemisphere is usually described by PTT scholars as 
the US accepting and integrating into the previous status quo established by Britain 
(Tammen et al. 2000, 23, 49-50).18 According to the alternative theory developed in 
subsequent chapters, this is a poor conceptualisation that would be better described as 
British accommodation, and sometimes appeasement, of American radical 
revisionism. This is not to argue that the US should necessarily follow this example in 
handling a rising China in Maritime East Asia. It is to argue that more concrete and 
useful policy evaluations can be generated by an explanatory account that focuses on 
                                                
18 The argument has not essentially changed since first articulated in Organski (1958, 323-5). 
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discerning the conflictual or complementary implications between overlapping status 
quo-oriented and revisionist strategic agendas.  
Mearsheimer in analysing the rise of China begins from a similar starting point as 
PTT – the projection of potential power trends. Given other aspects of his theory, 
however, very different recommendations for US policy are generated. Mearsheimer 
sees two main possibilities for the strategic situation in East Asia in the 21st century, 
depending on whether China’s high GDP growth rates can be sustained (2001, 393-
400). If not sustained, then Mearsheimer believes the US would withdraw from the 
region and leave Japan to accept the burden of maintaining the balance of power in a 
multipolar structure with China, Russia and perhaps India. If Chinese growth were 
sustained, then given China’s overwhelming population base, China would emerge as 
a potential hegemon with the potential capacity to dominate all local rivals and 
challenge the US strategic posture in the region. According to Mearsheimer: 
[If] China becomes not only a leading producer of cutting-edge technologies, 
but the world’s wealthiest great power, it would almost certainly use its wealth 
to build a mighty military machine. Moreover, for sound strategic reasons, it 
would surely pursue regional hegemony … [and] develop its own version of 
the Monroe Doctrine …What makes a future Chinese threat so worrisome is 
that it might be far more powerful and dangerous than any of the potential 
hegemons that the United States confronted in the twentieth century … China 
would likely be a more formidable superpower than the United States in the 
ensuing global competition between them (2001, 401). 
Following this assessment at the conclusion of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 
Mearsheimer goes on to make an explicit appeal to the US to abandon ‘constructive 
engagement’ and pursue ‘containment’ instead: 
American policy has sought to integrate China into the world economy and 
facilitate its rapid economic development, so that it becomes wealthy and, one 
would hope, content with its present position in the international system. This 
US policy on China is misguided. A wealthy China would not be a status quo 
power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony… it is 
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not too late for the United States to reverse course and do what it can to slow 
the rise of China (2001, 402).  
In the decade since, it probably has become too late for the US to slow Chinese 
economic growth without harming itself and its allies, given increased economic 
interdependence and the level of the Chinese economy’s embeddedness in regional 
and global production networks. The main problem, though, is how MOR closes off 
thinking and deliberation about alternative pathways, reinforcing singular and overly 
determinate projections, which are in this case remarkably pessimistic. In particular, 
Mearsheimer’s assumptions regarding the translation of wealth into the maximisation
of military strength and the pursuit of hegemony are too inflexible and unconditional. 
While this is certainly a possibility, it would do better to take a step back from these 
assumptions and return to the basic underlying driver of Mearsheimer’s states – 
security.  
In his analysis of the rise of the US in the Western Hemisphere, we have already seen 
Mearsheimer relax somewhat his assumptions regarding the expansionary drive of 
states, and the drive towards maximising military power (2001, chap 7). Clearly, the 
US at a certain point placed self-imposed limits upon its territorial expansion in the 
Western Hemisphere when it was capable of doing otherwise. The US also 
maintained a relatively modest growth in its land and naval forces both during and in 
the immediate decades after it had surpassed Britain in potential power terms (around 
1890). US naval expansion in the early twentieth century proceeded in fits and starts 
depending very much on domestic political conditions (O’Brien 1998). 
Mearsheimer’s reasoning in this case is that America’s earlier expansion to become 
the dominant land power in North America; its huge (unchallengeable if fully 
mobilised) reserve of potential power; as well as Britain’s out-of-home region and 
globally stretched strategic posture, provided the US a margin of security much 
greater than was the case for any contemporary European great power. In MOR then, 
a low threat environment and accompanying sense of security can potentially weaken 
the drive for military or territorial expansion, although not necessarily the drive for 
local regional hegemony.  
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But if security is considered to be the most important underlying driver of states’ 
strategic behaviour, it makes sense to open up this variable to closer scrutiny and ask 
whether there might be other potential conditions under which great powers can attain 
a sense of security. MOR assumes that international politics in the contemporary era 
is qualitatively no different to early eras, and operates according to timeless 
principles. Nonetheless, it is surely inaccurate to suggest that the nature of 
international politics is the same now as it was during the era of competing European 
empires (that is, pre-1945) – the latter of which occupies a full three-quarters of the 
time period of Mearsheimer’s historical analysis (1792-present).  
There is no doubt that sovereign territorial borders are much more stable and 
unchallenged in the contemporary era than ever previously in history. Norms against 
imperial expansion have become widespread if not universal. Most states today, and 
certainly the great powers, do not face as much of an external threat to their physical 
survival, except in the event they were subject to nuclear attack – an eventuality 
which mutual arsenals have so far deterred. Further, in Europe during the post-Cold 
War period we have seen potential regional military great powers such as Germany, 
France and Britain continue to place self-imposed limits on their national military 
outlay. They remain integrated within a multilateral alliance structure that depends on 
the strategic leadership and lion’s share material contribution of an external 
superpower. These potential regional great powers continue to show no sign of 
dissatisfaction with this arrangement in a security sense, despite MOR’s predictions 
throughout the post-Cold War period that the end of NATO and a return to 
destabilising multipolarity was inevitable (Mearsheimer 1990; 2001, 392-6).       
In both Europe and East Asia, most regional states have tended more to trust than 
distrust the US despite its strategic dominance since the end of the Cold War (Gill et 
al. 2009; Sutter 2006). This is due in no small part to its relatively consultative 
approach to alliances, its complete lack of territorial aspiration in these regions, a 
consistent track record of facilitating rather than obstructing the free flow of 
commerce and mutual prosperity (Nye Jnr 2002), and the correspondence of its 
normative preferences and values with many regional states (Green and Twining 
2009).  
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Within East Asia, however, China stands as a chief complainant of the US, which is 
viewed as the main obstacle to what China defines as the full realisation of its 
territorial integrity and recognition of its maritime rights and regional interests. 
Coexistent with this perception of US containment, however, is a contrasting 
perception that China is emerging within a relatively safe and progressive 
international environment by historic standards. This situation is officially described 
as facilitating (since the late-1990s) a 20-year ‘period of strategic opportunity’ for 
China to enhance its ‘comprehensive national power’ without serious impediments. 
And besides wariness about US moral encouragement of separatist forces in Tibet and 
Xinjiang, China knows it faces no realistic threat from the US to its physical existence 
as a unitary power on the Asian mainland, unless China was to directly threaten the 
US homeland.  
Thus, a case can be made that the rise of China is not playing out in the more fully 
fledged Hobbesian state of anarchy (however prudent and rational) depicted by MOR. 
Rather the politico-strategic dynamics can more accurately be depicted according to 
Wendt’s concept of a Lockean culture of anarchy (1999, chap 6). In a Lockean 
culture, the mutually accepted and entrenched norm of respect for sovereignty and 
recognised territorial borders provides for basic existential security. This does not 
preclude though the emergence of serious disputes and conflicts over frontier 
boundaries, strategic access and influence, and relative power and status.  
As the rise of China will initially play out in a maritime region, within which several 
key sub-regions contain sizable Chinese territorial and jurisdictional claims, the 
possibility touted by MOR of a Chinese drive for regional hegemony cannot be 
discounted. Given, however, that there are specific issues around which the process 
and outcome of an East Asian power transition can be soundly anticipated to pivot, it 
makes sense to examine how the actors involved perceive that their security is being 
affected by these issues and by the positions of the other actors. Given limits to 
overall existential security threats, examination of the compatibility or conflict 
between the interests the major players bring to these disputes may hold the key to 
assessing the conditions upon which a more or less peaceful or conflict-prone power 
transition might proceed. 
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Diverting analytical attention in this way is admittedly partly driven by a normative 
preference for giving peace a chance – or at least conflict minimisation and 
preservation of the prospects for establishing enduring terms of strategic co-existence 
or cooperation. Through honing in on the variable and potentially mutable interest 
definitions of conscious agents (and the motivational structures underpinning such 
preferences), a framework is opened up for considering possibilities for mutual 
interest adjustment and conditions for mutual security satisfaction.  
There is also an undeniably realistic explanatory logic behind this analytical approach. 
That is, in terms of temporal sequencing, motivations and interests always emerge 
prior to the preparation of material capability. As argued in the next chapter, such 
motivations and interests are often not nearly as opaque and unknowable as MOR in 
particular presumes. What this means is that a rising state that is ‘dissatisfied’ can 
often be identified earlier and its possible strategic orientations narrowed down more 
tangibly and concretely than when material variables alone are employed to gauge 
these phenomena. Such early assessments in turn provide material that can be used in 
timely negotiations with a rising state to (a) probe and test the relative conditionality 
of some of its (and one’s own) interest commitments, and (b) gauge reactions to 
compromise proposals regarding aspects of a future regional security order.  
Thus this matter of causal sequence, whilst important also in historical analysis, is of 
added import when examining prospective cases of power transition such as the rise 
of China. In the latter case, attending closely to more prior causes in the causal 
sequence is essential in terms of offering the most realistic prognosis of possible 
trajectories and policy options. Examination of the critical realist philosophy of 
science will further clarify these issues about causation and their implications for 
theoretical and research methodology issues relevant to the topic at hand. 
2.4: Conclusion
The internal critique of PTT and MOR in this chapter has revealed some crucial 
limitations of employing a predominantly materialist approach to the explanation and 
understanding of international power transitions.  
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PTT was useful in highlighting the role of uneven development as a key driver of 
long-term transformation in international power structures, but the theory (i) has 
limited explanatory value, and (ii) has a problematic conceptual apparatus. Both 
problems are attributable to the behaviourist criteria that came to underpin causal 
analysis within PTT. On one hand, the search for general historical regularities based 
on the correlation of quantifiable material variables has generated insight only into 
symptomatic conditions often associated with the incidence of great power war, rather 
than its causes. On the other hand, the ongoing statistical testing of given 
propositions, and accompanying debates over adequate means of measurement, has 
taken precedence over qualitative considerations of the descriptive adequacy of key 
concepts. A lack of critical conceptual evolution has led to some persistently 
misleading or inaccurate characterisations of phenomena under study. 
Mearsheimer’s even more thoroughly materialist theory was argued to have three 
advantages over PTT. These include: (i) a more coherent conceptual basis for a 
capabilities-based approach to measuring power, (ii) inclusion of spatial-geographic 
variables, and (iii) greater empirical correspondence enabled by a more complex and 
multi-conditional approach to causal analysis, as well as better concepts. Despite 
these advantages, MOR’s prioritisation of material conditions and indicators is 
accompanied by an overly simplified and generalised account of state motivation, as 
well as a lack of appreciation for the causal power and variable effects of ideas and 
socialising norms. 
Their concepts and measures differ, but both PTT and MOR share a similar method of 
explanation of the causes of major great power war, along with similar limitations. 
Both theories give too much explanatory weight to more symptomatic material 
indicators, and neglect a more direct and in-depth investigation of the perceptions and 
interests motivating the key powers in specific power transitions. Such neglect (PTT) 
or over-simplification (MOR) of sequentially prior motivational causes means that the 
resources of these theories are too imprecise and speculative to be relied on to 
adequately evaluate possibilities for war and peace in a prospective case of power 
transition such as the rise of China. 
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All in all, such deficits highlight the need for a revised theory of power transition that, 
while retaining and adapting the better insights of these more materialist theories, is 
able to integrate them into a causal model that gives due recognition to the socio-
cultural and ideational bases of state motivation. To do this though, we must first 
develop a more sophisticated concept of causation. 
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Chapter 3: Critical Realism, Causation, and Methodology 
This chapter makes a transition from a critique of existing theories towards the 
development of an alternative theoretical and methodological framework for the study 
of international power transitions. Pivotal to this move is the use of the critical realist 
philosophy of science, associated principally with the early works of British 
philosopher Roy Bhaskar.19 In this chapter, critical realism is applied as both a 
diagnostic tool (through an external critique) and as an aid for theory construction. On 
a diagnostic level, critical realism’s critique of the positivist concept of causation, 
along with the alternative concept it provides, helps to identify further limitations of 
causal analysis within PTT and MOR. On the constructive side, the more 
sophisticated and multi-layered concept of causation of critical realism allows us to 
identify and conceptualise a greater diversity of both material and ideational sources 
of causation, as well as the interaction between them. 
Section 3.1 introduces and summarises four concepts comprising the main features of 
critical realism’s unified philosophy of the natural and social sciences. Following this, 
I apply the critical realist concept of causation to the subject matter and methodology 
of this thesis. First, critical realist insights are used to extend the critique of PTT and 
MOR in sections 3.2 and 3.3. What emerges is the need to locate more accurately the 
sources of causal sequences in power transitions. In section 3.4, following a critique 
of neorealist claims about the causal properties of the international system, an 
alternative ontology is developed. It is argued that causation in power transitions is 
generated from the variable internal motivations or interest structures/complexes of 
great powers conceived as relatively empowered and sovereign corporate agents. 
Preliminary indications (elaborated further in Chapters 5 and 6) are given as to how 
such interest structures can be conceived and studied. 
Critical realism’s pluralist concept of causation highlights the perennial problem in 
the social sciences of how to evaluate the relative explanatory power of competing 
causal claims that (a) apply directly to complex and multi-causal real world 
environments, and (b) cannot be subject to the powerful arbitrating means of 
                                                
19 Bhaskar’s philosophy was initially developed in regard to the natural sciences (Bhaskar 2008 
[1975]). It was subsequently extended to the social sciences (Bhaskar, 1998 [1979]). 
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experimental testing. Critical realists themselves have made little progress towards 
addressing this problem. In section 3.6, an innovative solution is proposed in the form 
of a three-level explanatory evaluation process. Further methodological innovations 
developed include a proposed extension to the critical realist concept of causation 
(‘ideal-type’ versus ‘conditioned’ causation), and a novel method of closed system 
qualitative simulation for analysis of prospective cases such as the rise of China. On 
the basis of critical realist principles, such future projection is conceived of as an 
‘explanation of possibilities’, rather than as prediction.  
3.1: Key concepts of critical realism 
(i) The intransitive and transitive dimensions 
This first concept posits a dichotomy between the existence of a real world and real 
causal structures (the intransitive dimension) that exist and act independently of the 
social practice of scientific investigation and production of knowledge (the transitive 
dimension) (Bhaskar 2008 [1975], 21-4; Bhaskar 1998 [1979], 9-13; Benton and 
Craib 2001, 123, 129-30). In this view, science is a practice that attempts to evolve an 
ever deeper and more approximate perception and conceptual modelling of the 
generative mechanisms that operate in this real world. The intransitive dimension 
underpins the ‘realist’, whereas the transitive dimension provides the ‘critical’ part of 
the appellation ‘critical realism’. The content of these concepts is not particularly 
distinctive, and is shared in common with other forms of scientific realism that 
similarly challenge both hard empiricist and relativist philosophies of knowledge 
(Wendt 1999, chap 2). Critical realism’s distinctive contribution lies in its novel 
justifications for a realist concept of causation, along with its systematic and coherent 
application across both the natural and social sciences.    
While the notion of real world independence continues to be a source of controversy 
in philosophical circles (Wendt 1999, 52-60), most natural and social scientists find it 
necessary to assume this in their work if it is to carry the distinction of knowledge 
providing progressive insight about the world. Still, where empiricist understandings 
about theory and epistemology are held, ambiguities can arise on this question. To 
take an example from mainstream IR, much of the discussion in Waltz’s Theory of 
International Politics on the distinction between reality and theoretical representation 
52
can be viewed as consistent with the intransitive/transitive concept. An ambiguity 
arises, however, when Waltz speaks of the need for theory to move away from reality 
in order to increase explanatory power (1979, 7-8). If what Waltz meant is that 
theories and models necessarily focus on particular mechanisms that for explanatory 
purposes are abstracted from the totality of reality, then this would be consistent with 
the intransitive/transitive concept.  
More problematic from the critical realist perspective is Waltz’s statement (1978, 9) 
about an ‘infinity of possible explanations’ of an infinity of data, given their concept 
of stratification (see below) in which the world consists of distinct things and 
structured mechanisms with essentially finite properties. There are often multiple 
ways, according to critical realists, that things and inter-relationships can be defined 
and modelled. But the range of possible descriptions and explanations is not infinite. 
Some descriptions and explanations can be shown empirically to be better knowledge 
representations than others.  
Mearsheimer’s views are less ambiguous in these respects and more consistent with 
the critical realist view. He argues that theories, while certainly human constructions 
and simplifications of reality, should nonetheless be conceived as attempts to 
accurately describe and explain observable reality – upon which criteria they prosper 
or fall (2001, 8-12). While the founders of PTT do not raise this issue directly, they 
frequently write as if the goal of their enterprise were to uncover and describe real 
causal conditions that operate regardless of whether perceived by conscious human 
agents.  
As theoretical constructions, the works of Waltz, Mearsheimer, and Organski 
generally concur in practice with a key implication of the intransitive/transitive 
distinction. That is, the process of concept building and imaginative modelling that 
builds descriptions and causal hypotheses out of existing linguistic components and 
metaphors is just as important as empirical observation and the testing of models in 
the scientific process (Bhaskar 2008, 185-99, 118-26; Bhaskar 1998, 49-50). Less 
explicitly acknowledged within mainstream IR is the notion that the content, fit and 
inter-relationship of a model’s conceptual descriptions are equally important in 
debates about empirical validity as the statistical testing of given propositions 
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(Dessler 1991). Neglect of this dimension as a site of scrutiny and examination has 
been a particular problem within PTT. 
The conceptual dimension within social scientific work is not just about getting 
descriptions right (or avoiding bad ones). It is also about recognising how questioning 
the descriptive fit or inter-relationship of already existing concepts can itself generate 
new insights and contribute to progress in knowledge. Problematising a well-known 
concept, and probing its logic and application to empirically observed phenomena, 
can potentially enhance its explanatory utility. This is precisely the treatment given to 
the concept of revisionism in this thesis, whose redefinition, and indeed reinvention, 
has proceeded in back-and-forth interplay between the probing of internal 
connotation/logic and the rigorous testing of empirical fit with diverse historical 
examples. The alternative power transition model developed later in Part I emerges 
principally out of the reinvention of the definition and inter-relationship of several 
familiar IR concepts, most notably revisionism. 
(ii) Causal powers 
Critical realism offers a concept of causation that contrasts considerably with the one 
most commonly assumed across the rationalist/reflectivist or positivist/post-positivist 
spectrum within IR. As Milja Kurki (2008, chaps 1 and 3) has argued, the most 
common understanding of causation within IR throughout the post-war period to the 
present day derives from what critical realists refer to as the Humean account of 
causation.  
Humean precepts on causation underpinned various 20th century positivist 
philosophies and the behavioural revolution in the social sciences. Derived from a 
position of philosophical scepticism, 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume 
established his concept of causation upon empirical, but non-realist, grounds.20 Hume 
argued that human beings could have no knowledge of the nature, ultimate source and 
meaning of causal powers. Relations of cause and effect are associations made by the 
human imagination out of habit derived from the sense perception of a constant 
conjoining of the same events. Upon this sceptical and subjective human perceptual 
                                                
20 For a more neutral account of Hume’s ideas on causation than provided by the critical realist critique, 
see Coventry (2007, chaps 6 and 7). 
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basis, the Humean concept goes on to limit the legitimate derivation of causal 
relationships to the observed regularity of events in the specific sense that whenever 
event X is observed, event Y is the expected result (when X, then Y).  
Critical realists, following Bhaskar, refer to this uniform relationship between a 
particular cause (or set of causal conditions) and a particular effect as regularity-
determinism based on the perception of invariant empirical regularities (Bhaskar 
2008, 69-79). In this thesis, however, the description ‘uniform regularity statements’ 
is argued as more preferable on the grounds that (a) it better encompasses the 
probabilistic uses that have also been made of this concept of causation. Moreover, it 
will be argued later in this chapter that (b) there is still a sense, consistent with but not 
acknowledged within critical realism, in which observed regularity remains as a 
crucial marker of causation – uniform or otherwise.
However labelled, this thesis concurs with critical realism that conceiving causation in 
terms of uniform regularity statements is too narrow a criterion, and provides an 
unrealistic depiction of how cause and effect operates in the observable world. To the 
extent that many reflectivists and constructivists in IR also equate causal analysis with 
the Humean concept, the ways in which so-called ‘constitutive’ ideational and social 
structural analysis are also loaded with causal assumptions tends to be obscured 
(Kurki 2008, chap 4, 178-82).  
Bhaskar agrees with Hume that the ultimate causes and drivers of the powers 
operating in the universe are unknowable. Bhaskar nonetheless defines causal analysis 
(including causal laws) as an attempt at real description and explanation of the 
tendencies of the innate powers (that is, the capabilities, liabilities, and ways of 
acting) of identifiable things under certain conditions (2008, 45-56, 229-38). When 
applied to the social sciences, this notion of causal powers is transferred to the 
motivations and reasons held by conscious human agents for wanting to, intending to, 
or actually acting in a certain way (1998, 90-7). Social/ideational structures are also 
argued to possess causal powers in so far as they pre-exist and shape (enable or 
constrain) the motivated activity of human agents that collectively reproduce and 
sometimes transform these structures (1998, chap 2).  
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Bhaskar’s concept of causation thus is based on ontology rather than epistemology. 
That is, a belief in the existence of real causal powers/tendencies located in real 
things, agents and structures that are in some measure autonomously constituted. 
Underpinning this ontology-based concept of causation are two further concepts – the 
stratification of phenomena, and the distinction between causation operating in open 
and closed systems.  
(iii) Stratification and emergence 
This concept is critical realism’s solution to the problems of reductionism and infinite 
regress in the philosophy of causation. These problems in fact disappear in the face of 
critical realism’s conception of phenomena as differentially structured, or stratified 
(Bhaskar 2008, 163-85; Collier 1994, chap 4; Benton and Craib 2001, 124-8).  
The basis of the argument is that at certain points during the evolution of the universe, 
the active or dormant tendencies of relatively more basic causal entities have, under 
certain conditions, driven the emergence of new macro-structural relationships and 
mechanisms that have acquired distinct causal powers/tendencies of their own. The 
move from sub-atomic matter, to atoms, to molecules, to higher order chemical 
structures such as proteins, to the living cell, to the emergence of all sorts of multi-
cellular biological systems and organisms; all these steps reflect the process of 
stratification. Critical realism also argues for the materially emergent properties of 
mind in human beings (Bhaskar 1998, chap 3), which is in turn the basis for 
arguments about agency and the causal power of the social/ideational. 
Critical realism recognises that the object of study at a certain stratum is always 
causally constituted from or affected by powers operating at more micro- and often 
more macro-level21 strata as well. The argument about stratification is thus not about 
the causal independence of any stratum of observed reality (which is impossible). 
Rather it is about the integrity and relative permanence of structured natural or 
social/ideational/psychological mechanisms with certain determinate features and 
tendencies. Such mechanism structures are composed of relations of natural necessity
                                                
21 For instance, evolved biological organisms play some role in determining which chemical and 
physical laws are operative through an ability to self-select many of their own action contexts – the 
experiences to be avoided or sought out. The latter situation arises, for example, every time one decides 
whether or not to let one’s hand be roasted on a naked flame. 
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(or necessary connections) between entities and variables that are identified (more or 
less successfully) through the work of science, and represented in hypothesised 
explanatory models and laws. Far from simply cataloguing and systematising surface 
events, science is viewed as the progressive investigative penetration, and ever more 
approximate conceptualisation, of the deeper and, at least initially, unobservable real 
structures and mechanisms that constitute the natural and social worlds. 
(iv) Open and closed systems 
Critical realism conceives a crucial distinction between how causation operates within 
open and closed systems respectively (Benton and Craib 2001, 123-4, 128-9). As 
Bhaskar argues, the Humean concept of causation is so unsatisfactory because, for the 
most part,22 it is limited in its application to the closed conditions of an experiment 
where the behaviour of mechanisms is manipulated in isolation from intervening 
variables. Nature outside the laboratory, however, like large societies (and therefore 
politics and international relations), most usually operates on the basis of an open 
system.  
The corollary is that both the social and natural sciences (outside controlled closed 
system conditions) are mostly explanatory, and not commonly predictive in any 
precise or consistent sense. In the open environment of nature, an identified causal 
mechanism may or may not be expressed, or only partially expressed, given its 
interaction and interdependency with a countless multitude of other causal 
mechanisms in its environment. This is the basis for Bhaskar’s conceiving of natural 
causal laws as tendencies rather than invariant empirical regularities. Such tendencies, 
under numerous possible conditions, ‘may be possessed unexercised, exercised 
unrealised [or unfulfilled], and realised unperceived (or undetected) by men’ (Bhaskar 
2008, 18).  
In the social sciences, and not least IR, closed experimentation is impossible. Analysts 
thus face a highly complicated multi-causal environment composed of multiple causal 
agents and structures interacting in complex ways that can often be unexpected, given 
                                                
22 Enduringly (but ultimately still only temporarily) undisturbed structures such as the orbits of the 
planets in the solar system constitute natural closed systems – but they are the more the exception than 
the rule. 
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that we can never know all the factors that might be, or become, causally relevant in a 
given context. Such open systems generally preclude the possibility for reliable or 
precise means of prediction – at least beyond some forms of more immediate-term
forecasting in which the multiple necessary conditions and trends are already prepared 
and actively in trajectory. For Bhaskar, the upshot of this is that ‘the criteria for the 
rational development and replacement of theories in social science must be 
explanatory’ rather than predictive (1998, 45-6). 
Having provided a basic outline of the critical realist concept of causation, we can 
now focus more specifically on its application to the subject matter and methodology 
of this thesis. We will begin by returning to the theories of power transition that were 
critically examined in the previous chapter.  
3.2: Critical realism and PTT 
It is not difficult to perceive how critical realism could explain the limited explanatory 
value of PTT. International politics operates in an open system, that is, a world of 
manifold interactive causal conditions. PTT has a narrow and rather abstract causal 
focus – chiefly, the posited relationship between a structure of (usually bilateral) 
material parity with the incidence of war. It is a causal relationship, moreover, 
conceived in terms of a Humean uniform regularity statement. A fixed set of causal 
conditions are stipulated (material parity, sometimes combined with a surrogate 
material variable to indicate satisfaction/dissatisfaction) and related to a single 
category of behaviour (the initiation of war or its absence).     
Critical realism provides grounds for being sceptical (at least initially) towards 
Humean approaches to causal analysis that are applied to social phenomena operating 
in open systems. In the case of PTT, such scepticism can be applied to question 
whether the stipulated relationship between parity and war really is probabilistic. Key 
to this is whether or not there exists an apparent natural necessity or necessary 
connection linking the alleged cause and effect (Bhaskar 2008, 183-5, 201-2). With 
causes conceived as mechanisms, critical realism draws attention to the qualitative 
dimensions of explanation in science, both natural and social. That is, the need to 
observe and conceptually describe the relationships arising from the intrinsic 
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properties and roles of the parts that jointly constitute a perceived causal structure. If a 
qualitative description linking and arranging correlated variables into an empirically 
sound and logically coherent mechanism structure cannot be made, it is doubtful 
whether a meaningful causal proposition has been formulated (however well 
correlated) (Dessler 1991). This is crucial for a theory like PTT that uses such small 
aggregations of case samples to correlatively test its propositions. 
The causal link between parity and war is more or less indirect depending on whether 
GDP/capita measures are employed alone or together with military measures. As a 
measure of potential economic and human resources, and to some extent industrial 
modernisation, GDP/capita indicates some crucial conditions needed to build and 
develop competitive armed forces. However, it cannot indicate the degree to which a 
state will translate such potential resources into military development. Without a 
further explanatory hypothesis linking GDP/capita levels with varying levels of state 
military development, there would be no link between GDP/capita and war that could 
constitute a necessary connection. 
In some recognition of this, PTT further stipulates the condition of a challenger state’s 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the status quo. In studies where this variable is 
operationalised in empirical tests (Kugler and Lemke 1996; Lemke 2002), the 
tendency has been to develop and use a surrogate material indicator. The two most 
common are military ones – extraordinary military build-ups, and the similarity or 
dissimilarity of alliance portfolios. The constitutional linkage between these variables 
and war is closer than is the case with GDP/capita. Both the products of military 
investment and brokered alliances are essential instruments of warfare. But they are 
only instruments; they do not behave or act of their own accord. What causal powers 
they do possess are activated and delimited in their use by other causal sources – 
namely, the authorisation of governments directed by motivated human agents. 
GDP/capita and military indicators are thus better conceived as dependent variables 
rather than as independent variables within the chain of causation effecting war and 
peace (a Y more than an X in ‘when X, then Y’).  
On the question of whether the parity-war thesis is genuinely probabilistic, at the very 
least the satisfaction/dissatisfaction variable needs to be factored in. Yet, both the 
59
definition of this variable and the measures used to operationalise it do not provide for 
a convincing argument about causal necessity. Military build-ups and alliances can 
deter as well as enable war. Nor does the general notion of dissatisfaction with one’s 
position in a power hierarchy necessarily imply that a state will go to war. Logically, 
and in the absence of other contrary motivations, the reaching of parity or an 
overtaking to become the number one military power might itself provide for 
satisfaction.  
Ultimately, whether or not a war occurs during a power transition depends on whether 
a state develops and is committed to objectives that require war in order to be realised. 
That is, objectives that imply the need for forcible physical resistance towards the 
conservative or expansionary objectives committed to by other powers. Such 
objectives, moreover, generally relate to the governance or structure of power within 
tangible geographic spaces. In this sense, dissatisfaction is another dependent 
variable, in that it depends on particular types of unfulfilled objectives being present 
at the core of a state’s motivational disposition. 
In short, PTT’s formulation of the causes of war in a power transition does not capture 
any direct chain of causal necessity. For GDP/capita to be meaningful as an enabling 
condition for war, states must have access to the right resources and the will to 
translate wealth into a modern competitive military. Such an orientation in turn 
depends on dissatisfaction, which, to be causally meaningful here, depends on states 
committing to geo-strategic objectives that require military contestation for their 
fulfilment. Only the latter provides the relevant causal connotations within the other 
claims – which, of course, are those made within PTT. Moreover, to understand the 
nature and level of commitment of states to the latter sort of geo-strategic objectives, 
we need to go even further back down the causal chain to the perceptions and interest 
structures that drive and perpetuate such motivations. 
Given that PTT’s causal claims can be shown to be dependent on other unspecified 
causes, it is problematic to view the formulations of this theory as genuinely 
probabilistic. Whatever validity the zone of parity thesis might have as a motivating 
condition for war is absolutely contingent on the existence of certain types of state 
objectives that remain unspecified and un-theorised within PTT itself. As a result, 
60
PTT cannot generate any reliable prognosis about the chances for war or conditions 
for peace in a prospective power transition such as the rise of China. Instead, the 
above analysis implies that once a potential zone of parity has been identified through 
GDP projections, any methodology designed to assess the potential for war needs 
alternatively to encompass (a) the identification of geo-strategic agendas that tangibly 
conflict, and (b) investigation into the content and nature of the interest structures that 
are causing the pursuit of such agendas. 
3.3: Critical realism and MOR 
In contrast to PTT, the more complex and varied conceptual apparatus of MOR is 
relatively more amenable to open system analysis. MOR is less parsimonious and 
more precise in its conceptual definitions of a wider range of general causal 
conditions. Mearsheimer’s application of his theory to historical cases for empirical 
testing demonstrates a comparatively more multi-causal perspective on the dynamics 
of international politics. 
That said, MOR limits itself mostly to explanation in materialist terms. 
Mearsheimer’s world of international politics largely implies an inter-play of 
unconscious material forces and drives. In his depiction of this world, however, he is 
quite eclectic in the choice and use of methods. Mearsheimer only once uses and tests 
a Humean-type regularity statement. Similar to PTT, this occurs in his chapter on the 
causes of great power war where he seeks to correlate the percentage of years (since 
1792) that involved great power war in European bipolar, balanced multipolar and 
unbalanced multipolar systems respectively (2001, chap 9). Unlike PTT though, MOR 
elsewhere uses extensive qualitative analysis and more varied concepts to describe 
and explain a wider range of (largely material) conditions operative in particular cases 
(2001, chaps 6-8).  
MOR shares with PTT the tendency to represent key causal variables according to 
brute material indicators.23 There is, of course, a really existing brute material 
dimension to politics. Oceans, mountains, distance and climatic conditions limit the 
                                                
23 The concept of ‘brute materialism’ is Wendt’s (1999, chap 3), and is used to denote any aspect of the 
unconscious or inanimate material dimensions of existence. 
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free movement of people in the absence of suitably constituted technologies to aid the 
overcoming of physical barriers. Once the causal powers of weapons have been 
activated they exercise real destructive effects on people, buildings, terrain and 
machines. Various resources and technologies have specific and usually measurable 
capacities and limitations that make a difference to states obtaining in both the brute 
material and human political spheres. 
Obviously though, any account of political life would make no sense in the absence of 
some concept of either human agency or human nature. The development and 
accumulation of military arsenals only means something to us in political terms if we 
can know, or otherwise desire to guess, the reasons and objectives to which people 
intend to use them. In political contexts, even something like an ocean barrier 
(MOR’s ‘stopping power of water’) presupposes not just physical limitation, but 
psychological predisposition and effect. In the latter case, the ‘stopping power’ 
assumes innate social psychological tendencies such as the survival-mindedness of 
great powers (leading to minimally adequate coastal area defences); a desire generally 
to win rather than lose any physical contest they initiate; and a desire to minimise the 
harm on one’s own side. 
Critical realism would not pre-emptively exclude the possibility that certain general 
tendencies within human nature might commonly manifest when conditioned within 
certain broad social organisational arrangements (the sovereign state) and 
international material-systemic constraints. It may also be that terms such as 
‘survival’, ‘security’ and ‘self-help’ are useful somehow in capturing important 
aspects about how state interests and motivations are generally constituted.  
Several of the fundamental generalising arguments of neorealism, however, are 
flawed. Neorealist arguments about systemic causation and state motivation raise 
fundamental issues about ontology and the location of genuine structural sources of 
causation. The following section systematically addresses these issues through (a) a 
critique of the neorealist account of systemic causation in international politics, and 
(b) the advancement of an alternative ontology and methodology for analysing great 
power military-security relations based on critical realist principles. 
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3.4: Locating causation in power transitions 
In any social science, a fundamental task is the ontological one of identifying objects 
of study, and, in particular, of distinguishing between various relative agents and 
macro-structures (or unitary actors and systems). Such preliminary concepts embody 
implicit hypotheses about causation, and strongly influence the nature of the resulting 
theory (Wight 2006).  
Within IR, every theory makes some form of distinction between these two basic 
components of social scientific analysis, however defined. In treating the unit part of 
the equation, initial judgements need to be made as to whether, or to what extent, the 
actor is conceived as an empowered agent capable of creating its own agenda and 
manipulating its environment. Or conversely, the extent or manner in which it is 
dominated by influences beyond its capacity to control. On the latter, decisions need 
to be made about the relative influence of environmental and internal unit-level 
factors, with the latter further dividing into considerations of biological/unconscious 
and ideational/institutional sources of motivation.  
On the system/macro-structure side, judgements need to be made about whether such 
structures are simply the sum outcome of the interaction or negotiation between the 
agendas of relatively empowered (that is, autonomous agenda-setting) agents. Or 
conversely, the extent to which that system has intrinsic causal properties that produce 
an independent conditioning influence on the preferences and strategies of all the unit-
level actors – whether individuals, organisations or states. 
3.4.1: Neorealism and the international system 
Since the advent of neorealism, a key locus of debate in IR has turned on how to 
characterise the macro-structural side of the equation. Within neorealism, the 
international system is said to possess intrinsic causal properties that condition the 
preferences and strategies of states. The two major systemic causal factors posited 
initially by Waltz and carried over into MOR, are the underlying condition of 
international anarchy, and the distribution of capabilities prevailing at a given time 
(or polarity).  
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Anarchy is conceived as the underlying cause of endemic security competition, rather 
than a cause of particular international wars (Waltz 1979, chap 6; Mearsheimer 2001, 
chap 2). Anarchy is, however, viewed as a crucial enabling condition that makes 
international war possible. In regard to the distribution of capabilities, various forms 
of polarity are purported to have a somewhat more direct influence on the probability 
of war than anarchy in itself – bipolarity is seen as more stable than multipolarity 
(Waltz 1979, chap 8; Mearsheimer 2001, 337-44). This latter factor, however, is still 
not regarded as the cause of war and peace in itself or in isolation.  
In MOR though, the cause of major great power war does become more directly 
associated with a particular form of polarity, not identified in Waltz’s theory, referred 
to as ‘unbalanced multipolarity’ (2001, 344-6). In MOR, the structure of unbalanced 
multipolarity arises with the emergence of a ‘potential hegemon’ that takes the lead in 
both immediately available weaponry and rapidly mobilisable potential power, 
threatening the security of many other states in a region. Mearsheimer’s unbalanced 
multipolarity is the most obvious case within neorealism in which an alleged systemic 
cause is attributed to a situation that could just as easily, and as argued here more 
convincingly, be depicted in terms of the interaction of specific agent-level agendas 
and interest perceptions. This same observation in fact applies to all systemic causal 
claims advanced within neorealism.  
In neorealism, and the topic of power transition, we are dealing primarily with 
explanatory accounts of great power relations. Great powers by definition are states 
that possess material capabilities substantially greater than the other middle and small 
powers in a region. Historically, the number of great powers in regions has remained 
well within single digits, and usually towards the more concentrated end of the 
spectrum (Kaufman et al. 2007).  
Accordingly, Waltz, in making analogies between market theories and international 
politics, often bases his comparison on the behaviour of actors in oligopoly markets 
(1979, 103-4, 129-38; Little 2007, 176-80). Yet, this is something of a false analogy. 
Corporations comprising an oligopoly are in some ways not the most powerful actors, 
or at least not the only most powerful actors, shaping the market system. They do not 
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have sovereign rights, and they are not solely decisive in determining the regulatory 
framework within which they are required, and if necessary forced, to operate. In the 
contemporary age they do not have their own armies.24 Companies comprising 
oligopoly markets are thus constrained in important ways and to differing extents by 
the power and rights of states, singly or in cooperation. That is, they operate in a 
broader political-legal systemic framework that greatly delimits the scope of their 
activities and interests.  
States, on the other hand, according to their mutually recognised sovereign 
entitlements, are not so constrained by external formal legal constraints. This includes 
any attempts to deny the right of a state to develop material capabilities, especially the 
means of security, beyond an externally imposed limited mandate. For a sovereign 
actor, its very will (however actualised through its domestic arrangements) is law 
within its domain. Consequently, any agreements, treaties and institutions it resolves 
to enter into with other sovereign entities are similarly an expression of this will. 
Further, for a sovereign state, any later unilateral abrogation or violation of such 
agreements, with the exception arguably of the recognition of the sovereign existence 
of other states, is not illegal in any sense (although may still be anti-social, and thus 
court consequences such as ostracisation or punitive responses from other states). 
States that are recognised as sovereign thus effectively possess a residual right of 
rebellion towards the terms of international society that is much broader than is the 
case for citizens in even the most liberal domestic regimes. 
At first glance, such points might seem only to reinforce the case for neorealism. 
Closer scrutiny of these propositions, however, points instead towards an undermining 
of neorealist claims about the scope of the intrinsic causal properties alleged to 
emanate from the international system. On anarchy, for instance, rather than viewing 
this structural condition as primarily a cause, it is even more salient to view it as an 
effect of the desire of states and their populations to maintain the nation-state as the 
seat of sovereign agency. This is both sequentially more accurate, and less likely to 
prejudice considerations of the possibilities for cooperation or conflict, order or 
disorder within the condition of anarchy (or dispersed sovereignty). The wills of 
                                                
24 The British and Dutch East India Companies for instance once had the powers to wage war and 
conduct their own foreign policy. 
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sovereign states can, considered in the abstract, potentially be directed towards 
cooperation as much as zero-sum competitive goals. 
The only intrinsic conditioning effect of the structure of anarchy is the relative added 
uncertainty (in comparison to well-established domestic polities) of the permanence 
and reliability of other states’ commitments to negotiated treaties, agreements and 
understandings. Even this point, though, can be over-estimated in terms of its alleged 
inhibiting effects on cooperation.  
The logic of neorealism is most concerned with effects of uncertainty on states’ 
military-security behaviour. According to this logic, to ensure survival and sovereign 
independence, states are driven either to remain competitive with (defensive realism) 
or eclipse (MOR) the military power of rival security seekers. To do this, states use 
both internal balancing (military build-up) and/or external balancing (alliance). Yet, 
there is no convincing reason why peer great powers that have been erstwhile rivals 
cannot, in principle, potentially achieve cooperation and enduring concord in the 
military-security domain. Such a possibility is raised in some streams of defensive 
realism, where a levelling out of competitive impulses and consensus on a well-
balanced mutual military-security disposition is conceivable under certain conditions 
(Jervis 1978; Glaser 199525; Van Evera 1998). To the extent that MOR in particular 
contradicts such an expectation, further defence of the possibility for great power 
security cooperation, beyond the confines of neorealism, can be made from two 
angles.  
(i) An exaggerated uncertainty argument 
First, we need to focus further on MOR’s over-estimation of the uncertainty generated 
by the residual right of rebellion in a system of dispersed sovereignty. One of 
Mearsheimer’s fundamental propositions is that – given great powers always possess 
some form of offensive military capacity and are not subject to any higher authority – 
‘states can never be certain about other states’ intentions’ (2001, 30-1). From this 
arises a relentlessly circular argument and self-fulfilling prophecy: endemic 
uncertainty requires a state to assume and act as if others have aggressive intentions, 
                                                
25 Glaser, whose most recent work (2010) has become more eclectic and normative, no longer 
considers himself a neorealist. 
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which indeed they will have, given endemic uncertainty and the fact that other states 
will, correctly, ascribe aggressive intentions to the state in question. The paradox is 
that intentions in this process actually do come to be assumed as knowable. For the 
paradox to be coherent, though, it must be assumed that the leaders and societies of 
some great powers, prior to their inevitable adoption of this deliberative logic, might 
have initially possessed some less aggressive or more idealistic cooperative 
tendencies. 
The idea that states can never initially be certain of other states’ intentions is only true 
in the trivial sense that they are ‘impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty’ 
(2001, 31). At slightly less absolute odds there is in fact much that can be understood 
about the intentions of other states, for two reasons.  
First, states are corporate rather than individual human agents (Wendt 1999, chap 5). 
People can withhold as much information as they please through silence. Corporate 
actors must maintain communicative channels between its members that enable the 
group’s values, interests, and agendas to be defined, propagated, re-negotiated and re-
defined. Corporate agents are often able to maintain a degree of secrecy or coded 
communications. However, in complex and populous corporate bodies like states, 
public communication is unavoidable and cannot be completely guarded from 
external scrutiny. Such public communications, moreover, such as media, educational 
and official government materials, are in fact very revealing. This may even be 
especially the case in authoritarian states where a clearly defined and comprehensive 
political  (including foreign policy) consensus is often propagated as the precondition 
for a mobilisable populous. The lines of revealed debate, whether in liberal-
democratic or authoritarian systems, are equally informative.  
To the extent that interests defined or debated within a national discourse have 
implications for the interests of other states, these issues of intention in turn become 
the substance of inter-state negotiation. This leads to the second weakness of the 
endemic uncertainty argument, which is that there are ways for states to probe and 
assess the credibility of commitments to or denial of intentions indicated in the 
national discourse. This can be done, in part, through the probity of diplomatic 
communication. Modern means of satellite surveillance can also today better track 
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any corresponding military build-ups. Moreover, conflicting interest commitments 
often get confirmed in the course of lower intensity diplomatic or military 
confrontations. In the latter situation, the disputing parties are especially compelled to 
provide some form of open justification for their standpoints, which often contain 
important indications of official strategic objectives. Specific and tangible reasons for 
why conflict might be possible in a prospective power transition can hence be tracked 
quite early, as well as the potential scope for interest complementarity and peace.  
(ii) An unverified simplification of state motivation 
MOR could always fall back, though, on a more psychologically grounded argument 
about the security-seeking behaviour of states. When neorealists argue about the 
propensity of states to pursue relative power gains, they seek to avoid grounding their 
case on the basis of a hard-wired ‘will to power’ in human nature, as the classical 
realist Morgenthau did (2006, chap 1).26 Instead, the source of the pursuit of power 
lies in the effects that anarchy and the prevailing distribution of power have on state 
security. Mearsheimer, in particular, seeks to differentiate his structural account from 
what he terms ‘human nature realism’ (2001, 18-22). Yet, this structural account 
would be impossible in absence of the assumptions he makes regarding the prior 
psychological disposition of the state units whose behaviour the structure of the 
international system is said to affect.  
MOR, in fact, is as much dependent on an account of human nature as any other. 
MOR’s account of state motivation is relatively more specific than in Waltz’s 
theory.27 The psychological dimension of the theory is nonetheless its most 
simplified, under-examined and unverified component. For MOR to be broadly 
sustained on some level, efforts ultimately need to be made to better define, explain 
and verify the notion that there exist some real general tendencies of human nature 
that regularly manifest when conditioned within certain broad social organisational 
arrangements (the state) and international material constraints. To do this, some 
connection would need to be made with the discipline of psychology, and especially 
                                                
26 Nietzsche, unsurprisingly, was a key formative influence on Morgenthau’s intellectual development 
(Frei 2001). 
27 Waltz deliberately avoids elaborating beyond a vague base assumption that states are motivated by 
survival and security (1979, 91-2). 
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social psychology. Arguments about general human nature, after all, presuppose 
common human cognitive mechanisms and behavioural tendencies. 
Better demonstrating and explaining some aspects of generality in state motivations 
across time and space would not necessarily preclude similarly important, and 
sometimes even more decisive, aspects of variability.28 MOR itself has developed a 
broad palette of variously combining material conditions that are depicted as affecting 
the strategic choices or options of states in variable ways, even whilst retaining some 
underlying constant motivations. Mearsheimer is even concerned that the US will 
continue to be overly influenced by liberal ideology and fail to do what his theory 
deems as necessary to undermine the rise of China. Neoclassical realists, whilst 
adhering to the neorealist claim about the primacy of systemic factors, have expanded 
their accounts to include a focus on domestic political and ideational variables (Lobell 
et al. 2009). They do so to explain (a) deviations from behaviour that would normally 
be expected from a neorealist systemic account, and (b) the policy choices of states in 
less constrained strategic situations judged to allow for greater value discretion.  
Whatever the precise ratio of generality and variability in the motivational disposition 
of states, the question remains whether Waltz was correct to posit the existence of an 
emergent stratum at the level of the international system, and that arises from the 
material balance of power. The question is not whether an international system exists. 
It is whether the system operates as an autonomous stratum with intrinsic causal 
properties, or is simply a formal outcome or effect of the interacting agendas of 
empowered agents. My argument leans strongly towards the latter conception. 
Waltz’s move to focus on a material-systemic account of causation, along with his 
criticism in general of ‘reductionist’ accounts of international politics based on unit-
level causes and interactive analysis, is viewed here as a misstep.  
Analysis of international power politics inevitably entails a limited number of primary 
actors – the great powers. This, together with the fact that they are sovereign, means 
they possess a special capacity to influence the dynamics of the system through the 
very acts of defining their interest preferences and prosecuting their will. Great 
                                                
28 For analyses of numerous historic cases argued as defying neorealist expectations about either the 
balancing or power maximising behaviour of states, see contributions in (May et al. 2010). 
69
powers are both empowered and constrained agents. Yet, to the extent that they are 
constrained, this is not simply the result of the objective condition of the material 
capabilities of other powers. Rather, it is the scope of ambition and interactive 
implications of particular interests referring to specific strategic spaces that most 
impacts on a given state’s sense of frustration, forbearance or satisfaction with its 
security situation, and its relative sense of feeling constrained or not. And as even 
Mearsheimer would concede, such particular interest definitions are based on 
perceptions of a complex strategic situation that to some degree are irreducibly 
subjective – the product of a limited and finite outlook.  
Perceptions, however, are also invariably built up from sources outside the scope of 
neorealism, namely the internal socio-political life of states. Shared, and often 
institutionalised, perceptions of national identity (about its territory, history and 
deserved status), as well as various acculturated values and theoretical outlooks often 
influence the specific agendas of states in ways that have crucial effects on the 
interactive dynamics in the international system. States’ international orientations and 
interests are also commonly influenced by domestic economic interest demographics 
that acquire strategic stakes in the security of various regions and international spaces 
beyond its borders (Narizny 2007; Layne 2006). 
The approach taken to analysing great power relations and power transition in this 
thesis accordingly is agent-based and interactive, rather than systemic or macro-
structural. A word, however, needs to be said in regards to the alternative and non-
material forms of macro-structural explanation in IR theory. Namely, those advanced 
by constructivists such as Wendt (as well as English school theorists29) on the 
emergence of shared norms and institutions that constitute international society.  
3.4.2: Wendt’s account of international structure 
As noted in the previous chapter, Wendt’s arguments about the possibility for 
different cultures of anarchy are considered here as compelling, and concur with the 
above arguments about the narrow intrinsic causal properties of anarchy (1999, chap 
                                                
29 The foundational work of the English School is Bull (1977). 
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6). Arguably, a more convincing distinction between the Hobbesian, Lockean and 
Kantian dynamics might have been made between a regressive Hobbesian ‘condition’ 
(a reversion perhaps to more instinctive survival responses provoked by at least one 
particularly aggressive and ambitious state) and Lockean and Kantian ‘cultures’ of 
anarchy. Wendt’s arguments about the progressive emergence of Lockean and (within 
Europe and across the North Atlantic at least) Kantian international social strata do, 
nonetheless, reflect important aspects of historical and contemporary international 
relations.  
Yet, when it comes to international power transitions, I argue the essential impetus of 
the phenomenon to be located in unilateral perceptions of security needs, interests, 
and opportunities, rather than in any pre-existing or emerging corpus of shared norms 
(although the latter can potentially play some role in shaping or delimiting the 
former). This judgement extends no less to the prospective case that is emerging in 
East Asia through the rise of China. 
The contemporary social dynamic in East Asia is largely Lockean, although relations 
within and across the US alliance network in the region bear more Kantian qualities. 
Certain territorial/jurisdictional/strategic disputes in the region have potential under 
certain circumstances to push great power relations in the region from rivalry to 
enmity. A full reversion to a Hobbesian condition though (with the accompanying 
threats to existential survival) would probably require some form of nuclear threat 
escalation between China and the US. At any rate, the thinness of the normative 
consensus on which the Lockean culture of anarchy rests, as well as the still very 
rivalrous great power strategic relations at play in contemporary East Asia, reinforces 
the case for favouring agent-level and interaction based analysis.  
This does not mean that a process of resolving conflicts of interest and establishing a 
great power compromise consensus for regional security order might not eventually 
facilitate the emergence of a more fully fledged Kantian stage stratum of enduring 
security community. Even here though, common norms and institutions would have to 
be reproduced through the separate national political/legal and 
educational/propaganda systems of a limited number of social members bearing huge 
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material power differentials between them. Thus it is unclear whether the emergence 
of such a security community could ever be described as an autonomous macro-level 
stratum. At any rate, strategic and security policy outlooks among contemporary East 
Asian great powers persist in reflecting more an acculturation from domestic (and 
alliance) sources than a common inter-relational consensus. 
3.4.3: An alternative view of structural analysis 
In accordance with critical realism, taking a predominantly agent- and interaction-
level approach does not necessarily make one’s analysis any less structural. From a 
critical realist perspective, all forms of causes, including those sourced from ideas, 
can be conceived as operating in the manner of structured mechanisms. Distinction 
between paradigms of social scientific explanation consists mostly of differences in 
the conception of the strata at which the most essential causal phenomena are claimed 
to be located. The difference is not one between structural and non-structural forms of 
explanation.   
Critical realism, with its positing of the predominance of open system dynamics in 
nature and society alike, implies the need for multi-causal accounts that can capture 
the interaction of multiple causal mechanisms operating at different strata. To 
understand how the critique of neorealism remains consistent with this outlook, we 
need to again the distinguish between systems that truly act as causal mechanisms, 
and those that are the systemic outcome of causal mechanisms operating at other 
levels. This time, the arguments will be extended in reference to neorealism’s other 
system-level causal theses about polarity.  
Waltz (1979, chap 8) and Mearsheimer (2001, chap 9) both argue that international or 
regional systems structured according to bipolar or multipolar configurations are more 
and less stable respectively. Bipolar systems are stable because each great power has 
only one major adversary to balance against and so strategic moves can be calculated 
more predictably. Multipolar systems are inherently more unstable because (a) there 
are a greater number of potential conflict dyads, and (b) the balance of power is more 
difficult to calculate due to shifting alignments and shifting asymmetries in states’ 
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national power. The greater uncertainty is said to increase insecurity, and so generate 
state policies that perpetuate the uncertainties.  
A key problem with Waltz’s and Mearsheimer’s argument is that it is based on a 
relatively narrow range of historical experience. Arguments about bipolarity are based 
solely on the Cold War, while arguments about multipolarity are based on recent 
centuries of European history alone. Yet, even within this historical context, there 
were lengthy periods in the 19th century of relative peace and stability among the 
great powers in a multipolar Europe.30 Mearsheimer covers this, to a degree, with his 
argument that balanced multipolarity is less prone to system-wide war than 
unbalanced multipolar orders involving a potential hegemon (2001, chap 9). 
However, his sample is too narrow to enable his distinctions between polarities – 
especially between bipolar and multipolar orders – to be generalisable beyond the 
particular cases he uses and made the basis for a probability argument. What is more, 
if the rigid nature of the alliances on the European continent (minus Britain) that 
preceded WWI is taken into account, it seems more appropriate to define the polarity 
in the decade or two preceding the war as bipolar (see next chapter).  
Similarly, unipolar orders can be stable and relatively enduring, such as seen in the 
past century of US strategic hegemony in the Western Hemisphere (established, 
moreover, through a power transition process that was peaceful), and recent decades 
of US primacy in Maritime East Asia. On other occasions, they have been unstable 
and short-lived, such as the decade of Napoleonic French or half-decade of Nazi 
German supremacy in Europe.  
An alternative interpretation of this same historical record, and the one advanced here, 
is that the dynamics of a form of polarity cannot be anticipated in the absence of an 
understanding of the particular interests, strategies and worldviews at play. That is, 
the ways in which the implications of various subjectively derived national agendas 
overlap and interact within specific geographical contexts and material constraints. In 
the abstract, and similar to the case of anarchy, an increase in the number of great 
                                                
30 On the operations of the Concert of Europe from 1815-48, see contributions in (Kupchan et al. 2001). 
For a thorough overview of the management of crises between 1870-1914, see Part II of Choucri and 
North (1975).  
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power dyadic relationships in a region provides just as much prospect for an increase 
in the volume of inter-state cooperative agreements, as it does for an increase in 
potential sources of dissatisfaction, division and conflict.  
If there are any general causal effects that can be associated with polarity, they are 
limited to the notion that the great powers are so relatively more capable and 
materially present (or potentially so), that this frequently causes other states 
(including the great powers between themselves) to place these states at the centre of 
their military-security planning. Beyond this, there are no intrinsic dynamics 
(peaceful/stable, conflict-prone/adversarial) to various forms of polarity in 
themselves. Neither can patterns of alliance be predicted in abstract from 
consideration of the case-specific interests of the states involved. 
Thus to the extent then that the external environment inevitably affects foreign policy, 
states are not simply responding to a set geometrical system of material variables with 
a set solution. The process rather involves interpreting the way in which the interests 
and potential orientation of other states might impact on the formation or adjustment 
of one’s own preferences and aversions pertaining to particular strategic spaces and 
the overall balance of power. Accordingly, any reliable explanatory account of a 
power transition, or future projection of one, needs to identify how the key agents 
concerned perceive their security environment, and define and prioritise their interest 
preferences within a particular historical strategic context. To do this with scientific 
rigour and precision, however, we need to understand how such interests and 
perceptual outlooks exercise a causal (that is, structural) impact on the people that 
comprise the system of collective action (or corporate agency) that are states.  
3.4.4: The significant causal status of state interest structures/complexes 
This thesis argues that the interest structures of states comprise a distinct ontological 
category. As the generative structures comprising state motivation, interest structures 
are the site at which the real potential for any power transition first emerges. They are 
also the primary drivers of the power transition process from start to finish.   
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As claimed ontological entities, interest structures possess real emergent causal 
powers that are autonomous from and causally influence the individuals that 
collectively execute state policy. The emergent stratum is the domestic socio-political 
system of states. The adhesive that links individuals to the collective action that 
comprises the behavioural effects manifested at this stratum is the causal power of 
shared ideas.  
Such an adhesive force is by no means always uniform across the entire membership 
of society. Some interest structures may indeed be underpinned by near whole-of-
society support, but others reflect the influence of, or are opposed by, particular 
political factions and social groups.  
Note that in complex open systems, foreign policy is generally driven by a plurality of 
motivations. The term interest complexes is thus also used to denote the interactive 
relationship of multiple (and sometimes conflicting) interest structures operative in 
the domestic life of particular states. In-depth and holistic study of the entire complex 
of interest structures that underpin a given state’s foreign policy agenda is especially 
crucial when seeking to identify and evaluate potentials for revisionism as part of a 
prospective (or future-oriented) case study. For future projections to be reliable, 
particular interests that have theoretically deducible and tangible revisionist 
implications need to be understood in the context of a state’s entire motivational 
disposition. In the case analysis of the rise of China in Part II of this thesis, Chapter 6 
provides this function. 
Given that the role of collective ideas is not usually conceived in causal terms within 
the mainstream IR literature (due to the dominance of the Humean concept),31 it is 
necessary to elaborate further here on their causal properties and, in turn, their 
capacity to be operationalised in causal analysis. 
In his treatise on the human sciences, Bhaskar draws on Aristotle’s notion of ‘material 
cause’ to describe ideational social structures as the pre-existing material and tools out 
of which agents define and channel their goals (1998, 34-5). Such materials and tools 
                                                
31 One important exception is Legro (2005, 4-7, 179-80), whose theorising implies, but does itself fully 
develop, an alternative concept of causation akin to critical realism.  
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include language, concepts, theories, ideologies, and myriad forms of institutionalised 
relations. Institutions it should be noted are collectively reproduced ideas about rules, 
and mental images of the inter-relationship between defined roles, status positions, 
and legitimate resource allocations.  
For every activity or event initiated by an agent, according to Bhaskar, there are both 
material and efficient causes at work. The latter are immediate conditions associated 
with the initiation of a particular event (namely, both the existence of sufficiently 
motivated and actively capable agents, and sufficiently permissive material 
conditions). The former represent conditioning structures that exercise a pre-active 
formative influence on and shape the motivated goals of active agents.  
Kurki’s extension to the critical realist concept of causation 
Kurki (2008, 218-34), following a lead from Wendt (2003), proposes that a fuller 
departure from the straightjacket of the Humean concept can be achieved through 
drawing further and more directly on Aristotle’s four-fold typology of causes – 
material, formal, efficient, final. Kurki agrees with Bhaskar’s basic distinction 
between constitutive and action-inducing types of cause. She argues, however, that 
the conception of the former benefits by the pairing and differentiation of Aristotle’s 
‘material’ and ‘formal’ categories. The active category similarly benefits from a 
pairing of ‘final’ with ‘efficient’ causes.  
Kurki defines ‘final’ causes as the intentions that trigger an action, and is analytically 
dependent on an account of ‘formal’ causes (see below). The ‘efficient’ category too, 
in presupposing the existence of actively capable agents, depends on ‘material’ and 
‘formal’ categories in accounting for such a physical predisposition. Kurki’s causal 
schema thus further clarifies the critical realist insight that events can only be properly 
accounted for causally in terms of the pre-existing material and mental disposition of 
the agents concerned. Positivist philosophies of science, in particular, overlook just 
how much work in the natural sciences involves identifying and describing how such 
pre-dispositions are structurally constituted.  
An inter-connected relationship between material and formal causes is present within 
the objects of inquiry of both the natural and social sciences. The natural world, as 
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depicted by critical realism, is stratified such that matter is differentially organised 
and moves, attracts and repels according to particular evolved forms of structured 
inter-relationships. To the extent that formal causes in the social sciences are more 
man-made and ideational, it is nonetheless evident through the empirical findings of 
neuroscience that ideas and perception are a product of the cognitive possibilities of 
the biological brain (Harris 2010, chap 3). In this respect, both the general tendencies 
of human nature and the variability of idea and motivation have their root in the 
material/formal causal mechanisms and capabilities located at the stratum of human 
neurophysiology.  
While having a material basis of possibility, ideas exercise a causal power that is best 
understood according to Aristotle’s formal cause category. As Hume himself in effect 
recognised, ideas are the product of how the mind/brain perceives and organises the 
innumerable impressions that flow in from sensory experience (Coventry 2007, chap 
4). For each human being, that more or less similar (but never identical) cognitive 
apparatus is born and nurtured within differing physical and social environments such 
that different brains derive variable lessons from a unique reserve of experiences and 
memories (Andreasen 2006). The process usually proceeds under the comprehensive 
shaping or compulsion of a common social culture that has accrued memories and 
lessons from a distinct and finite historical experience. Various instinctive 
psychological tendencies respond to and variously facilitate the embedding of such 
social norms in individual minds, especially during early formative stages (Legro 
2005, 5-6). 
Whatever the primary source of the organising of impressions in a given instant (the 
individual brain or social culture), ideational structures, once established, exercise 
causal effects in the way they frame, filter and influence how an individual 
cognitively and emotionally experiences new incoming impressions. They provide 
essential cognitive frameworks through which individuals interpret their environment 
and their role and identity within it. Ideas thus routinely play a role in pre-defining the 
scope of action in given contexts and how different inner drives and impulses are to 
be hierarchically prioritised and evaluated. Ideas are thus causal in the way they 
supply form to many actions.  
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This is perhaps most broadly the case with corporate agency. The need for constant 
communication between members means that most corporate actions pursue goals that 
are consciously pre-formed and articulated, rather than unconsciously or impulsively 
undertaken. It is for this reason especially that we can viably study and anticipate the 
potential causal effects of ideas directly (and most efficiently) through their symbolic 
manifestation in language transmission. 
Reasons as causes 
According to critical realism then, the actions of a human agent are in great part 
causally accountable in terms of the reasons motivating an actor. In Bhaskar’s words: 
‘…any cognitive activity that takes action as its object or result … presupposes the 
causal efficacy of reasons, in the sense of their making a possible difference to the 
physical states that will actually obtain’ (1998, 92).  
Critical realism distinguishes between reasons given or consciously held by human 
agents, and the actual source of motivations or rather the hypothesised real reasons 
underpinning articulated goals and behaviour (Bhaskar 1998, 90-7). Sometimes the 
two can be interpreted to closely correspond, and therefore the actual content of the 
reasoning of the actors – that is, their own concepts and descriptions – can be 
expounded at length. In such cases, they can be used directly as representations of the 
belief structures of given cultures or political entities. At other times, beliefs might be 
argued as misleading, false, or perhaps just incomplete rationalisations of behaviour 
or motivation. These are then contrasted with an alternative or supplemented 
explanation of motivations given by the external observer. Often there will be a mix 
between the two approaches, as is the case with the analysis of contemporary Chinese 
interest structures in Chapter 6.  
Interests as ‘beliefs about needs’ 
In applying the notion of ideas as formal causes to IR analysis, the understanding here 
corresponds closely to Wendt’s characterisation of state interests as constituting 
‘beliefs about needs’ (1999, 113-35). That is, a state’s or political community’s 
beliefs about how its objective reproductive needs (especially the physical and 
economic means of security) can be satisfied. As with Wendt, it is recognised here 
that interests are also constituted out of identity perceptions. This makes the potential 
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content of interest definitions even more variable in terms of the demands or 
expectations a state might bring towards the politics or political status of strategic 
spaces beyond its borders.  
Such beliefs about needs and identity are not necessarily immutable, however 
resistant to change they may be in particular cases. Indeed, the nature of human 
agency is such that decisions can potentially be made to adjust or transform the 
content of defined interests in response to satisfactory or accommodative signals from 
other states (Glaser 2010), or shifts in the terms of domestic debate (Legro 2005).  
Conversely, rigidity in interest definitions can exist, leading interaction within a 
particular strategic space to become mutually exclusive and physically conflicting. In 
such cases, recourse is best had towards explaining this in terms of the particular 
nexus of domestic perceptions and interest structures that invariably lie behind such 
uncompromising state postures. This does not, however, preclude the existence of 
more generalised social psychological tendencies that could be identified and usefully 
incorporated into the explanation. 
3.5: Explanatory evaluation in open systems 
The attribution of particular ideational structures to the motivation of actions actually 
or potentially undertaken by agents is complicated by the fact that such structures 
operate in open systems. Such open systems are composed not only of the multitude 
of material conditions and intentional actions of other agents in the external 
environment, but also of other motivational structures that operate within that agent’s 
inner life – conscious or unconscious. Critical realism thus raises, and is itself 
confronted with, the problem of how to develop methods for evaluating the 
explanatory power of causal propositions that apply within open systems.  
3.5.1: Preliminary guidelines 
(i) Practical interest as the opening move of evaluation 
Usually, the starting point for explanatory evaluation in the social sciences lies in the 
practical interests or values driving a particular study (Kurki 2008, 149-61; Shapiro et 
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al 2004; Flyvbjerg 2001). Both the natural and social worlds are multi-faceted and 
complex. Finite limits on investigation need to be placed somewhere – a process 
aided, critical realists would add, by the real stratification of the world. Pure science 
might be possible within the social sciences, but the impetus for social scientific work 
usually arises from the desire to solve or manage real-world problems. Furthermore, it 
is the nature of a given problem, so defined, that plays a key role in selecting the 
phenomena to be studied, and provides the basis for hypotheses about the existence 
and inter-relationship of identified causal mechanisms. 
In the case of this thesis, the focus on power transitions and the rise of China arises 
from an interest in finding ways to prevent perceived conflict potential in East Asia 
from precipitating a breakdown in overall regional order and stability. The analysis 
thus takes the complex of causal factors underpinning the strategic agenda of an 
identified revisionist actor as a core variable cluster. It then seeks to critically evaluate 
the potential for other structures (conceived by other, sometimes competing, 
explanatory theories) to either inhibit or channel the expression of the core variable 
cluster in more peaceful or conflict-prone directions.  
If one were alternatively to examine whether, for instance, economic interdependence 
conditions peace or prevents conflict, then this proposition would need also to be 
critically evaluated vis-à-vis the enabling or constraining effects of a range of other 
variables. These might include: the nature of the interest complexes underpinning 
existing geo-political or territorial disputes (and relative levels of commitment 
towards these); balances of material power and prestige; international or domestic 
normative structures; and the enabling or constraining role of geography.  
(ii) The rational-empirical baseline 
Critical realists agree with positivists that explanations and hypotheses must be 
disciplined and judged according to empirical tests and internal logic. Critical realism 
opposes paradigms of explanatory or judgemental relativism that imply that any 
explanation is as good as any other and cannot be falsified (Bhaskar 1998, 62-3). 
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This empirical and rational baseline for evaluation is indispensable in social science, 
but it remains insufficient in itself as a methodological guideline for analysis of open 
system phenomena. In open system contexts, we need some further standards for 
evaluating the validity and relative importance of hypothesised causal mechanisms in 
relationship to other, sometimes corresponding, sometimes competing, causal 
accounts within the discipline.  
3.5.2: Existing explorations of IR critical realists  
Some critical realist pioneers within IR, especially Kurki and Heikki Patomaki, have 
made preliminary efforts towards developing new analytical approaches that are more 
conscious of open system dynamics. Both authors speak of the need for building more 
integrative multi-causal narratives, and advocate an abandonment of the quest for 
fundamental singular causes.  
Kurki’s work on broadening the concept of causation has some methodological 
implications, namely that it justifies the validity and need for interpretative methods 
in articulating ideational and social institutional types of causes (2008, 196-239). 
Beyond the empirical-rational baseline, however, the criteria through which the causal 
logic of the multi-causal accounts she advocates could be evaluated in comparison to 
competing explanatory approaches are left unspecified. This is a deficit of which 
Kurki is nonetheless conscious of, as acknowledged within the sub-section heading in 
her last chapter titled ‘Openings for further research’ (2008, 308-9). 
Among IR critical realists, Patomaki (2002, chaps 4-6; 2008) has gone furthest in 
exploring methodological possibilities for building multi-causal explanatory accounts 
on the basis of open system dynamics. Patomaki’s engagement with critical realism 
has proceeded along some similar methodological pathways to my own.32 Most 
notably, Patomaki (2006) similarly recognises the potential utility of critical realism 
for the study of prospective or presently unfolding cases and trends, rather than just 
past processes and cases. Some of Patomaki’s most recent work (2006; 2008) has 
                                                
32 Note that the methodological innovations I develop for this thesis (in section 3.6 to follow) are 
largely derived from an independent reading of the works of Bhaskar. My reading of Patomaki came 
after most of the thesis methodology had already been developed. 
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aimed at establishing ‘futures studies’ as a legitimate field within IR. In a recent book 
(2008), Patomaki ambitiously projects the interaction of a broad selection of 
hypothesised major trends in the contemporary global political economy into a 
systematic array of contrasting future scenarios.  
Patomaki may have been a little over-ambitious with the latter project, even when we 
grant that his approach is explicitly non-predictive and provides a number of limiting 
provisos and analytical cautions (2008, chap 2). The sheer scale and complexity of the 
global domain being analysed engenders vulnerability on numerous fronts to exposure 
of inadequate or incomplete hypotheses and characterisations of trends in the global 
political economy and their implications. The lack of acknowledgement or awareness 
of some causal factors leads on occasion to one-sided or lop-sided accounts.  
This is most evident in Patomaki’s characterisation of US interventionism in the post-
Cold War period, especially since 9/11, as a trend towards neo-imperialism (2008, 
chap 6). Patomaki views this trend as analogous to the British return towards imperial 
expansion in the 1870s in an allegedly similar political-economy context of presaged 
relative decline and neo-liberalism. The analogy is extended to illustrate parallel 
possibilities, or scenarios, for a 21st century breakdown in global security order 
comparable in magnitude, although somewhat different in kind, to the cataclysm of 
WWI (2008, chaps 7 and 8).  
Left out of Patomaki’s account of existing trends are such things as: the role of 
American pluralism at the domestic level, together with public criticism, in 
contributing to vacillations in foreign policy approach throughout its history; the 
depth of cohesion and common cause within US alliances such that there are strong 
potential limits to alliance partner defection  (as well as US unilateralism itself); and 
an identification of potential sources for future unilateral actions on the part of other 
powers besides the US, which cannot be completely accounted for in terms of reaction 
to US conduct. As will be seen, some of China’s existing interests fall potentially 
within this latter category.  
Patomaki’s work demonstrates the pitfalls of not just futuristic analysis, but also 
historical analogy, despite his acknowledgement of the limitations of both these 
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analytical approaches. In general, critical realism suggests inherent limits to the 
effectiveness of historical analogy. Causal mechanisms that appear as salient across 
different cases invariably operate within a uniquely combining constellation of 
diverse and often dissimilar variables. A mechanism common across cases cannot be 
presumed to always exercise the same effect when it is co-determining events (or 
otherwise inhibited) in interaction with different combinations of greater or lesser 
causes. 
Despite of the problems, or excesses, in Patomaki’s methodological innovations, I 
argue that there is still much merit to his explorations. If subject to some further 
disciplines, they can still serve as the basis for some productive new research 
directions and approaches in IR.  
3.6: Proposed solutions 
3.6.1: A three-level process of evaluation 
The two main methodological problems accrued from the above discussion are (a) 
criteria for explanatory evaluation that is mindful of open system dynamics, and (b) 
future projection. In regard to the first problem, the solution offered here is a three-
level evaluative process comprising: (1) the ontological level, (2) the mono-
theoretical level, and (3) the inter-theoretical level.  
In this thesis, the three chapters comprising the case study of the rise of China in Part 
II corresponds to this schema. It is not necessary, however, for research to proceed 
strictly according to this sequence. Many research projects might focus more on 
particular levels, or jump around between them at various times during project 
development. The point is that a viable candidate for being both a valid and 
substantial causal hypothesis within the discipline generally, or in application to a 
particular case study, would need to perform well in all three evaluative tests.  
For some theories, the first and second levels may be largely synonymous. This is 
especially the case with macro-systemic or social institutional theories in which a 
particular ontological claim (eg. the existence of a social institution with its own 
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causal properties) is also the central (mono-) theoretical claim. For the power 
transition theory developed in this thesis, however, and, more generally, any theory 
whose explanations describe the interactions and relationship between multiple and 
differing causal entities and structures, it is useful to differentiate between the two 
levels. 
This chapter has already introduced the principal ontological assumptions advanced 
within this study.33 The case was made that agent level and interaction level
approaches are most suitable for causal analysis of great power relations and regional 
security order. It is accepted that states, as corporate agents, can be soundly 
characterised ontologically as individuals, so long as they are conceived to embody a 
pluralism of interacting (and sometimes conflicting) drives. A variety of interest
structure motivations can accordingly be identified within particular states. At the 
ontological level, these are the sorts of basic propositions exposed to the scrutiny of 
critical evaluation. For critical realists, establishing the validity and correspondence of 
basic ontological categories and descriptions to observed reality is a crucial 
component of social scientific work.  
The first chapter of Part II (Chapter 6) advances, in addition, claims about the 
ontological existence and casual properties of particular interest structures that 
comprise and drive contemporary Chinese grand strategy (on the basis of a unit level
analysis). Chapter 7 then shifts to an application of my alternative power transition 
model, which operates at the level of inter-state interaction. Ongoing testing of (a) the 
concepts and causal claims comprising this interactive model (as presented in 
Chapters 4 and 5), and (b) its empirical adaptability to the case of the rise of China 
(Chapter 7), constitute the evaluative process at the mono-theoretical level.  
In general, analysis at the mono-theoretical level may involve (a) applying, testing or 
revising an existing theory, or (b) building a new theory of either a newly perceived or 
already recognised phenomena. The scope of a theory’s applicability needs to be 
understood before any evaluation can be made. Some theories are more time-space 
specific in their application, and may even be intended only to describe mechanisms 
                                                
33 For a more complete summary of the ontological claims that underpin my theory, see Chapter 5. 
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deemed as peculiar to a single case. Other theories are explicitly designed for a more 
general, cross-case application (as is the case with my theory).  
At the mono-theoretical level, a theory is evaluated according to the extent to which 
empirical evidence from relevant cases can be coherently matched to the key 
definitional categories and relationships stipulated by the theory. The question of 
whether, regardless of such empirical correspondence, the mechanism in question is 
causally substantial in the overall scheme of things, or the most adequate conceptual 
and explanatory formulation of a given phenomenon, is not addressed at this level, 
however. For this, the analysis needs to adopt an inter-theoretical perspective (to be 
addressed shortly). 
Particular (mono-) theories capture particular sets of processes and mechanisms that 
are operative within the complex totality of reality. Their very establishment is an act 
of abstraction of some features of reality from the entire network of causes at the level 
of the concrete (Sayer 2010, chap 3). Moreover, in order for claims about the defining 
tendencies of particular causal structures to be made intelligible, many theories are, at 
some stage of their exposition, necessarily articulated in a way that presumes a closed 
system.  
3.6.2: Ideal-type versus conditioned causation 
To be coherent on this issue of what is often an unavoidable closed system abstraction 
in the establishment of models, critical realist social science needs to make a clearer 
distinction between what I call ideal-type and conditioned causation. In a nutshell, 
conditioned causation refers to the normal and usual mode of causation that is 
observable in the real world of open systems. Ideal-type causation operates much less 
frequently in the real world, and more typically is simply a device for analytical and 
theoretical abstraction.  
Many natural sciences have recourse to experimental closures. Given the more 
unconscious or instinctive mechanisms that operate in natural systems, the production 
of invariant and predictable causal sequences within an experiment (where they 
occur) would perhaps be better characterised as chains of perfect causation. In the 
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social sciences, the equivalent notion of ideal-type causation can be applied in two 
ways.  
The first denotes the idealised abstraction of a hypothesised real-world mechanism 
out of the complex totality of reality. Such a model is invariably represented in an 
ideal form at some stage of the analysis to indicate how the mechanism would operate 
if unimpeded by other variables. Such idealised abstraction plays an indispensable 
role in aiding the perception and communication of structural relationships in the 
stratified observable world. This is the case so long as there is an understanding that 
in the real world of open systems, there may, in any given case, be operating a whole 
host of other mechanisms that interfere with the ideal-type expression of the modelled 
variables. 
The second application of ideal-type causation relates more specifically to the 
operation of ideational causes, including interest structures. It can be captured in the 
simple terms that in the absence of barriers to fulfilment, any desired goals and 
objectives of an agent could be fulfilled without trouble according to the ideal image 
of the motivated actor. There would be a clear, instant and predictable succession of 
cause and effect. To take one example, if ideal-type causation were the operative form 
of causation, the desire of China or any other disputant for sovereign control over 
Spratly/Nansha would, in the absence of inhibiting variables, immediately (or perhaps 
several hours later) express itself in actual unimpeded sovereign control.  
States are highly conscious agents whose representatives and officials are largely 
aware of what they are doing, and engage in internal communications (both public 
and confidential) that render many of the objectives, and even motives, of state policy 
into the sphere of conscious awareness. Furthermore, objectives and interests are 
rarely vague and abstract in the sense of being intangible. Rather they contain
numerous concrete referents that are fully tangible in their suggested material and 
spatial implications – and in the event they were fully realised in ideal-type fashion. 
An understanding of interest structures and their tangible ideal-type referents is thus 
essential in the causal analysis of both previously manifested and potential behaviour. 
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In contrast, conditioned causation is the normal state of affairs in which a particular 
causal mechanism, or motivational structure, is conditioned in its expression or 
prevented from ideally fulfilling itself by the broader causal environment. It therefore 
follows, contra the Humean concept of causation, that the same causal powers will, at 
different times, produce different effects or behaviours because an agent is under the 
influence or sufferance of other external forces and internal imperatives that condition 
or alter the expression of the other.  
Returning to the example above, China does not need to achieve the ideal-type effect 
of unimpeded sovereign control of Spratly/Nansha before this desire on their 
collective part can be classified as a real cause. In fact, this motivational structure 
affects China’s behaviour all the time in a variety of ways. In this sense, a virtually 
invariant regularity can be seen in the way this desire is unfailingly expressed in word 
and deed. There are, however, differences across time in the way it is expressed 
depending on other prevailing conditions and the Chinese government’s subjective 
strategic response to these conditions and other internal motivational imperatives. 
There is here no invariant relationship between the causal complex that can be 
identified and a particular form of behavioural response.  
One major contribution of the method to be advanced for evaluating competing causal 
claims at the inter-theoretical level is that it makes allowance for significant 
conditioned causation effects. As will be demonstrated later in the thesis, the 
explanatory power of some (mono-) theories can potentially be enhanced when claims 
about the ideal-type effects of causal mechanisms are supplemented with hypotheses 
about altered or compromised impacts as a result of interaction with other major 
causal variables.  
3.6.3: Retrospective and prospective analysis 
Most (mono-) theories, we have suggested, are at some point communicated in an 
ideal-type form in a way that presumes a closed system. The theory of power 
transition developed in following chapters, however, functions this way in only one of 
the two modes in which it can be applied. In application to historical cases, the 
variability (albeit still finite) of some its general features enables this model to avoid 
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the need to presume an artificial closure. Embodying a built-in understanding of open 
system dynamics, the flexibility of the model enables it to capture a comparatively 
more diverse range of historical cases of revisionism embodying very different 
dynamics. 
The use of the model differs when applied towards a prospective case of power 
transition, as is undertaken in Chapter 7. In this case, an artificial closure is 
unavoidable. This is because in contrast to retrospective analysis where the model is 
applied to cases in which a power transition actually took place and became 
materially manifest, prospective analysis is dealing with potential, not actualised, 
phenomena. It is always possible that potential trends will never actually be realised, 
or eventually be transformed. For critical realists, in highly complex open systems 
there is simply no basis for making watertight long-range forecasts, and this is usually 
the case for nearer-term predictions as well.34   
This limitation should not be construed as rendering prospective analysis, or future 
projection, a futile endeavour. Indeed, this thesis agrees with Patomaki about the 
validity of analytically drawing out and explaining the tangible future possibilities 
embedded within existing causal structures. This thesis agrees also with the related 
idea that such analytical projections are potentially empowering. Through indicating 
some tangible potential consequences of existing behavioural and motivational 
tendencies, reflective agents are given some extra room to reappraise priorities, as 
well as possibilities for or against shaping the future in certain directions. This is 
surely the raison d’être of most social scientific work. In contrast to Patomaki, though, 
this thesis provides more precise guidelines and evaluative criteria for this analytical 
modality. 
This thesis argues that for qualitative projection to be viable and useful to social 
science, a given study needs initially to focus more narrowly on a particular problem 
or causal mechanism, and then work outwards from there in critical dialogue with the 
broader discourse of the discipline. In other words, the credibility of qualitative 
projection depends on an initially solid and defensible set of characterisations at the 
                                                
34 For extensive evidence of just how poor the track record of prediction is in political science, see 
Tetlock (2005).  
88
mono-theoretical and ontological levels. Sound qualitative projection thus needs to 
begin with a closed system rational simulation (CSRS) of the possibilities embedded 
within a particular set of hypothesised causal structures.  
CSRS is especially useful for analysing conflict logic. The nature of conflict is such 
that it is almost common sense to observe that the potential for crisis can often be 
tangibly perceived and explained well in advance of any crisis event – without 
necessarily being able to predict whether or not it will occur. For instance, if there 
ever were to be a crisis or war over the future status of Taiwan, we already have 
sufficient evidence to generate knowledge capable of explaining many of the main 
causes (especially formal causes) that would contribute to the outbreak of this sort of 
event (without being able to predict the immediate conditions that might trigger it, its 
timing, or the trajectory it would follow). The use of disciplined rational simulation to 
explain possibilities can also help locate possibilities (or otherwise) for 
accommodating conflicting perspectives.  
Chapter 7 uses CSRS to pinpoint and explain both conflictual and accommodative 
possibilities within the military-security order of contemporary and future Maritime 
East Asia. The analysis is consciously reduced to a closed system interactive dynamic. 
This enables us to assess how Chinese attempts to ideally realise its regional 
geopolitical agenda would interact with the geopolitical interests of other regional 
powers. For this purpose, other interests and causal processes are temporarily 
screened out. Chapter 7 applies generic indicators of my power transition model to 
demonstrate how various possible versions or adjustments of state interest definitions 
in contested sub-regions would influence (a) the hierarchical form of the regional 
military-security order, and (b) its potential dynamics (peaceful or war-prone; 
consensus or coercion based).  
Some might view the various contingencies generated through CSRS as a form of 
prediction. Given the closed basis of the analysis, and the fact that in real world open 
systems the full range of initial conditions can never be fully known or anticipated, I 
argue explanation of possibilities is the more accurate term. Projected contingencies 
that become manifest should probably only be crowned as a prediction after the event. 
Even then, for a prediction to be viewed as more than luck, the explanation that 
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generated it prior to the event would need to be shown to have both a reasonable 
empirical correspondence and necessary connection with what transpired. 
Explanatory power – that is, the level of accuracy in claims about the workings and 
substantial impact of particular causal mechanisms and processes – thus remains as 
the primary criterion for assessing theoretical success within open system contexts.  
3.6.4: The inter-theoretical level and CATB test 
The essential aim of analysis at the mono-theoretical stage is to make the case for a 
particular explanation to be considered a major candidate for inclusion in the 
mainstream discourse pertaining either to the understanding of a particular case or the 
more general body of theory in a discipline. A mono-theory is more likely to do better 
in the marketplace, however, if the authors are cognisant of a broad range of 
theoretical developments and applications. This enables authors to better anticipate 
the limitations of their work and grapple with potential criticisms in advance. Most 
authors in IR do accordingly incorporate an inter-theoretical dimension to their 
analysis, at the very least as a pre-emptive defence strategy. It is also often done in 
recognition that different theories, within their particular limits, have constructive 
insights to offer.  
The concept of inter-theoretical analysis advanced here denotes a critical process, and 
an often competitive one. However, its aim is to facilitate the integration, not 
fragmentation, of knowledge. The objects of inquiry in IR operate within an open 
system according to conditioned causation dynamics. It is thus argued here that a 
mono-theory, or its application to particular case(s), should provide its own 
preliminary investigation and account of its relationship to other causal mechanisms 
and alternative explanatory models in the existing literature.  
The key term is relationship. Essentially, to what extent are two or more explanatory 
accounts compatible, and to what extent are they in conflict, and why? Critical 
realism defends the notion of a real world independent of our knowledge of it as a 
basis for the possibility of scientific progress. Thus in situations where there is some 
degree of conflictual overlap between different theories encompassing some of the 
same observed phenomena, one theory can potentially be evaluated as superior on 
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objective empirical-rational grounds.35 Alternatively, the process of competitive 
scrutiny might show weaknesses and strengths in both accounts, and encourage a new 
synthesis, or expose the need for a complete alternative to both.  
Awareness of the critical realist concept of open systems helps place any competitive 
intra-disciplinary dynamics in a more constructive perspective. That is, the real world 
is greater and more complex than any individual mono-theory. The world invariably 
encompasses a host of other mechanisms or strata that lie beyond the scope of even 
the most convincing mono-theory. And to the extent that inter-theoretical analysis and 
scrutiny pose a potential threat to the integrity of one’s own work, exposed 
weaknesses and errors may nonetheless provide beneficial insights and promote 
progress in the overall discipline. A more flexible theoretical approach and weaker 
attachment to particular mono-theories can thus potentially promote greater 
theoretical integration in the discipline.  
Once again, and especially in the case of inter-theoretical analysis, there is need for 
further criteria of explanatory evaluation beyond the empirical-rational baseline. As 
posited here, there are four basic categories or tests in which the relationship of one 
mono-theory to others can be qualitatively described and evaluated on the basis of a 
common, unifying criterion of natural necessity (that is, the presence or absence of a 
necessary connection between variables that is empirically supportable and logically 
coherent). Labelled respectively as ‘Coexistence’, ‘Assimilation’, ‘Trivialisation’, and 
‘Breakdown’; these evaluation criteria are referred to here collectively in acronym as 
the ‘CATB test’. The first two categories represent a more positive or benign result 
for a theory subjected to an inter-theoretical test. The other two represent a more 
negative or crisis-inducing result.  
The first of the benign categories is coexistence. That is, the existence of the other 
theories does not pose any conflict to the fundamental principles of one’s own 
explanatory account. The other theories might be explain mechanisms not causally 
related or interactive in any major way with one’s own domain of focus. Of most 
significance, however, are cases in which there is overlap, yet there is a 
                                                
35 This argument thus challenges the more radically relativist connotations of Kuhn’s (1996 [1962]) 
famous ‘incommensurability’ thesis. 
91
correspondence or translatability in the concepts employed and relations 
hypothesised.  
The second benign category is assimilation. This denotes a theory’s ability to 
incorporate the insights of other theories, without being colonised by other 
perspectives. That is, the ability to make additions and adjustments that do not 
undermine the validity of most of the fundamental unifying principles and 
mechanisms of the theory. Unlike the category of coexistence, however, it is possible 
for a theory to, less benignly, induce a breakdown in another theory whilst 
assimilating, or effectively colonising, certain aspects of the other into its own.  
The first and weaker of the two negative evaluative categories is trivialisation. In this 
case, hypothesised mechanisms and processes are not irrelevant to the explanation of 
events and dynamics, and exercise some significant conditioned causation effects. It 
has nonetheless become evident that, in application to particular cases, the 
mechanisms posited are of lesser importance than claimed, and vis-à-vis those 
advanced within competing explanatory accounts. Trivialisation is thus compatible 
with coexistence. Such a combination would represent a mixed scorecard in terms of 
explanatory evaluation – that is, valid, but of secondary (or tertiary) not primary 
causal importance.  
The second and stronger negative category is the logical-empirical breakdown of a 
theory. In this case, certain fundamental principles and concepts of the theory are 
found to be in contradiction with empirical reality. The given theory may also be 
demonstrated as substantially inferior to an alternative theory. The latter might be able 
to encompass more of the empirical record (explain more facts or cases), better 
resolve logical contradictions embedded in the other, or better assimilate the insights 
of the other. Breakdown is the category of ‘falsification’ proper. 
These four evaluative criteria do not always apply in a mutually exclusive way. Two 
or more theories may on different issues be simultaneously both compatible and 
conflictual. In areas at least where there is no unresolved conflict regarding 
overlapping terms of reference, inter-theoretical analysis can play a further 
constructive role. That is, it can be used to explore how contrasting explanations can 
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be integrated together to illustrate the patterns of conditioned causation operative in 
a particular time-space specific context.  
      
In subjecting my arguments about Chinese revisionism to an inter-theoretical test in 
Chapter 8, three alternative explanations of East Asian security order in the existing 
IR literature are critically considered. These include: (1) material balance of power 
arguments as embodied in various neorealisms and PTT, (2) liberal economic 
interdependence arguments, and (3) constructivist arguments about socialisation 
according to common norms (in this case, the ‘ASEAN way’). I first assess the 
evidence for viewing these different classes of structural argument as valid according 
to presently observable causal impacts. Next, I stipulate the necessary conditions for 
their future validity. The CATB test is then used to identify and evaluate the possible 
terms of complementarity or conflict between each of these explanatory paradigms 
vis-à-vis my own theoretically informed arguments about Chinese revisionism. 
Inter-theoretical evaluation is an ongoing process that cannot be fully decided in a 
single study. First, there is the fairness issue of allowing for an open-ended right of 
reply from proponents of critiqued theories. More broadly, it is only through the 
collective capacity of the discipline, and exposure to the varying knowledge bases and 
critical perspectives of its protagonists, that the relative strength of various 
ontological, mono-theoretical or inter-theoretical claims can be evaluated over time. 
For this reason, this study refrains from making immodestly unequivocal claims about 
any implied breakdown of other perspectives. Rather, this is for the discipline to 
collectively determine through debate over time.   
Another factor that presses for caution in judgement is that within this study the main 
case study is prospective not retrospective. The weakness of prospective analysis is 
that there can be no definite determination of how the course of future events will 
unfold; or of which trends and mechanisms (and how they evolve) will exercise the 
greatest relative impact. Surprising major developments, or exogenous shocks, can 
occur that substantially alters the overall balance of variables, temporarily or 
permanently. The construction of an ultimate, universal and infallible open system 
model that could successfully identify and integrate the vast multitude of causal 
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mechanisms across man, society and nature is clearly beyond the capacity of 
mankind. 
There is a flip-side strength to prospective analysis, however. That is, given the 
seminal causal role in IR played by conscious agents capable of reflexive thinking and 
continuous deliberation, there is some scope for choice and an ongoing adjustment of 
priorities and values. Indeed, the very act of prospective analysis that states invariably 
undertake and deliberate on in shaping their international strategies should itself be 
considered a key variable in the causal equation that determines the direction of 
events. Any official or public space opened up to deliberation on prospective trends 
and strategic choice accordingly opens up a sort of analytical limbo zone in which the 
future can be characterised as embodying multiple real possibilities; a zone that 
shrinks to the extent that space for deliberation closes up, and, for better or worse, 
resolutions become hardened and fixed. It is a premise of this thesis that certain 
details of the interests currently held by East Asian great powers are sufficiently 
ambiguous and under-determined to allow for meaningful deliberation on the 
possibilities, or otherwise, for a compromise accommodation on the region’s future 
military-security order.  
Despite then the limitations acknowledged above, the innovative methodologies 
developed in this chapter offer some potent tools to aid the deliberations currently 
underway on issues of major concern and interest to all major stakeholders in 
contemporary East Asian security order – including China. Combined with an 
alternative theory of power transition, it offers a comparatively inclusive yet orderly 
integrative framework for identifying and evaluating tangible causal trends towards 
regional hierarchical change, as well as important potential conditions for future 
conflict or compromise. Further consideration of how my analytical framework can be 
used as a tool for policy-making and deliberation will be provided in the conclusion of 
this thesis.  
3.7: Conclusion 
In this chapter, a transition has been made from the critique of existing theories 
towards the formulation of an alternative theory and methodology for the study of 
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international power transitions. For this purpose, extensive use was made of the 
critical realist concept of causation.  
Critical realism argues that the most common understanding of causal analysis held 
across the theoretical spectrum in IR – the Humean concept – is too narrow and of 
highly limited application within open systems. Humean ‘uniform regularity 
statements’ capture the dynamics of causation operating in closed systems. The 
challenge for social scientists is to better understand and model multi-causality based 
on conditioned causation, the usual mode of causation in open systems.  
In this chapter, an innovative three-level process of explanatory evaluation was 
developed for this purpose, and to provide the structure of inquiry for the case 
analysis of the rise of China in Part II. The framework provides a novel way to 
combine both closed and open system methods of analysis, based upon ideal-type and 
conditioned models of causation respectively. The chapter also advanced a solution to 
the problem of future projection in open systems. As an alternative to prediction, a 
qualitative method of closed system rational simulation was developed to provide a 
tangible means for explaining possibilities. This enables us to precisely identify and 
map the potential consequences of existing powerful tendencies for regional change 
without presuming any uniform or immutable trajectory.  
Critical realism also helped us to locate the more primary sources of causation 
operative in international power transitions. Applying the concept of necessary 
connection within mechanism structures to the critique of PTT and MOR indicated 
that materialist explanations of great power military-security relations are insufficient. 
The interaction of particular geopolitical agendas in overlapping strategic spaces, not 
brute material structures such as the zone of parity or forms of polarity, drive the 
dynamics of regional security orders. Adequate understanding and explanation of 
these agendas requires a primary focus on state motivations, and the perceptions and 
interest structures that underpin them. These arguments about the location and nature 
of the primary causal powers in power transitions are fundamental to the alternative 
power transition theory that is developed and applied in subsequent chapters.  
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Preliminary indications were given as to how state motivations can be operationalised 
in causal analysis. The basis for this involved two ontological propositions about (a) 
great powers as relatively empowered and sovereign corporate agents, and (b) the 
significant causal status and variation of state interest structures/complexes. The 
routine public communication that is necessary for states to function as corporate 
agents, and the causal power of collective ideas, together justify the use and reliability 
of interpretative methods to model ‘reasons as causes’ and ‘interests as beliefs about 
needs’.  
At the beginning of the chapter, discussion was also made about the critical realist 
distinction between an intransitive and transitive dimension. In this view, a key 
objective of science is to bring our transitive concepts and theories into ever-closer 
approximation and contact with the intransitive world they attempt to describe and 
explain. Thus, without neglecting the importance of ongoing empirical observation 
and testing of propositions, critical realism places the critical evolution of the 
qualitative conceptual basis of theory at the centre of the scientific process. It is to this 
task we turn to now in developing the building blocks of an alternative theory of 
power transition. 
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Chapter 4: Reinventing Revisionism 
This chapter provides the underlying rationale and definitions for the concepts used to 
build the alternative theory of power transition advanced in this thesis. The central 
concept that needs to be dealt with and developed here is ‘revisionism’. In the 
understanding advanced in this thesis, power transitions by definition can only be said 
to occur or potentially arise so long as there exists a revisionist challenge posed to a 
status quo order. If there are no revisionist actors there can be no power transition, 
potential or actual. 
The chapter seeks to remedy several shortfalls in existing conceptualisations of the 
revisionism-status quo dichotomy. The concept is important to get right because of 
the way in which it captures a key necessary link of cause and effect in a power 
transition. On the causal side, it is commonplace to refer to a ‘revisionist state’ to 
indicate a certain type of motivational disposition or foreign policy goal. On the effect 
side, the concept of revisionism implicitly refers to a certain type of systemic order 
outcome. Combined together, one can see that a revisionist state is identifiable 
according to either its seeking or actual achievement (however temporary or 
permanent) of some sort of substantive transformation in the structure of the 
international system and the norms upon which it is based. Conversely, any actual 
revisionist outcomes are obviously driven initially by the agendas of revisionist states. 
Section 4.1 critically reviews the main existing attempts in the literature to define and 
expound the concept of revisionism. The remainder of the chapter then develops a 
series of arguments underpinning an alternative understanding, and indeed re-
invention, of the concept. In the process, reference is made to several other 
mainstream IR concepts which are themselves redefined and adjusted to 
accommodate the alternative power transition model that emerges from this thorough 
reappraisal of the concept of revisionism.  
4.1: Revisionism in the existing IR literature 
The term revisionism, or some equivalent, has been a mainstay concept within the IR 
literature during the entire post-war period. Yet, only a handful of authors have 
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provided any detailed exposition of the term’s meaning, scope and definitional 
referents. Even less satisfactory have been the very few attempts to relate the concept 
systematically and consistently to historical examples. The most explicit typologies of 
revisionism that, in addition, are presented together with lists of historical great power 
regimes judged to fit these categories, are provided by Morgenthau (2006, chap 5) at 
one end of the post-war period and Schweller (1994; 1999) more recently. It is 
precisely these two influential authors, however, that have contributed more than most 
to the implicit and common bias within IR that associates revisionism with a 
particularly aggressive and destructively anti-social type of state.  
In the case of Morgenthau this bias was probably not wholly intended. For he was 
also concerned with portraying, in neutral terms, all states as driven by similar power 
and security drives (2006, chaps 1 and 3). In different contexts these common drives 
are said to manifest in either a policy of the status quo or imperialism. Morgenthau 
was clear that the policy of the status quo was not always purely defensive (and 
certainly not static), but an active and sometimes aggressive policy to maintain a 
particular distribution of power (2006, chap 4). It did not help, however, that the term 
he used to denote the agent of change, ‘imperialism’, had, in the time and place he 
was writing (early post-war America), come to take on wholly negative connotations 
as a byword for illegitimate conquest.  
Morgenthau’s definition of a policy of imperialism as aiming at the ‘overthrow of the 
status quo’ and a ‘reversal of the power relations between two or more nations’ only 
added to the impression of an especially aggressive type of policy (2006, 57). There 
are, moreover, other aspects of Morgenthau’s arguments that implicitly cast such 
dramatic and unilateral attempts at international change in a disapproving light. 
Indeed, Morgenthau’s normative vision of a path to peace through great power 
accommodation and mutual concession of non-vital interests strongly suggests a 
preference for incremental over radical change to the status quo (2006, chaps 31 and 
32). Morgenthau’s work reflects a preference for moderation, restraint, and a 
respectful awareness of the interests of other powers, along with disapproval towards 
ideological vanity and blind national egotism (2006, chaps 16 and 20). 
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Schweller (1994) revived the concept of revisionism as ‘revisionism’ so as to capture 
forms of state motivation – namely profit, advantage and ambition – that had been 
downplayed in significance by influential defensive realist theories. These theories 
had focussed largely on gauging the propensity of states to engage in balancing 
behaviour.36 Like Morgenthau, who had made a distinction between imperialism that 
aims at world empire, continental empire and local preponderance (2006, 67-9), 
Schweller also produced a typology of revisionist goals. In this case, the distinctions 
made were between limited-aims revisionist and unlimited-aims/revolutionary states, 
as well as risk-averse and risk-acceptant states.  
Schweller’s conception evolved during the 1990s. In 1994, Schweller made a 
distinction between unlimited-aims (‘insatiable’) revisionist ‘wolves’, and limited-
aims ‘jackal’ revisionists. The latter were defined as band-wagoners that seek to gain 
in the spoils of victory as part of either a revisionist/wolf-led expansionary campaign 
or status quo/lion-led restorative or defensive campaign. In this article, wolves and 
jackals are depicted as ‘predators’ and ‘aggressors’, whereas the lions are depicted as 
satiated and defensive system managers – ‘providers of the common defence’ and 
‘collective goods’. And ‘[w]hile they may seek to extend their values, status-quo 
states do not employ military means to achieve this end’.  
By 1999, Schweller had ironed out some of the problems with the above formulation. 
The use of animal metaphors is mostly avoided, and the jackal category of 
bandwagoning lesser powers is more marginal in regards to the definition of 
revisionism itself. Rather, the distinction between limited-aims and unlimited-
aims/revolutionary states now refers chiefly to different types of great power 
objectives. Schweller writes: 
The key question is whether the rising power views the protection and 
promotion of its essential values as dependent on fundamental changes in the 
existing international order; or whether it is merely dissatisfied with its 
prestige and position within that order … If the latter, then … its demands can 
be satisfied while at the same time preserving and perhaps strengthening the 
                                                
36 The main focus of Schweller’s critique is Walt (1987) 
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established order. These limited-aims revisionist states are typically regional 
powers that seek … territorial adjustments, recognition as an equal … and/or 
changes in the rules and decision-making procedures within existing regimes 
(1999, 19). 
This passage does represent some improvement, capturing as it does historical 
examples (1999, 22) of expansionary aims that were more limited than in the cases of 
the most notorious universalising imperial powers that were earlier the focus of 
Schweller’s definition of revisionism. This revised schema, however, brings in some 
new problems of its own.  
The main definitional one is similar to one of the problems identified in PTT. Namely, 
the tendency to view relatively less ambitious or dissatisfied ‘challengers’ as 
operating within the bounds of the status quo order. This problem also has similar 
sources in a lack of grounding of the definition of ‘revisionist’ or ‘challenger’ in terms 
of some concrete spatial and geographic referents (note the vague use of the phrase 
‘are typically regional powers’ above). More generally, there is a lack of any 
consistent or coherent specification of the essential tangible features constituting a 
status quo order and a ‘challenge’ or ‘revision’ in the first place. Surely there needs to 
be some important common element(s) of change of a status quo order involved when 
applying the term revisionism according to differences in degree. Otherwise, there 
could be no justification for using the term, however qualified, for allegedly more 
limited cases. 
Despite the greater nuance that Schweller brought to his adjusted concept of 
revisionism, there was still one key aspect of his previously more biased conception 
that remained unchanged. That is, when selecting examples to fit his categories, the 
US was not placed in any of the revisionist boxes, whilst all of that country’s 
twentieth century enemy regimes were. The question accordingly arises as to how the 
US achieved such a powerful and, in many regions or sub-regions, dominant position 
in the international system. Surely the US has not always been a mere defender of the 
status quo order. If this were the case then we might imagine the current international 
system to appear much as it did in the early nineteenth century – at least in the 
Western Hemisphere. Given it is so evident that the US has indeed engaged in various 
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forms of strategic expansion throughout its history, it is surprising how rarely it’s path 
to world power has been analysed in terms of its leading role in various revisions of 
prevailing orders. That is, it’s various roles as a revisionist power.37  
There have been a few major contributions to the IR literature, such as key works of 
E.H. Carr (2001), Gilpin (1981) and Buzan (1991) that have treated the status quo-
revisionism dichotomy in ways that preserve a greater sense of value neutrality across 
the two categories in the abstract. That is, a less automatic association of aggression 
and blame for instability (if it occurs) with the revisionist category alone. Of these 
authors, Buzan (305-11) is the only one who has also gone on to attempt a typology 
distinguishing different forms of revisionism in the manner of Morgenthau and 
Schweller.38 While these three authors’ treatment of revisionism is relatively more 
nuanced and value-neutral, theoretical articulation of potential conditions for peaceful 
or relatively stable revisionism, at least beyond appeasement or radical retrenchment 
on the part of status quo powers,39 is still under-developed. 
Alistair Iain Johnston (2003) has noted the inadequacy of existing attempts to define 
and apply the concept of revisionism in IR, and the potential importance of this in 
terms of understanding the rise of China: 
Perhaps because … Nazi Germany is the paradigmatic revisionist state, 
international relations theory has tended to assume that we should recognize a 
revisionist state when we see one. But it is not always obvious. More refined 
indicators of revisionist and status quo diplomacy are needed. And when one 
does develop and apply these indicators…the orthodox rising-power-as-
revisionist argument does not really help to explain the totality of China’s 
diplomacy. 
                                                
37 Mearsheimer is a prominent exception to this, at least in regards to the rise of the US in the Western 
Hemisphere. Certain historical studies of US grand strategy, although not using the term revisionist, at 
least clearly depict the ways in which US strategic expansion has transformed regional orders (Layne 
2006; Hunt 2007). 
38 Buzan’s distinction between ‘orthodox’ and ‘revolutionary’ revisionism is discussed later in this 
chapter. 
39 Carr’s arguments (2001, chap 13), in effect, about appeasement as a potential means of enabling 
peaceful change have since been tainted by his accompanying justification for compromise with Nazi 
Germany prior to WWII (or at least German inter-war irredentist claims). For Gilpin on retrenchment, 
see (1981, 192-7). 
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This thesis agrees with Johnston’s appeal for more ‘refined indicators’. But it differs 
substantially in terms of proposed solution, and with the follow-on notion that the 
concept of revisionism does little to explain China’s contemporary strategic agenda.  
When developing his definitional indicators, Johnston gives special consideration to 
Gilpin’s (1981, 27-38) three international structures of (a) distribution of (material) 
power, (b) hierarchy of prestige, and (c) ‘rights and rules that govern or at least 
influence the interactions among states’. Johnston dispenses with the prestige 
category, arguing that realists seem to treat the term as coterminous or parallel with 
material power. This leaves two overarching categories comprising: (1) ‘the question 
of how proactive an actor is in challenging formal and informal rules of the major 
institutions in the international system that most other actors support most of the 
time’; and (2) ‘the attitudes and behaviour of an actor toward distributions of material 
power that appear to be disadvantageous to it.’ In regards to the second category he 
makes a distinction between dissatisfaction at the level of preference, and at the level 
of behaviour. For the latter material power category, dissatisfaction is defined as a 
clear inclination, and preparedness to use military force if necessary, to realise a 
redistribution of power.  
This thesis agrees with Johnston’s characterisation of the material power dimension as 
revolving primarily around the military distribution, and with his taking seriously 
revisionist implications that are manifest at the level of preferences (of which emerge 
at an earlier stage than immediate behaviour geared towards realising a pre-formed
strategic agenda). This thesis, however, disagrees with Johnston’s requirement for a 
‘clear preference for a radical redistribution of material power in the international 
system’ to be evident [emphasis added]. Johnston moreover brings us no closer to a 
more precise and tangible set of referents for identifying what constitutes such a 
redistribution, radical or otherwise.  
Issue is also taken with the overly broad and diffuse range of factors and indicators 
employed by Johnston. Essentially, this arises from a lack of discrimination in 
selecting for the sorts of ‘informal and formal rules’ or institutions that are most 
relevant for gauging a transition in the structure of power. Such factors as a state’s 
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participation rates in international institutions and degree of compliance with 
international norms are too diffuse and imprecise to tell us anything useful about how 
to identify a revisionist or status quo state in a particular politico-strategic context.40
Moreover, a focus on current pre-transition patterns of normative compliance 
obscures the fact that it is achievement of an elevated position in the international 
hierarchy of power that historically has opened up the greatest opportunities for a 
state to seek wider changes in regional or global political and economic norms and 
structures. Indeed, it is precisely because of this potential, in addition to questions of 
war and peace, that power transitions are of such wide and enduring interest.  
Given the level of unknowns involved in thinking about the long-term 
transformational impact of a potential power transition, the solution proposed is to 
limit the issue of normative challenge or opposition in discussion of revisionism only 
to those particular norms, rules and institutions that have a bearing on the way a 
regional military security system/order is hierarchically arranged. This serves both to 
(a) better unify the normative and material power distribution categories that Johnston 
treats largely separately, and (b) remove any automatic association of international 
hierarchical change with the wholesale overhaul or opposition towards existing 
regional and international norms and practices.  
The above critical arguments can be summarised as follows. To emphasise a positive 
first, all analysts have been intuitively correct in (a) their initial identification of 
historically generalisable categories of revisionist and status quo policies, and (b) in 
their common identification of a number of clearly-in radical cases of revisionism 
such as Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, Napoleonic France; and even some relatively 
more limited cases such as Bismarckian Prussia up to 1871 and the Soviet Union in 
the immediate post-1945 years. Despite this, no existing conception provides a 
satisfactorily precise, tangible and all-round consistent set of justifications for 
                                                
40 Johnston focuses on Chinese attitudes towards: the norm of sovereignty; compliance with 
international economic institutions and free trade norms; compliance with non-proliferation regimes; 
and accession to various human rights treaties. On these issues, the case for viewing China as a 
revisionist state is indeed unsupported. China has a record of being a staunch supporter of the norm of 
respect for sovereignty as the bedrock of international relations; has a reasonable record of cooperation 
with non-proliferation regimes; has been no more a barrier to the workings or extension of the global 
free trade system than other major powers; and there are a number of UN human rights treaties that 
China has ratified, but which the US has not. 
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recognising such a like kind. In addition, insufficient attempts have been made to 
work out how the rise of US power at various historical stages fits within a given 
definition of revisionism.  
This latter shortcoming is significant, firstly, because the US has been the most 
successful revisionist power in the modern era. It is significant also because the US 
has not always behaved according to an ‘aggressor’ or ‘predator’ image. At some 
stages and in some contexts the US strategically expanded through forcibly acquiring 
additional sovereign territory, or by imposing some form of jurisdictional authority 
(Nugent 2008; Hunt 2007). Yet, pointing to various coercive or violent modes of 
strategic expansion alone would paint an incomplete and inaccurate picture of 
America’s rise.  
In several contexts, America’s international extension has been facilitated by the 
consent of other states and their willingness to accept US parity or primacy. 
Moreover, on closer inspection this dimension of relative consent, which gives 
legitimacy, also assists a satisfactory explanation of why, for instance, Bismarck’s 
Prussia succeeded in consolidating their expansionary gains, whilst the successes of 
Nazi Germany and Napoleonic France were so short-lived. As will be seen, this 
question of (external) legitimacy is crucial when considering the possibilities or 
otherwise for contemporary Chinese revisionism to be channelled or negotiated in 
future towards a stable regional outcome.  
4.2: Basic definition and agenda for conceptual development 
It is proposed here that the most coherent and workable application of the term 
revisionism is to link it to the issue of hierarchical change in the military-security 
system/order of an identifiable geo-political region. Our basic definition of 
revisionism can thus be laid down here as:  
hierarchically consequential strategic expansion within a regional military-
security system – expansion that, when successful, works to transform the 
basis of the order (material and normative) upon which that regional military-
security system operates.  
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Strategic policies that have revisionist implications favour the relative advancement of 
that state as a great power pole within a given geo-political region. The term 
revisionism, accordingly, is being applied here as a description at both the level of 
systemic order/outcome and policy/intention. 
The remainder of this chapter will (a) expound at greater length upon the reasoning 
and considerations that have led to the adoption of this definition, leading to (b) the 
development of some more detailed and qualified definitional indicators for this and 
related concepts that form vital parts of an alternative power transition model.  
The arguments are developed in four sections. In section 4.3, the proposed definition 
associating revisionism with hierarchical change in the specific domain of military-
security order will be justified by comparison with the nature of power transitions, or 
political revolutions, at the intra-state level. In section 4.4, we clarify the concept 
further by separating out the contents of the term revisionism from that of three other 
commonly conflated concepts: irredentism, imperialism, and revolutionary 
vanguardism. A revisionist agenda or outcome may also be accompanied by or 
prosecuted through policies that fit within these latter categories. It is not necessarily 
the case, however, that revisionism will involve any of them, and so should be viewed 
as a wholly distinct category. Section 4.5 then expounds on four further positive 
features of the concept in its present reformulation (that is, considerations of what 
revisionism is, rather than what it is not). Finally, section 4.6 develops and defines the 
indicators for the alternative power transition theory that will be presented in its 
entirety in the concluding chapter to Part I. 
  
4.3: International revisionism and domestic political revolution 
It is largely because of the condition of anarchy that we intuitively draw upon the 
term revisionism as both an analogue and differentiation to the concept of political 
revolution in intra-state contexts. Taking this distinction beyond intuition, a formal 
distinction between the revision of international power structures and revolution of 
domestic political systems can be identified as located in the latter involving an extra 
dimension not experienced within the former. That is, within intra-state political 
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revolutions the location and/or expression of the sovereign power undergo change. 
Major international shifts in regional power and security hierarchies do not involve a 
shift in legitimate authority of this intensity.  
Within intra-state and international contexts alike, the quest for order is closely 
related to the quest to regulate the means of violence and conditions for common 
physical security. Within intra-state contexts, a key dimension of the quest for order, 
identified most famously by Max Weber (1978, 54), involves establishing the terms 
upon which an effective monopoly on the legitimate authorisation and use of violent 
force will operate. In any relatively stable domestic regime, the use of force and 
various military and police institutions are always effectively subordinate to the 
sovereign power of the day.  
In authoritarian systems, sovereignty is located either in the hands of a dictator, or 
more usually, in the consensus of an elite governing council. In liberal-democracies 
the expression of sovereignty is more complex and usually less direct. Sovereignty in 
this case is located ultimately in the institution of an electoral majority, but mediated 
through a web of dispersed institutional powers, delegated authorities and the 
influence of various organised political parties and special interests (the latter of 
which are also common to politics in authoritarian systems). At any rate, what is easy 
to ascertain in liberal-democracies is that various military and police forces are clearly 
subordinate to a civilian authority, the government of the day, which further is 
dependent on a sustained electoral majority for its longevity and survival. The state’s 
constitution, and therefore institutional structure, can also in theory be potentially 
subject to any number of proposed changes through referenda (including the 
abdication of democratic sovereignty itself). 
The apparently universal and ideal solution for managing violence within the state 
therefore has tended to be the attainment (forcibly or otherwise) of a sufficiently 
broad internal consensus or lack of resistance towards the location of sovereignty and 
structures of institutionalised power. Where this is not attained, or where such 
previous attainment is lost or undermined, the state lapses into a situation of a 
heightened risk of violent confrontation. A key factor usually is the attitude of the 
existing state armed forces towards the various protagonists.  
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To the degree that desire for revolutionary political change has a clearly widespread 
popular base, armed forces imbued with a strong sense of nationalism have sometimes 
opted not to violently confront a swelling wave of civil disobedience. In such cases, 
this has played a key role facilitating the resulting peaceful change in the location of 
sovereignty and in the state’s constitutional and institutional structure. Outstanding 
examples of this latter phenomenon include the democratic revolutions in Eastern 
Europe accompanying the end of the Cold War (Thompson 2004, chap 4).  
At the international level by contrast, sovereignty is dispersed and possessed by state 
agents, which among other things involves the ultimate right of authorisation of each 
state’s own foreign and strategic policies. Sovereignty means ultimately that no other 
power or institution of another state actor, or at the international level, has the 
authority to demand compliance without the voluntary consent and cooperation of the 
sovereign power. The most that can be expected within this set-up (international 
anarchy) is to harness a sufficiently weighty critical mass of material and moral 
support from other sovereign actors towards one’s own preferences, and in resistance 
to the aims of adversaries.  
The different role of sovereignty in the international context has implications for how 
violence is regulated. Most important, sovereign states are not legally obligated to 
comply with any externally issued dictates on the volume and type of armed forces 
they can develop and deploy. A state may be limited in its prospects to achieve what it 
desires by other sovereignties that deny it crucial material or informational resources. 
There is, however, no legally authoritative limit on the forces a sovereign power can 
develop so long as they have the means.  
The dispersal of military force and military goals in the international system has, of 
course, frequently created mutual security dilemmas as well as more concrete sources 
of threat and conflict. It has nonetheless tended to be accepted by state actors as a 
normal and legitimate state of affairs. Within intra-state contexts, any splinter of 
allegiance and command within state military forces is usually perceived as a threat to 
the stability of the polity. In international contexts, such division of primary 
allegiance and command is an accepted habitual feature of social relations.  
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A key consequence of the dispersal of sovereignty is that disputes and conflicts when 
they do emerge, and as is widely recognised, are not subject to any external or over-
riding arbitrating authority, at least in the absence of any voluntarily acceptance of it 
by the sovereign parties to the dispute. Yet, the dynamics that ensue are really not so 
different in kind from disputes and conflicts that arise in an intra-state context 
between revolutionary and conservative forces, especially in the anarchic moment of 
revolution itself. In both contexts, either opposing preferences are reconciled and 
compromised; or one side surrenders or retrenches from their position; or there is a 
more physical confrontation.  
The heart of comparison is that in both domestic political revolution and international 
revisionism, what we invariably witness is a basic challenge to or change in the 
structure upon which public security is established. In domestic revolution, the 
solution universally drawn upon is the establishment of a secure new consensus and 
allegiance around a new (necessarily singular) location of the sovereign power, as 
well as constitutional and institutional structure. The aim is that once this new 
consensus is secured, and concentrated authority for regulating violence re-established 
and conformed to, the pursuit of other goals pertaining to the attainment of the good 
life can be more productively pursued. This will often involve some form of social
revolution as well.  
In the international context though, substantial change in the structure of power is 
often pursued without an accompanying ambition to extinguish the sovereign powers 
of all or sometimes any other states in the existing system. The common aim across 
various historic revisionist agendas rather involves a desire to change the hierarchy of 
power amongst a community of sovereignties in a way more favourable to the 
revisionist state or coalition. A revisionist state may believe that it needs to expand its 
sovereign territorial base in a certain direction for this end, so as to acquire easy and 
exclusive access to more resources, or attain some more favourable relative strategic 
positioning. In other cases, a revisionist may just want to increase its own means of 
security and its position in a regional power hierarchy through developing capacities 
for greater influence beyond its sovereign borders. The latter sorts of restrained ends 
and means would include: obtaining tight and exclusive military alliances, developing 
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extended conventional deterrence capacity, or a key position in the hierarchy of a 
domain of international commons.  
It is also possible that events and outcomes that are revisionist in effect may have 
been driven by the more ambitious goal of eventually attaining to a universal 
sovereign empire within a region. If such a goal were ever achieved though, it would 
effectively destroy the international within that geographical part of the world, and 
thus would, at the latter stages, no longer be revisionist. A number of states over the 
past two centuries have realised a position of unipolar dominance or primacy within 
their home region. No state in the modern age, however – not even Napoleonic France 
or Nazi Germany – ever made the leap from unipolar hegemon to a (regional) 
universal empire. At this final stage, where regional affairs become the internal affairs 
of state, this would be a purely imperialist and revolutionary venture (see below), not 
revisionist. 
The key point of differentiation thus of revisionism vis-à-vis revolution is that in any 
time and place in which it occurs, it is the position of most states that the 
international, that is the condition of dispersed sovereignty, should be preserved. In 
contrast to intra-state contexts, where security order emerges from closure on the 
location of sovereignty, international security order is a product of the efforts of each 
sovereign state (and most influentially the great powers) to internally deliberate on 
and/or externally negotiate with others about definitions of security. More 
specifically, this concerns the question of what they each perceive as the safest or 
most practical distribution and disposition of externally (and in the case of territorial 
or jurisdictional conflicts, also internally) projected armed force amongst them.  
Order then may, in certain contexts, arise partly or wholly out of the sum of various 
individual and autarkic decision-making processes. This is a presumption clearly at 
the heart of MOR (although that same systemic order is then represented as having 
some far-reaching rebound causal impacts of its own). For Mearsheimer’s states, 
security can only really be satisfied through attainment of hegemonic advantage in 
terms of externally projected armed force. Alternatively, sovereign states do have the 
option, and have frequently used it, to negotiate and deliberate with their peers to 
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explore possibilities for a mutually acceptable basis for, at least temporarily, stable 
security order.  
The latter point leads to a further implication that is worth exploring, but whose 
possibility tends to be dismissed by MOR. That is, a consent-based security order, not 
unlike a well-established intra-state order, should in theory remain also as one 
possible power transition outcome. The key defining points here are simply that the 
condition of dispersed sovereignty has been maintained, and a shift in the military-
security hierarchy (or polarity) effected. It would thus even be consistent with 
revisionism for the powers concerned to evolve their level of military-security 
agreement and coordination to a confederation-type arrangement. This is an 
arrangement whereby the individual sovereignties initially establish and then 
voluntarily delegate administration of a joint force in certain over-lapping strategic 
spaces of a region to an autonomous multilateral or bilateral authority. The individual 
states as sovereignties, though, would still retain the right to pull out from or stop 
complying with any such arrangement (the residual right of rebellion) if for some 
reason they later deemed this as in their interest.  
The key question that arises, and one that has relevance when thinking about the rise 
of China, is whether such arrangements are possible to establish and maintain within 
power hierarchies that are not unipolar. The most successful historical example of a 
consensual and confederal-type security order after all is the internal relations of 
NATO.41 Can such an enduring foundation of consensus be achieved in a shift away 
from a unipolar system to a new and stably enduring bipolar or multipolar order? 
Such an outcome is viewed here as theoretically possible. As will be discussed in Part 
II, however, several concrete strategic conditions and issues in contemporary 
Maritime East Asia (and the interest structures and identities that lie behind them) do 
pose considerable obstacles to the realisation of any such vision. 
                                                
41 The multipolar Concert of Europe can also be viewed as establishing, to varying degrees of success 
at different times, some rudimentary principles for a great power consensus-based, but not confederal, 
security order (Kupchan et al. 2001, 112-21). 
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4.4: What revisionism is not 
To clarify this proposed conception of revisionism further, we now turn to articulating 
the differences between this and a number of other concepts that have often been 
insufficiently differentiated, and sometimes even treated as synonymous, with the 
notion of revisionism itself. 
4.4.1: Irredentism 
This term is specifically territorial, and is defined here as: any claim by a state on a 
territory it does not control, but views as a part of its territorial identity. Such 
territory is always disputed, and most usually already under the control of another 
state. Irredentism is thus commonly a major source of antagonism and conflict in the 
relations between states, as the party that is dissatisfied usually has to threaten or 
actually go to war if it is to physically redeem its claim. However, an irredentist state 
is not necessarily a revisionist state, and a revisionist state does not necessarily bring 
with it an irredentist agenda.42  
The efforts of the Serbian dominated Yugoslav rump state, for instance, to redeem 
territories populated with Serbian nationals in the wake of the break up of Yugoslavia 
in the 1990s, cannot be considered as revisionist.43 In order to qualify as revisionist, 
any irredentist territorial claims need to have demonstrable implications for a regional 
hierarchy. This does not just entail consideration of the relative spatial-geographic 
distribution of territorial mass. It also involves the degree to which the broader 
strategic position of the adversary needs to be relatively weakened in order to 
successfully execute and secure a physical territorial redemption, as well as who that 
adversary is in the first place, or who their allies are.  
For instance, the territorial scope of France’s pre-1914 claim over Alsace-Lorraine 
would, in terms of geography alone, not amount to any significant shift in Europe’s 
                                                
42 The theorists critiqued in this chapter generally do not make such a conflation. The association of 
territorial claims (as well as territorial expansion in general) with revisionism is nonetheless common 
within the discipline. For a recent theoretical contribution that does more directly conflate the content 
of these two concepts see Miller (2009, 85-119).   
43 For this and other cases of irredentism that would not qualify as revisionism defined here see 
Ambrosio (2001). 
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hierarchical order. To the extent, however, that France might have needed (with the 
help of Russia) to significantly weaken Germany in order to secure re-establishment 
of control over the territories, such a claim would potentially have been conceivable at 
the time as revisionist in its implications (as indeed the military and territorial 
sanctions imposed on Germany after the war were in fact44).  
4.4.2: Imperialism 
Imperialism is an alternative mode of territorial expansion, defined here as: the
coercive extension of military and (at least quasi-) sovereign control over any 
populated territories with a pre-existing independent socio-political structure. 
Imperialism and irredentism can sometimes be conceived as overlapping. That is, an 
irredentist agenda is sometimes perceived as an imperialist imposition by either parts 
of or most of the population of the claimed territory. Imperialism though most usually 
encompasses the colonisation of societies or nations viewed as foreign in identity to 
the imperialising nation, and often located at a great geographical distance from the 
empire’s core.  
This definition of imperialism is differs from Morgenthau’s, which in turn was 
different from more common usages. For Morgenthau, the policy of imperialism was 
synonymous with the revisionist one of seeking to change (in his words ‘overturn’ or 
‘reverse’) the hierarchy of power between two or more other powers. This usage of 
the term is unsatisfactory for two reasons: (1) because an international power 
hierarchy can be changed through mediums other than territorial expansion, and (2) 
status quo powers can also pursue imperialist expansion (in the more commonly 
understood sense) as a defensive means to preserve their relative position or 
advantage in a particular power distribution. Britain’s return to policies of imperial 
expansion post-1880, manifested for instance in the ‘scramble for Africa’, and 
occasional attempts to control Afghanistan, can perhaps be best seen in this light 
(Choucri and North 1975, chaps 3-5; Patomaki 2008, chap 4). So can Austria-
                                                
44 The Versailles Treaty imposed a substantial demilitarisation on Germany, leaving France as the 
dominant military power in Western and Central Europe during the 1920s (Kissinger 1994, chaps 9-
11). 
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Hungary’s de facto annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the late nineteenth 
century (Choucri and North 1975, chap 8).  
Morgenthau’s usage makes most sense if it is presumed that all strategic expansion is 
continental and territorial. While for most of human history this has been the case, the 
constant development of ever more powerful technologies applied towards weaponry 
and transportation over recent centuries has changed how military force can be 
projected and power balances formed. Conventional armed force has become more 
mobile over longer distances. Traditional land power has sequentially been 
accompanied by the development of international military power configurations at 
sea, in the air, and in space.  
In the maritime domain at least, such developments had already been long evident 
when Morgenthau first published Politics Among Nations in 1948. For much of the 
previous two centuries, Great Britain had been a naval hegemon, around Europe and 
globally. But during the half-century preceding 1948, such naval hegemony had been 
steadily eroded, with Britain voluntarily conceding to revisionist pressures in this 
domain from America in the Caribbean (Campbell 2007, chap 7), and Japan (in 
alliance initially) in East Asian waters (O’Brien 1998, chap 2 and 7; Kennedy 1976). 
Conversely, Britain opted to resist and compete with the emerging German revisionist 
challenge in the North Sea and English Channel (Kennedy 1980; Choucri and North 
1975, chap 6). In the 1920s and early 1930s, Britain engaged in naval arms limitation 
accords that would channel American aspirations for a global navy ‘second to none’ 
into an agreement that set a limit at overall parity with Britain, despite the clear 
potential for the US to eventually eclipse the latter’s naval power (O’Brien 1998, 
chaps 6 and 7; Goldman 1994).  
Zero-sum disputes are certainly possible within non-continental realms (see below). 
But so are cooperative approaches in which a new disposition of deployed force in 
specified geographical areas is negotiated between status quo-oriented and revisionist 
states. Given now the role and reach of air weaponry (including missiles) in 
conventional land power balances, continental hierarchies can also potentially shift 
through the evolution of a new balance of deterrence. Given that such modalities are 
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possible ways in which regional power hierarchies can be revised, the term 
imperialism applied in this context obscures more than it illuminates.   
4.4.3: Revolutionary Vanguardism  
Buzan (1991, 306-9), Schweller (1999, 19-21) and also Henry Kissinger (1957) are 
most associated with the concept of revolutionary states. In the work of these authors, 
revolutionary states fall at the most radical end of the revisionist spectrum, and denote 
the efforts of one particularly powerful state to dominate the system and redefine it in 
its own ideological image. It is argued here, however, that using the term revolution 
as a category of revisionism is not the most coherent and useful way of treating and 
synthesising these two concepts together. 
Schweller’s juxtaposition is between limited-aims revisionists and unlimited-aims or 
revolutionary powers. Buzan makes a similar distinction primarily45 between 
‘orthodox’ and ‘revolutionary’ revisionist states: 
Orthodox revisionism is purely about power and status. It involves no major 
challenge to the principles of the prevailing order, but centres on a struggle 
within the existing order … Revolutionary revisionism combines a struggle for 
power within the system with a basic challenge to the organising principles of 
the dominant status quo (1991, 306). 
Several of the criticisms applied to Schweller’s definitions apply equally here. 
Buzan’s treatment of revisionism, though, does have somewhat less of a status quo 
bias in his recognition (following Carr) that revisionist states can be motivated by 
security as well as profit. Buzan’s conception also contains a nuanced understanding 
that the same power might simultaneously be definable as revisionist in one strategic 
theatre and status quo in another. Following this, and according to the definitions 
developed in this thesis, US strategic policy in the post-Cold War period, for instance, 
                                                
45 Buzan also devised a third category of ‘radical revisionism’ to denote the attempts at collective 
action by third world states (eg. the Group of 77) to reform patterns of representation and distributional 
benefit in international economic institutions. In Buzan’s own formulation, radical revisionism ‘may 
pose no central threat to the basic distribution of power and status in the system’ (1991, 309). 
Accordingly, this thesis regards this as a reform movement not revisionism.  
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can be defined as revisionist in Eastern Europe and Central Asia; but status quo in 
Maritime East Asia, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere. 
The preference advanced here is for the shift towards a unipolar concentration of 
power in a regional military-security order to be defined as radical rather than 
revolutionary or unlimited-aims revisionism. On one hand, attainment of unipolar 
hegemony or primacy can sometimes eventually lead to an end-point in the desire for 
territorial expansion, as was the case with the Chinese Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) 
(Dreyer 1982), and the US on the North American continent. On the other, the road to 
unipolarity may not necessarily occur solely or even at all through territorial 
mediums. Such a road might encompass other modalities such as: outpacing potential 
rivals in defence proliferation within various international commons on the basis of a 
superior national economic base; or accumulating and being at the centre of a network 
of alliance dependencies and treaty relationships. 
The question of revolution in international affairs is nonetheless an interesting one, 
and one in need of further clarification. To do this, basic questions need to be re-
asked. Namely, what constitutes a revolutionary objective in the first place? And what 
sorts of actions are generally required in order to successfully promote such 
objectives? On the first question, Buzan and Schweller speak of revolutionary states 
as desiring an entire change of system, usually based on some form of new trans-
national ideology. This formulation is not perfect, but a workable starting point. Of 
the two authors, only Buzan moves us some way towards addressing the second 
question:  
The rise of a strong revolutionary revisionist threatens not only the distribution 
of power, but also the domestic values and structures of all the states 
associated with the prevailing status quo. Monarchies rightly quaked before 
the prospects of triumphant republicanism, just as capitalist states feared the 
spread of communist power and influence. In both cases, a victory for the 
revisionists threatened major political transformations like those imposed by 
the Soviet Union on Eastern Europe after the Second World War, or those 
imposed by the West on Germany and Japan in the purging of fascism (1991, 
306-7). 
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Change in the domestic constitution of states is critical to understanding revolution 
from an international perspective. For if a given power desires a certain ideology or 
alternative ordering of basic normative priorities to prevail in the international arena, 
it is the existence of a critical mass of other states with differing ideological priorities 
that poses the biggest obstacle. Such a state would, at very least, need to persuade and 
convert many other ideologically variant domestic regimes around to their normative 
preferences – or else sit and wait until such polities eventually ‘come around’ through 
their own volition. At a much greater level of perceived imperative though (whether 
as a result of domestic pressures or mounting external opposition and threat), the most 
logically ideal solution would seem to be an active policy of regime change or 
imperial annexation.  
Revolutionary policies are therefore defined here as: an intention or action to change 
the domestic political order and policy orientation (including possibly the annexation 
and extinguishment) of an existing sovereign state. This definition is consistent with 
the distinction already made between international revisionism and intra-state 
revolution. The separation of terms, moreover, is useful for descriptive purposes. For 
while revolutionary policies may indeed be revisionist in their implications, 
revisionist agendas do not necessarily involve revolutionary policies. And 
revolutionary policies are not the preserve of revisionist powers alone. It is due to this 
that the Bush Administration’s regime change in Iraq can be viewed simultaneously 
as revolutionary and intended to further the strategic status quo in terms of 
entrenching America’s existing unipolar primacy in the region.  
The example of the adversarial bipolar relationship in Europe between the US-led 
Western and Soviet-led Eastern blocs during the Cold War is especially instructive for 
grasping this distinction. According to the definitional indicators of my theory, the 
initial establishment of both these blocs are clearly definable as acts of revisionism. 
Nevertheless, once the Soviet Union had established an effective nuclear deterrent, 
the strategic policies of both sides in effect maintained a rough parity of conventional 
and nuclear capabilities in Europe, such that a quite rigid geopolitical status quo was 
maintained for decades. Within the West-centred IR discipline, the USSR is usually 
characterised as the revisionist power during these years. The perceived difference in 
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the policy orientation of the Soviet bloc in Europe vis-à-vis the West is somewhat 
illusory though.  
The USSR was indeed built on an ideology that looked forward to a bright future in 
which the states of the capitalist sphere would eventually collapse and become 
socialist. But normatively, many in the Western political classes too looked forward to 
a bright future in which the states of the Eastern bloc would cast off the Soviet and 
Communist yoke and embrace liberal-democracy and capitalism. Communist rollback 
in Europe was, moreover, a serious policy option considered in Washington strategic 
deliberations during the early Cold War (Lieven and Hulsman 2006, 21-8). At very 
least, the US-led Western bloc pursued a soft version of this policy (Fukuyama 2006, 
131-8) – best symbolised perhaps by the operation of Radio Free Europe.  
Thus during most of the Cold War in Europe, both the US and USSR can be described 
as revolutionary in intention and aspiration, but defensively status quo-oriented, not 
revisionist, in geopolitical terms. In some sense this situation even reflected a degree 
of consensus of a negative or pragmatic sort. That is, a fundamental political and 
strategic division was recognised. Each recognised the other as an adversary, and that 
the other also saw things that way. In hindsight, the prevailing caution seems to have 
reflected a shared desire to ensure that this tenuous situation at least remained stable.  
The key difference between the two sides was that the USSR maintained its bloc on 
more imperialist terms, whereas the Western bloc, with its basis nonetheless on US 
hegemony over strategic policy, was maintained on a relatively more internally 
consensual basis.46 This difference did prove consequential. For once USSR under 
Gorbachev began to indicate a strategic retrenchment from this region, the countries 
of Eastern Europe did prove to be primed for mass-supported revolution (Meyer 
2009). In time this was followed by the extraordinary situation of these former 
Eastern bloc regimes voluntarily lining up to join an expanded Western security 
community in Europe (David and Levesque 1999). Although not usually conceived as 
such, the resulting extension of the US-led and guaranteed security network of NATO 
clearly counts as a case of revisionism according to my theory. In this case, the US 
                                                
46 On the internal struggles within the Western bloc during the Cold War see Layne (2006, chaps 4 and 
5)  
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did not have to pursue an active revolutionary or imperialist policy to succeed at 
strategic expansion over a well-populated continental space. 
4.5: Aspects of revisionism 
At this point, we redirect attention to conceptual features that shed light on what 
revisionism is. The four positive features expounded below advance novel insights 
about revisionism as a concept that is: about power; relative change; is value neutral; 
and expressed in geographical space. 
4.5.1: Power
Power is a complex concept, denoting a phenomenon that is manifested in a countless 
variety of ways (Lukes 2005). It is also a concept that when applied to the social 
sciences is normally impossible to measure quantitatively, and therefore predict its 
potential impacts, with any precision. To be sure, there are aspects of social life that 
can be so measured and compared. This is especially the case with accumulations of 
various forms of non-living resources (military or economic) in reference to their 
relative uses and functions. The ease with which numerical indexes can be made of 
such categories has made them a natural focus for theorists seeking for (at least 
statistical) laws of human or social behaviour that are as simple, general and elegantly 
axiomatic as has been previously achieved within many natural sciences. 
However, given that it is ultimately human beings that develop and employ such inert 
resources; in the study of international politics, we need also to account for 
motivations and structured relationships whose tendencies are formed and conditioned 
by a profusion of open-system causal factors – both brute material and ideational. 
Indeed, from a critical realist perspective, the concept of power needs to be supported 
by a plausible concept of causation and causal powers.47
On this basis, there is certainly a place for a capabilities-based approach to treating 
power in IR. The capacity of various forms of military and economic resources to 
                                                
47 This linkage of power to causation, as well as the notion of power as ‘a capacity not the exercise of 
that capacity’, is also central to Lukes’ (2005, 12) extensive study of power. 
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destroy, obstruct, deprive, protect or provide can be tangibly estimated. And it is clear 
that most states seek to obtain as much reliable information as they can about both 
their own and other states capabilities in this regard. Most states act as if the 
accumulation of military and economic resources – whether for themselves or by 
others – is highly consequential for their interests, international status and influence. 
Moreover, when compared with lesser powers, the material advantages of a great 
power enable them to extend significant influence into a greater number of 
geopolitical issues across a broader geographical canvas, even if their preferences do 
not prevail on every issue (Lukes 2005, 74-5). Thus, where military forces are 
accumulated by states in peacetime but not actually used in active combat, it make 
sense to evaluate and rank the relative power amongst states according to the quantity 
and quality of their military capabilities, as well as supporting economic and 
population resources.  
As is seen in episodes such as the Vietnam War, and the experiences of the USSR and 
NATO in Afghanistan, however, states that have an overwhelming material advantage 
can nonetheless potentially have trouble achieving their defined objectives against 
less capable adversaries. The historical record also shows some instances in which a 
bid for unipolar hegemony, while temporarily successful, was eventually thwarted and 
completely reversed by the combined efforts of other states (eg. Napoleonic France 
and Nazi Germany). Conversely, in the case of the US, ascendance to hegemony or 
primacy within particular geo-political regions or sub-regions has often been 
enduringly accepted or even invited by other states, with minimal resistance or 
counter-balancing occurring. In other words, experience demonstrates that there is 
something more to international power than relative military and economic 
capabilities alone.  
The more holistic understanding of power advanced in this study shares some features 
with the conception developed by Patomaki on the basis of critical realist principles, 
and shaped additionally by the ideas of Anthony Giddens and Michel Foucault. 
According to Patomaki’s definition (2002, 113): ‘Power is the transformative capacity 
of agents’ capabilities (= resources as competencies and facilities).’ When Patomaki 
uses terms such as capabilities and resources, he does not just mean material ones, but 
also, and especially, discursive ones. That is, ideas and institutions that constitute, or 
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have currency in, society and which exercise a formal causal influence on agents, or 
provide them tools for action and exercising influence. In Patomaki’s words:  
When actors utilise, invent or innovate resources – normally to grasp or 
change the world – in the course of social interaction, they also produce 
discursive knowledge, techniques, practical knowledge and skills, which 
constitute internal social relations (2002, 113).  
Patomaki’s insights point to an important normative dimension of international power 
that co-exists on at least equal terms with the brute material dimension, and is 
sometimes primary to it. Of course when we talk about power, what we are usually 
referring to are particularly strong and influential sources of causal efficacy (as 
opposed to just any casual source) (Lukes 2005, 30). And in contrast to Patomaki’s 
focus on ‘transformative capacity’, it needs also to be acknowledged that power, both 
material and normative, and for better or worse, can act to inhibit and prevent 
possibilities for change and transformation, as well as enable it.  
Thus a more accurate form of concise and generic definition would be that: Power 
refers to the relative causal capacity of a given agent in relation to their environment. 
An actor that is more powerful relative to others in a particular social domain is 
accordingly one that possesses a relatively greater share of both material resources 
and normative assent according to the most important conditions constituting a given 
system of social interaction. 
In different social contexts, the balance and constitution of material and normative48
variables comprising an equation of power differs substantially. Within an 
international professional or academic organisation, for instance, intellectual authority 
or prestige (sources of normative power derived from one’s internally recognised 
contribution to a given field) count considerably in terms of influence and power, as 
often do personal and institutional affiliations. When such factors facilitate access to 
or control over the distribution of economic resources, a material power dimension is 
brought in. Such a dimension may also have been brought in earlier through the 
                                                
48 What is referred to here as normative power is similar to Lukes’ (2005, chap 3) revised concept of 
the ‘third dimension of power’. 
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means of other organisations, such as governments or business corporations, who 
attempt to influence the direction of research taken in the field. Military power is 
usually not a relevant currency of power in these contexts. It is always possible 
though for the state to intervene by using police or military forces to shut down a 
particular conference or organisation and attempt to physically influence what 
research can and cannot be done. In liberal social contexts, the passivity of the 
materially coercive arm of the state is at least a background enabling condition for 
intellectual freedom. 
In international relations by contrast, and in the case of power transitions and 
revisionism in particular, material variables such as military capability and the 
economic and population facets of potential power, are central currencies of power. 
This is the case even when we view these factors from a more normative angle. For 
what we witness in a power transition is the interaction between revisionist and status 
quo agents that bring to their interaction an, at least initially, differing set of 
perceptions and interests about what constitutes an acceptable or ideal configuration 
of relative military capability and geo-spatial posture between them.  
Beyond the potential destructive, obstructive, and protective power properties of the 
material capabilities themselves, however, I argue that state power manifests 
additionally from the resolve and commitment demonstrated towards particular 
interest objectives, the latter of which exercise a normative power impact on the 
people that collectively enact that state’s corporate agency. Such objectives and any 
actions oriented towards achieving them (including the development of greater 
material capabilities) are in turn perceived and interpreted from the vantage point of 
other states. The latter are faced with deciding whether the normative agenda of the 
other state should be band-wagoned with, accommodated or resisted.  
It would appear then that there are some important attractive and repulsive, or 
cohesive and divisive, forces operating in international (and intra-state) political 
settings. In the international domain, this is manifested in what is here dubbed 
positive and negative prestige. In intra-state systems, the equivalent is the existence or 
absence of authority expressed in the degree of conformity by society or particular 
groups to the command powers possessed by state institutions.  In both contexts, 
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division and cohesion hinges around the phenomenon of legitimacy. In both cases, 
such legitimacy is determined by the degree to which a (presently) materially 
powerful agent is able to claim the normative assent of others to its objectives – that 
is, attain and sustain normative power.  
In an international political context, normative power and legitimacy arise from both 
internal (intra-state) and external (inter-state) political sources. On the domestic front, 
normative power is most related to the issue of relative resolve and commitment 
towards the foreign policy objectives defined by state representatives. A government 
that defines a strategic agenda that resonates, draws the allegiance and willingness to 
bear risks, expenses and sacrifices, and encounters minimal resistance or divisions 
within its population compared to its rivals; such a government finds its power in the 
international arena, at least on particular issues, augmented beyond its material 
weighting. This is the dynamic that occurs when a materially stronger power finds 
itself in trouble within an asymmetric conflict situation.  
Similarly important, and possibly more so in the context of international power 
transitions, is the external prestige dimension of normative power. As a normative 
category, the concept of prestige, commonly understood in the IR literature as 
reputation for power, is one that has not been carried over from its classical realist 
origins into neorealism.  
A key exception is Gilpin (1981, 30-4) who retained more of the explanatory variety 
of the classical realists. While Morgenthau (2006, chap 6) characterised prestige as a 
conscious policy undertaken by a state to make an impression of power on others, 
Gilpin’s (1981, 31) discussion reflects more the understanding of Carr, and the one 
taken up here. In the latter, prestige is described as emanating from the perceptions of 
other states – to which I would add for greater clarity, regardless of the conscious 
efforts of the prestige-bearing state.  
The conception of prestige advanced here differs from Gilpin’s in two main respects. 
First, rather than viewing power and prestige as separate, it is more accurate to view 
prestige as a key facet of a form of power – normative power – that has a closely 
interactive causal relationship with the material dimension of power. The second and 
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more consequential difference is the distinction made here between positive and 
negative prestige. Positive prestige represents an augmentation, the latter a 
diminishment, of a state’s international power. Such a distinction brings greater 
clarity to the concept and makes it easier to develop indicators through which the 
phenomena can be empirically identified and evaluated.  
Negative prestige involves recognition of, as well as either adaptation or challenge, to 
a great power based on a perception of threat. Positive prestige conversely involves an 
acceptance by others of the legitimacy of a great power’s strategic disposition or 
expansion within a given geographical space. Revisionist agendas, of course, have 
often been effected through physical military success in war, or through prevailing in 
a less physical and more psychologically-based struggle that nonetheless has a 
materially coercive basis. However, the endurance of any strategic expansion 
achieved through force, the threat of force or other material threats, depends 
considerably on the balance of positive or negative prestige assessments that prevail 
in the aftermath. While not an absolutely determinate factor (see next chapter), a 
revisionist state whose gains have been made at the expense of accumulating negative 
prestige perceptions both within and beyond its new borders, bears potential 
vulnerabilities that are not experienced by a state whose revisionist agenda is 
supported by the normative assent of most other states.  
Naturally, there can often be a duality of assessment, with bestowal of positive 
prestige dependent on a certain limited strategic disposition, beyond which the power 
of the other state is viewed as a threat. Positive prestige whenever it is attained, 
however, can only be a boon for the power of a state. For through pursuing its 
expansion within the bounds of the acceptable or tolerable in the eyes of other states – 
that is, expansion broadly consistent with others’ normative or pragmatic preferences 
for regional order – it more reliably stabilises and reduces the source of potential 
threats to its attained position.  
It is important to reiterate that when distinguishing in definitional terms, and in 
peacetime, a great power from other lesser powers, the most relevant indicators are
material measures. Nonetheless, when it comes to the crunch of any international 
confrontation or crisis, the normative power dimension of relative positive and 
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negative prestige frequently plays a crucial role in augmenting or diminishing the 
power of states.   
4.5.2:  Relative change 
Revisionism is a relative concept that is necessarily defined in comparison to an 
existing or previous status quo order. This is a simple point, but its main implication 
is the often-overlooked one that the term revisionism is applicable to more than one 
form of hierarchical change. Thus in addition to the more commonly conceived 
radical or hegemonic shift towards unipolarity from some other previous polarity 
arrangement, more limited forms of revisionism can involve a shift from unipolarity 
to bipolarity or multipolarity, multipolarity to bipolarity, or vice versa. Limited 
revisionism can also involve cases in which there is a substantial change of ranking 
within a well-populated multipolar system (eg. the outcome of German unification 
under Prussia during the 1860s), or substantial shift in the symmetry of a bipolar order 
(eg. the power transition in Europe encompassing the fall of the USSR and expansion 
of NATO).  
In regard to a definition of the status quo, the one advanced by Morgenthau remains 
largely satisfactory. In Morgenthau’s words: ‘The policy of the status quo aims at the 
maintenance of the distribution of power that exists at a particular moment in history’ 
(2006, 51). There are two aspects of status quo policies, however, that have been 
over-looked in the existing literature. The first is that the status quo too is a relative 
concept. Accordingly, if a status quo order is unipolar, a strict or hard status quo 
policy would seek to preserve this order and fend off challenges by contenders 
seeking to (a) transform order in a bipolar or multipolar direction, or (b) replace the 
existing hegemony or primacy with its own. A hard status quo policy within an 
existing bipolar or multipolar order would be directed at (a) fending off bids for 
unipolarity, or (b) preventing the entrance or diminution of other poles. 
The second point is that in order to be more flexibly and usefully adapted to the 
empirical record, it is important to make a qualitative distinction between hard and 
elastic policies pursued by status quo states. A hard status quo policy involves a state 
actively resisting any change to an existing great power polarity. An elastic policy, on 
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the other hand, leads existing bearers and supporters of the status quo to accommodate 
or enable (through declining to resist absolutely) some degree of revisionist expansion 
and limited transformation of the regional strategic hierarchy. In this case, the 
appellation of status quo represents more an initial orientation and disposition, rather 
than a fixed and unbending posture.  
An important distinction needs to be made between an elastic status quo policy, and 
radical strategic retrenchment. A status quo power that pursues an elastic policy will 
be adamant in their aspiration to remain a leading pole within any altered hierarchy. 
An elastic policy can accommodate a shift to parity, that is, limited revisionism 
accompanied by the status quo state’s own limited retrenchment. What a status quo 
state pursuing an elastic policy cannot tolerate is a complete overtaking or eclipsing of 
it’s power, or demotion from the ranks of the great powers and polarity. Acceptance 
of the latter would constitute a more radical retrenchment of its position.  
Retrenchment, defined as a policy of voluntary strategic diminution or disengagement
(as opposed to involuntary defeat and induced surrender in war), is in effect a mirror 
complement of revisionist expansion. Given finite geo-spatial constraints, where 
revisionism is successful yet not the result of military victory, then logically one or 
more status quo power(s) must have voluntarily allowed a relative diminution of their 
material weighting in the regional hierarchy. Whether this involves an active military 
withdrawal from a region/sub-region, or a passive policy of not engaging in an arms 
race and allowing oneself to be brought into parity or eclipsed by a rising state; such 
policies are equally defined here as retrenchment. 
Accordingly, peaceful power transitions involving limited revisions of strategic 
hierarchies will necessarily entail (or have the conditions prepared by) some form of 
limited retrenchment on the part of status quo powers. A peaceful radical revision will 
necessarily be accompanied by a radical retrenchment. Therefore, in addition to 
policies of revisionism and the status quo must be added the third category of 
retrenchment (the latter two of which sometimes overlap in the case of limited 
revisionism). When thinking of these categories as referring to types of systemic order 
outcome, however, the traditional two-fold dichotomy between the status quo and 
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different types of revisionist order outcome remains as the most coherent conception. 
Retrenchment is not a category of order. 
4.5.3: Value neutrality  
Earlier in the chapter, it was argued that revisionism in IR has accumulated some 
overly negative or pejorative connotations that obscure how it can also be adjusted to 
more peaceful episodes of transition. In the absence of any other more benign 
complimentary concepts to the status quo in the discipline, it is necessary to reform 
the image of this concept in a more value-neutral direction.   
On a critical realist basis, claims of value neutrality will always, at the very least, be 
made on descriptive/empirical grounds. All concepts and explanations within my 
theory are, accordingly, being presented as representations of real structures and 
processes, to be judged, further adapted, or abandoned as evidence and logic indicate. 
It is nonetheless possible for a concept simultaneously to be value-neutral in a 
descriptive sense and value-laden in a normative sense. Revisionism, with its accrued 
associations in common usage with violent change and coercive overlordship, has 
often been value-laden in this latter sense. To the extent that it has, however, it has 
been based on a flawed descriptive foundation. On the basis of the conception of 
revisionism advanced here, it becomes possible to view it as potentially value-neutral 
in a normative sense also.49  
For a concept to be normatively value neutral, it needs to be the case that the 
phenomenon being described can, from a particular cultural or interest perspective, be 
viewed as neither a good nor a bad thing in itself. That is, from a certain collective 
and subjective vantage point, different cases of the same phenomenon are judged 
variously as having been good, bad, or neutral in their effects.  
In the case of revisionism, to a large extent this hinges on the case for the possibility 
of both peaceful and conflict-prone power transitions (presuming of course that most 
                                                
49 This thesis disagrees with Taylor that theories inevitably secrete a single, exclusive value system. 
See ‘Neutrality in political science’ in Taylor (1985, chap 2). 
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people do have a value bias towards international peace and the absence of war). The 
concept of revisionism advanced here is indeed adaptable to several cases (often not 
formerly classified as revisionism) that many in the West at least would view as 
historical developments that were generally favourable and beneficial, at least in the 
long run. This includes the case of the US destruction and conquest of Imperial Japan 
in WWII that facilitated its post-war establishment of regional maritime hegemony – 
an act of revisionism that, like the Japanese imperial project it was countering, 
employed tremendous violence. In this case, the violence used to achieve this 
revisionist outcome is often justified as having been a necessary evil.50
For consistency, one must also apply the normative value-neutrality criterion to the 
status quo. That is, the possibility for some status quo orders to be viewed as unjust 
from a contemporary value perspective. One might look, for instance, to the 
(admittedly short-lived) Napoleonic ‘continental system’ and Nazi imperium as 
examples of status quo orders that lacked legitimacy and were justified in being 
resisted and overthrown. The modes of expansion of both these powers leading to the 
establishment of these orders would today be seen as violations of the UN Charter. 
By contrast, according to contemporary international law, there was nothing illegal 
about Germany’s revisionist naval challenge to Britain in the early twentieth century, 
nor Britain’s arms race counter-response for that matter. The same applies today to 
consideration of China’s current gradual naval build-up.  
Current international legal considerations are unlikely to be the only factors 
contributing to the normative assessments people make about particular revisionist 
agendas and status quo orders. The above discussion aims only to remove any 
automatic normative associations attached to the terms status quo and revisionism in 
the abstract. Normative evaluations of revisionism versus the status quo need always 
to be assessed anew and built out of the particulars pertaining to specific cases.  
  
                                                
50 There has, however, been greater controversy over whether it was necessary to use the atom bomb. 
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4.5.4: Geographical space 
Any theory of international power needs to be grounded in some concept of spatial-
geographical context. After all, the transition of power and change in the balance of 
influence being spoken of is, by definition, taking place beyond the borders of any 
single state. Extending from the insights of MOR, and the lone contribution of Lemke 
within PTT, it is argued that, with the exception of the nuclear balance (to which can 
be added the military balance in outer space), international military-security orders are 
regional hierarchies.  
Our concept of geopolitical region is applicable not just to continental regions, but 
also maritime regions, and hybrid continental-maritime regions as well. This 
distinction brings with it an important qualitative difference. That is, in maritime 
spaces that are recognised as ‘high seas’ in international law, revisionist expansion 
does not involve contestation over property rights of territorial sovereignty or 
jurisdiction. This does not mean that zero-sum contestation over relative levels of 
force presence or control over areas of the commons is not possible. A country that 
refused to cap limits on naval deployment (whether status quo or revisionist) might 
still potentially find itself the target of punitive measures to force negotiation of a 
more balanced mutual disposition. War could be the result of such a confrontation. 
Nevertheless, the non-proprietary legal status of the high seas, and the absence of 
populations to govern or control, does remove one key source of affliction that has 
frequently accompanied continental power transitions throughout history. 
While an important factor, the overall picture is more complex and variable. For 
maritime regions can include within them island territories and land features whose 
ownership is contested. As with contemporary East Asia, the existence of such 
disputes, and accompanying legal and strategic disputes over the status of surrounding 
waters, can contribute to the very definition of an identified geopolitical region and its 
subregions. Variation in the possible forms of legal status within certain contested 
maritime areas in East Asia nonetheless adds greater complexity and nuance than in 
purely landed territorial disputes involving the politically exclusive category of 
sovereignty alone.   
128
Conversely, modern technologies have increased the scope for revisionist strategic 
expansion in continental regions to proceed through modalities other than territorial 
aggrandisement. In the case of the cultivation of exclusive alliance dependencies and 
networks, such an option has always been available to states as a potential modality of 
geopolitical expansion. In addition though, twentieth-century developments in 
weapons technology have extended the potential geographical reach of conventional 
deterrent capabilities. Accordingly, revisionism can potentially be executed purely 
through a shift in the regional balance of deterrence (unilaterally or in alliance).  
4.6: Definitional indicators 
The remaining task of this chapter is to map out and define the contents of the 
indicators that comprise the generic descriptive categories of the alternative theory. 
These descriptive components together provide a basic map of the general 
constitution and sequencing of stages common to all power transitions. The basic 
sequence is very simple. Primary causation in power transitions is located in the 
motivational structures and geopolitical agendas of the key powers involved. This is 
the first and generative stage of a power transition. The other two stages in the 
sequence are generated chiefly from the causal structures identifiable at stage one. 
These are (a) the varying types of interactive processes through which a revisionist 
encounter with a status quo order can proceed, and (b) the generic forms of systemic 
order outcome that can potentially occur in a power transition. 
It is at these two stages that the sequence model comprises a series of qualitative 
descriptive categories. These are organised as two sets of indicators – one for the 
second interactive process stage, and another for the third order outcome stage.51 The 
two sets of indicators, however, will be developed here in reverse sequence. 
4.6.1: Order outcomes 
It is at this stage that the term revisionism is operationalised as a marker of gradations 
of change within a regional power hierarchy. As a phenomenon that is expressed in 
                                                
51 The operational use of these indicators is addressed in the next chapter. 
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geographical space, any indicators for degrees of revisionism or for defining a status 
quo need to be rooted in tangible geo-spatial referents. For this purpose, the model 
employs and combines the concepts of geopolitical region and polarity.  
The geopolitical region is the setting within which a power transition takes place, and 
from which status quo orders and revisionist agendas are definable. The term 
encompasses both the geo-spatial and political-strategic dimensions of this setting. 
Part of its definition is geographical, in that what is being identified is a political-
strategic complex operating on a localised portion of the Earth’s surface. Moreover, 
geographical features often contribute to the separation of a given political-strategic 
complex from others located in other places. This was especially the case historically, 
before the exponential technological developments of recent centuries reduced the 
tyranny of distance, and helped to overcome many physical obstacles. In the modern 
era, as MOR emphasises, large bodies of ocean continue to provide a separating 
function, at least between continental regions. To the extent, moreover, that 
contestation persists in great power strategic relations, the issues that divide are still 
expressed locally in regards to the control or levels of relative influence within 
particular strategic spaces, continental or maritime. These are objectives that still 
depend upon concentrations of localised conventional forces for their exercise. 
While geographical setting is important, it is the field of political-strategic relations 
prevailing in a given geographical area that contributes most decisively to the 
definition of geopolitical regions. And it is to denote key features of this field of 
political-strategic relations that we here employ the term polarity. A geopolitical 
region is accordingly a polarity system operating over a contiguous geographical area.  
The similarities and differences in the uses of the concept here and in neorealism need 
to be clarified. Much of the descriptive content is the same. The poles being spoken of 
are indeed great powers, and defined by their possessing an overwhelming material, 
and especially military, lead over other countries in a regional system. 
Whereas neorealism argues that particular forms of polarity have certain causal 
properties or tendencies, it is argued here instead that polarity should be regarded as 
an order outcome or effect of state activity, not a cause. The concept of polarity here 
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also goes further than MOR in the tying of its definitional content to geographical 
considerations. Part of this involves incorporating Lemke’s factor of mutual military 
reach as one key criterion. There is considerably more though to the connection 
between polarity and geography than this. Two other criteria need to be considered 
when distinguishing a geopolitical region. These are (a) the effects of the existing 
distribution of politically parcelled territory, and (b) the existence and location of 
areas of overlapping interest. 
The first of these factors is crucial when considering the grounds for separating out a 
geopolitical region. For while brute geography and distance often do some of the 
work of separation, the role of these factors in themselves is frequently far from 
decisive. The best way to illustrate this is through reference to the role of the largest 
sovereignty on the contemporary Eurasian landmass – Russia.  
In Eurasia, the distances involved are such that it is easy to regard the separation into 
regions such as Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and East Asia as 
geographically circumscribed. In the absence of modern technology, such a view 
would carry much weight, although this did not prove to be an insurmountable barrier 
for the thirteenth century Mongols. (By the same token, the Mediterranean Sea was 
not a barrier for the Romans in linking together Europe south of the Alps and Africa 
north of the Sahara.) In fact, and in the modern world this is especially decisive, the 
separateness and distinctiveness of these regions is a product chiefly of the 
historically evolved configuration of political and strategic power.  
Today, the pole of Russia effectively sets the frontier boundaries demarking the edge 
of Europe, and the northern extents of Central Asia. Before the collapse of the USSR, 
these boundaries were further to the west and south respectively. In fact, the very 
existence of the contemporary geopolitical region of Central Asia, as well as the new 
geopolitical contours of Europe, are a direct product of this political/territorial 
collapse. To the extent that Russian territory is uncontested by others, this creates 
huge areas of internal sovereign political space that are geopolitically inactive. And it 
is the vast size of these inactive zones that contributes so much to the geopolitical 
separation of Europe from Central Asia.  
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Contemporary Chinese territory similarly contributes to the geopolitical separation of 
Central and East Asia. During various periods in Chinese history in which political 
fragmentation prevailed, a further geopolitical region was effectively opened up 
within the geographical/cultural area of China Proper.52  
The contemporary division of geopolitical regions across Eurasia is by no means the 
only one that could be imagined. The Mongol conquests, for instance, linked 
politically and culturally dispersed areas of Eurasia according to different 
administrative divisions and centres of power than prevail today. It would also be 
possible to imagine a large continental state, encompassing perhaps the Eurasian parts 
of the former Ottoman Empire together with parts of Russia, competing (or 
cooperating) with another vast continental state further in the East for influence over 
smaller states in a geopolitical region encompassing the Indian subcontinent. 
This leads to consideration of the other crucial determinant of a geopolitical region. 
That is, the identification of areas of overlapping strategic interest comprising a 
geographically localised security complex. Frequently, this manifests in the evident 
commitment of great power poles towards differing agendas for how particular sub-
regions should be politically and strategically governed. On occasion these visions 
can be complementary, or otherwise amenable to adjustment and accommodation. At 
others, they will be in conflict and contested on a zero-sum basis. 
The overlapping security complex can also be identified at the whole-of-region level 
according to the existence of a general structure of (conventional) deterrence. This 
structure might be based on unilateral policies and strategic postures amongst the 
region’s poles, or alternatively might be better assessed through taking into account 
alliance relationships.  
                                                
52 Major periods of political fragmentation include the Warring States period (403-221 BC), the period 
between the Han and Sui Dynasties (221-589 AD), the period between the Tang and Song Dynasties 
(907-960 AD), and the so-called warlords period from 1916-28. In addition, the Southern Song 
Dynasty (1127-1279 AD) existed in polarity with the Jin empire in the northern part of China Proper 
(and most other centralised dynasties at some time in their reign operated in polarity with other powers 
in Central Asia). All centralised dynasties were, moreover, established out of the military victories of a 
rising pole of power that originally ruled one localised area of China Proper (or in the case of the 
Mongol [1279-1368 AD] and Manchu Dynasties [1644-1912 AD], outside China Proper). 
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Having provided basic criteria for identifying geopolitical regions, we can now define 
the content of the indicators used at the order outcome stage. There are three 
categories: status quo, limited revisionism and radical revisionism. Each of these 
categories is identified initially according to the polarity existing within a particular 
geopolitical region. Such polarities are invariably supported by a prevailing normative 
structure that is usually institutionalised in formal treaty arrangements. Such treaties 
can be nominally universal in coverage (eg. the Versailles Treaty), or alternatively 
reflected in divided alliance relationships (eg. the division between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact). Thus in addition to change in polarity structure, it is important to look 
for change or challenge to the treaty arrangements framing territorial and military-
security orders. This is the equivalent of the state constitution within intra-state 
contexts. 
The method for identifying a status quo order is fairly self-evident. The task involves 
establishing the validity of a polarity structure, with additional reference to 
corresponding treaty structures that support regional territorial and political-strategic 
norms. While the status quo is the benchmark from which revisionist change is 
identified or projected, the preservation or restoration (after challenge) of the status 
quo power structure also comprise possible order outcomes in a power transition. 
Identifying and distinguishing between limited and radical revisionism involves 
somewhat more consideration. The difference between the two is the form of polarity 
shift. It is not one between more and less violent or peaceful forms of revisionism. 
There are conditions under which both limited and radical forms of revisionism can 
be conflict-prone or peaceful. This latter dimension is indicated at the second 
interactive process stage, not the order outcome stage. Yet, whether achieved 
peacefully or otherwise, revisionism of any gradation is always a challenge, because it 
always involves some degree of zero-sum adjustment within a finite space and field of 
relations. 
Both limited and radical revisionism are primarily indicated by shifts in relations of 
control, primacy or deterrence. In landed contexts, control is here defined as military 
occupation in either a sovereign or quasi-sovereign capacity. The equivalent in 
maritime contexts is ‘sea control’ defined as the ability to prevent military penetration 
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of a maritime region or subregion by rival navies. Primacy is indicated by patterns of 
alliance and spheres of influence (whether voluntaristic or the result of hegemonic 
subordination).  
In limited revisionism, if control or primacy is involved it takes place at a sub-
regional level. In effect, a shift towards unipolarity over a single sub-region that 
previously embodied a different configuration of strategic influence or control. The 
previous configuration might have been bipolar or multipolar, or alternatively 
consisted of the territory or unipolar sphere of influence of another power. A genuine 
sub-region needs to be a substantial geographical segment of the entire geopolitical 
region, not a minor frontier region. 
In radical revisionism, primacy (and potentially control in the case of a region of high 
seas) is effected over an entire region, and involves either the elimination or 
superseding of previously rival or co-existing poles. There is thus a move away from 
either bipolarity or multipolarity towards unipolarity across the entire region. In 
addition to violent ejection or diminishment, there is the possibility also of a power 
effecting a radical (or limited) revisionist shift through filling the strategic vacuum 
left by a retrenching power.  
Limited revisionism can manifest alternatively in the establishment of a new region-
wide deterrence or cooperative security relationship in an overlapping strategic space, 
continental or maritime. In such situations, the aim of a revisionist agenda is not to 
dominate but to counteract or prevent dominance by other states. That is, it challenges 
unipolarity or bipolarity.  
On the normative side, establishment of a new polarity normally produces a 
corresponding shift in the normative order underpinning a geopolitical region. The 
new normative order may or may not be consensually based. It might embody a 
division (such as the post-WWII European Cold War order), or be forcibly imposed 
(eg. the Napoleonic treaty system). To whatever extent backed or lacking in 
consensual support, the revised military-security order will usually be further 
indicated through treaty arrangements that attempt, successfully or otherwise, to 
enshrine the legitimacy of the new order. 
134
4.6.2: Interactive processes 
At this stage of the model, there are two sets of indicators – active and pre-active. The 
active category denotes a series of generic means through which a revisionist 
encounter with the status quo order can proceed. These six generic active processes 
include: war, conquest, control, deterrence, alliance, and negotiation. The pre-active 
category denotes an assessment of the balance of positive and negative prestige. 
Two types of dynamics indicated and assessed at the interactive process stage include 
(a) the extent to which a power transition was, or may potentially be, peaceful or 
conflict-prone, and (b) the extent to which a revisionist agenda was, or may 
potentially be, prosecuted on a coercive or consensual basis. It is the processes within 
the active category that indicate the existence of peaceful or conflict-prone dynamics. 
The issue is not always black-and-white, and most cases involve a combination of 
processes. Several of the six, moreover, have the dual potential to be accompanied by 
either peace or conflict.  
Coercive/consensual dynamics are most indicated by prestige assessments. Prestige, 
after all, is comprised of the attitudes other states have towards the status quo order 
and revisionist agenda in light of their own motivational disposition and balance of 
interest priorities. Some less direct indication of coercive/consensual dynamics can 
nonetheless be discerned within discussion of the active processes as well.  
The contents of the six active processes will be defined first, followed by further 
discussion of prestige. 
War: This is the only one of the six that can be described as non-peaceful and 
coercive by its very definition. Like the next two processes, it is also a predominantly 
physical category of indicator. That is, war is indicated by the attempt to physically 
achieve geopolitical objectives through prevailing in a military-to-military contest. 
There is, of course, a fundamental psychological dimension to warfare that plays a 
key role in determining its initiation and outcomes. However, its distinguishing 
feature when contrasted to a state of non-war is the physical clash of armed forces to 
achieve physical objectives.  
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Conquest: In practice, conquest is usually accompanied or preceded by a war. It is 
defined here as the physical military occupation of land territory beyond a state’s 
prior areas of control. The territory does not necessarily need to be formally annexed. 
While usually a non-peaceful modality, it is nonetheless possible sometimes for 
conquest to proceed with minimal if any military-to-military violence on the basis that 
resistance is weak or otherwise successfully deterred. Further, the action may to some 
degree be consensually based. Nazi Germany’s 1938 annexation of Austria is an 
example of such a conquest. 
Control: This term is used to capture equivalents of conquest and occupation within 
non-landed areas. Such areas include international commons such as the high seas and 
outer space, as well as maritime zones whose proprietary or administrative status is 
contested. Control occurs in these areas when the armed forces of a state or coalition 
are able to dominate and prevent, at will, the access and use of these spaces by its 
rivals. Achievement of control may or may not be preceded by a clash of armed force, 
and in some cases may in part be consensually based. 
Deterrence: This is the first of two indicators comprised of both physical and 
subjective psychological elements. Physically, weapon arsenals are the means used to 
attempt to neutralise the forces of the other, and constrain the scope of their potential 
uses. Deterrence is also psychological because the use of such military means to 
constrain others’ actions presupposes that the other side has a certain type and level of 
risk aversion that, under anticipated force level conditions, will dominate their 
motivational disposition.  
In a given case, such shifting force ratios may or may not exercise the intended 
deterrent effect, and indeed may sometimes be viewed more as an opening window of 
opportunity for aggression on the part of the rising state. In some cases, other states 
will, according to their perceptions and interests, view shifts towards military parity as 
threatening. At other times, mutual security satisfaction might be attainable. At the 
very least, though, shifts in the polarity of deterrence have historically played a major 
role in how the politics of geopolitical regions evolve, and in determining patterns of 
relative negotiational status and hierarchy. 
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Deterrence is a category in the model that, together with polarity, requires some 
quantitative treatment. In establishing that a shift in the balance of deterrence is 
constituting a revisionist shift in itself, quantitative comparisons of weapons 
inventories are often needed to gauge approximate levels towards parity, whether in 
an emerging bipolar or multipolar context. Any weapons compared need to be those 
actually deployed or flexibly deployable as a reserve back up within a region. As with 
the contemporary US, this is not necessarily the full national arsenal. Accordingly, 
and in contrast to PTT, it would be expected that in certain contexts, military parity 
might be reached well before GDP parity.  
In determining a state of military parity, quantitative measures, while a necessary 
component of the process, are not sufficient in themselves. Qualitative assessment is 
needed of the types of weaponry and technology being matched and their particular 
powers of impact. Given the role of differential technologies and unilateral 
innovation, military parity is not inevitably the expression of a weapon-for-weapon or 
man-for-man numerical symmetry. In light of this, parity, in a deterrence structure 
context, is perhaps best defined as: a state in which poles of power possess the 
potential capacity (assuming further equivalences in motivation and strategic 
competence) to sustain an inconclusive outcome in region-wide conventional conflicts 
based upon open battle- (as opposed to guerrilla-) style warfare. In multipolar 
regions based on four or more great powers, this criterion for gauging parity (or 
qualification as a great power) is altered to encompass a similar potential capacity to 
sustain a stalemate, only this time in alliance with a single other peer or lesser power.  
Shifts in the hierarchy of deterrence can be adversarial or cooperative. Adversarial 
shifts are indicated by ongoing arms races; relatively or wholly cooperative ones by 
the negotiation of arms control agreements and treaties, and/or the voluntary 
retrenchment of a previous bearer of the status quo. Revisionism in the hierarchy of 
deterrence can thus potentially proceed on a consensual basis. Conversely, the same 
shift might at other times enable the revisionist state to proceed with more coercive 
expansionary actions against some smaller states, whilst neutralising the will to resist 
of other great powers.  
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Alliance: The formation of alliances can have both offensive and defensive purposes. 
Alliances have been made by revisionist states to further the prospects for success in 
coercive wars of conquest. The alliance formations of most interest here though are 
those that, in themselves, can be viewed as constituting revisionist shifts in a region’s 
polarity structure, even absent their use for actual war. 
Three conditions must be met in order for alliance formation to constitute a polarity 
shift. First, there needs to be evidence of a formal mutual defence guarantee. Second, 
the alliance needs to be exclusive of other great power poles in the region. An 
‘alliance’ structure inclusive of all poles and most states in a region, would not be an 
alliance so much as a collective security or concert of power mechanism. Third, the 
alliance needs to be the expression of an enduring alignment of fundamental 
geopolitical interests, manifested in policies of coordinated response and deterrence 
towards the other poles (or potential poles) in the system. Alignment cannot be too 
temporary or part of an ever shifting manoeuvring of an essentially autonomous pole. 
At base, the states need to be aligned on the question of maintaining the relative 
competitiveness and deterrence posture of the regional geopolitical pole they jointly 
form.  
Negotiation: This denotes the inter-subjective process of reaching agreements, both 
formal and informal (or tacit), on questions of military-security order. This process 
excludes instances in which terms are imposed by the victor of a major war. It is 
inclusive though of instances in which means of coercive diplomacy short of out-and-
out war (eg. economic sanctions, the threat of war, and perhaps even some limited 
military engagements) were involved in shaping a negotiation outcome. In these 
instances, the powers being coerced are still judged as possessing sufficient discretion 
in their decision-making to be considered voluntary parties to the agreement.  
There is, however, more to negotiation than just coercive bargaining. Of most interest 
are those instances in which negotiation and deliberation leads to a genuine consensus 
in which all parties view the order outcome agreed upon as legitimate. Instances in 
which, at the outset, preferences differed or were in conflict in some areas, but which 
were eventually adjusted for and a mutual accommodation reached.  
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Prestige: Prestige is a pre-active category because of its basis in the motivational 
sources that emerge prior to and shape the actions that states take. Prestige operates at 
the level of formal causation (in Aristotle’s terminology). In terms of causal analysis, 
therefore, prestige is a more substantial explanatory category in itself than is the case 
with the active categories. The latter indicate more how a power transition proceeded, 
than why it proceeded as it did. The category of prestige indicates both important how 
and why aspects of explanation.  
Positive prestige is indicated from the support that particular states give towards the 
status quo, or to conditions under which they could support the revisionist agenda. 
Negative prestige is indicated from the perceptions of threat or illegitimacy expressed 
by states towards the policies of the leading revisionist and status quo powers. 
Subsequent chapters will elaborate on the methods for making such prestige 
assessments within case analysis. 
4.7: Conclusion 
This chapter has provided rationales and definitions for the concepts comprising a 
revised theory of power transition. Central to the discussion was the concept of 
revisionism. As a mainstream IR concept that has been persistently underdeveloped, 
the key aim of the chapter was to reformulate this concept in a more logically and 
empirically consistent, as well as value-neutral direction. More tangible, precise and 
consistent indicators were developed for differentiating cases of limited and radical 
revisionism within the military-security orders of geopolitical regions. These 
definitions are able to encompass cases of both more and less peaceful or conflict-
prone, coercive or consensually based power transitions. Variability in the potential 
dynamics of a power transition is further captured by the diverse set of interactive 
process indicators developed. Chapter 5 will now incorporate these largely descriptive 
conceptual elements into a summary statement of the entire theory. 
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Chapter 5: The Alternative Theory 
This chapter concludes Part I by synthesising the various components and arguments 
of previous chapters into a summary statement of the alternative theory. The aim is to 
clarify the theory’s core propositions so as to enable it to be both readily tested and 
operationalised for case analysis.  
The establishment of any generic cross-case theory within the social sciences is 
invariably complicated by the fact that the phenomenon being analytically isolated 
operates in an open system. Where identical or similar processes are at play across 
differing historical and spatial contexts, it is expected that the dynamics, trajectory, 
and even some core features may differ as a result of the unique causal complexes 
operative in particular cases. 
Yet, critical realism also depicts the world as structured and stratified in at least 
relatively permanent ways. Thus while the world is indeed extraordinarily complex 
and prone to evolutionary transformation, most of this arises from the interaction of 
causal mechanisms and conditions with determinate or finite structures and ways of 
operating. In articulating a synthesised statement of the alternative theory of power 
transition, this chapter will draw out and distil observations from previous chapters 
about both the determinate and variable (yet finite) features of the power transition 
phenomenon that apply universally.  
Note that in my usage, the term determinate differs from, and is not synonymous, to 
the term finite. Determinate denotes those features of an international power transition 
that are definite, necessary and unchanging. Finite applies to those parts of my model 
where there is a circumscribed range of possibilities, and yet none of the individual 
categories within it are fixed or necessary, but are variable in their incidence.  
5.1: Ontology of international power transitions 
There are two types of determinate feature that a given theory can embody. The first 
is the ontology of a theory. That is, the causal entities, agents or structures that are 
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claimed by the theory to exist, to possess certain definite properties and tendencies, 
and whose non-existence would indicate the absence of the theorised phenomenon 
itself.  
The theory advances five major ontological claims. Claim 1 states that great powers, 
conceived as relatively empowered and sovereign corporate agents, are the causal 
protagonists of power transitions. Claim 2 posits the significant causal status of state 
interest structures/complexes, and is the most theoretically consequential claim of the 
five. Geopolitically relevant interest structures are the primary drivers of the power 
transition process from start to finish. As generative structures comprising state 
motivation, moreover, they are the site at which the real potential for any power 
transition first emerges.  
Interest structures, however, are important as much for their cross-case variability as 
for their determinate causal role. In contrast to existing theories of power transition, 
we advance an open system concept of state motivation that acknowledges states as 
motivated by multiple, and sometimes conflicting, goals and values. The definition 
and relative priority of these are determined as much by varying cultural perceptions, 
ideas, and domestic inter-group relationships, as by the influence of the brute material 
circumstances states find themselves in. State interests and motivations, accordingly, 
need to be investigated for their particular case-specific attributes, and in all their 
complexity, in order to attain adequate explanation and understanding of state 
behaviour (past, present, and potential).  
The site of such investigation is the domestic socio-political system of states, which, 
unlike anarchy and polarity within neorealism, are argued as genuinely emergent 
structures that exercise real formative causal impacts on the individual agents that 
comprise the social system (in this case, individual human beings rather than states). 
The claim about corporate agency, in turn, is plausible so long as the identities and 
actions of state representatives are evidently moulded and conform to social 
prescriptions about their roles in a system of collective action. On the question of the 
reality of state corporate agency, this theory sides with Wendt (1999, chap 5), rather 
than Wight’s (2006, chap 5) sceptical view. 
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The three remaining ontological claims relate more directly to the material context of 
international politics. Claim 3 stipulates the indispensable role of geographical space 
as a stage setting, currency, and sometimes a material obstacle for geopolitical action.  
Claim 4 posits comparative military force as both the defining attribute of a great 
power, and core currency (together with geographical space) of a power transition. 
Both of these claims reflect an assimilation of key components of MOR. The main 
difference of their treatment in my theory lies in the mediating role of normative 
factors (ideas and values) in determining the meaning, and relatively benign or 
threatening security significance, that states superimpose on their brute material 
circumstances.   
Finally, Claim 5 affirms and assimilates the insight of existing power transition 
theories that a supportive national economic base is the necessary underpinning for 
military power. Whatever the social system and mode of production through which 
the economic life of a state is constituted in a particular historical era; in order to 
develop and sustain weapons production and military organisations, state leaders need 
always to generate and sustain sufficient wellsprings of industrial capacity, public 
revenue, and food production. Accordingly, national economic security motives in 
whatever form they take (benign/malign mercantilist, liberal, or autarkic) invariably 
feature significantly within the interest structures of great power states involved in 
power transitions.  
In addition to these ontological components, the three-stage sequence structure of the 
power transition process also counts as a determinate feature. The sequence is 
determinate in that it is impossible for a power transition to occur and circumvent any 
of the three stages. Introduced in the previous chapter, these stages are: (1) the 
generative motivational stage; (2) the interactive process stage; and (3) the order 
outcome stage (see Table 1). Both this sequence structure and the possible actions 
occurring at each stage are a product of and therefore circumscribed by the 
ontological features listed above. It is not an ontological entity in itself.
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Table 1: The sequence structure of an international power transition 
The primary source of causation is at Stage 1, which captures the generative powers 
of the perceptions and interest structures that causally underpin the content of the 
various great power geopolitical agendas. From the vantage point of the Stage 3, 
Stage 2 might also be considered as causal in terms of the influence of various 
possible processes (eg. war, deterrence, negotiation) on the resulting order outcome of 
a power transition. In reality, however, these processes are more caused than cause, 
and are really just a conceptual way of capturing the variable (but finite) forms of 
interaction amongst the various true ontological entities and forces. Namely, the great 
powers and the shifting relationship of their interest motivations to other of their own 
and to those of other states; and with reference to material factors of geography, the 
balance of military force, and economic capacity. The categories within the order 
outcome stage – geopolitical regions, polarity, status quo, limited and radical 
revisionism – do not possess emergent causal powers of their own, but are rather the 
formal systemic effect and outcome of causal mechanisms located elsewhere. The 
individual generic categories comprising the contents of both Stages 2 and 3 are, 
moreover, variable/finite not determinate features of the model. 
Stage 1 
Generative Motivational
Stage 2 
Interactive Process 
Stage 3 
Order Outcome 
• Primary source of 
causation 
• Intra-state 
perceptions and 
interest structures 
manifested in state 
geopolitical agendas 
Active 
War 
Conquest 
Control 
Deterrence 
Alliance 
Negotiation 
Pre-active 
Balance of positive and 
negative prestige 
perceptions 
Limited Revisionism 
Radical Revisionism 
Status Quo 
(preservation or 
restoration) 
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5.2:  Three hypotheses about war and peace 
The second type of determinate feature is more controversial when applied to the 
social sciences. That is, the discovery of determinate causal laws that arise out of the 
nature of the things identified at the level of ontology. The incidence and trajectory of 
a power transition is, indeed, mostly contingent on a unique case-specific 
constellation of multiple interacting causal tendencies. Most of these are generated 
from the motivations and actions of consciously reflective agents with the potential to 
change their collective mindset. Yet, it would appear that there are at least three non-
trivial aspects of power transitions, relating to war and peace, that can be rendered in 
the form of a general and determinate hypothesis as a sort of preliminary audition 
towards law status (pending more extensive testing and debate). Such ‘laws’ are most 
easily discernible through qualitative not quantitative forms of logic – that is, 
considerations of natural necessity (or observable necessary connections between 
variables). As determinate causal claims, the revelation of a single case anomaly, or 
plausible hypothetical one, would be enough to stymie the possibility for them to be 
considered as laws. 
Hypothesis I:  
The first hypothesis arises from the limiting properties of the spatial-geographic 
setting of international geopolitics. That is, given that a revisionist agenda always 
applies to and occurs within a finite geographical space and field of military-security 
relations – the existing status quo power(s), or other revisionist competitors in a given 
region or sub-region, are always faced with the prospect of losing some former level 
of relative power and status. That is, any substantial increase of territorial control, or 
military capabilities deployed in coverage over a strategic space by a revisionist 
power, naturally and unavoidably diminishes the previous advantages of status quo 
powers in a rough inverse ratio (taking into consideration likely qualitative variations 
in weapon technology and innovations between these powers). Accordingly: 
In a power transition there is always some form and degree of zero-sum 
adjustment that is being demanded, requested, or enacted.  
144
While neutral on the question of war and peace, this first hypothesis nonetheless 
defines and explains the essential challenge of a power transition. 
The spatial constraints are such that if a status quo power viewed their interests as 
best served by a hard status quo policy, then the only way to prevent any impending 
shift in polarity (even if only expressed as a shift in the balance of deterrence) would 
be through recourse to coercive military action. The latter contingency would mean 
war if the revisionist power retaliated rather than surrendered.  
Conversely, any peaceful revisionist outcomes will have been facilitated by a 
corresponding limited or radical retrenchment on the part of the bearers of the status 
quo. If the power transition process proceeds largely on a consensual basis, however, 
such a zero-sum adjustment in material power relations can still potentially provide a 
basis for stable military-security order and mutual security satisfaction post-transition. 
Hypothesis II: 
This second hypothesis will be referred to as the generic cause of conflict in a power 
transition. Once again, as a phenomenon that is expressed in geographical space, 
where conflict arises in a power transition, it is always due to the existence of 
irreconcilable zero-sum differences over how particular strategic spaces of 
overlapping value should be politically and strategically governed. The range of 
possible mutually exclusive ambitions and objectives include sovereign territorial 
disputes, contestation over spheres of influence, or over relative military force 
deployments in particular strategic spaces. Stated axiomatically:  
The generic cause of any conflict in a power transition lies in the physical 
incompatibility of the geopolitical interest definitions held by the great power 
stakeholders within an overlapping strategic space. 
This generic cause is not determinate in an ‘if X, then Y’ sense. The determinacy of 
the generic cause is most clearly seen through reversing the formulation. That is, if Y 
(the incidence of conflict) occurs, it is always principally generated by X (the 
conditions stated in the generic cause formulated above). The conditions of the 
generic cause are not sufficient in themselves to generate an outbreak of conflict. 
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Various other conditions are always operative that, moreover, need to be perceived by 
the protagonists themselves as either enabling effective military action or as making 
resort to arms unavoidable.  
The conditions of the generic cause are necessary ones though, unlike PTT’s zone of 
parity or the emergence of a potential hegemon in MOR. Sub-parity conflict initiation 
is possible if particular motivations and varying perceptions and thresholds of risk 
permit (witness, for instance, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941). Neither do the 
propositions of PTT and MOR necessarily function as symptomatic conditions 
indicating the potential for or immanence of conflict. A zone of parity, and an 
overtaking or potential hegemon can potentially emerge without the incidence of 
conflict. In every case of power transition where a conflict occurs, however, one is 
always witnessing the physical manifestation of an incompatibility in the pre-formed 
geopolitical agendas and interests of the protagonists. If this normative 
incompatibility is removed, there is no potential for conflict. 
While the generic cause of conflict stipulates this necessary condition of normative 
incompatibility, the actual content of the particular geopolitical agendas of states as 
well as the motivational sources underpinning them need to be filled in for each case 
under examination, and serve as the real dynamic causes. When examining the 
conditions for a more or less peaceful or conflict-prone power transition, the generic 
cause helps us to determine the factors that demand further investigation. In the case 
analysis of the rise of China in Part II, a key question underpinning the investigation, 
and derived from this generic cause, is: Are the current geopolitical interest 
definitions of China and the US (and other key regional stakeholders) compatible or 
incompatible in their physical implications within the overlapping strategic space of 
Maritime East Asia?
Hypothesis III: 
The third hypothesis states that:  
The relative gains of a revisionist state are guaranteed to be secure if it attains 
and sustains the consent to its position from all other great powers and most 
other states with a stake in a geopolitical region.  
146
Or in even more simplified terms:  
Mutual positive prestige = legitimacy = deep geopolitical stability  
In practice, such a condition of mutual positive prestige is not easy to attain in a 
power transition context, given the irreducible element of zero-sum adjustment 
involved. It is nevertheless plausible in light especially of the non-territorial modes of 
strategic expansion highlighted by this theory. Great powers in history, moreover, 
have not infrequently given enduring recognition to each other’s annexations – more 
usually when it is someone else’s loss. 
The term consent needs qualification. In practice, consent can be genuine or tactical. 
Tactical consent refers to agreements that states make on suboptimal terms out of a 
sense of either temporary or permanent weakness and disadvantage in a relationship 
or regional strategic situation. The longevity of such an agreement cannot be 
guaranteed under changed conditions of relative power or alliance. It thus lacks the 
stability and reliability of genuine consent, which is what the above principle 
presumes. The Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 is a classic example of an agreement entered 
into from both sides on the basis of tactical consent. Contrary to the assumptions of 
MOR in particular, reliable clues as to the relative authenticity or expediency of 
consent to geopolitical agreements and understandings can often be obtained through 
study of the internal foreign affairs discourse and interest structures of states.  
The determinacy of the third hypothesis does not apply to its opposite. That is, the 
notion that negative prestige stemming from other peer or displaced poles will 
inevitably threaten the loss and reversal of any revisionist gains. In modern times, this 
is precisely what happened to Napoleonic France, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. 
It did not happen, however, when the USSR established the Eastern Bloc at the end of 
WWII, where it sustained its imperial gains for four decades in the face of negative 
prestige from the US and Western European powers. When the Eastern Bloc did 
collapse, moreover, it was pre-dominantly driven by causes internal to the Bloc states 
(an internal legitimacy problem), and facilitated by the Soviet Union’s own moves 
toward retrenchment (Meyer 2009). 
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There are at least two general conditions that can retard the corrosive power of 
negative prestige. The first is an emergent material disparity so large that rivals or 
enemies can no longer militarily compete, individually or collectively. This situation 
was seen during the height of power of regional empires such as Rome and some 
Chinese dynasties (especially the Tang Dynasty), as well as American primacy in 
Maritime East Asia since 1945 and up until recently. The second condition is that 
existing rivals are unwilling to accept the risks, costs, sacrifice, or perhaps 
ruthlessness required to reverse an undesired geopolitical outcome. This describes the 
attitude of the Western powers towards the establishment of the Eastern Bloc at the 
end of WWII (despite the US nuclear monopoly). The corrosive power of negative 
prestige, while frequently significant, thus cannot be translated into a general 
hypothesis or law of reversal of fortune.  
5.3: Variable features 
The variable features of this theory are located within the three stages comprising the 
power transition sequence structure (Table 1).  
The generic categories within Stages 2 and 3 represent variable but finite possibilities 
at the interactive process and order outcome stages respectively. In regards to Stage 2, 
I make the (determinate) claim that any power transition that reaches the active stage 
will involve at least one of the six generic processes proposed – war, conquest, 
control, deterrence, alliance, negotiation. These modalities are variable in their 
incidence, combination, and causes within particular cases, but represent the finite 
range of means that can be employed whilst remaining within the bounds of a power 
transition.  
At Stage 3, I claim that the outcome of any power transition will closely approximate 
one of only three possibilities – limited revisionism, radical revisionism, or the 
preservation or restoration of the status quo. A limited or radical revisionist outcome 
will not necessarily be the product of the revisionist state that gave the initial impetus 
to a power transition. Historically, resisting powers have, in the course of their 
struggle with a revisionist, often come to define their own interests in a revisionist 
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direction. The aftermath of WWII in both Europe and Maritime East Asia should be 
understood in this way. Note that there is no determinate relationship between any 
particular processes at Stage 2 with any particular outcomes at Stage 3. 
Greatest variability is located within Stage 1 of the model. Even here, the range of 
possibilities is not infinite. To qualify as relevant, interests formed at this stage must 
refer to the two primary currencies of international power transitions – geographical 
space (beyond areas of existing territorial control) and military resources. Yet, 
whatever finitude exists in the possibilities for state motivation in a power transition, 
attempts to narrow the range down to a handful of generic categories are not 
particularly useful for either historical explanation or future projection purposes.  
One could, for instance, make a distinction between geographical control and 
deterrence interests. The problem is that we cannot know whether or not either of 
these categories is a potential source of a great power conflict, or even a case of 
revisionism, unless we can know or tangibly estimate (a) the minimum geographic 
scope and contour of expansionary ambitions, (b) the geographical or military 
development red lines that would trigger confrontation with status quo powers, and 
(c) the robustness, stability, and relative priority of the political motivations that 
underpin such geopolitical interests. No matter how finely we further sub-divide any 
generic categories here, to identify cases of fit or misfit we cannot avoid the need to 
define the specific ideational contents of state interests, and identify the reasons and 
socio-political forces that support or weaken the motivational force or potential 
commitment to defined interests. Both the influence of culture based on varied lessons 
of historical experience, and differences in the forms and dynamics of intra-state 
group relations, mean that the content of geopolitical interests (and levels of 
commitment toward them) cannot be deduced and predicted from a state’s brute 
material environment and potential power alone. Adequate explanation and/or future 
projection of power transitions requires state interests and perceptions to be 
investigated, conceptualised, and evaluated for their revisionist implications (or 
otherwise) on a case-by-case basis.  
The methods for identifying and conceptualising interest structures provide, 
simultaneously, the means for undertaking assessments of the balance of positive and 
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negative prestige (the pre-active process operative at Stage 2). This, naturally, is 
because it is these very perceptions and interest structures that form the standpoints 
states take towards the policies and actions of other states; which in turn mould the 
propensity of states to engage in behaviours consistent with various of those listed in 
the active category of Stage 2. Note that state prestige perceptions (and the interest 
motivations underpinning them) can sometimes be highly dualistic, leading to policies 
that are fluid and changeable. The shift in Anglo-American/Soviet relations from 
allies in WWII, against the shared threat of Nazi Germany, to enduringly hostile rivals 
in the war’s aftermath, provides a good illustration of this point.   
Evidence of both the existence of interest structures, and of positive and negative 
prestige perceptions held by states towards its peers, can be obtained from both word 
and deed. Official diplomatic communications and government documents are the 
most authoritative sources. Further and deeper insights can be gained through wider 
exploration of internal national discourses. The latter, however, needs to be supported 
by explanations of how currents in the national discourse are related to political 
interest structures that influence government policy (see Chapter 6).  
Compared to prospective analysis, in historical cases, explanatory claims about the 
role of particular interests and ideas can be relatively more decisively confirmed or 
falsified through additional reference to the actions and responses that states made to 
events (eg. the wars initiated, participated in, or abstained from; the compromise 
proposals supported or dismissed; the treaty terms voluntarily or involuntarily agreed 
to, etc). In prospective cases, given that there is usually more ambiguity in the 
evidence (at least on particular details), assessments of state perceptions and interest 
priorities are relatively more interpretative. In-depth and evidence-based justifications 
need to be developed, and are indispensable, for supporting one interpretation over 
another. 
The overall function of the three-stage sequence structure as a methodological tool 
differs too when applied to historical and prospective cases. In historical cases, the 
sequence structure, and the generic categories within it, are used to generate an 
orderly description that functions as a richly suggestive ‘thin’ explanation. In 
providing a framework for demonstrating how a given power transition proceeded, 
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such a ‘thin’ explanation in turn provides an efficient way of structuring further 
investigation into deeper and more particularised causal explanations concerning why 
a power transition occurred and took the trajectory (conflict-prone/peaceful, 
coercive/consensual) it did. 
In contrast, when applied to prospective cases, such as the rise of China, the function 
of the variable indicators within Stage 2 and 3 changes and is arguably enhanced. 
That is, the indicators are used to identify tangible possibilities for hierarchical change 
or stasis in regional military-security order, as well as potentials for regional peace or 
instability, implied within the existing interests of regional powers. In other words, 
they become tools for explaining possibilities. The claim here is that owing to the 
knowledge we have of the variable/finite forms a power transition trajectory can take, 
the model enables us to (a) confidently identify the potential for a revisionist 
encounter with the status quo order, and (b) identify important conditions under which 
existing geopolitical agendas and their interactive logic imply certain power transition 
processes and outcomes and not others.  
The task set for Part I of this thesis – exposition of an alternative theory and 
methodology for the study of international power transitions – has now been 
completed. Part II will now thoroughly apply it towards enriching understanding and 
explanation of the rise of China as a prospective case of power transition.          
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PART II: 
APPLICATION TO THE RISE OF CHINA 
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Chapter 6: Contemporary Chinese Grand Strategy 
The aim of this chapter is to identify and explain the complex of interest structures
underpinning contemporary Chinese grand strategy. The analysis of motivational 
causes in this chapter provides necessary materials and context for following chapters 
that explain and evaluate possibilities for Chinese revisionism. On one hand, the 
present chapter (a) defines the contents, and (b) explains the robustness of particular 
interests that are later identified as revisionist in their implications. On the other, the 
chapter establishes a reliable basis for subsequent future-oriented analysis through 
placing such interests in the context of the entire motivational disposition of the 
Chinese state. 
The chapter has four sections. Section 6.1 examines some case-specific 
methodological issues involved in identifying interest structures in Chinese foreign 
policy. The remaining sections then define and analyse the contents of each of these 
interest structures, as well as some of the inter-relationships between them. 
6.1: Chinese interest structures: methodological issues 
There are two components of state interest structures that always need to be identified 
and analysed. The first is their ideational manifestation in the form of real (that is, 
authentic, rather than misleading, representations of) government policy agendas. 
Such agendas, once consolidated, exercise real causal impacts through (a) supplying 
form and purpose to the political and foreign policy action of state representatives, 
and (b) influencing domestic social attitudes towards the state (in conformity or 
opposition).  
Secondly, such ideational agendas are themselves a perpetual product of the socio-
political networks and dynamics comprising the internal politics of a state at a given 
historical moment. Hence, the explanation of real grand strategic agendas requires an 
account of the domestic political forces that underpin either the stability or fragility of 
such agendas. That the institutional composition, inter-group dynamics, as well as 
political and social cultures within states are never identical across cases, means that 
153
the analyst must consider factors that are not replicated across other, even similar, 
domestic political systems.   
In the case of China, the fact that its domestic political system is based on the political 
hegemony of a single party (the Chinese Communist Party; henceforth CCP), that 
moreover has, in recent decades, reformed away from a previously more totalitarian 
system, remains central to understanding Chinese foreign policy. The intense 
concentration of power within the party and state apparatus, and the tight control 
exercised by this hierarchy over media, political/historical education, and civil society 
(Gilley 2011; Brady and Wang 2009), has fostered some distinctive patterns of 
foreign policy making and state-society relations in comparison to any liberal-
democratic state.    
To be sure, a generic mechanism in the foreign policy making process of hierarchical 
manufacture and dissemination (HMD) operates in some form within every modern 
state. In representative democracies, there is always a sense in which the government 
has a mandate to formulate and implement a foreign policy program reflective of their 
own strategic preferences. In liberal democracies, however, government policies are 
always expressed within a broader marketplace of ideas, and are subject to continual 
public critique and political contest. On foreign policy no less, political parties must 
sometimes be prepared to adjust existing policies and preferences or risk being ejected 
from, or prevented from being elected to, government. In a liberal democracy 
therefore, the mechanism of HMD is ultimately subordinate to another mechanism of 
public discursive selection (PDS). 
In contrast, within the People’s Republic of China (PRC), HMD is the dominant 
foreign policy making mechanism. This does not preclude the possibility of public 
debate on foreign policy issues. Where debate occurs, it is conducted within a tighter 
and more multi-faceted set of enforced parameters and prohibitions. In addition to 
prohibitions common in democracies, such as against incitement to terrorism or racial 
vilification, public commentators and opinion leaders in China will not be published, 
or else may be punished or at least censured, if their views contradict core political 
narratives and interest definitions.  
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Beyond this coercive dimension, hegemonic regime narratives exercise a formative 
influence on the normative thinking of many Chinese through the tightly controlled 
media and education systems. In China, one will not find any seriously contradictory 
views to the regime’s interpretation of national history, the definition of Chinese 
territorial integrity, or about a future political system that would not require the CCP 
to maintain the leading role. Consensus and repetition is thoroughgoing in Chinese 
publications about politics and international relations, and much of the accumulated 
official narrative was established and consolidated during the earlier totalitarian 
phases of the regime (1950s-early 1980s). The depth of the regime’s longstanding, 
closed propaganda legacy is such that even those strains of popular nationalism that 
are critical towards the government are (with the important exception of Han 
chauvinism [Leibold 2010]) largely just more passionate and one-sided defences of 
components of the regime narrative they have grown up with. 
Since the ‘reform and opening up’ period inaugurated under the leadership of Deng 
Xiaoping in the 1980s, the CCP has allowed some expansion of the space for open 
policy debate. Public debate and alternative views within expert communities are 
today evident on numerous issues, including non-trivial ones such as China’s future 
geopolitical strategy, economic and social policy, and, within strict limits, the 
possibilities for political and institutional reform (Leonard 2008; Gilley and Holbig 
2009). The regime has also expanded mechanisms of consultation (albeit still highly 
selective) with academic and other non-governmental expertise in the foreign policy 
making process (Lampton 2001; Zhao 2007). In addition, with the advent of the 
internet in China, the regime has needed to respond to and manage the unprecedented 
critical scrutiny and judgement of its conduct by an expanding online community 
(Shirk 2010; Xiao 2010; Hong 2007; Lu 2007).53  
Manage is the key word here. For while the regime has become more responsive and 
willing to consult with a wider range of expertise and social forces, there has never 
been any question of abandoning the one-party system and centralised authoritarian 
decision-making procedures (Tsang 2009; He and Thogersen 2010). The role of 
                                                
53 See also the reports on internet public opinion and government strategic responses in the annual 
‘Blue Book’ published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: Zhongguo Shehui Xingshi Fenxi 
yu Yuce (Society of China: Analysis and Forecast).  
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debate where it occurs, therefore, does not translate into a mechanism of PDS. Rather, 
in the Chinese case, HMD co-exists with a mechanism of authoritarian consultation 
and management (ACM). To the extent that threads of the relatively more open 
discourse are woven into official policy at the national level, it occurs through 
negotiation within and voluntary selection by the regime’s top hierarchy, and without 
the additional selective effects of electoral pressures and outcomes. 
The high degree of consensus (both enforced and genuine) in the Chinese polity 
simplifies somewhat the task of identifying regime interest structures. More than that, 
the ubiquitous spread and consistent expression of the regime’s view throughout the 
media and educational systems, and also in academic publications, means that 
Chinese interest structures are significantly transparent.  
It is important to acknowledge two aspects of Chinese foreign policy where there is a 
relative lack of transparency. The first of these concerns the full extent of China’s 
military development as documented by several non-Chinese state and non-state 
organisations and analysts.54 The second concerns the workings of the top-level 
decision-making process, and the precise spread of foreign policy views and factional 
affiliations amongst the most influential individuals and institutions. Both of these, 
and especially the second, are indeed impediments to a more perfect understanding of 
Chinese foreign policy, and to anticipating the responses of Chinese statesman to 
critical events.  
There is a tendency though among some governments and expert commentators to 
exaggerate the transparency issue in Chinese foreign policy. Indeed, to the extent that 
the transparency issue is extended to cover China’s future intentions, the critique is 
both misguided and unfair.  
Firstly, the longer-term continuity or discontinuity of Chinese foreign policy cannot 
be anticipated with any more certainty or uncertainty than when the question is 
applied, for instance, to US or Japanese policy. Moreover, whether in the nearer or 
                                                
54 See, for instance, the ‘Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of 
China’ prepared by the US Department of Defence; the Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (www.sipri.org); and Fisher (2008).  
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longer-term, noone can predict the precise response and standpoint that any of these 
powers would take, for instance, towards any future crisis over Taiwan or the Korean 
Peninsula, or indeed the timing and circumstances of such events, given open system 
dynamics.  
Secondly, such doubts ignore the realities of corporate agency. Given that to realise 
its goals a state needs as far as possible to bring society along with them, or at least 
prevent crippling political divisions, the state must either inculcate or attempt to sell 
its objectives through common avenues of public communication. The high degree of 
consensus, consistency and ubiquity in the expression and rationale of national 
interests within China means that China’s current conception of its intentions should 
be viewed as significantly transparent to outsiders.  
Even the uncertainty that arises when particular interests are variously interpreted 
within a polity, or viewed according to different schemes of priority, does not mean 
we cannot gain knowledge and more precisely define what those differences are. This 
is a challenge constantly faced by the Chinese themselves when needing to anticipate 
the foreign policy stances of incoming democratic governments. Within China, the 
lines of debate on the nation’s finite geopolitical options are in fact readily 
identifiable, even as the balance of views at the top of the regime’s hierarchy remains 
somewhat obscure. Indications of the influence of differing views in the debate can 
nonetheless be gauged through: (a) the evolution of the language in official 
government documents, white papers, official statements and media, (b) the 
qualitative and quantitative trajectory of the nation’s military development, and (c) the 
stances and actions taken by the government to critical events. 
The following three sections systemically identify and explain the interest structures 
comprising contemporary Chinese grand strategy. In addition to using authoritative 
Chinese government sources and statements available in English, the analysis cites, 
and is generally informed by, a direct acquaintance with the dominant positions 
within the Chinese language discourse on IR and Chinese foreign strategy within the 
PRC. The explanatory accounts developed also draw upon sources from the extensive 
English language social science literature on contemporary China.  
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In this chapter, I make a distinction between interest structures that function as the 
fundamental objectives or ends of a state’s grand strategy, with those that take the 
form of doctrines or paradigms about the strategic means for pursuing such ends at a 
given time. Our analysis of Chinese interest structures begins (in section 6.2) with an 
examination of the former; that is, what the regime refers to as China’s ‘core 
interests’. For the most part uncontested within Chinese society itself, these core 
interests represent the most unconditional objectives of the regime. For each core 
interest, we (a) articulate its essential ideational content, (b) summarise its existing 
behavioural impacts, and (c) explain its causal robustness according to the key 
reasons and socio-political forces that underpin the regime’s commitment to such 
objectives.  
After this, section 6.3 turns to critically examine the regime’s relatively more 
conditional and (at least partly) tactical ‘peaceful development’ strategy. Following 
an initial exposition of the ideational content and politico-strategic rationales 
underpinning this paradigm, I apply my three hypotheses about war and peace in 
power transitions to frame a demonstration of its conditional (and sometimes 
contradictory) relationship to other of China’s interests.  
The final part of the chapter (6.4) tracks the regime’s emerging interest in a great 
power strategy based on sea power extension. Drawing directly on influential source 
material from within China’s national discourse, I posit a relationship between the 
recent trajectory of internal Chinese debate on the future of its geopolitical strategy, 
and the emergence of this official interest in sea power. 
6.2: Regime core interests 
The Chinese government explicitly introduced the concept of core interests into its 
diplomacy in 2009. At the conclusion of the first Sino-US Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue with the Barak Obama administration, one of the PRC negotiators, State 
Councillor Dai Bingguo, publicly stated: ‘To ensure the long-term, healthy and stable 
development of Sino-US relations, one condition of paramount importance is that we 
need to support, respect and understand each other, and to maintain our…core 
interests’ (cited in Wu 2009). Following this, he described China’s three core interests 
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as: (1) protection of China’s ‘fundamental system’ and state security, (2) the 
safeguarding of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and (3) ensuring 
sustained economic growth and social development. Nothing of the contents 
articulated was new or revelatory. In the time since this statement though, the concept 
of core interests has become diplomatic code for those aspects of Chinese policy that 
will not be subject to compromise or interference in foreign relations.  
Dai’s formulation is judged here to be an accurate and succinct summary of the key 
drivers of the regime that well corresponds with its actual behaviour. As such, the 
three categories provide an appropriate framework for social scientific analysis. 
6.2.1: The ‘fundamental system’ and state security 
Ideational content 
Dai’s articulation of this interest as first in sequence drew some criticism from online 
voices within China, who questioned whether the regime was indicating it places 
preservation of its own power above other national goals (Wu 2009). A more recent 
official white paper places this interest in the middle of the sequence, and re-words it 
as ‘upholding … China’s political system established by the Constitution and overall 
social stability’ (WP 2011, section III). The adjustment is significant, as while it can 
still be consistent with the notion that external actors should not interfere in China’s 
internal affairs, there is a more implicit opening provided for the possibility of 
political reform. 
This particular core interest can perhaps best be summarised as stable and non-
disruptive political development free from external expectations. The refrain is that 
China is walking its own path to modernity and democracy based on its own historical 
conditions and cultural characteristics.  
Existing behavioural impacts 
One of the utilities of the formulation of this interest structure is that it can encompass 
and justify both conservative and gradualist reform tendencies within the regime. 
Political reform has not been as extensive and transformative as economic reform 
over the past three decades (Lai 2010). Even so, some important reforms have 
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periodically occurred during this time (He and Thogersen 2010; O’Brien and Han 
2009).
The current CCP leadership have in recent years initiated internal Party and expert 
deliberations on the possibilities for political reform. One of the most interesting 
products of the reform discourse is a study undertaken by senior scholars at the CCP’s 
Central Party School (Zhou et al. 2007). The report (titled Storming the Fortress in 
English) provides a stage-by-stage blueprint for furthering democracy and the rule of 
law in China. The report’s authors believe that China can, by 2020, cultivate the 
rudimentary ingredients that are needed before proceeding towards democracy, which 
they estimate could possibly reach a moderate level of maturity by 2040.  
Their proposals include a good many liberal reforms: establishing a system of mutual 
accountability and oversight amongst administrative, executive and legislative organs; 
strengthening the independence of the judiciary; and limiting the level of government 
control over the media. Other proposals are preparations for democratic reform: 
expanding the role of civil society and religious organisations as intermediaries 
between state and society; furthering intra-party democracy through enabling the 
election and candidate selection procedures of the CCP National Congress to operate 
in a more bottom-up and competitive fashion; and enhancing the role of the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) to debate and critically scrutinise legislation, including the 
annual national budget.  
The reform vision in Storming the Fortress represents the outer limits to which the 
current CCP leadership are willing to permit public advocacy on the evolution of the 
‘fundamental system’. Aspects of democratic reform that are ignored in the report are 
instructive. The report does not advocate the competitive (intra-party) election of CCP 
leaders, and affirms the need for the NPC to remain non-political, that is, accepting of 
the Party’s monopoly on steering the political line. There is also no mention in their 
specific recommendations covering the period to 2020 about expanding the popular 
franchise beyond the village level. 
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Those who do publicly advocate for more comprehensive democratisation continue to 
be treated by the government as illegal subverters of the state. Most recently, this was 
seen in the suppression and denunciation of ‘Charter 08’, and the diplomatic defiance 
of the state’s refusal to release from prison its chief organiser, Liu Xiaobo, after he 
was awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize (Dyer 2010).55  
The conflict between the regime’s priorities and the values of ‘Charter 08’ is present 
within the existing PRC Constitution. On one hand, the Constitution mandates a 
‘people’s democratic dictatorship’ under the ‘leadership of the CCP’ (Preamble), and 
prohibits ‘sabotage of the socialist system’ (Article 1). On the other, it holds the 
legislature to be the ‘highest organ of state power’ (Article 57) and ‘instituted through 
democratic election’ (Article 3). It also provides explicitly for ‘freedom of speech, of 
the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration’ (Article 
35). The former aspects could never be guaranteed if the latter reforms (revolutionary 
in total) were ever implemented. 
The government’s position on ‘Charter 08’, as well as its intensely hierarchical 
methods of exercising power, national policy decisions and state personnel 
appointments, demonstrate that it continues in practice to equate the ‘fundamental 
system’ with the one-party hierarchy of command mechanism. While objectively not 
a democracy (this would require a shift in the location of the sovereign power from 
the Politburo Standing Committee to a citizen’s electoral majority), the existing 
leadership depict their system as an already emergent and unique form of democracy 
with Chinese characteristics (WP 2005a). That the regime has sought to inculcate in 
the public an association between the concept of democracy (with its progressive and 
emancipatory connotations) and the existing system attests to the strength of 
conservative political tendencies within the CCP hierarchy. 
Socio-political explanation 
What duly needs to be explained here are the socio-political forces and reasons 
underpinning both the reformist and conservative tendencies within the regime. On 
the reformist side, the regime has, since the abandonment of Maoism, entrenched a 
                                                
55 The Charter 08 website is located at: www.charter08.com  
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general consensus in the national discourse about the need for ongoing gradualist 
reform in all spheres of administration. Dissatisfaction with the social chaos and 
stagnant development outcomes of the preceding period spurred the initial uptake of 
this norm. The combination of the successes of initial economic reforms to generate 
sustained growth, and the comparative experience of the Soviet system, has tended to 
reinforce consensus for gradual and stable reform rather than radical change.  
As a state with a similar Leninist and imperial structure, the rigidity of the Soviet 
Union until the mid-1980s is perceived to demonstrate the vulnerabilities that can 
accumulate when institutions are not adapted to evolving trends (He and Thogersen 
2010). In addition, the scope and pace of Soviet and then Russian reforms is 
interpreted as generating the undesirable outcomes of political and economic collapse. 
The latter especially is a routine point of reference in the national discourse, and 
frequently used as a defence against accusations of lagging political reform. 
A major motivation for liberal and democratic types of reform proposals within 
Chinese elites arises from public dissatisfaction with the widespread corruption at all 
levels of public administration. The top echelons of the regime recognise an interest in 
publicly acknowledging and seeking to remedy the frequent abuses of power and 
favouritism (Ko and Weng 2011; Wen [S.] 2012). Demonstrations and public 
disturbances over local grievances have greatly increased in frequency across China 
over the past decade (Lai 2010), and the regime recognises that its legitimacy as the 
people’s party will erode if it appears unable to curb official abuse and injustice. Both 
President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have publicly stated a belief that 
corruption is a threat that could lead to the collapse of both Party and state (Garnaut 
2012b; Wen [P.] 2012).  
While the CCP continues to enforce strict limits on public discussions of political 
reform, Chinese expert elites have been at greater liberty in recent decades to study 
and take inspiration from liberal-democratic political experience and theory. More 
Chinese experts now have a background of overseas study in Western countries, and 
more diverse literature on the political experience and theory of foreign countries is 
now easily accessible within China itself. Increase in elite support for liberal and 
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democratic reforms as a result of generational change cannot be discounted as a future 
possibility. 
Conservative tendencies in the regime are supported by several factors. The most 
broadly held supporting factor is the desire to avoid disrupting China’s economic 
development. Gradualist reform has so far sustained a prolonged period of high 
growth. In the process, a new class structure has emerged, involving new wealthy 
capitalist and urban middle-classes. These income strata comprise a clear (yet 
substantial) minority of the population at several hundred million (Ye 2010; ‘China’s 
middle class …’ 2010). In contemporary China, it is people within these social strata 
that possess the capabilities (economic resources, higher education, connection to elite 
social/institutional networks, and spare time) that would be necessary to organise a 
viable political opposition movement (Garnaut 2012c). For the time being, however, 
these key beneficiaries of the reform period have in general been unwilling to 
jeopardise levels of stability and wealth generation that are unprecedented in modern 
Chinese history (Chen and Dickson 2008). In addition, the steady accumulation of 
international power that the existing political stability enables is attractive to many 
Chinese within these strata who are enthused by the regime’s national revival 
narrative. 
The lower income majority of labourers and farmers are also more guaranteed to find 
or sustain employment in a high growth context, although under the current system 
industrial labourers in particular have little bargaining power to negotiate the 
conditions of their labour.56 Farmers have recourse to village elections and local 
public hearings, but are still systemically vulnerable to corruption or having their 
interests overridden through lack of consultation in implementation of higher-level 
administrative resolutions (O’Brien and Han 2009). Existing grievances towards the 
regime, across all classes,57 would likely prove less tolerable in the event of any 
prolonged national economic downturn and increased job scarcity.  
Other factors underpinning conservative maintenance of the one-party state are 
internal to the operation of the regime and the logic of its political narrative. There are 
                                                
56 See material on the ‘China Labor Watch’ website at: www.chinalaborwatch.org  
57 On Chinese capitalist class grievances, namely corruption, see Chen and Dickson (2008). 
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two general concerns within the regime that act as a brake on the scope of political 
reform. These are: (1) a desire to avoid debilitating divisions within the governing 
hierarchy of the CCP, and (2) the potential dangers to CCP rule and PRC political 
cohesion of allowing more liberal access to information and freedom of expression.  
The unity imperative is deeply embedded in the CCP’s internal culture. In part, this is 
a legacy of the Party’s long history of struggle with perceived class enemies. For 
those leaders that look to Chinese imperial history for guidance, moreover, one of the 
most persistent lessons interpreted by ancient historians concerns the role of 
factionalism, and the emergence of poles of power autonomous from the imperial 
centre, as harbingers of decline and turmoil (Liu and Ge 2001). Such lessons can 
easily appear confirmed by the painful political history of China during the first half 
of the twentieth century. Of more recent and vivid impact, though, are the perceived 
lessons of the ‘Tiananmen incident’. With regime conservatives prevailing over 
liberals in this crisis, the official interpretation entrenched within the Party is that this 
incident was a case of near miss survival for the regime, which in future can only be 
prevented by avoiding any public display of internal differences (Shirk 2007, chap 3).   
There is some practical logic to this concern with unity and division in the 
contemporary Chinese context. If policy-making and deliberation were to become 
more pluralised within the CCP through expansion of intra-party democracy, for 
instance, decision-making and especially inter-governmental agreement could easily 
become less efficient than is the case under the current hierarchy of command system. 
Top CCP leaders may find that they have even more trouble overriding special 
interests that could delay or stalemate policy implementation. Without an 
accompanying process of popular democratisation, there would be even less guarantee 
than presently that policies arrived at would be primarily geared towards improving 
people’s lives and remedying the myriad developmental problems facing the nation.  
Extension of the scope of popular democratisation, however, is constrained by the 
second concern. That is, the CCP regime would be lucky to survive the sort of major 
liberalisation of the public sphere that would be required to make genuine democratic 
politics viable. Democratic politics needs access to information, especially in 
situations where there is a demand to investigate and remedy popular grievances or 
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resolve conflicts of interest. However, unless the system of screening out most bad 
news stories in the media was maintained, more open access to information could 
easily lead a liberalised media, fairly or unfairly, to inundate the country with a torrent 
of bad news stories that could effect the level of public tolerance towards the regime. 
There are also risks for the CCP if it were to license open debate and scrutiny of its 
interpretation of Chinese history (see section 6.2.3 below). 
Any major moves to liberalise the public sphere will likely continue to face tough 
resistance from both Party conservatives and the self-interest of those PRC official 
and commercial elites that profit from or whose unlawful conduct is relatively
shielded by the status quo. This in turn feeds back into fears of internal disunity and 
confrontation between factions. There are thus strong motivating incentives within the 
regime against pursuing full implementation of the liberal-democratic strands of the 
Constitution, and for maintaining the ‘fundamental system’ on an illiberal and 
authoritarian basis.   
6.2.2: Economic growth and social development 
Ideational content  
During the three decades of ‘reform and opening up’, economic development has 
been the leading imperative of the regime. The development trajectory inaugurated by 
Deng Xiaoping is invariably represented in the national discourse as the new China 
finally finding its feet. The achievements of the early decades of the regime that are 
routinely noted include the establishment and consolidation of most of China’s 
political and territorial unity, as well as independence and protection from foreign 
interference. At the same time, however, it is also mentioned in passing and without 
detail that several of the economic and social experiments of this earlier period were 
misguided and erroneous. Learning from this experience, the regime under Deng’s 
leadership discovered the ‘correct’ path for China ‘at the current historical stage’.  
The essentials of this path include (a) recognition that China is still in the early stages 
of socialism and thus needs to make use of the methods of capitalism to generate 
growth and modernisation. The task of the reform period is thus the building of a 
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‘socialist market economy’58 to drive progress in the ‘four modernisations’ of 
agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology. Complementary 
to this is (b) a commitment to developmental progress and reform on the basis of 
pragmatic experimentation and adaptability. In an aversion away from idealistic 
ideological blueprints, China’s leaders have promoted an eclectic approach based on 
ongoing learning from the expertise and experience of others as well as China’s own 
successes and failures. A central feature of this pragmatic turn included (c) a strategic 
shift to re-open China’s door to international trade and investment relations with 
capitalist countries.   
On the basis of Deng’s paradigm, subsequent generations of CCP leaders have 
continued to evolve a national development agenda based on imperatives of high 
economic growth, opening up to the outside world, and the long-term goal of 
achieving a xiaokang shehui (usually translated as a ‘moderately prosperous society in 
an all-round way’).59 The latter concept looks beyond economic growth in itself to 
encompass qualitative aspects of development such as wealth distribution, social 
welfare, environmental health, culture and leisure. The aim is for the average Chinese 
to reach a modestly well-off standard of living by 2020, and for China to become a 
moderately developed country by 2050.  
Current leaders also promote the establishment of a ‘harmonious society’ through 
‘people-centred scientific development’ (Zhao and Ni 2007, chap 4). The latter is 
essentially a program to correct accumulated imbalances of the reform era, chiefly 
between the levels of wealth and development in urban and rural areas, in eastern and 
western provinces, and between man and nature (in reference to China’s severe 
environmental challenges [Economy 2010]).       
     
Existing behavioural impacts 
Countless researchers and journalists have documented evidence of China’s 
commitment to economic growth and social development in the reform period, and so 
only a brief selection of indicators is required here. In recent decades, the CCP 
                                                
58 On this ideological transition, see Pu et al. (2009, chap 3) and Harding (1989). 
59 See for instance: ‘President Jiang Zemin’s Report to the 16th Party Congress’, 18 Nov 2002, chap. 
III, accessed: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-11/18/content_632550.htm  
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leadership have consistently instituted an annual GDP growth target of 8 percent 
(reduced to 7.5 percent in 2012 [Back and Hong 2012]). In practice, the country has 
usually exceeded this. Official figures indicate an average of 9-10 percent growth per 
annum over the past two decades.  
On social development, the government has introduced numerous programs to address 
inequalities in income and economic opportunity, improve environmental protection, 
healthcare, education and social security. No attempt will be made here to evaluate 
how much substantive progress has been made towards social development targets. At 
very least, it can be noted that the idea of a relationship between progress or regress 
on these quality of life issues with social and political stability is well entrenched in 
the national discourse. 
Of most interest for the purposes of this study is the scope of the internationalisation 
of the Chinese economy that the ‘open door’ policy has facilitated. According to 
World Trade Organization statistics, China’s trade with the world was worth 55 
percent of its GDP in 2010. This divides roughly in half according to exports and 
imports.60 Over the last two decades, China has shifted away decisively from a 
posture of resource self-sufficiency and has steadily increased its dependence ratio of 
imported energy and mineral resources. China already depends on imports for around 
50 percent of its supplies of oil, iron ore, copper, lead, and zinc (‘China’s imports …’ 
2011).  
As the government and Chinese companies have increased their accumulation of 
surplus capital, the regime has since 2001 encouraged Chinese outward-bound 
investment as part of an official ‘going out’ policy (Yueh 2012). According to a report 
from China’s Ministry of Commerce, in the decade to 2010 ‘more than 13,000 
domestic investing entities had established about 16,000 overseas enterprises … in 
178 countries’ with a combined total stock of $317 billion (MOC 2011). 
                                                
60 These statistics are taken from China’s ‘country profile’ on the WTO website, accessed on 21 Nov 
2012 at: http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile  
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Socio-political explanation  
A simple but important initial observation is that China’s achievements in economic 
and social transformation in the reform period, while state-led, would have been 
impossible without the willing, or otherwise acquiescent, participation of most of the 
Chinese population. The Chinese people had also been responsive to previous state-
led progressive campaigns, some of which (most notably the ‘Great Leap Forward’ 
and ‘Cultural Revolution’) had ended in serious failure. In the reform period, regime 
leaders were able to rekindle that responsiveness on a more pragmatic basis, and 
channel it into an evolving array of structural conditions that have been more 
successful in sustaining continuous growth and development (though not always 
improved living conditions for everyone [Lai 2010; Economy 2010]). A substantial 
part of that structural environment includes the expansion of market competition and 
space for the private sector. Equally significant, however, has been the ongoing deep 
managerial oversight of the state. 
From the vantage point of the CCP regime, continued adherence to a policy platform 
of ensuring economic growth and social development is essential for its ongoing 
legitimacy. As a party founded on an ideology that views a socialist society as the 
vanguard of human material and spiritual progress, the regime has generated 
expectations in its population that, for credibility’s sake, it needs to continuously 
demonstrate it is both capable and willing to fulfil. 
The internationalisation of the Chinese economy has become increasingly structurally 
entrenched during the reform period. The recent global financial crisis has motivated 
the regime to rebalance the sources of China’s growth towards the domestic market, 
chiefly through rapid urbanisation of the rural population (Ru et al. 2012, see abstract 
and opening general report). Yet, given existing levels of dependence on export 
revenue, both for government and the vast export-oriented industrial sector, any 
marked reversal in the balance of the domestic and international markets would need 
to be gradual and long-term in order to be stable and avoid precipitating a severe 
economic downturn. As a result of such interests, the internationally extended arm of 
the Chinese economy will likely continue to be perpetuated on the basis of a 
considerable degree of ‘path dependence’ for many years to come. 
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The international orientation of the Chinese economy is also generated from 
interaction between the regime’s development goals and sheer population numbers. 
The regime’s goals to facilitate even a modestly prosperous standard of living for its 
huge population and place the majority of Chinese in urban areas will generate 
ongoing increases in demand for industrial resources and consumables. As the 
elevation of Chinese living standards towards official targets is still only in the early 
stages, so it is also likely the case with importation trends. Chinese economic security 
is becoming increasingly dependent on markets, production sites, and investments 
well beyond its sovereign borders.    
6.2.3: Sovereignty and territorial integrity 
Ideational content 
This core interest principally concerns the external recognition aspect of sovereignty, 
rather than the internal power structure dimension that is the focus of the first core 
interest. Even so, internal governance and separation of powers issues are an 
important component of territorial integrity issues such as Taiwan and Tibet, thus 
there is some overlap. 
Like other states, China seeks to protect territory over which the state already 
exercises control. The two generic threats to such an objective are of course internal 
secessionist movements and external invasion. While understandably keen to maintain 
an effective deterrent against the latter, China knows that it currently faces no evident 
threat of an unprovoked attack on the territory it already controls, and that is 
recognised by all states as falling under PRC sovereignty. China is faced with ethnic 
separatist pressures, however, in its large Western provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang. 
Because some foreign governments extend residential, moral or diplomatic support to 
organisations that Beijing views as separatist in orientation, reinforcing recognition of 
its sovereignty over these areas has remained a live issue in Chinese diplomacy. 
That the issue of territorial integrity looms so large in China as a foreign policy and 
external security issue, however, is chiefly a result of several major unresolved 
territorial disputes on China’s periphery. These include claims of sovereignty over: 
Taiwan and several nearby offshore islands (contested with the Republic of China 
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[ROC]); Southern Tibet (comprising the bulk of India’s current province of Arunachal 
Pradesh); the Diaoyu Islands, considered part of Taiwan province, in the East China 
Sea (currently administered by Japan as the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture); 
and all land features in the South China Sea (contested variously by Vietnam, The 
Philippines, Malaysia, the ROC, and Brunei).  
China’s disputes in the East and South China Seas also extend to issues of maritime 
jurisdiction in the waters contiguous to China’s coast and contested land features. The 
US too has indicated that its strategic interests are impacted by China’s claims within 
Maritime East Asia. Thus for China, the defence of territorial integrity here also 
means overcoming American interference or obstruction of its irredentist goals. 
China justifies its territorial claims on the basis of two ideas: (1) historical justice, and 
(2) a primordial territorial identity dubbed here as the ‘One China doctrine’. 
According to the first justification, China is seeking to recover territories that were 
conceded to foreign powers in ‘unequal treaties’ under conditions of defeat in military 
conflicts in which China was not an aggressor. The territorial losses are especially 
tangible symbols of what is perceived in the Chinese national narrative as the ‘century 
of humiliation’. Beginning with the coerced opening of the Qing Dynasty by Britain 
in the First Opium War (1839-42), the period until the establishment of the PRC is 
viewed with bitterness as a time when sources of internal stagnation and corruption 
left China vulnerable to exploitation and invasion by predatory foreign powers.  
With political unity and freedom from foreign interference established on the 
Mainland, and Hong Kong and Macao already transferred from British and 
Portuguese to PRC sovereignty, the main focus of the historical justice narrative has 
fixed on Taiwan. The symbolism is especially acute in this case. Taiwan was ceded to 
Japan at the end of the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), a defeat that was especially 
humiliating at the time given discrepancies in size and traditional Chinese norms of 
hierarchy in the relationship. Contemporary bitterness towards Japan, however, is 
even more the product of the latter’s full-scale imperial invasions in the 1930s and 
1940s. The earlier loss of Taiwan is viewed as one of the key stepping stones that 
enabled the later Mainland offensives. 
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Taiwan is also viewed as unfinished business from the Chinese Civil War (1946-49). 
Once the forces of the Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek were defeated 
on the Mainland, they retreated to Taiwan. The ROC government on Taiwan was able 
to maintain itself during the Cold War through its alliance with the US. With the US 
still maintaining an interest in the security of a now democratised Taiwan, the issue is 
framed in China as one of overcoming the last vestiges of foreign obstructions to 
Chinese unity and revival.  
To support the historical justice justification, the regime makes reference to the 
provisions of the Cairo (1943) and Potsdam Declarations (1945) that instituted the 
terms of Japanese surrender at the end of WWII. The Cairo Declaration states that: 
‘… all territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa 
[Taiwan], and the Pescadores [Penghu Islands, currently administered by ROC], shall 
be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other 
territories which she has taken by violence and greed’ (cited in Suganuma 2000, 120).  
The PRC’s view is that the comprehensive victory of the CCP in the civil war against 
a KMT regime that had lost its mandate to govern means that the PRC inherits the 
provisions promised to the ROC in the Cairo Declaration. While Taiwan is 
specifically referred to as a territory to be returned to the Chinese, there are no such 
specific international legal provisions to draw upon in justifying other Chinese 
irredentist claims, such as Diaoyu and Nansha (known in English as the Spratly 
Islands). On maritime jurisdiction issues, China bases most of its entitlement claims 
on an interpretation of provisions in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). 
The international legal basis for all of the PRC’s territorial claims is in varying ways 
contestable, and thus the regime has, since its inception, sought to bolster its claims 
with another form of justification. That is, the idea, or mythology, of a primordial 
Chinese territorial unity and the ancient title of any successful unifying regime to the 
lands defined as falling within it. According to this national myth, dubbed here the 
‘One China doctrine’, the normative ideal, and indeed imperative, is the establishment 
of an undivided sovereignty over all territories defined as historically Chinese. The 
prospects for the thriving of Chinese civilisation are perceived as relative to the extent 
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in which national territorial unification is attained. The necessity of the doctrine is 
supported through reference to the ‘century of humiliation’. While this alternative 
justification carries little if any normative force beyond China itself, it nonetheless 
plays a major role in forming identity, perception and motivation on these issues 
domestically.   
Existing behavioural impacts 
This third core interest provides a textbook illustration of the diverse range of 
strategic behaviour that can be generated by a motivational structure on the basis of 
‘conditioned causation’. In the case of the territorial claims, in particular, we are 
dealing with ideal objectives that are yet to be realised, but where actions to attain the 
ideal exist as a real future potential. Yet, despite this unrealised dimension, such goals 
have played a constant and indeed invariant causal role in the generation of varying 
regime behaviour across its entire history. 
The discussion here will limit itself to behaviours manifested during recent decades. 
In regard first to Taiwan, since the 1980s, the normative content of the PRC’s claim 
(undivided sovereignty; unification under ‘one country, two systems’; ideal of 
‘peaceful unification’) has remained constant, as have certain aspects of its strategic 
conduct. In regards to the latter, the most notable aspects include: vigilant efforts to 
prevent official diplomatic recognition of the ROC by other states; to prevent its 
membership in international organisations requiring state membership; facilitate its 
economic dependence on the Mainland61; and a steady build-up and modernisation of 
China’s offshore military forces, for which deterrence of formal Taiwan independence 
is currently a primary objective. The regime also opposes US arms sales to Taiwan. In 
2010, the PRC for the first time threatened economic sanctions on companies party to 
a US arms transfer (Garnaut 2010). 
Other aspects of China’s policy towards Taiwan have been more changeable, 
depending on shifting international and domestic political conditions. In the early 
1990s, the regime opened up indirect engagement mechanisms between senior 
                                                
61 This is evident in the PRC’s cross-strait policy slogans, laid down in the 1990s, of yi shang cu zheng 
(use commercial interests to push political objectives/or Taiwan’s political class) and yi min bi guan
(use the people to pressure the official class) (Lee 2006, 194). 
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government advisors on both sides of the Strait (Wachman 2007, 5-9; Lee 2006, chap 
3). Dissatisfaction with the increasingly independence-leaning policy direction of 
ROC President Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000) led the PRC to return to a hostile stance in 
Cross-Strait relations (Wachman 2007, 9-15). In 1996, the regime unsuccessfully 
attempted to influence the result of the first popular presidential election in Taiwan 
through firing missiles into waters near the island (Ross 2000). America’s response of 
dispatching of two aircraft carriers near Taiwan subsequently spurred PRC resolve to 
accelerate military modernisation.  
The regime maintained a hostile stance through the remainder of Lee’s presidency, 
and through the two presidential terms of Chen Shui-bian (2000-08), whose 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) unambiguously favours Taiwan independence. 
Apart from massive expansion of Cross-Strait trade (Lin 2007), Cross-Strait relations 
were politically stagnant and unstable during this time. In 2005, the regime passed an 
‘Anti-Secession Law’ that authorises the use of ‘non-peaceful means’ in response to 
acts the PRC would define as moves towards permanent Taiwanese independence 
(Zhao 2007). 
Since the election of KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou in 2008, the PRC has, 
to an unprecedented extent, turned towards détente and engagement under the banner 
of advancing the ‘peaceful development of Cross-Strait relations’. The steady stream 
of Cross-Strait agreements in the years since have focussed on furthering cooperation 
and removing regulatory barriers to economic and cultural exchanges.62 No ground 
has been made on tougher political and security issues. Chinese leaders continue to 
uphold ‘one country, two systems’,63 despite the overwhelming rejection of this 
policy within Taiwan itself, including the present KMT administration.64 PRC 
coercive policies of ensuring the ROC’s diplomatic isolation (Lowther 2011), and its 
military and missile build-up directed towards Taiwan (Chang and Cole 2012), have 
not ceased. Exceptions to this include a provisional ‘diplomatic truce’ between the 
two sides to refrain from poaching each other’s micro-state allies, and the PRC’s 
                                                
62 For a timeline and information about these agreements, see the ROC’s ‘Mainland Affairs Council’ 
website: http://www.mac.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=3  
63 See President Hu Jintao’s speech to the 18th Party Congress on 8 Nov 2012: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259.htm  
64 Opinion polls in Taiwan continue to show that more than 80 percent of the population reject ‘one 
country, two systems’ (Chan 2012).  
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approval of Taiwan’s participation as an observer in the World Health Assembly each 
year since 2009.  
In regard to China’s other maritime territorial claims, in the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping 
introduced a policy of ‘shelving disputes’ and ‘joint development’ in disputed zones. 
These phrases have been a regular refrain on the issues of Diaoyu and Nansha ever 
since. During the same time, however, the regime has reinforced its commitment to a 
non-negotiable stance on the sovereignty issue. In 1992, the regime incorporated its 
claims to Diaoyu and Nansha into national law in Article 2 of the PRC’s ‘Law on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone’.65 Whenever a controversy emerges on these 
issues, diplomatic representatives of the regime always state that the PRC’s sovereign 
claims are ‘indisputable’. Maps published in China indicate the territories as part of 
the PRC, and without any indication that they are disputed.  
On maritime disputes, Chinese conduct has oscillated over time between different 
degrees of passivity and confrontation. In both the East and South China Seas, small 
clashes between fishermen and patrol vessels in disputed areas, or involving 
irredentist activists from either side, have for decades periodically disrupted China’s 
relationships with other claimants. Since 2009, however, confrontation has escalated 
and become more regular.66 In the South China Sea, this has occurred despite China 
and ASEAN’s years-long negotiation and signing, in 2002, of an interim accord 
entitled the ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’.67
Recent years have seen a renewed agitation in Chinese diplomacy towards the 
ongoing sovereignty contestation and economic activities in disputed areas of other 
claimants. China’s actions have included: major increases in patrolling activities and 
military exercises in and near disputed maritime areas; more frequent engagement in 
                                                
65 The text of this law can be accessed at: http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/tsatcz392/
66 For a detailed chronology of various relevant events since this time, see the China-Japan and China-
Southeast Asia sections of the Comparative Connections journal for the years 2010-12: 
http://csis.org/program/comparative-connections See also ICG (2012a; 2012b). For a Chinese 
perspective, see Wang (2012). 
67 The text of the Declaration can be accessed at: http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm  
In addition to promoting regulatory cooperation in the area, the Declaration establishes general 
principles of resolving disputes through peaceful means, refraining from the threat or use of force and 
from escalating disputes by occupying currently uninhabited land features. It is, however, not the 
detailed and legally binding ‘code of conduct’ that was initially intended by its advocates (Emmers 
2007, 55-9).  
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low-level physical confrontations in disputed areas and tit-for-tat patterns of 
diplomatic and symbolic legal retaliation with Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan; 
and the employment of strategically targeted economic sanctions (albeit so far minor) 
towards other disputants during particular standoffs. Frequent editorials on these 
issues in Chinese state-owned media since 2010, moreover, indicate a reinforced 
determination towards prevailing in sovereignty disputes over the long term, as well 
as a readiness to punish other claimants in future if their opposition to China’s 
position is sustained. 
China’s recent assertiveness in the South China Sea has also involved the US. No 
openly tense incidents between the US and China in the South China Sea occurred 
during the Bush administration after 2001. That was the year when a crash between a 
US spy plane and Chinese fighter jet within an uncontested part of China’s exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) had created a brief diplomatic crisis. During 2009, the first year 
of the Obama administration, the Chinese renewed their protests against US military 
surveillance patrols in their claimed EEZ. The most notable of numerous incidents 
involved the close surrounding of the US surveillance ship USNS Impeccable by five 
Chinese fishing vessels.68 As in 2001, Chinese officials demanded, unsuccessfully, 
that the US surveillance missions cease altogether.  
In 2010, in formal dialogues between US and Chinese high officials, the Chinese a 
few times indicated that it views the South China Sea as a ‘core interest’ just like 
Taiwan and Tibet (Wu 2010; Sheridan 2010). Chinese officials have not made a direct 
association between the term ‘core interest’ and their claims in the South China Sea in 
their public diplomacy. Nevertheless, the term, with its non-negotiable connotations, 
is certainly consistent with the way the territorial sovereignty aspect is routinely 
treated in the internal Chinese discourse. 
Socio-political explanation
Like the second core interest, the contents of this third one also have considerable 
popular support. However, exactly what proportion of the population are true 
believers of the ‘One China doctrine’, or rather pragmatic conformists that go along 
                                                
68 See the US-China relations section of Comparative Connections, Vol. 11, No. 1-4 (2009). Accessible 
at: http://csis.org/program/comparative-connections
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with it for self-protection, career advancement, or concerns about socio-political 
stability is not known. There are no fine-grained or free-ranging social science 
surveys conducted about these issues in China.  
This reveals an important point. That is, the basis of Chinese irredentist claims is a 
narrative about history that is taken for granted and never subject to public critical 
scrutiny. Both the historical justice and ‘One China’ mythology aspects of this 
narrative have been entrenched through several generations of propaganda, and 
initially under totalitarian political conditions. At the same time, however, the 
narrative draws normative strength and staying power from popular memories of 
Japanese imperialism and Chinese degradation and suffering that are recounted within 
many families, as well as more ubiquitously within the national discourse.  
At the regime level, ongoing commitment to all of China’s outstanding irredentist 
claims is underpinned by two fears. These are (1) the fear of opening up internal 
political schisms, and (2) the fear of losing credibility. Both fears are well founded. 
Giving substance to the first is the fact that generations of regime propaganda have 
created a great many true believers of the ‘One China doctrine’ and its terms of 
national revival. PLA publications are highly doctrinaire in their commitment to the 
narrative, and express the necessity of preparing for military struggle to secure 
unredeemed territories, and not just Taiwan. Any CCP leader that made moves to 
abandon Chinese sovereignty claims would be unlikely to have the PLA, or at least a 
united PLA, on their side. Without PLA support, such leaders could be sidelined or 
ousted by other Politburo members opposed to such a policy shift.     
The millions of Chinese netizens that express passionately nationalist views on 
territorial issues are another indication that there are a large number of devout 
believers in the ‘One China doctrine’ across Chinese society. Particularly alarming 
from the regime’s point of view is the criticism they receive on the internet suggesting 
they are a soft touch on territorial integrity issues, or selling out the national interest 
(Shirk 2007, chap 6 and 7; Hong 2007). In proportion to China’s massive population, 
the views of radical nationalist online agitators may not be representative of the views 
of the bulk of the population. As Susan Shirk argues, however, whether minority 
voices or not, authoritarian China has been responsive to radical nationalist voices on 
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numerous occasions since the 1990s in order to pre-empt the development of 
oppositional activism and division within the regime (Shirk 2007). The regime’s more 
assertive stance on territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas in recent years 
in great part reflects this perceived imperative.    
At the same time though, in persisting with an uncompromising normative stance on 
these issues, the regime has simply been defending the terms of a long-standing 
narrative of its own creation. Accentuating concerns about political schism, many in 
the regime likely sense that the veracity of the narrative itself would become difficult 
to sustain if exposed to free critical and empirical scrutiny. This is the basis of the 
credibility fear. 
The PRC’s claim on Taiwan is provided some support by factors other than a 
unilateral sense of ancient entitlement. Various external sources of legitimacy, 
however, can be countered with alternative interpretations. The Cairo and Potsdam 
provisions can be read as applying to the ROC only. The ‘One China’ policies of 
other states towards Taiwan could potentially denote ‘one civilisation’ or ‘one ethnic 
nationality’ (Zhonghua minzu), rather than ‘one sovereign state’ as understood in the 
PRC.69 The only international legal supports for the PRC on Diaoyu and Nansha are 
provisions, in treaties that it is not party to, that indicate that sovereignty of the 
territories is yet to be specified (Hara 2007, chap 6 and 7; Suganuma 2000, chap 4).70
The ultimate support for the legitimacy of all of China’s territorial claims is thus the 
‘One China doctrine’. This too is contestable, both on the basis of historical fact 
(Dreyer 2008; Wachman 2007, chap 2), and through recourse to alternative 
international legal principles such as ‘effective control’ and, in the case of Taiwan, 
self-determination. The rigidity of the stance taken on all sovereignty claims by the 
PRC, however, ultimately lies in the fact that the varying historical origins and bases 
for the claims are tied together in a common logic that is undermined if one of them is 
backed down from.   
                                                
69 This is an argument commonly advanced within Taiwan (Lin 2006; Liu and Wang 2007). 
70 These include the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Reversion Treaty that transferred 
administration of Diaoyu/Senkaku to from the US to Japan in 1972. 
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In the case of Nansha, for instance, the claim is not supported by decisive evidence of 
effective or exclusive control, but rather early naming and mapping of various land 
features, as well as maritime navigation through the area by representatives of several 
imperial dynasties (Shen 2002; Valencia et al. 1997, 20-4; Tonnesson 2002, 6-7). On 
international legal grounds, this claim is the weakest link in the chain of China’s 
maritime irredenta. To back away from this claim, however, would make it harder to 
sustain the notion that Taiwan has been Chinese since ancient times.  
Effective control and administration of the western and central portion of Taiwan was 
only ever in place during the last imperial dynasty – the Manchu Qing (Wachman 
2007, chap 2). The island was never formally administered or permanently inhabited 
by Chinese communities during any previous hegemonic dynasty. There is no 
evidence that Taiwan received any more attention from earlier dynasties than Nansha. 
The Diaoyu Islands arguably received more attention than either during the previous 
Ming Dynasty, which included them as part of a maritime frontier to defend the 
Mainland from pirates and other threats (Suganuma 2000, chap 2 and 3). Thus 
backing down from the sovereignty claim over Nansha would pull away the grounds 
for including Taiwan as part of a traditional Chinese sovereign domain. For if similar 
justifying principles cannot be applied in one instance, why should they be applied in 
the other? Han Chinese presence in Taiwan would come to look more like a 
contingent outcome of modern history (akin to the case of Singapore). The case for 
Taiwan self-determination would become harder to oppose. 
A situation where the regime could not logically sustain the ancient Chinese identity 
of Taiwan would in turn render other parts of the regime’s national unity narrative 
less defensible. The overwhelming majority of Taiwan’s population is Han Chinese. 
But if the claim of sovereignty over a Han Chinese territory is seen to be based only 
on the contingency of modern history, then this same logic can also be applied to 
territory in Tibet, Xinjiang, Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia, that in the dynastic era 
were dominated by non-Han ethnic groups and dynasties.71 Indeed, during the last 
millennium of the dynastic era, it was only those hegemonic dynasties ruled by non-
Han groups (the Mongol Yuan and Manchu Qing) that incorporated territories in these 
                                                
71 On the history of the regime’s efforts to integrate traditionally non-Han regions into the Chinese 
national identity, see Zhao (2004, chap 5).  
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regions into a common empire. In these cases, however, ‘effective control’ of the PRC 
has been in place for over half a century, and there are both practical and 
humanitarian reasons (such as a large Han Chinese presence, peace and stability, and 
the resource needs of a huge population) for justifying the continuation of PRC 
sovereignty over these territories.  
Whether a domino process of historical revisionism in China could further empower 
separatist causes in Tibet and Xinjiang, and undermine the international legitimacy of 
its rule in these areas is unknown, but is nonetheless a possibility taken seriously in 
the PRC precisely because of this uncertainty (Shirk 2007, 182). The broader concern, 
however, is that once scepticism was permitted on selected historical issues, it would 
be hard to justify why other issues should be exempt from critical reappraisal. The 
fear would be a domino effect that undermined the credibility of the regime’s political 
narrative on numerous fronts, leaving China more divided and unstable internally (not 
all true believers can be expected to concede to historical revisionism) and its people 
angry about China’s perceived humiliation internationally.  
For these reasons, liberal public discussion about Chinese history will likely remain 
vigorously opposed within the senior ranks of the regime. Regime leaders perceive 
the least risky option as maintaining a social climate in which it is accepted as normal 
that official historical narratives be taken as indisputably true, and where calling such 
matters into question is taboo. Under such conditions, the regime will continue to face 
socio-political pressure to act in ways that are consistent with the ‘One China 
doctrine’.  
6.3: The ‘peaceful development’ paradigm 
Contemporary Chinese leaders do not frame China’s foreign policy strategy in terms 
of ‘core interest’ objectives alone. Indeed, over the past decade, Chinese official 
statements on foreign policy have, with similar frequency (both internationally and 
domestically), made reference to an aspiration for China to achieve a ‘peaceful rise’ in 
the twenty-first century and contribute towards ‘building a harmonious world’.  
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The fact that the regime has not included these objectives (key components of what is 
referred to here as the ‘peaceful development’ paradigm [PD]) among its core 
interests is significant. On one hand, this non-inclusion seems to reflect an honest 
appraisal and tacit recognition by the regime of the conditionality of PD vis-à-vis its 
third core interest in particular. On the other hand, however, recourse to the PD 
narrative in public diplomacy seems to have had some tactical use (between 2003 and 
2009 chiefly) in obscuring the extent to which the irredentist agenda embodied in the 
latter core interest challenges and conflicts with the interests of other regional states. 
Despite its relative conditionality, there are, nonetheless, grounds for treating the 
normative content of PD as a genuine guiding and limiting force on China’s present, 
and potentially longer-term, international conduct. That is, in both its authentic and 
tactical guises, it needs to be taken seriously as an interest structure in its own right. 
The following analysis of PD outlines the politico-strategic context in which it 
emerged and developed, and then summarises the paradigm’s essential ideational 
content. After this, I demonstrate the conditionality of PD, using my theory’s three 
hypotheses about war and peace to frame the critique and draw out key contradictions. 
Politico-strategic context and rationale 
While certain conceptual components of PD can be traced back to the earlier 
revolutionary decades of the PRC, the paradigm extends more fundamentally from the 
pragmatic turn in foreign policy consolidated by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s under 
the banner of an ‘independent foreign policy of peace’ (Chu and Jin 2008, 99-109). 
The regime’s efforts to improve relations with its neighbours and former enemies, and 
remove the strategic and economic liabilities of isolation, encountered some setbacks 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Following international criticism and economic 
sanctions in the wake of the Tiananmen crisis, and mounting evidence of persistent 
opposition towards China’s sovereign territorial claims on Taiwan and elsewhere, 
Deng incorporated an additional strategic guiding principle of tao guang yang hui, 
you suo zuo wei (Chen and Wang 2011). An accurate rendering of this reads as 
‘concealing brightness and nourishing in obscurity, yet having a goal(s) to work 
towards’. The official translation, however, often renders the first two characters as 
‘biding time’.  
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Employing the expression tao guang yang hui to signal a modest and self-contained 
foreign policy orientation was problematic given that one of its traditional 
applications is to conspiratorial episodes in Chinese history where a state stealthily 
built up its power and used duplicitous tactics to overthrow another state(s).72 Its use 
by regime leaders, from the 1990s to the present day, has thus often tended to 
reinforce rather than dampen suspicions of Chinese intentions held by outside 
observers (Chen and Wang 2011). The broadest connotation of the concept, however, 
is that through patience and caution in the face of obstructive or premature conditions, 
one can preserve oneself from danger and prepare for more favourable circumstances. 
The perceived danger in this case was the prospect of provoking a containment 
coalition that might pose a setback to China’s economic development and 
accumulation of ‘comprehensive national power’ (on the latter concept, see Craig 
2007; Zhao and Ni 2007, 139-49). 
With concerns about the rise of China increasing during the 1990s, especially in the 
US, CCP leaders were motivated to develop a more comprehensive narrative of 
reassurance. Under the fourth generation CCP leadership led by Hu Jintao, this has 
taken the form of the ‘peaceful development’ paradigm.  
Ideational content 
CCP researcher, Zheng Bijian, who has held positions in key Party advisory bodies, 
was the first senior figure to publicly expound the official concept of China’s 
‘peaceful rise’. He did so in a speech to the Bao’ao Forum in 2003, later revised as an 
article published in America’s Foreign Affairs journal. Zheng (2005) emphasised that 
China’s focus in coming decades would be on domestic economic and social 
development. He stated that the choice made by leaders since Deng was to pursue 
China’s development and satisfy its needs through integration and adaptation into the 
existing international economic and political systems. Zheng articulated a modest 
view of China’s stature as still a poor developing country, and an awareness of the 
enormous challenges and obstacles to sustainable development in China. The PRC 
accordingly needs a peaceful and stable international environment to achieve its goal 
of becoming a ‘modernised, medium-level developed country’ by 2050.  
                                                
72 The most well known historical case that the concept is associated with is the state of Yue’s 
destruction of the state of Wu in the Spring and Autumn period (Ye 2003, 5-9). 
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Most significantly, Zheng (2005) stated that China seeks to ‘transcend the traditional 
ways for great powers to emerge’:  
China will not follow the path of Germany leading up to World War I or those 
of Germany and Japan leading up to World War II, when these countries 
violently plundered resources and pursued hegemony. Neither will China 
follow the path of the great powers vying for global domination during the 
Cold War. Instead, China will transcend ideological differences to strive for 
peace, development, and cooperation with all countries of the world.  
Since 2003, the PRC leadership have placed the concept of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ at 
the centre of the national foreign policy narrative. Shortly after its adaptation into 
official public diplomacy, however, the wording was further revised to ‘peaceful 
development’ to avoid any connotation of a challenge to the existing international 
system (Jia 2005). Within the internal PRC discourse, the term is nonetheless often 
articulated alongside, and synonymous with, the goal for China to rise to great power 
status and gain greater influence as a major pole in world affairs.  
PD has been extended to provide an interpretation of all aspects of the regime’s 
foreign and domestic policy conduct, and indeed forge a conceptual linkage between 
the two. In the English language, this is most clearly embodied in two Chinese 
government white papers (WP 2005b; WP 2011). That the regime felt the need to 
repeat the exercise demonstrates that they have not been entirely successful in 
persuading other countries of their professed long-term commitment to PD. The latter 
paper in fact comprised part of a diplomatic effort to mollify the shake-up in regional 
perceptions of China as a result of its uncompromising and assertive diplomacy on 
maritime territorial issues during the previous two years (ICG 2012a).  
If PD is to be treated seriously, and not automatically dismissed as an empty or 
misleading rhetorical strategy, it needs to be viewed as a series of negative and 
positive pledges. The negative pledges (what China says it will not do) include claims 
that China will never pursue hegemony, engage in an arms race, attack others unless 
attacked, engage in aggression and expansion, or seek to establish a sphere of 
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influence. Nor will China ‘shift its own problems and contradictions onto other 
countries’, or ‘plunder other countries to further its own development’ (WP 2005b, 
section III).  
More positive proposals include a normative commitment to ‘building a harmonious 
world’ on the basis of the ‘five principles of peaceful co-existence’73 and ‘new 
security concept’. The latter promotes the idea that security in the post-Cold War 
period can be furthered through increased economic and diplomatic interactions, 
rather than traditional strategic competition, on the basis of mutual trust, mutual 
benefit, equality and coordination (MFA 2002). The regime promotes a 
‘democratisation of international relations’ in which all countries, great and small, 
respect each other’s interests and negotiate on an equal footing, managing and 
resolving conflicts through dialogue and negotiation rather than resort to military 
means. The 2011 white paper further expresses a willingness to ‘explore new ways to 
establish and develop a new type of relationship among the major countries’ (section 
II) and identify ‘new dimensions in the common interests and values of mankind’ 
(section IV). 
An important factor that counts in favour of taking the above seriously is that, in 
addition to being tailored to a foreign audience, PD is the prevailing official paradigm 
on foreign affairs and strategy within the PRC itself. PD is staple fare in Chinese 
media and academic texts, and a common point of reference in mainstream debates 
about China’s future foreign strategy. Aspects of the narrative also guided historical 
interpretation in a major documentary series produced and broadcasted on China 
Central Television (CCTV) in 2006 about the rise of nine past great powers.74 By all 
appearances, it seems that at least some influential figures in the regime have been 
working to inculcate in Chinese society a long-term commitment towards limited and 
moderate strategic goals. 
                                                
73 These include: (1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty (2) mutual non-aggression 
(3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs (4) equality and mutual benefit (5) peaceful 
coexistence.
74 The 12-part series titled Daguo Jueqi (The Rise of Great Powers) was also released as a series of 
books in both the PRC and Taiwan. 
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Many aspects of the paradigm, moreover, are not new. The ‘five principles of 
peaceful coexistence’ and ‘new security concept’ were first formulated in the mid-
1950s and mid-1990s respectively. The term peaceful development itself echoes the 
judgement made by Deng Xiaoping early in the reform period that ‘peace and 
development are the main themes of the time’. Aversion to imperialism, colonialism 
and hegemony has been a mainstay of official propaganda during the entire regime’s 
history. There is thus considerable foundation to PD within the PRC itself.  
The conditionality of PD 
Despite these factors, there are compelling grounds for maintaining scepticism 
towards the pledges contained within PD. In Part I of this thesis, I developed a theory 
that claims to provide knowledge about determinate features of the power transition 
process that do not change across human history. As part of this theory, three 
hypotheses were advanced about the generic determinants of war and peace. 
Application of these three principles can help us better discern problems with the 
pledges embodied in PD. 
The first hypothesis proposes that international power transitions always involve 
some form and degree of zero-sum adjustment in military security hierarchy within a 
finite geopolitical region. This principle is neutral on the question of war and peace, 
as the theory of which it is part claims that such a zero-sum shift in material power 
distribution is neither a necessary nor sufficient cause of war in itself. Such zero-sum 
adjustment can potentially be executed on a consensual basis.   
The first hypothesis supports the possibility of ‘peaceful rise’ and cooperative 
hierarchical change in principle. Power transitions, moreover, do not necessarily 
involve either radical revisionist or hegemonic forms of change. PD is consistent with 
these insights. 
It is also possible to conceive of changes in a military-security deterrence structure 
that take place in the absence of an arms race dynamic. In effect, this would require an 
agreement between the revisionist and other powers that legitimised a period of 
catching-up towards military parity, such as was enabled for US naval forces vis-à-vis 
Britain during the inter-war period (Goldman 1994; O’Brien 1998).  
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It is difficult, however, to avoid the appellation of ‘arms race’ in situations where 
there is some active resistance towards a revisionist’s interests and efforts to catch-up. 
From a revisionist’s point of view, it would be easier and quicker to achieve their 
goals if status quo states refrained from augmenting their own forces and alliances in 
kind. Most revisionist states would likely prefer not to have to engage in an arms race, 
given the extra expenditures involved. However, once a state has resolved to either 
maintain or extend their relative position in a military-security hierarchy in the face of 
some degree of active resistance, that state has effectively become an active 
participant to an arms race.75
Revisionists generally have an interest in depicting their efforts to catch-up in terms 
of legitimacy or fairness, and so there is a tendency to blame resisting powers for any 
arms race that ensues. In this vein, China too has sought to frame its efforts to field an 
ever more regionally competitive military as a ‘right to develop’ that cannot justly be 
denied. China is indeed not breaking any international law or treaty by doing so, and 
is only doing what the US, for one, has done in the past. In general though, PD tends 
to obscure the fact that China’s geopolitical objectives naturally have some 
substantial, and in this case quite difficult, zero-sum implications for the regional 
military-security hierarchy.  
Beyond the emerging shift in the regional deterrence structure, China’s regional 
geopolitical interests also involve extensive territorial and maritime jurisdiction 
claims contested by other states. It will be recalled that our second hypothesis states 
that war is the product of geographically overlapping interest definitions that are 
incompatible in their physical terms of reference. This necessary condition is present 
in potential form within all China’s territorial disputes, as well as in differences over 
strategic and maritime jurisdiction issues with the US, as the next chapter will 
systematically demonstrate.  
If China were willing, under certain conditions, to employ military force to settle 
these issues, would this not contradict PD? According to the interpretation in the 
                                                
75 This point was conceded in a recent editorial in China’s state-owned Global Times: ‘Arms race will 
happen, but who to blame?’, 20 March 2012, accessed: www.globaltimes.cn  
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PRC, the answer is no. Potential wars over sovereignty issues are exempted as a 
breach of PD on grounds that China would be acting in self-defence, a right granted 
under the UN system. If a war occurred over any of these issues, blame would be 
placed on the other parties who are viewed as breaching Chinese territorial integrity. 
Yet, if Chinese leaders do not expect that rival claimants will voluntarily defer to 
China’s position on territorial issues, and anticipate that non-peaceful means may be 
necessary to resolve the issues to China’s favour (as the regime seems to indicate 
through the premium it places on preparing a capability to ‘win local wars under 
information age conditions’76), then claims of purely peaceful intentions are 
somewhat disingenuous. 
China’s pledges that it will only attack if attacked by others, and will not ‘fire the first 
shot’, moreover, may not necessarily be what they seem. For instance, the official 
translation of what is widely considered the most authoritative Chinese military 
strategy textbook available in English defines ‘firing the first shot’ in both physical 
and political terms. It states that ‘if any country or organisation violates the other 
country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the other side will have the right to “fire 
the first shot” on the plane of tactics’ (Peng and Yao 2005, 425-6). Given that, 
according to the PRC, several other countries are already violating China’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, China could, with some internal consistency, 
permit itself to initiate military operations on these issues under circumstances of its 
choosing. There are, at any rate, ways to provoke conflict (such as sailing a large 
naval contingent into the claimed territorial seas of enemy occupied areas, and using it 
to blockade enemy forces) without actually firing the first shot.  
Finally, the third hypothesis states that a state of mutual positive prestige (or 
perceptions of geopolitical legitimacy) amongst the great powers and most regional 
states is the most watertight basis for stable security order. Strategic stability is 
possible too under a state of mutual negative prestige, although the stability of the 
latter is less determinate and thus more shallow and vulnerable to disruption. 
                                                
76 See Note 11 
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In applying the Marxist philosophies of dialectical and historical materialism to the 
concept of the ‘harmonious world’, theorists in the PRC retain a view of the world in 
which conflicts always exist in human affairs (Zhao and Ni 2007, 249-60; Crisp 
2010b). PD nonetheless holds out the promise that if all states respect each other’s 
sovereignty and core interests, the sources of conflict can be minimised, and made 
more amenable to constructive efforts at accommodation and resolution. While a 
cyclical process, the paradigm also implies the possibility for a spiral of progress as 
the proper handling or settlement of differences over time entrenches mutual trust and 
builds constructive mechanisms of engagement and strategic partnership. PD, in other 
words, is a normative vision that promotes movement towards an ever-greater state of 
mutual positive prestige. 
Once again, however, this vision runs up against the particular way in which the PRC 
defines its core interest of sovereignty. Many other states do not perceive PRC claims 
in the South China Sea, in particular, as ‘indisputably’ Chinese. More than that, many 
regional states perceive the prospect of Chinese control over economically and 
strategically important maritime areas as a potential hegemonic threat to their own 
national security and autonomy.  
For China’s part, officials and elite commentators are, at best, ambivalent toward the 
US security role and alliance system in East Asia (Lieberthal and Wang 2012). While 
acknowledging the current stabilising role of the US in containing Japan as well as 
instability on the Korean peninsula, the regime contests the legitimacy of US defence 
activities in its peripheral seas, and its involvement in regional territorial disputes. If 
the US were not present, then China would above all need to negotiate regional 
geopolitics with Japan. In the East China Sea (and potentially the South China Sea 
also), current Chinese and Japanese interest definitions are largely irreconcilable, and 
the stakes involved have the potential to generate a major escalation of strategic 
rivalry in the absence of the US. As subsequent chapters will demonstrate in detail, 
the capacity of China to allow space for mutual accommodation and inclusive 
solutions to regional maritime geopolitical issues will be an essential litmus test for its 
peaceful rise and harmonious world doctrines. 
187
6.4: Debating the path to great power status 
In propounding PD, the regime is saying that ideally it favours peaceful and 
cooperative means of satisfying its core interests. Yet, other PRC actions and 
statements indicate a more limited faith in the prospect that dialogue and cooperation 
in itself can be relied upon to guarantee their long-term satisfaction. Rather, the 
mainstream consensus in China is that it is essential for the nation to raise its 
international material power profile well beyond the regional and global average. 
China’s rising international power is not simply a natural by-product of successful 
economic growth, but rather the result of conscious assessments and ongoing internal 
debate about the means through which China can best guarantee its core interests over 
the long-term under a range of possible future contingencies. That the regime has 
sustained double-digit increases in its annual defence budget for most of the past two 
decades suggests the PRC is banking neither on moral suasion alone, nor on attaining 
only an average middle power profile to ensure its future security. Part of China’s 
military modernisation is directed at enhancing the regime’s existing internal security 
system across the vast territories and population already under its control. The more 
outward and maritime focus of China’s defence modernisation during the reform era, 
however, is unmistakable. There are two main drivers of this latter orientation, arising 
from China’s efforts to satisfy its second and third core interests respectively. 
In regards to China’s third core interest, the rationale for maritime military 
development (supported also by air, space, and information warfare capacity) is 
especially obvious. The regime would be correct in perceiving that rival claimants on 
sovereignty disputes are unlikely to eventually come around to the Chinese point of 
view so long as China lacks the capability to threaten unacceptably adverse 
consequences if its will is indefinitely rebuffed. The objective of developing military 
power sufficient (if need be) to win local wars over sovereignty disputes, and deter or 
prevail against US intervention, is not contested in the Chinese national discourse.  
In addition, however, the idea that securing China’s second core interest also 
necessitates a more outwardly extended national defence policy has taken on ever-
greater currency within the Chinese discourse over the past decade. The key driver of 
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this trend has been the arguments advanced by a range of sea power advocates 
stemming largely from military (especially naval) circles – both academic and 
official. Despite the fact that certain aspects of this sea power advocacy contradict 
PD, it has nonetheless come to exercise a significant influence on mainstream elite 
and public opinion (Holmes and Yoshihara 2007; Wachman 2007; Ross 2009; Crisp 
2010a).  
The views of sea power advocates have been openly debated and contested in publicly 
accessible journals and media. The terms of this debate are important to understand 
and follow on an ongoing basis for two reasons. First, the competing visions have 
differing implications for the scope and nature of Chinese revisionism in East Asia 
and beyond. Second, the evolving grand strategy of the regime currently appears as an 
attempt to balance the competing priorities emphasised by various parties to the 
debate. Indeed, it seems that the strategic priorities emphasised by different parties to 
the debate all have supporters at the senior level of the regime.    
Contemporary sea power advocacy in China stems largely from the influence of 
former-Admiral Liu Huaqing, considered the father of the PRC’s modern navy 
(Holmes and Yoshihara 2007, chap 3). During the early reform years, Admiral Liu 
established many of the concepts and naval developmental objectives that frame 
contemporary Chinese discourse about naval strategy. In the process, he was greatly 
influenced by the ideas of American sea power theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-
1914) (Holmes and Yoshihara 2007, chap 3; Liu [H.] 2004, 430-40).  
Mahan is commonly associated with a deterministic view about the relationship 
between sea power, history and national destiny. Mahan’s most famous work (1965 
[1890]) does indeed indicate a view (derived largely from the experience of Great 
Britain) that sea power and a capacity to control crucial maritime chokepoints and 
obstruct an adversary’s seaborne commerce is the key attribute distinguishing powers 
of the first rank. Mahan at times also emphasised the role of decisive naval battles in 
determining the ascendancy or decline of a nation. Mahan’s vast oeuvre of writings on 
geopolitics and sea power, however, taken together is more diverse and contingent in 
their arguments and conclusions than is often given credit for (Sumida 1997, chap 5). 
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Mahan’s ideas, formulated during the height of the colonial period, had been 
disparaged in Maoist China as providing justifications for hegemony and colonial 
expansion. Admiral Liu played an instrumental role in rehabilitating Mahan, 
demonstrating the applicability of many of the latter’s strategic principles to the 
strategic contexts faced by the PRC (Holmes and Yoshihara 2007, chap 3). Much of 
the maritime strategy discourse in China over the past decade has continued to 
employ his Mahan-inspired concepts. Many contemporary sea power advocates quote 
Mahan in their writings. 
It is not known how such advocates are represented as a lobby within the regime 
hierarchy. They do appear to be a coherent grouping, as their arguments demonstrate 
consistency and common assumptions. Arguments reflecting the Mahanian sea power 
paradigm are commonplace in the PLA Navy’s flagship journal, Dangdai Haijun 
(Modern Navy),77 which suggests such views are well embedded in that institution. 
Articles reflective of this paradigm are also published in many other military and 
academic journals. 
One of the key distinguishing features of Mahanian sea power advocacy is a view of 
globalisation less sanguine than that underpinning PD. PD emphasises the restraining 
and cooperation-inducing aspects of economic interdependence, and thus is justified 
according to an essentially liberal theory of globalisation. In contrast, sea power 
advocates emphasise the security vulnerabilities, and future resource and growth 
expansion needs of China’s globalised economy, and the potential competitive 
pressures that this will generate with other major powers in future (see for instance 
Liu and Zhui 2007; Liu 2007; Zhan 2007a and 2007b; Zhang 2003; Liu [X.] 2004; 
Yang 2004).  
Approximately half of Chinese foreign trade and 80 percent of its oil imports are 
carried by sea across the Indian Ocean and through the Malacca Strait (Feng and 
                                                
77 This assessment is based on an examination of the articles published in this periodical from the 
beginning of 2007 to mid-2008. The articles were accessed in full-text during a period of research at 
Fudan University, Shanghai in 2008. Dangdai Haijun is affiliated with the PLA Navy Political 
Department (Cheung 2010). 
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Zhang 2007).78 This is commonly perceived in China as a vulnerability that could be 
exploited by other powers in a struggle over Taiwan or other territorial claims (Feng 
and Zhang 2007; Zhang 2005). The solution for sea power advocates is to no longer 
remain shy in building up naval power projection, including aircraft carriers. China 
needs to be capable of defending for itself its commercial transit through the Malacca 
chokepoint and beyond, wherever its vital economic interests are at stake. A 
substantial oceanic defence presence, moreover, is touted as essential for the exercise 
of a diplomatic leverage commensurate with genuine great power status. 
Sea power advocates advance geo-strategic rationales for Chinese maritime territorial 
and jurisdiction claims that are more explicit and thoroughgoing than found elsewhere 
in the national discourse. The conception of Chinese maritime geography advanced 
resembles the way Mahan analysed the strategic geography of the Caribbean from the 
vantage point of the United States, with the proposed Panama Canal equivalent to the 
role of the Malacca Strait (Holmes and Yoshihara 2007, chap 4). Sea power advocates 
argue for a navy capable of enforcing ‘command of the seas’ (a Mahanian concept) 
within what is dubbed the ‘first island chain’ (Holmes and Yoshihara 2007, chap 4; 
‘Daolian yu …’ 2007). Introduced into the mainstream lexicon by Admiral Liu, the 
‘first island chain’ consists of island groupings controlled by US allied regimes 
running north to south from the Japanese home islands through Japan’s Okinawa 
prefecture, Taiwan, and The Philippines, and enclosed in the south by the Indonesian 
archipelago. The ‘first island chain’ is viewed as the greatest barrier to the 
development of Chinese sea power, and thus, for those who link sea power with 
national destiny, a key vulnerability and barrier to China’s long-term national 
rejuvenation.  
Taiwan is depicted as bearing special strategic attributes. Located at the centre of the 
‘first island chain’, control of Taiwan, and especially its surrounding waters, promises 
to be the ‘key’ that unlocks the chain.79 This would open up strategic access to the 
Pacific Ocean, and enable the regime to coordinate its northern and southern naval 
fleets to better enforce its claims in the East and South China Seas. Control of Taiwan 
                                                
78 The statistics for oil imports have not changed as of 2010. See China’s ‘Country Energy Profile’ at 
the US government’s Energy Information Administration website: www.eia.doe.gov   
79 The ‘key’ metaphor is cited in ‘Daolian yu …’ (2007). For related metaphors see Wachman (2007, 
chap. 7) and Holmes and Yoshihara (2007, 54-62). 
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is also depicted as useful for balancing and better deterring US forces based on Guam, 
the most crucial link in the so-called ‘second island chain’ (‘Daolian yu …’ 2007; Yu 
2007; Yang 2004). Admiral Liu’s naval development agenda similarly envisioned 
China eventually projecting power beyond the first and towards the ‘second island 
chain’ (Holmes and Yoshihara 2007, chap 3).  
Most sea power advocates take for granted a natural right for China to exercise 
‘command of the sea’ within the ‘three seas’ (Yellow, East China, and South China) 
that fall within the ‘first island chain’. In doing so, these writers are implying a 
maximal interpretation of the maritime sovereign rights vested to UN member states 
in UNCLOS, as well as an audacious ‘historical waters’ claim. Ability to control these 
waters is spoken of in defensive terms as breaking the ring of ‘containment’ unjustly 
imposed by the US, Japan, and other allies, and ensuring the protection of Chinese 
sea-borne commerce along the home straight. The gravity of the task is reinforced 
through reference to China’s vulnerability during the ‘century of humiliation’, and 
laments about the lack of Chinese sea power consciousness that had facilitated this. 
One article published in Dangdai Haijun, however, has argued in more offensive, but 
nonetheless accurate, terms that mastery of the ‘three seas’ will enable China to 
control Japan’s ‘strategic lifeline’ (Zhan 2007c). 
Critics of this sea power paradigm employ a range of counter-arguments. One 
common strategy is to pour cold water on the more deterministic assumptions of 
Mahanian sea power theory by employing counter-evidence and revised 
interpretations of the historic scenarios analysed by Mahan (Xu 2003; Wu 2008). Xu 
Qiyu (2003), a researcher at the National Defence University, sums up this view when 
he writes that rather than sea power determining the course of history, it is history (or 
more precisely the total historic context) that determines the utility and significance of 
sea power.  
Some Chinese strategic thinkers adopt an alternative land-power or Eurasian centred 
grand strategy on the grounds that China stands a better chance of extending influence 
and balancing the US in this region than in maritime Asia where it faces greater 
strategic disadvantages (Holmes and Yoshihara 2007, 43-6). The land power 
paradigm of Beijing University Professor Ye Zicheng (2007) is particularly worth 
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examining for two reasons. First, some of Ye’s appeals are based on the need for 
consistency with PD, thus highlighting some of the key tensions within the Chinese 
discourse. Second, Ye’s comprehensive land-power centred vision provides a means 
to critically assess the viability of a Chinese grand strategy that would attempt to 
bypass the need for an ocean-going navy. The problems of Ye’s vision help explain 
why elements of the sea power paradigm have come to successfully influence 
mainstream opinion.  
Ye argues, on the basis of his analysis of previous great powers, that the scope for 
maritime extension depends on geographic position, geo-political context and the 
strength of the national land base to support such extension (2007, chap 2). In China’s 
case, all of these variables are deemed unfavourable for the development of sea 
power. Ye argues that the overwhelming bulk of China’s sovereign territory and 
resources, population, and economic activity are land-based (2007, 114-29). Further, 
he argues that China’s greatest security challenges at present are internal rather than 
external, and so the bulk of national resources should be directed towards solving the 
socio-economic, environmental, and corruption problems of China’s internal 
development (129-41). The development of sea power capabilities beyond what is 
required to bolster China’s strategic position vis-à-vis Taiwan and the Spratly dispute 
would be a misappropriation of precious national resources (284-99). 
One implication of Ye’s arguments is that, in time, and provided China were able to 
overcome its internal challenges, the country may be in a stronger position later on to 
extend maritime power. Ye, however, believes the prospects for maritime extension 
are limited by the proximity of two existing maritime powers, Japan and the US (300-
32). Ye fears that Chinese naval expansion (unilaterally) into areas beyond the scope 
of China’s sovereign waters would risk igniting what he refers to as a traditional 
pattern of rivalry between land- and sea-based powers – for instance, Britain and 
Germany prior to 1914, and the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War. Ye does 
not believe the PRC could overcome an initial position of disadvantage and safely 
compete in a maritime rivalry. China’s interdependent economic relationships with 
Japan and the US, moreover, necessitate the maintenance of stable ties, and an 
atmosphere conducive to cooperative strategic partnerships for managing issues of 
mutual interest and concern. Strategic restraint on the maritime front is also 
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considered by Ye as more consistent with PRC pledges to avoid seeking hegemony, 
or enter into an arms race. 
Ye does not relinquish the goal for China to become a strong power and major pole in 
world affairs – terms he himself uses. His alternative grand strategy relies above all 
on the extension of Chinese economic magnetism, and depends additionally on the 
interests of other Eurasian powers such as Russia and India to assist in containing US 
influence on the Eurasian landmass. The fostering of tightly interdependent 
relationships with the states on China’s periphery is viewed as a strategic hedge to 
ensure its interests are taken seriously, and to dilute the potential for a US-led anti-
China alignment (2007, chap 4). Maintaining friendly and mutually beneficial 
relations with border countries is the chief means for promoting an image of China as 
a force for international peace, prosperity and stability.  
Ye proposes China put special emphasis on cultivating its strategic partnerships with 
fellow Eurasian powers Russia, India and Europe (chap 5). Initial progress could be 
made by expanding the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to include India (and 
others such as Pakistan and Iran). Thinking more long term, Ye encourages 
cultivation of Europe’s participation also into a Eurasian-wide cooperative 
organization to manage Eurasian affairs, founded upon a four powers partnership. 
Beyond being a ‘soft balancing’ mechanism vis-à-vis the US, a clear motivating 
purpose and function for such a Eurasian-wide cooperative organization is not 
explicitly articulated. However, connections can be made between this proposal and 
other parts of his analysis that promote the development of a network of commercial 
rail transportation across the entire Eurasian landmass (2007, 284). Herein lies Ye’s 
answer to China’s ‘Malacca dilemma’. If China is able to foster a situation whereby 
the bulk of its trade flows and energy/resource imports from Europe and the Middle 
East can be transported overland by a comprehensively linked rail infrastructure – a 
‘new silk road’ – then it will have removed the basic rationale for pursuing sea power 
beyond its sovereign domain.  
Ye acknowledges that his arguments about limiting the scope of China’s sea power 
development do not represent the majority view. Indeed, the purpose of his book was 
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to challenge the prevailing view which conceives of China as a composite land and 
sea power whose rise to world power and influence requires developmental emphasis 
and extension on both fronts (2007, 111-14, 258-63). As a prominent insider to the 
debate, Ye provides important testimony about the extent to which the sea power 
paradigm has been absorbed into the mainstream discourse.80 The extent to which sea 
power advocates are exercising an influence on mainstream strategic thinking in 
China, especially at the official level, is one that US Naval War College analysts 
James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara (2007) felt unable to answer on grounds of a lack 
of transparency in Chinese domestic politics. An article by US China scholar Robert 
Ross (2009), previously a prominent sceptic about Chinese interest in sea power, puts 
to rest many doubts in this regard. Ross holds a similar perspective to Ye regarding 
China’s essential strategic attributes as a land-based power. Ross nonetheless 
catalogues a large amount of evidence pointing to the increasing influence in China of 
what he calls ‘naval nationalism’ at both elite and popular levels.  
In the contemporary Chinese discourse, the priorities and policies embodied in the sea 
power paradigm are engaged in an ongoing dialectic with those of PD. The appeal by 
sea power critics to China’s pledge to never pursue hegemony, for instance, has 
motivated at least one prominent sea power advocate to more tightly define his call 
for a strong navy as about the defence of sovereign rights and the upholding of 
international law. In turn, a distinction is made between rights of ‘unlimited 
extension’ within China’s sovereign domain, and ‘limited extension’ in accordance 
with international law and cooperation through the UN in waters outside China’s 
sovereign domain (Zhang 2004).81 The notion of ‘unlimited extension’ could still 
threaten the viability of PD in East Asia, especially if China’s sovereign domain is 
viewed as encompassing an ‘historical waters’ claim over the ‘three seas’. The latter 
proposition, however, does indicate an accommodation between the two paradigms.  
The dialectic between the sea power and peaceful development paradigms manifested 
itself at the official level during the sixtieth anniversary celebrations of the PLA Navy 
(PLAN) in 2009. The event received high profile coverage in both China’s domestic 
and internationally oriented media. The centrepiece of the festivities was a display of 
                                                
80 Professor Ye is identified as a prominent voice in the debate in Shi (2008).  
81 The adjustment of Zhang’s views in response to criticism is identified in Shi (2008). 
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Chinese naval vessels and aircraft (including some nuclear submarines), accompanied 
by vessels from fourteen other countries. President Hu Jintao gave an address on the 
theme of China’s contribution towards fostering a ‘harmonious ocean’. President Hu 
reiterated key assurances of PD, including the importance of adhering to international 
law (‘President Hu meets …’ 2009).  
During the anniversary, the official Xinhua news site ran a prominently displayed 
special section on the celebrations. Even on its English language site, several articles 
posted reflected the views of the Mahanian faction, with calls for China to be 
prepared to ‘fight in regional wars’, ‘guarantee the command of its seas’, and 
‘gradually extend its operational range beyond the offshore area’ to safeguard 
‘expanding maritime rights and interests’. In one article it was declared that ‘the 
country must rule the waves with more overseas missions in areas vital to China's 
foreign trade’.82 Several articles described the event as a public consciousness raising 
effort about the importance of sea defence to China’s future. Others cited opinion 
polls and discussions in internet forums to indicate an already intense popular interest 
in sea power and the development of an aircraft carrier capacity (Peng and Cui 2009; 
‘China’s ever-largest …’ 2009).  
Nothing of prominence gets published in major state-owned media outlets in China 
without some form of high-level sponsorship (Shirk 2007, chap 4). Accordingly, the 
above is significant evidence for the influence of the Mahanian sea power paradigm 
among an unknown proportion of senior regime officials. In the years since this event, 
editorials in state-owned media have generally become more assertive in advancing 
the right for China to develop a strong navy, resist US ‘interference’ in regional 
maritime disputes, and challenge US military activities in the Yellow, East and South 
China Seas.83 Most editorials, however, attempt to reconcile this stance with PD, and 
concede the need for some form of accommodation, yet to be specified, with the US 
in the West Pacific. The same applies to the more open advocacy of China’s right to 
                                                
82 Quotations are from Peng and Cui (2009), Li et al. (2009), and ‘Chinese navy to …’ (2009).
83 See for instance ‘Growing Chinese navy no cause for fear’, People’s Daily, 27 April 2010; ‘West’s 
pressure no sway on defense budget’, People’s Daily, 29 Feb 2012, both accessed: 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn. See also the following Global Times editorials: ‘Watch out for 
China-US tension at sea’, 12 July 2010; ‘American shadow over South China Sea’, 26 July 2010; 
‘Yellow Sea no place for US carrier’, 9 June 2010; ‘World-class military not exclusive luxury’, 7 Jan 
2011; ‘Besieging China may have int’l backlash’, 6 April 2012; all accessed: www.globaltimes.cn  
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develop aircraft carriers and a blue-water navy capable of defending overseas 
economic interests. One notable editorial argued that:  
… only when the old logic of sea power, illustrated by … Mahan … is broken 
and a new strategy gains ground can the preparation be properly made … 
China’s ambition of building a blue-water navy is to pursue the basic right to 
develop, rather than maritime hegemony. The Chinese navy … would be able 
to better help maintain regional stability and world peace.84  
In official defence white papers, the regime has consistently indicated a commitment 
towards ‘gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations’ 
(WP 2006 chap II). Recent defence white papers have added to this concept a goal of 
developing capabilities for ‘conducting cooperation [2008] (operations [2010]) in 
distant waters’ (WP 2008, chap V; WP 2010, chap III). A reference in the 2004 white 
paper (chap III) to strengthening capabilities for ‘winning … command of the seas 
and command of the air’ was never repeated. 
In terms of the physical realisation of policy, the focus of China’s maritime military 
build-up has been on bolstering capabilities relevant to enhancing it’s bargaining and 
war-fighting power on regional territorial disputes. The concentration of resources 
required to contest advanced powers in the region, even asymmetrically, means that 
China has not yet diverted substantial investment towards fielding a trans-regional 
blue-water navy. The regime’s actions so far have only been directed towards 
preparing the normative grounds (domestically) and promoting the legitimacy 
(diplomatically) for such an endeavour. As part of this effort, China has increased its 
participation in maritime security cooperation (see defence white papers). Most 
notably, since 2009 the government has been sending naval vessels to the Gulf of 
Aden off Somalia to better protect Chinese merchant ships against pirates, and in 
coordination with an existing UN-sponsored multi-national force (Ng 2008). 
Simultaneous with its growing interest in sea power, the regime is hedging its bets 
and pursuing many options embodied in Professor Ye’s Eurasian solution to the 
                                                
84 ‘Time to prepare for China’s aircraft carrier’, 11 March, 2010 (www.globaltimes.cn)  
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‘Malacca dilemma’. The government has continued to deepen its energy relationships 
with Russia, the former Soviet states in Central Asia and Iran, including importantly 
the construction of direct overland pipelines (Seaman 2010). China has also continued 
to invest in the development of port facilities and transport infrastructure in Myanmar 
and Pakistan, to be used as overland transit options that bypass Malacca. Most 
remarkably, reports in Global Times have disclosed plans within the government to 
work towards a trans-Eurasian high-speed rail network for the transport of 
commercial goods between China and Western Europe according to the three routes 
specified by Ye. With a goal of being operative by 2025, it is estimated that such 
infrastructure may enable an overland trip from Beijing to London to be covered in 
two days (Kang 2010; ‘China to build …’ 2010).  
For a number of reasons, however, these overland options cannot be expected to 
substantially reduce China’s economic dependence on the sea for the foreseeable 
future. First, it is hard to envision growth of energy consumption from overland 
sources in Russia and Central Asia outstripping growth from sources in the Middle 
East and Africa. Ye’s own un-referenced figures indicated that by 2010 China would 
be getting roughly half of its oil imports overland from Russia and Kazakhstan (Ye 
2007, 292-3). This has proved incorrect. Various sources consistently estimate half of 
China’s oil imports come from the Middle East and 30 percent from Africa (Seaman 
2010; Feng and Zhang 2007).85 It would take a radical reduction in imports from these 
sources to make Ye’s figures feasible over the long-term.  
    
In regard to overland options from ports in Myanmar, Pakistan, or perhaps the Middle 
East, there are three main problems. The first is the security of transit. Are these 
countries stable enough to entrust the security of crucial commercial infrastructure 
that China would increasingly rely on? If the answer to this is not unshakeably 
affirmative, then China might be driven towards thinking about the notion of land 
power in ways beyond that envisioned by Ye. That is, China might be compelled to 
consider a network of foreign military bases. One editorial published in Global Times 
in 2009 has already argued that China needs to abandon the passivity of PD and 
harness economic, political and military resources to function as an active ‘regional 
                                                
85 See also China’s ‘Country Energy Profile’ at the US government’s Energy Information 
Administration website: www.eia.doe.gov   
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stabiliser’, including on land in places like Pakistan and Afghanistan.86 It would 
remain a perpetual challenge for China to sustain a distinction, in practice, between 
this sort of role and that of a regional hegemon. In contrast, most of the Indian Ocean 
is a vast international commons in which port access is the only necessary encounter 
with the sovereign rights of other states. 
The second problem with the overland option is that rail transport operates on fixed 
gauges. There is a question of whether a limited number of cross-Eurasian rail lines 
could handle the bulk of China’s vast and ever-growing economic needs. Maritime 
freight, on the other hand, can be manoeuvred with vastly greater flexibility, and the 
seas can support much greater quantities of traffic. 
The third problem is that, for the foreseeable future, the overland option provides for 
only limited scope to bypass sea transit. The plan for a trans-Eurasian rail network 
does not currently include a link to the Persian Gulf oil-producing states (Iran 
excepted), let alone Africa. Even if the Myanmar and Pakistan options eventually 
enabled a complete bypassing of the Malacca Strait, there would still be some 
important stretches of sea transit to negotiate. Such residual economic dependence on 
the sea (if not partly reversible within the next decade or two) may well continue to 
lend weight to the case in China for a great power strategy based in significant part on 
the extension of sea power. 
6.5: Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the complex of interest structures, or motivational 
tendencies, underpinning contemporary Chinese grand strategy. It has shown that 
even in a case where the workings of the political system are highly veiled to outside 
observers, the public communication imperative of corporate agency generates ample 
evidence for identifying guiding policy ideas and the socio-political forces that 
produce and perpetuate them.  
                                                
86 ‘China should act as a regional stabilizer’, 20 Oct 2009 (www.globaltimes.cn)  
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The underlying drivers of contemporary Chinese grand strategy are well captured by 
what the regime has dubbed China’s core interests. According to its peaceful 
development narrative, the regime proclaims that China seeks ideally to satisfy its 
core interests through peaceful and cooperative means. Other trends, however, such as 
China’s steady military build-up and emerging interest in sea power, indicate that the 
regime does not view its future security as guaranteed by dialogue and negotiation 
alone. In addition to the coercive capacity needed to prevail on territorial disputes, the 
idea that China needs a capability to defend against potential threats to its extensive 
overseas economic interests and future resource needs has become a leading view in 
the national discourse.   
Despite pledges of peaceful development, the way in which China has long defined its 
core interest of territorial integrity contributes towards the presence of potential 
conditions for war, and an existing deficit of mutual positive prestige in East Asia. 
One of the most important conditions sustaining the tenacity of China’s commitment 
to its sovereignty claims is the regime’s prohibition on liberal discussion and debate 
about Chinese history. The regime’s enduring propaganda legacy has produced a 
multitude of true believers in the ‘One China doctrine’ at all levels of society. More 
pragmatically, many Chinese also fear that abandonment of Taiwan might empower 
the cause of separatist forces in Tibet and Xinjiang. The regime’s fear that it would 
undermine its credibility, legitimacy, and stability of its rule if it opened the door to 
historical revisionism is a powerful conservative force blocking general prospects for 
deeper liberalisation of the Chinese public sphere.
The second core interest of sustaining economic growth and social development also 
has a robust causal underpinning. This is a result largely of the expectations of 
gradually improving living standards that the regime has engendered in its people, and 
upon which the regime has also staked their legitimacy. In the coming decade, at 
least, the deep internationalisation of the Chinese economy will likely be sustained on 
the basis of some degree of path dependence.  
Having identified and explained the reasons and socio-political forces that give 
existing Chinese core interests their motivational power and durability, the basis for 
viewing them as potential major drivers of future trends and events has now been 
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established. The remaining chapters of Part II will analyse the causal tendencies 
examined in this chapter in regard to their implications for prospective power 
transitions in East Asia and beyond.   
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Chapter 7: Defining Chinese Revisionism 
Our in-depth investigation, in the previous chapter, of the interest structures 
comprising contemporary Chinese foreign policy motivation provides a basis now for 
conducting a future-oriented analysis in this and the following chapter. Given the 
focus of this thesis on the subject of power transitions, the key question is whether 
any of the interest motivations identified imply some form of revisionist geopolitical 
orientation; and if so, what dynamics (conflictual/peaceful; coercive/consensual) are 
potentially implied in their interaction with the interests of other regional states?  
Cursory reflection on the various interests analysed indicates, according to 
geopolitical relevance, two candidates for an assessment of revisionist potential. 
These are: (1) the irredentist agenda of maritime sovereignty and jurisdictional claims 
embodied in China’s third core interest, and (2) China’s emerging interest in sea 
power extension to defend trade routes beyond its home region. It will be recalled 
that, according to my theory, neither irredentism nor spatial military expansion are, in 
themselves, necessarily revisionist. What needs to be assessed is whether the actions 
necessary to realise particular objectives of such kinds would, in any given case, have 
potential consequences for the overall military hierarchy, or polarity, of a region.  
In this chapter, I demonstrate the utility of my theory to help draw tangible and 
realistic conclusions about future revisionist potential (or otherwise) from the 
information contained within existing interest structures, together with other relevant 
empirical evidence. To do this, I use the indicators developed in Chapter 4 to order 
and discipline the analysis according to the knowledge they contain about the finite 
range of possibilities at the ‘interactive process’ and ‘order outcome’ stages of the 
universal power transition sequence.  
The chapter has three main sections. Section 7.1 sets the context through specifying 
both the physical and normative features of the geopolitical region and status quo 
order in contemporary East Asia. Section 7.2 then conducts a detailed examination of 
the implications of Chinese territorial and maritime jurisdiction claims for the future 
of this geopolitical region. The method of ‘closed system rational simulation’ (CSRS; 
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developed in Chapter 3) is used together with my theoretical indicators to demonstrate 
tangible possibilities for hierarchical order, as well as conflict and peace, implied in 
the interaction of the ideal preferences held by key states. Specifics of the analytical 
procedure I deploy are outlined at the beginning of 7.2. Section 7.3 subsequently 
applies a similar, yet altered, method to consider the implications of emerging 
Chinese ambitions to extend sea power beyond its home region. 
7.1: The geopolitical region and status quo order 
In analysing the rise of China, the geopolitical region and status quo order of greatest 
significance is defined here as Maritime East Asia (MEA). MEA is a coherent 
geopolitical region according to all three of the essential indicators specified in 
Chapter 4: politico-territorial distribution, great power military reach, and the 
existence of an overlapping or common security complex. Important aspects of this 
status quo order are also underpinned by an identifiable normative treaty structure.  
Politico-territorial distribution 
A key factor circumscribing the geopolitical region in contemporary East Asia is that 
most land territory in the region is uncontested by others and therefore geopolitically 
inactive. This is true of continental China and Southeast Asia, Japanese territory, and 
the archipelagos of Indonesia and The Philippines. MEA is also delimited by the 
geographical separation of the East Asian sovereignties from Central and Western 
Eurasia (due to the vastness of Chinese continental territory) and the Americas in the 
East (due to the even greater vastness of the Pacific Ocean).  
Great power military reach 
A defining feature of the post-WWII geopolitical status quo has been the capability of 
the US to project military power at will and uncontested through the seas contiguous 
to the coasts of all East Asian states. American unipolarity in MEA is accordingly the 
status quo reference point from which revisionist change can be apprehended. 
Overlapping/common security complex 
The capacity or potential for military reach is insufficient as an indicator of status quo 
orders and revisionism. Equally important is the need to demonstrate that the vital 
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strategic and security interests of contiguous states, or powers potentially capable of 
extending into the region, are fixated on the common geographical area. MEA in the 
post-WWII era has been a coherent unipolar order precisely because US power 
projection has been (a) constantly maintained and exercised, and (b) perceived by all 
states, from allies to adversaries, as affecting their vital security interests. Even for 
more neutral states such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, American interests in 
the region, backed by military projection and alliances, influence security outlooks 
and strategic options, not least indirectly through containment effects on Japanese and 
Chinese military power.   
With the rise of China, and its assertion of sovereignty and jurisdiction over large 
maritime areas, the coherence of MEA as a geopolitical region has been further 
reinforced through the emergence of contested subregions. These sub-regions are 
delimited by both political geography and the politics of territorial and strategic 
contestation. The geopolitical sub-region of Maritime Northeast Asia (MN) consists 
of the East China and Yellow Seas. MN is geographically circumscribed by 
continental China and the Korean Peninsula to the west and north, Japan to the east, 
and Taiwan to the south. Territorial and strategic contestation in the area 
predominantly involves China, Japan and the US.  
The sub-region of Maritime Southeast Asia (MS) encompasses the South China Sea. 
It is geographically circumscribed by continental China and Taiwan to the north, 
peninsular Southeast Asia in the west, the Indonesian archipelago and Malacca Strait 
in the south, and the Philippines in the east. Geopolitical contestation in the area 
primarily involves China and the US.  
One further potentially contested geopolitical sub-region can be identified in MEA. 
Encompassing the oceanic high seas between the first and second ‘island chains’ 
extending to the US territory of Guam and US administered Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands, this sub-region is dubbed here as the Greater West Pacific 
(GWP). 
Extensive economic linkages in East Asia increase the intensity of the overlapping 
security complex in MEA and its constituent sub-regions. Most intra-regional trade 
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has to pass through the waters of MS and/or MN. A third of the world’s sea-borne 
inter-continental trade in monetary terms (half in terms of gross tonnage) currently 
traverses the South China Sea.87 Most regional countries accordingly have a 
considerable stake in the military power structure and normative principles that 
govern this geopolitical region. 
Normative treaty structure 
In the post-WWII period there has been no all-inclusive treaty framework in the 
region pertaining to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of conventional military force 
postures. The US has exercised unipolarity through a combination of de facto force 
projection posture; alliance treaty relationships with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, 
The Philippines, and Australia; and defence cooperation and base-access agreements 
with other states such as Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and, more recently, Vietnam 
(Bitzinger 2006; Kaplan 2005). The US strategic presence is thus underpinned by a 
considerable degree of positive prestige (Goh 2008). 
During the post-WWII era, the US has used its power to deter regional states from 
embarking on military solutions to territorial and irredentist disputes. In addition to 
active defence of the internationally recognised divisions of Korea and Vietnam, on 
issues such as Taiwan and Spratly, the US has in practice upheld the terms of the 
1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty (Hara 2007, chap 2 and 6). In instituting the terms 
of Japanese surrender in WWII, the treaty renounced Japanese ownership whilst 
leaving the allocation of sovereignty to be determined at another time. The US has 
maintained a similar posture of neutrality towards Diaoyu/Senkaku since it passed 
administrative jurisdiction of Okinawa to Japan in the 1972 Reversion Treaty (Hara 
2007, chap 7). Not surprisingly, the PRC rejects the legitimacy of relevant clauses in 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the inclusion of Diaoyu in the Reversion Treaty. 
For one, neither the PRC nor ROC had been invited to negotiations of the 1951 treaty 
due to controversy over who was the legitimate government of China. More 
importantly, the PRC opposes its ‘One China doctrine’ against any notion that the 
sovereign status of these territories has ever legitimately been in dispute or in limbo.    
                                                
87 Sea-borne trade, moreover, accounts for around 90 percent of inter-continental trade (Cronin and 
Kaplan 2012, 7).  
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The other important normative element of the status quo in MEA concerns the 
respective rights provided by international law to coastal states and the militaries of 
other states within an EEZ. The US considers EEZs to be international waters. China 
argues that other states need the permission of the state enjoying jurisdiction before 
they can transit military vessels through the area. How this clash of legal 
interpretations is resolved will have an important impact on the future of geopolitical 
order and hierarchy in MEA. 
7.2: Chinese irredentist and maritime jurisdiction claims 
This main section of the chapter investigates whether Chinese claims on Taiwan, in 
the East China Sea, and South China Sea can be defined as revisionist in their 
implications according to the indicators of my theory. The chapter does not consider 
China’s claim to ‘Southern Tibet’, which is an outlier located well outside the 
geopolitical region of focus here. 
Our assessment of each of China’s irredentist claims follows an identical five-step 
procedure, as follows: 
Ideal preference: Each sub-section begins by articulating how China defines 
and interprets the details of its claims. Grey areas in which aspects of a claim 
have not yet been fully specified (and thus are ambiguous) are also identified.  
Preliminary order outcome assessment: Order outcome indicators are then 
applied to these preferences to indicate what their ideal realisation potentially 
implies for the military-security hierarchy of MEA, especially its constituent 
sub-regions. 
Contemporary interests of other stakeholders: Identifies the interest 
definitions of other key stakeholders that geographically overlap in their terms 
of reference with the above.   
Implied interactive processes: Identifies the terms under which the interest 
definitions of the various parties can be viewed as either physically 
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incompatible or potentially compatible. The finite options in each case are 
structured according to relevant indicators at the interactive process stage. 
Adjusted order outcome assessment: In the final step, the initial order outcome 
assessment is refined, and, if necessary, supplemented with a consideration of 
alternative possibilities in light of the interactive dynamics identified through 
steps 3 and 4. 
7.2.1: Taiwan 
Ideal preference 
In recent decades, the Chinese government has indicated their preferred solution to 
the Cross-Strait dispute as ‘peaceful unification’ under ‘one country, two systems’. 
The degree of autonomy promised for Taiwan under this formula goes somewhat 
further than has been implemented in Hong Kong and Macao. The PRC says that 
Taiwan will be able to maintain a fully democratic legislature, and that no PRC 
military or administrative personnel will be dispatched to the island (WP 1993, 
section III). In exchange, the PRC expects that the ROC will be terminated as a 
constitutional entity, with sovereignty of ‘One China’ residing in the PRC, and 
Taiwan existing as a highly autonomous province within the latter. The PRC also 
expects that Taiwan’s defence cooperation and arms purchases from the US will have 
ceased prior to unification.  
One key grey area concerns the procedures for regulating security in the immediate 
maritime areas around the island. On the issue of naval passage through the sea-lanes 
contiguous to Taiwan, at least, it is unlikely that the central government would 
endorse an arrangement in which it had to first obtain permission from the Taiwan 
authorities. Questions arise, however, about (a) whether the cessation of Taiwan’s 
defence relations with the US will be compensated through allowing Taiwan’s 
defence force to take sole legal responsibility for security in a given maritime 
perimeter around the island, and (b) the terms under which the PRC might expect a 
right of access to Taiwan’s ports for the PLA Navy. Politically, there are grey areas 
concerning (a) the legal mechanisms that could guarantee the autonomy of Taiwan’s 
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democratic system in perpetuity after transferral of sovereignty, and (b) the title, 
functions, and method of selection of the head of the executive government.  
Preliminary order outcome assessment 
In the context of MEA as a whole, Taiwan and its surrounding maritime area is not 
large geographically. The main geopolitical significance of Taiwan lies in its position 
at the intersection of the three geopolitical sub-regions of contemporary East Asia. 
Whether incorporation of Taiwan would, in itself, comprise an act of revisionism 
depends on the strategic contingency required to achieve this objective. According to 
its ideal preference, the PRC would not need to execute a physical conquest of the 
island to achieve its goal. Ideally, war is avoided altogether. In this scenario, any 
revisionist implications would depend on the scope and nature of the coercive 
potential needed to attain the Taiwan government’s submission to unification on PRC 
terms, and keep the US on the sidelines. The issue of whether to define hierarchical 
change at the point of unification as entailing limited or radical revisionism, or else 
not yet revisionist, requires, in this scenario, an independent assessment of the 
evolved structure of military deterrence in the region as a whole, as well as China’s 
progress in actualising its other claims. 
Contemporary interests of other stakeholders  
The other primary stakeholder on this issue is the ROC. While the ROC is divided 
politically on aspects of Taiwan’s status and the strategic approach towards Cross-
Strait relations, the polity is held together by a consensus on two fundamentals. These 
are (a) the independent sovereignty of the regime on Taiwan vis-à-vis the PRC, and 
(b) the conviction that Taiwan’s future status can only be legitimately determined 
through existing legal procedures provided in the ROC constitution. In other words, 
on the issue of unification versus independence, both sides of the mainstream political 
divide support Taiwan self-determination through referendum. 
The two major political parties in the ROC are the KMT (the current power holder at 
the national level in both the executive and legislature) and the DPP (Democratic 
Progressive Party). The latter has been a key driving force in the promotion of a 
separate Taiwanese national identity. For adherents of this side of politics, the 
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struggle for independence and the democratisation process are understood in terms of 
decolonisation (Jacobs 2008; Lin 2006). The DPP built its support base through 
tapping into historical grievances towards the KMT’s post-war dictatorship held by 
many within the 80 percent of the population whose ancestry on Taiwan precedes the 
arrival of the KMT.      
The mainstream position on Cross-Strait relations within the KMT is somewhat more 
complex. Nominally, KMT leaders adhere to a ‘One China’ policy on the basis of 
‘different interpretations’ on each of the Strait. The interpretation of the current KMT 
administration is that ‘One China’ refers to the ROC. On the basis of the ROC 
Constitution and 1992 ‘Act Governing Relations Between Peoples in the Taiwan Area 
and the Mainland Area’, the Cross-Strait status quo is conceived as ‘one ROC, two 
areas’ (Mo 2012). 
The general conduct and rhetoric of the current KMT administration, however, 
suggests that this formulation is adhered to not on the basis of a literal belief in its 
reality, but rather as a pragmatic means for sustaining calm and forestalling 
confrontation in Cross-Strait relations as the PRC’s international power grows. Many 
committed KMT supporters feel a relatively greater sense of kinship with Chinese on 
the other side of the Strait than their political rivals do. Yet, the majority of KMT 
supporters and voters reject unification under ‘one country, two systems’. Most of the 
alternative unification models proposed in the mainstream Taiwan discourse – 
primarily forms of confederation, or else EU-style integration – involve the continued 
existence of a sovereign ROC (Lee 2006, chap 8). President Ma Ying-jeou and his 
cabinet ministers routinely refer to Taiwan as an independent sovereign country, and 
state that all Cross-Strait agreements that impact on Taiwan’s political status 
(including any interim peace accord) need to be subject to referendum (Lee 2009; Mo 
2011). In doing so, KMT leaders are adhering to a long-term public opinion trend that 
has increasingly skewed towards favouring Taiwan independence (Keng and Chen 
2009; Keng et al. 2009).88       
                                                
88 In the latter article, scholars at National Chengchi University’s ‘Election Study Centre’ in Taipei 
utilise a method to separate peoples’ preferences based on pragmatic interest, from one based on an 
ultimate value position free from pragmatic constraints such as the PRC military threat. Their findings 
indicate almost 60 percent of the population support Taiwan independence. The majority of this group 
normally indicate in surveys that they support maintaining the status quo. Similar findings are 
209
The US is the other major player in the Taiwan issue. The main interest at stake for 
the US is the credibility of US power. Policymakers in the US do not necessarily 
define this interest in terms of an ability to directly defend Taiwan and prevail in a 
war with China over the issue. The US no longer has a defence alliance treaty 
obligation to uphold with the ROC. Normatively, China has been very successful in 
sustaining Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation, and motivating regional states to distance 
themselves and avoid interfering in the issue. There is also a considerable asymmetry 
in the stake that China and the US each have in this particular issue, and in their 
respective willingness to bear sacrifices and tolerate escalation in a conflict 
situation.89 In light of such factors, several analyses published in major American 
think tanks in recent years have suggested that direct US military intervention in a 
Cross-Strait conflict cannot be guaranteed (Shlapak et al. 2009; Blumenthal et al. 
2009; Murray 2008).   
Beyond direct intervention, the credibility of US power will be reflected in either one 
of two factors. First, its ability to ensure some leeway for the ROC to extract 
concessions or compensations in any political negotiations with the PRC; or second, 
to localise any hot conflict, or maritime control attained by the PRC during hostilities, 
to the immediate Taiwan area. 
Implied interactive processes 
In their current form, the ideal preferences of the PRC and ROC for resolution of the 
Cross-Strait dispute are, at very least, incompatible in normative terms. Either the 
PRC has sovereignty over Taiwan, or the ROC does. It is not possible, logically or 
practically, for both these constitutional entities to possess sovereignty over Taiwan at 
the same time.90 This reality, in combination with the disparate political systems and 
                                                                                                                                           
replicated in the survey data referred to in Note 8 below, where support for independence (on condition 
the PRC could not attack Taiwan) was 61.7 percent in 2005 and 65.7 percent in 2008. 
89 For evidence that Chinese strategists are mindful of this factor, see Christensen (2001) and Sawyer 
(2009). 
90 This argument obviously challenges the feasibility of the view advanced by some prominent 
contributors to the literature on Cross-Strait relations that some sort of shared sovereignty arrangement 
is possible (Bush 2005; Jakobson 2005). My position is that sovereignty has no meaning if it is not 
located at a single source or institution. The ultimate choice for any Cross-Strait settlement in regards 
to the determination of sovereignty is thus essentially binary – Taiwan’s incorporation into the PRC 
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ideologies of the two regimes, generates the security dilemma experienced by the two 
sides.  
On one hand, Taiwanese fear that if sovereignty is relinquished to the PRC, Taiwan 
will be even more completely isolated, and vulnerable (legally and physically) to 
gradual pressure and encroachments on their existing political and social freedoms. 
On the other hand, the PRC view recognition of ROC sovereignty, even in a 
confederation arrangement, as amounting to a situation of ‘two Chinas’, an outcome 
(along with ‘one China, one Taiwan’) towards which it has long indicated opposition 
(WP 1993, section III). The PRC would not endorse an arrangement in which it had to 
negotiate aspects of foreign policy for the whole of China (eg. diplomacy in 
multilateral institutions) on equal terms with the ROC, or which potentially enabled 
the ROC to ally with other liberal democracies against PRC policies in international 
diplomatic settings.91
According to the PRC’s existing outlook, a negative referendum outcome on any 
unification proposal in Taiwan would not be viewed as influencing the legitimacy of 
its sovereignty claim. China’s 1993 White Paper on Taiwan (section III) states that: 
‘“Self-determination” for Taiwan is out of the question’. In a second White Paper 
(2000), it was declared that the 23 million people on Taiwan cannot alone determine 
the issue. Rather, the outcome needs to reflect the will of all 1.3 billion Chinese.92  
The PRC has indicated a preparedness to go to war over Taiwan under certain 
circumstances, including vaguely defined ones such as if ‘possibilities for a peaceful 
reunification should be completely exhausted’,93 or ‘if the Taiwan authorities refuse, 
sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits reunification through negotiations’ 
(WP 2000). Certain of its defence acquisitions indicate that China does not rule out 
the contingency of an amphibious operation (ie. conquest of some scope) (Shlapak et 
                                                                                                                                           
(under a credible separation of powers arrangement) or sovereign independence for the regime on 
Taiwan.  
91 Proposals for confederation in Taiwan either imply or directly stipulate these forms of empowerment 
for the ROC (Lee 2006, 169-65; Shih 2000). 
92 For a more recent expression of this sentiment by a generally moderate Chinese scholar 
commentator, see Jian (2009). 
93 See Article 8 of the Anti-Secession Law: 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/14/eng20050314_176746.html  
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al. 2009, chap 5). Most non-Chinese military experts, however, believe the most 
likely object of a PRC military campaign would be to rapidly knock out the island’s 
air and naval defences and establish an economic blockade through control of the 
maritime area surrounding the island (Shlapak et al. 2009; Blumenthal et al. 2009; 
Bush and O’ Hanlon 2007).  
The ROC has also sustained extensive defence preparations (Shlapak et al. 2009; 
Blumenthal 2009), and surveys indicate about a fifth of the adult population are sure 
in their commitment to actively contribute to the defence effort in a conflict.94 In a 
recent survey of Taiwan’s youth (Shih 2012), around half the respondents supported 
the notion that ROC citizens should continue to resist and fight China if their 
government unilaterally signs a political settlement on PRC terms (ie. without 
recourse to referendum).95 The ROC is not willing to voluntarily relinquish their 
existing defence control of the maritime area surrounding Taiwan. 
Adjusted order outcome assessment 
The above analysis suggests that according to existing and well-entrenched interest 
definitions on both sides of the Strait, the PRC would need to exercise some form of 
physical coercion if it is to eventually prevail on the sovereignty issue. The concept of 
‘peaceful unification’ surely excludes war or the live and targeted use of weaponry 
from its ambit, but not necessarily the threat of the use of force, and probably not 
economic sanctions. The above interactive analysis, however, indicates a Cross-Strait 
war as a real alternative possibility. 
Including the possibility of war does not alter our preliminary assessment that the 
revisionist implications of Taiwan depend on a given contingency’s impact on the 
geopolitical sub-regions and overall deterrence structure of MEA. For instance: if the 
US were active combatants in a conflict, yet were able to contain it to the local 
Taiwan area, and maintain most of its existing freedom of manoeuvre through and 
                                                
94 This figure is derived from my analysis of the 2005 and 2008 ROC national security survey data sets 
compiled by Professor Emerson Niou. I am indebted to the ‘Election Study Centre’ at National 
Chengchi University for passing this material to me. On the same survey question, a further 10 percent 
indicate they will comply with government decisions in a conflict, while over 50 percent are effectively 
fence sitters that will decide at the time and under specific circumstances what they will do.   
95 57 percent of those in the same survey, however, also agreed that Taiwan citizens should have the 
right to refuse conscription. 
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between the geopolitical sub-regions of MEA (excluding, of course, the Taiwan 
Strait); then there would be two possible assessments: (a) no revisionist shift from the 
status quo had yet occurred, or (b) a revisionist shift to at least qualitative parity in the 
structure of deterrence at the point of conflict had been reversed and/or set back. Such 
assessments would apply also to a scenario in which China made an initial pre-
emptive attempt to gain broad military control of MN and/or MS down to the Malacca 
Strait, but were then thwarted and decisively defeated in these areas by the US and its 
allies.  
Alternatively, a Chinese capacity to prolong an inconclusive military stalemate across 
these sub-regions would be one possible indication of a more consolidated limited 
revisionist shift towards bipolarity (especially if China’s capabilities were competitive 
within GWP as well). The deterrence, entirely, of an active US intervention role, so 
long as this occurred under the specific conditions that qualitative parity had been 
reached or exceeded, would be another. 
In considering possible future order outcomes in MEA, however, a sole focus on 
Taiwan is greatly insufficient. In order to realistically assess possibilities for limited 
or radical revisionism in MEA, it is essential that we incorporate an understanding of 
the geopolitical issues arising from disputes in the East and South China Seas.   
7.2.2: East China Sea 
Ideal preference  
China’s claims in the East China Sea are two-fold (see Figure 1). Firstly, China claims 
sovereignty over a grouping of five islets and three rocks known collectively as the 
Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands in Japan). According to China, the islands are within 
the jurisdiction of Taiwan province. Secondly, China claims jurisdiction over a 
continental shelf which it claims ends at the foot of the Okinawa trench, 
encompassing most of the East China Sea. The two claims are mutually reinforcing. 
Diaoyu is situated on the continental shelf claimed by China. China argues that 
Diaoyu is not a natural extension of Okinawa, but rather divided from the latter by the 
Okinawa trench.  
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Figure 1: Map of Maritime Northeast Asia 
Source: Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senkaku_Islands) 
China has made a preliminary submission to the United Nations detailing some of the 
geographic coordinates of its continental shelf claim according to provisions in Part 
VI of UNCLOS (see citation beginning ‘Preliminary Information …’). In UNCLOS 
(Article 76), viable continental shelf claims provide states with ‘sovereign rights’ over 
resources on the seabed and subsoil extending to a distance of up to 150 nautical 
miles (approx. 300 km) beyond the outer edge of a 200nm EEZ. In the East China 
Sea, the distance separating the Chinese mainland and Okinawa is short enough that, 
even at its widest extent, the 200 nm point extending from China’s coast well exceeds 
the median point between the two coasts. According to China’s UN submission, at the 
widest distances identified, China’s claim extends between 60 and 100 nm further 
beyond the EEZ limit. In the narrower southern section, the 200 nm EEZ extends near 
the foot of the continental shelf. According to China’s claim then, the bulk of the sea 
in this area would constitute a 200 nm EEZ alone. Without the continental shelf claim, 
however, China would be unambiguously required to negotiate more equal-distance 
EEZs with Japan on the basis of UNCLOS’s equitability principle (the basis of 
Japan’s counter-claim). 
To understand the geopolitical implications of China’s claims, it is necessary to 
examine both (a) distinctions in the terminology of rights UNCLOS provides for 
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states in a territorial sea, EEZ, and continental shelf, and (b) how China interprets 
these rights.  
UNCLOS distinguishes ‘sovereignty’ and ‘sovereign rights’. Full ‘sovereignty’ 
applies to a territorial sea extending 12nm from a state’s coastal baseline (Article 2 
and 3), as well as bays and internal seas of an archipelago that qualify under 
UNCLOS (Article 49). For EEZs and continental shelves, UNCLOS deploys the 
terms ‘sovereign rights’ and ‘jurisdiction’. In an EEZ, states are provided ‘sovereign 
rights’ for economically exploiting and managing natural resources in the entire 
maritime area, as well as ‘jurisdiction’ over the establishment of man-made structures, 
the conduct of marine scientific research, and environmental protection (Article 56). 
In areas of continental shelf extending up to 350nm, states are provided ‘sovereign 
rights’ for exploring and economically exploiting resources on the seabed and subsoil 
only (Article 77). States are also provided specific rights of ‘jurisdiction’ in regard to 
the laying of submarine cables, pipelines, and over establishment of man-made 
structures in these areas (Articles 79 to 81). 
The key issue is how China interprets the respective rights UNCLOS provides both to 
a coastal state and to other states in an EEZ. This applies also to sections of the South 
China Sea. The question is whether China interprets UNCLOS as allowing a coastal 
state to regulate all military activity or traffic in an EEZ. In the 2001 EP-3/F-8 air 
collision and 2009 USNS Impeccable episodes, China made clear at least its 
opposition to foreign military surveillance operations in its EEZs.96 In dialogues with 
the US, the Chinese argue that such operations are ‘marine scientific research’ that 
has not been cleared for approval by the coastal state exercising ‘jurisdiction’ (see 
Chinese contributions in Dutton 2010). According to Article 143 of UNCLOS, marine 
scientific research is to be conducted for ‘peaceful purposes’, and its findings openly 
‘disseminated’. US surveillance operations do not fulfil the latter condition, and 
arguably not the former either (Valencia and Amae 2003).  
                                                
96 For an analysis of these legal issues as related to the 2001 incident, see Valencia and Amae (2003). 
On the 2009 incident, see the US-China relations section of Comparative Connections, Vol. 11, No. 1-
4 (2009), accessible at: http://csis.org/program/comparative-connections
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There is also a question of how China interprets the ‘sovereign rights’ provision. 
Given UNCLOS defines these rights as covering the ‘production of energy from the 
water, currents and winds’ (Article 56), virtually all matter within an EEZ could 
potentially qualify as an economic resource to be defended from the physical 
interference of others. As specified below, however, Part V of UNCLOS does qualify 
the rights of coastal states through providing rights of freedom of navigation, 
overflight and the laying of submarine cables for other states. China has yet to specify 
the terms under which it might permit free passage of foreign military vessels passing 
through its EEZ (that is, without needing to obtain Chinese authorisation first).  
Preliminary order outcome assessment 
The East China Sea comprises over half the maritime area of MN. The disputes in the 
area, moreover, directly involve a potential regional great power, Japan, whose 
strategic position is currently subordinated, and its security underpinned, by an 
alliance with the dominant power in the region, the US. Within the existing status 
quo, Japanese and US military forces predominate in the eastern half of the sea, and 
US surveillance operations often penetrate into the western side. Japanese forces 
occupy Diaoyu/Senkaku. 
Whether China’s claims in the East China Sea are revisionist in themselves depends 
on the degree of exclusivity in the security arrangements China promotes for its 
claimed EEZ and continental shelf. If China opted to implement an exclusive security 
policy in its EEZs in which it was the sole security provider, and where all military 
passage of foreign militaries was subject to its authorisation or rejection, then the 
military-security hierarchy in the East China Sea would approach unipolarity. The 
establishment of a new unipolarity over a geopolitical sub-region that previously 
embodied a different hierarchy is one means of effecting a limited revision of the 
status quo geopolitical order. Full transition to unipolarity in MN, however, would 
require a similar exclusive policy in the Yellow Sea. An exclusivist policy vis-à-vis 
the US and Japan in the Yellow Sea, however, would need to draw on an extra-legal 
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‘sphere of influence’ argument in areas where the two Koreas are eligible for their 
own EEZs.97  
Less ambitious objectives – such as China limiting its hostility to foreign military 
activities in the uncontested western side of the East China Sea only, whilst agreeing 
to joint security and resource development with Japan in areas where there are 
conflicting legal claims – would be even less decisive in their intrinsic implications 
for regional hierarchy. In both scenarios, our order outcome assessment ultimately 
depends on the interactive processes involved in reaching a settlement, as well as 
developments in other sub-regions. 
Contemporary interests of other stakeholders 
Japan claims sovereignty over Diaoyu/Senkaku, and challenges China’s continental 
shelf claim. The sovereignty claim significantly influences the scope of its claimed 
EEZ, and undercuts China’s ability to claim exclusive rights to the continental shelf 
(Hsiung 2007). Japan, however, claims in addition that the Okinawa trench does not 
mark the end of the continental shelf. Rather, they argue that China and Japan both 
reside on a common continental shelf that extends further east (Bush 2010, 67). Japan 
also argues that the largest islets of Diaoyu/Senkaku qualify as ‘islands’ under 
UNCLOS, thus qualifying for an EEZ of their own. While Japan applies UNCLOS’s 
equitability principle (Article 74) to divide the northern section of the East China Sea 
evenly with China, in the south, the possession of Diaoyu/Senkaku increases its 
relative share of the sea. Japan presently uses the outer edge of its claimed EEZ as the 
boundary of its maritime security perimeter and air defence identification zone (Bush 
2010, chap 5). 
Japanese leaders face considerable socio-political pressure to avoid conceding 
China’s sovereignty claim on Diaoyu/Senkaku (Bush 2010, chap 11; Shirk 2007, 145-
6). In contrast to China, however, the risk is not so much regime instability as the 
collapse of political and electoral support for the cabinet or party forming 
government. A further comparative difference with China is that the issue of 
Diaoyu/Senkaku does not pose any potential threat to Japan’s broader territorial 
                                                
97 Affirmative reference to such a Chinese ‘sphere of influence’ appeared in one quite recent Global 
Times editorial: ‘Watch out for China-US tension at sea’, 12 July 2010, accessed: www.globaltimes.cn  
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integrity. Rather, the issues and risks arising for Japan in its disputes with China in the 
East China Sea concern (a) the extent of the relative decline of its regional status 
(Tokyo Foundation 2011), (b) the viability of the US alliance as the guarantor of 
Japanese security, and (c) the prospect of an involuntary strategic dependence and 
subordination to China, a country in which many of its people harbour hostile feelings 
towards Japan.98
The US has a considerable stake in these issues. In terms of territory and population, 
Japan is the largest and most significant country in the region over which the US 
extends a security guarantee. If Japan were to lose out completely to China’s maximal 
preferences in the East China Sea, the symbolism of the defeat would have an impact 
not only on the credibility of the US’s Asian security role, but potentially on its 
alliances in other regions as well.  
In regards to Diaoyu/Senkaku, the US says they do not take sides in the sovereignty 
dispute. Top officials in the current and previous US administrations have clearly 
indicated, however, that as a territory currently administered by Japan it falls within 
the US-Japan alliance treaty. Yet, the terms of the treaty do enable the US to exercise 
a choice between direct defence of the territory, or back-up deterrence alone to 
localise and prevent escalation of any Sino-Japanese conflict over the issue (Bush 
2010, 259-60). 
In addition to the issue of alliance credibility, the US contests the extent of the 
‘jurisdiction’ powers that China advances within its claimed EEZs, and of which the 
US has always defined as international waters. US administrations in the post-Cold 
War period have generally sought to sustain and extend America’s moment of global 
military primacy. America’s ability to do this has rested on its ability to maintain 
‘command of the commons’ at sea, in the air, and outer space (Posen 2003). From the 
American point of view, China’s advocacy of restrictions on the freedom of other 
states’ naval and air forces in an EEZ poses an unwelcome precedent that could 
                                                
98 On the depth of antipathy towards Japan, see Shirk (2007, chap. 6) and various Global Times
editorials published in the wake of the escalation of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute in 2012 (eg: ‘Diaoyu 
slowly drifting into crosshairs’, 27 Aug 2012).  
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potentially complicate its projection of power, not only in MEA, but elsewhere around 
the world if other countries follow suit (Dutton 2012).  
UNCLOS provides a degree of support to the American position. Article 58 states that 
in EEZs: 
… all States … enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, 
the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the 
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses 
of the sea related to these freedoms. 
Article 87 (in Part VII: High Seas) states in its second clause that: ‘These freedoms 
shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their 
exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under 
this Convention with respect to activities in the Area [emphasis added].’ Article 90 
reads: ‘Every State … has the right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas.’ 
Article 95 states: ‘Warships on the high seas have complete immunity from the 
jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State.’ Article 96 extends these rights also 
to: ‘Ships owned or operated by a State and used only on government non-
commercial service …’ The central point of contestation is the issue of how freedoms 
pertaining to the high seas are qualified and altered by the proviso in the italicised 
phrase in Article 87 that, above all, applies to the ‘sovereign rights’ and ‘jurisdiction’ 
of coastal states in an EEZ. UNCLOS itself does not provide a definitive answer.  
In addition to legal argument, the US appeals to customary practice, including its own 
toleration of Soviet and, more recently, Russian military surveillance missions in 
close proximity to its coasts (Dutton 2012).   
Implied interactive processes 
There is much physical incompatibility in the interaction of existing ideal preferences. 
The most difficult issue is the sovereignty dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku. Ideal 
realisation of China’s claim requires the expulsion of Japanese forces that currently 
fortify and defend the area. Japan cannot be expected to voluntarily withdraw to 
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facilitate a Chinese takeover and exclusive entitlement to the islands. A future war 
over the issue is a real possibility. 
If China ever attempted the ideal realisation of an exclusive security posture across 
the full extent of its claimed EEZ, this too would require an expulsion of Japanese and 
US forces. The existing interest preferences of Japan and the US suggest that they 
would fiercely resist any attempt at coercive expulsion, especially in the eastern half 
of the Sea. War would be the likely result.  
Even if the latter were never attempted during peacetime, a war over Diaoyu/Senkaku 
would nonetheless raise the premium of the East China Sea as a strategic space. The 
PLA would need some room to concentrate its forces against Japan’s territorial 
defences, and, if successful, to secure its gains in the aftermath (Hsiung 2007). War 
between Chinese and Japanese/US forces over control of areas of the East China Sea 
as a by-product of the territorial conflict is a real possibility. 
An alternative possibility to these violent scenarios arises from the fact that at least in 
regards to issues of EEZ delineation and the rights of coastal and other states in these 
areas, the arguments of the parties all have backing, and are not entirely contradicted, 
by international law. Mutual recognition that the interests of all parties have a share of 
legal legitimacy could provide the basis for negotiated compromise solutions in 
maritime areas where contradictory international legal principles pertain, and which 
the law in itself cannot resolve. Given the importance of Diaoyu/Senkaku to the 
credibility of China’s ‘One China’ doctrine, however, it is unlikely that this approach 
could be applied on this particular issue.  
Adjusted order outcome assessment 
The preceding analysis enables us now to fine-tune our understanding of the scenarios 
considered in our preliminary assessment. First, we can see that a shift to unipolarity 
in the sub-region of MN would, in light of existing interest definitions, necessarily 
require a Chinese victory in a major maritime war with Japan and the US. The 
numerical and technological advantage required to decisively win such a battle and 
sustain control of the area is such that this event would necessarily follow not precede 
a revisionist shift in the whole-of-region structure of deterrence to at least bipolarity. 
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The obstacles to realising such a maximal objective are also such as to imply that 
China would need already to have developed sufficient forces to cover its 
vulnerability to economic blockade in MS, and to severely disrupt US and Japanese 
force and supply lines in GWP. The likelihood of success would appear low, unless 
coming in the aftermath of decisive strategic gains or victories in these other sub-
regions, as well as Taiwan. The revisionist implications of this scenario are thus 
potentially radical more than limited. 
The implications of a negotiated compromise on EEZ delineation and security in the 
East China Sea for the whole-of-region geopolitical hierarchy remain indecisive. 
According to my theory, a shift within a single sub-region from a unipolar to a bipolar 
structure of deterrence would not qualify as revisionist in itself. In this case, we say 
that a state has (a) marginally extended and strengthened part of their peripheral 
defence, or else (b) attained a strategic foothold at the margins of another geopolitical 
region. At the sub-regional level, a bipolar structure of deterrence is not always 
simply a reflection of the whole-of-region military balance. A reliable assessment 
needs to take into account any asymmetries in interest commitments and motivation. 
Thus, at the sub-regional level, a bipolar (or multipolar) structure of deterrence can be 
evident (despite an overall material power asymmetry) when the key states involved 
are able to mutually inhibit and obstruct each other’s ideal preferences or scope for 
unilateral action. 
In the case of the East China Sea, it is possible that the various parties will be 
unwilling to bear the costs and risks of conflict escalation that insistence on the 
maximal realisation of ideal preferences would bring. In the case of the US, this 
would mean tacitly adhering to Chinese preferences in the western half of the sea to 
avoid military penetration without the latter’s prior consent. In the case of China and 
Japan, it would mean acknowledging legitimately overlapping claims on the eastern 
side, and agreeing to inclusive and equal terms of military security and resource 
development in that area. Regardless of whether such a settlement were more the 
product of the pre-emptive diplomacy of national leaders, coercive bargaining, or war; 
it is not possible to gauge the hierarchical implications of this for MEA without an 
understanding of possible corresponding developments in the South China Sea.  
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7.2.3: South China Sea 
Ideal preference 
Since its founding, the PRC has indicated its claims in the South China Sea through 
reference to a tongue-shaped arc comprised of nine broken dashes, encompassing 
approximately 80 percent of the Sea (see Figure 2). The arc extends in close 
proximity (often well within 50 nm) to the uncontested coastal baselines of Vietnam, 
the Philippines, and Malaysia. Chinese leaders are yet to specify the legal status and 
meaning of the nine-dash line. What is known is that China claims ‘indisputable’ 
sovereignty over all land features (islands, reefs, rocks, sand banks etc) within this 
arc, including those permanently submerged under water. What remains ambiguous is 
whether the Chinese government views the status of the waters and air space within 
the arc as subject to negotiation purely though the regular provisions of UNCLOS; or 
alternatively, whether it intends to advance either an ‘historical waters’ or ‘historical 
rights’ claim. 
The Chinese Foreign Ministry recently stated that no country, including China, is 
claiming sovereignty over the entire South China Sea (‘China committed to …’ 
2012). To defuse recent tensions, the Ministry has also briefed embassies of ASEAN 
states that China mainly claims the land features within the arc and the territorial seas 
and EEZs they generate according to UNCLOS (ICG 2012a). Recent research from 
the International Crisis Group (2012a), however, reveals that there is no uniform view 
about the status of the nine-dash line across and within state agencies, and that the 
Foreign Ministry does not exercise a centralising authority on the issue.  
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Figure 2: China’s claims in the South China Sea 
Source: Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nine-dotted_line)  
The content of the Foreign Ministry’s briefings, moreover, do not negate the potential 
for an additional ‘historical rights’ claim to areas of water within the arc that are not 
captured by EEZ entitlements. Before passing the PRC’s 1998 ‘Law on the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf’, National People’s Congress delegates 
negotiated the inclusion of Article 14 that states: ‘The provisions of this Act shall not 
affect the historical rights of the People's Republic of China’ (Zou 2001). The 
meaning of this clause has never been clarified. If intended as a basis for advancing 
entitlements beyond EEZs, there are two possible interpretations. The first possibility 
is that the ‘historic rights’ claim would be used to negate the right for other disputants 
to claim a pure EEZ over maritime areas extending into the nine-dash arc. On the 
grounds of the traditional use of the area by Chinese fishermen, China might insist on 
joint jurisdiction and exploitation of resources in these areas. The second possibility is 
that the ‘historic rights’ claim could be used to extend more exclusive jurisdiction 
over residual maritime spaces that are not captured by EEZ claims.   
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By contrast, an ‘historical waters’ claim would be an entire substitute for the need to 
negotiate EEZs or any other conditional forms of entitlement with other claimants. 
The claim would be unconditional sovereignty over the waters and air space within 
the nine-dash line. Within UNCLOS, there are three oblique references to ‘historic 
bays’ and ‘historic title’ that were likely included to cover ‘historical water’ claims 
that had been validated under preceding regimes of international law (Zou 2001). The 
fact that the nine-dash line was first introduced in 1947 (by the ROC) at a time when 
‘historical waters’ claims were recognised to have potential legal validity is one 
source of support for this type of claim.  
Other conditions for successfully advancing such a legal claim, however, would be 
insuperable for the PRC. In 1962, an International Law Commission report concluded 
that three factors should be considered when determining the validity of an ‘historical 
waters’ claim: (1) the exercise of authority over the area, (2) the continuity over time 
of this authority, and (3) the attitude of foreign states to the claim (Valencia et al. 
1997, 26). China does not have evidence from any historical period that decisively 
satisfies any of these conditions,99 and the experience of at least the past two hundred 
years is in complete contradiction with these requirements. It is perhaps because of 
these difficulties that Chinese law and many Chinese scholars refer instead to China’s 
‘historic rights’ (Li 2010). Such terminology may possibly have been adopted in order 
to preserve some room for compromise with other states, whilst maintaining political 
unity with more radical elite and online nationalists who view the nine-dash line as 
marking a traditional Chinese sovereign domain (ICG 2012a, section 5-E). 
In regards to EEZ delineation in the South China Sea, the Chinese government 
appears to be considering a maximal claim. Most controversial are its apparent 
intentions to extend EEZs from islets within or baselines around the disputed 
Paracel/Xisha and Spratly/Nansha groups. In 1996, China declared a baseline around 
Xisha, suggesting it views the group as equivalent to an archipelago with internal 
sovereign waters and eligible for an EEZ. In a ‘Note Verbale’ sent to the UN in 
protest at the Philippines in 2011, the Chinese government explicitly stated a view 
                                                
99 A thorough exposition of the evidence used to support the Chinese case can be found in Shen (2002). 
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that Spratly/Nansha is ‘fully entitled’ to an EEZ and continental shelf.100 Under 
UNCLOS, however, there would be no basis for archipelago claims in either case, 
given that the law requires a much greater ratio of land to water (Article 47).  
The question of whether any individual islets qualify as ‘islands’ under UNCLOS is 
more controversial. Many international legal experts advocate a more disciplined 
criteria for the ability to ‘sustain human habitation or economic life of their own’ 
(Article 121) than could be satisfied in the cases of Xisha, and also Japan’s 
Diaoyu/Senkaku claim (Valencia et al. 1997, 41-5). In the case of Spratly, only a few 
of the 25 to 35 land features that are above water at high tide (Article 121) are similar 
in size and vegetative life to the contender ‘islands’ in Xisha and Diaoyu. 
Nevertheless, if China advanced EEZ claims from only a few of the largest islets in 
Xisha and Spratly, much of the area within the nine-dashed line would still comprise 
an EEZ. In the absence of any ‘historic rights’ claim, however, China would be 
obliged to negotiate equi-distant arrangements with neighbouring states that have 
overlapping EEZ claims extending from their uncontested coastal baselines. 
Regardless of the principles China eventually advances for the status of maritime 
spaces in the Sea, the claim of sovereignty over all land features is enough to suggest 
significant military defence interests in the area. The mainstream view in China, 
moreover, is that the country needs to develop capabilities that can credibly defend its 
trade shipments through the Malacca Strait all the way to its mainland ports.  
Preliminary order outcome assessment 
Once again, whether China’s claims in MS are revisionist in themselves depends on 
the degree of exclusivity in the security arrangements China advances in the maritime 
spaces of this sub-region. If China opted to exclude and prevent other major powers 
such as the US and Japan from being able to transit their military forces through the 
South China Sea, then, if successful, the military-security hierarchy in MS would 
become founded on Chinese unipolarity. While at first glance this might seem like a 
scenario of limited revisionism, we know from our analysis of the East China Sea that 
the resistance of other powers and corresponding developments in other sub-regions 
                                                
100 The Chinese ‘Note Verbale’ was issued on 14 April 2011, and coded as CML/8/2011. Accessible at: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf  
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might realistically make for a more radical revisionist outcome. An aggregated 
assessment of possibilities for limited and radical revisionism in MEA will be 
provided shortly in the adjusted order outcome section below. 
Contemporary interests of other stakeholders  
Of all the sub-regions in MEA, MS involves the largest number of direct stakeholders. 
Of these, a distinction can be made between the interests of (a) the five minor powers 
that compete with the PRC over sovereignty and jurisdiction in the area, and (b) 
regional powers external to the disputes, namely the US, Japan, South Korea, and 
various non-claimant ASEAN states. 
With the exception of the ROC (whose claims are similar to the PRC’s), Vietnam’s 
claims are the most extensive among the other contending parties. Vietnam claims 
sovereignty over all of Paracel and Spratly, but advances EEZ and continental shelf 
claims off its main coast only. Malaysia contests twelve land features in the southern 
part of Spratly, while the Philippines claims sovereignty over numerous land features 
in the Western part, as well as two other small land groupings within the nine-dash 
line. Both countries also claim an EEZ and continental shelf extension into the South 
China Sea (ICG 2012b).  
At various times over recent decades, tensions and altercations over the disputes have 
been most common and volatile between China and Vietnam, and China and the 
Philippines. Vietnam, in particular, faces intense domestic political and popular 
pressure to stand up to China on sovereignty issues (ICG 2012b). Recent incidents 
with China have, however, hardened both Vietnamese and Filipino diplomatic stances 
on these issues (Thayer 2011), and prompted notable increases in defence acquisitions 
in both countries (ICG 2012b; The Hanoist 2012). Both countries are also engaging 
closer with the US, and look to the latter to counter-balance the potential for Chinese 
dominance. 
For the US, recent Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea has been a key factor 
prompting the Obama Administration’s so-called ‘return to Asia’. The intention of the 
current administration is to shift from the current 50-50 split of the US navy between 
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the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, to a 60-40 ratio favouring the Pacific by 2020 
(Garnaut 2012).  
In the South China Sea, the US defines its interests in terms of freedom of navigation, 
preventing the potential for disruption or interference of regional trade flows, and 
peaceful resolution of disputes according to international law (Landler 2010). The US 
has maintained that it does not take sides in any of the sovereignty disputes.101 It is 
uncertain exactly under what conditions the US would intervene in any military 
conflict between the parties disputing sovereignty. At a minimum, the credibility of 
US power would hinge on its ability to prevent any Chinese strategic lockdown of the 
area during a crisis, and minimise any disruption to normal trade flows.  
The importance of the South China Sea to the US needs to be understood in terms of 
its broader Indo-Pacific strategy. The South China Sea forms the shortest connection 
between these two oceans. Forces from America’s Pacific fleet are used to support 
operations in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. US forces stationed in the West 
Pacific and Japan rely on energy resources from across the Indian Ocean that passage 
through the Malacca Strait (Wang et al. 2008). If the US military and its economic 
shipments were denied access to the South China Sea, the US would become 
relatively more disadvantaged vis-à-vis China in a regional, or potentially extra-
regional, conflict. Besides incurring higher costs for the extra distance of detouring 
between the two oceans, the US military would be delayed considerably behind China 
in being able to manoeuvre its fleets between the Indian Ocean and West Pacific.  
An additional factor underpinning US interest in the South China Sea is the 
historically conditioned perception in that country regarding the dangers of conceding 
geopolitical power to authoritarian states. As Jeffrey Legro (2005, chap 3) has argued, 
the experience of WWII in particular drove the collapse of the previously dominant 
grand strategic paradigm of detachment from strategic affairs beyond the Western 
Hemisphere, and fostered the rise and consolidation of an alternative paradigm of 
active leadership. Christopher Layne (2006) argues further that the US policymakers 
                                                
101 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s references, however, to the ‘West Philippines Sea’ in public 
statements during a trip to the Philippines in 2011 was interpreted in China as taking sides at its 
expense (Whaley 2011). 
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are culturally conditioned to view authoritarian states as more likely to have an 
interest in constructing exclusive trade blocs and relationships that undermine US 
economic interests and threaten its traditional preference for an ‘open door’ world. 
Accordingly, since the Cold War, the US has tended to confront challenges to its 
interests from authoritarian rivals at an early stage, and avoid ceding advantages that 
might require a more costly struggle later on to reverse an adverse domino effect 
against its interests. 
Japan has also indicated a strong interest in developments in the South China Sea. 
With around 90 percent of its oil supplied from imports that transit the Malacca Strait 
and South China Sea (Cole 2008, 26), Chinese dominance of this sub-region would 
provide the latter potential leverage over the lifeline of Japan’s economy. Most of 
South Korea’s oil needs are also reliant on Middle East imports (Cole 2008, 31). The 
military security control of MS by a single power also enables it a potential capacity 
to selectively block intra-regional trade shipments, in regard to which almost all East 
Asian countries have acquired a major stake.    
Implied interactive processes 
At an irreducible minimum, physical incompatibility between interest definitions in 
MS is evident in the sovereignty disputes over land features. Full realisation and 
validation of these sovereignty claims ultimately depends on the ability of the winning 
claimant to expel the national flag and defensive fortifications erected in the area by 
other claimants. Once again, this is unlikely ever to be achieved in the absence of at 
least a credible threat of military and/or economic punishment. China’s interests here 
thus imply a real possibility of war with other claimants to achieve conquest of 
disputed territories.  
Presuming China were successful in this endeavour, additional challenges pertaining 
to (a) the structure of deterrence, and (b) the legal status of various maritime spaces in 
MS, would immediately move to the forefront of the regional diplomatic agenda. In 
regards to the former, China would be expected to erect its own defensive 
fortifications and deterrent naval presence throughout MS to protect against any 
attempts to reverse its gains. To counter the potential for Chinese control of the area, 
the US would also be expected to increase its own naval presence in the Sea. If the US 
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had not directly intervened and fought with China during the wars over disputed land 
features, existing US interests suggest they would nonetheless establish a naval 
presence in the Sea in an attempt to localise conflicts and minimise disruption to 
regional trade. 
In regards to maritime jurisdiction, China has four main options. Selection of the 
‘historical waters’ option, entailing exclusive sovereign authority over the distribution 
of security and resource development in the area, would be sure to invite major war
with the US and other states, allied or otherwise. Such an option is in conflict with the 
interests of all other major stakeholders in the South China Sea.  
The second option consists of EEZ claims around contender ‘islands’ in (or baselines 
around) Xisha and Nansha, augmented by ‘historic rights’ claims in residual maritime 
space. This option conflicts with the opposition of all other claimants towards the 
validity of the nine-dashed line. Moreover, it consumes much maritime space that 
would otherwise comprise coastal EEZs for the other disputants. It also poses a 
challenge to the credibility of US power, albeit to a slightly less extent than the first 
option. Especially if the US had not intervened in land territory conflicts, confidence 
in the US as a regional security guarantor would plummet if it could not prevent 
China’s coercive imposition of terms against the wills of all other claimants. The US 
would be unlikely to stay on the sidelines on this matter, diplomatically or 
strategically, given additionally that there is no clear basis or precedent in 
international law for this type of ‘historic rights’ claim (Zou 2001). 
The US would also be sure to assert rights of military transit within China’s claimed 
EEZs. This issue is also common to the third option, which involves China asserting 
EEZs off islets or islet groupings, without the additional ‘historic rights’ claim. This 
option would still shrink the area of other coastal EEZs relative to if there were no 
competing Chinese claim. The legal validity of Chinese EEZs off such islands, 
moreover, is contestable, and would likely be resisted by other claimants.  
While it is possible that the US would actively support efforts to deny China EEZs in 
the central and southern areas of the South China Sea, its bottom line remains 
opposition to unilateral military security control by coastal states within EEZs that 
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straddle strategically important waterways. According to its existing interests, the US 
will not voluntarily accept an arrangement in which all military transit through the 
Sea is subject to the latter’s formal authorisation or rejection (as opposed to the 
current US practice of notification only). Attempts to impose such an arrangement 
would likely provoke an increase of US naval transits in defiance. Effective 
opposition to US free transit would require a preparedness to engage in war.
The final option for China would be to abandon any jurisdiction claims in the central 
and southern parts of MS apart from the 12nm territorial seas generated around 
individual land features in Xisha and Nansha. In the absence of a scenario in which 
the disputing parties mutually agreed to de-nationalise the Spratly grouping, this is the 
option that would preserve the greatest potential room for a consensual order in MS. 
Coercive occupation of land features by China would of course create bad blood in 
relationships with other claimants. This option, however, contains the compensation 
that these other states would be entitled to a full 200nm EEZ and extended continental 
shelf rights, subject to compromise with China only in regard to the territorial seas of 
land features contained within these zones. It also would reduce potential for direct 
disputes with the US and its allies over freedom of navigation. There are indications, 
however, that such a concession of potential jurisdiction rights might be difficult for 
the Chinese government to negotiate in its domestic politics. 
Adjusted order outcome assessment 
An integrated assessment of China’s irredentist and maritime jurisdiction claims 
indicates that its geopolitical agenda for MEA at very least implies a limited revision 
of the regional military-security hierarchy. Firstly, China’s vision entails the 
successful incorporation and securing of Taiwan, Diaoyu and Nansha. In addition to 
confronting and prevailing over the determined resistance of rival claimants, 
realisation of these objectives implies that the US has lost the capacity to comfortably 
deter coercive and potentially non-peaceful resolutions to regional territorial disputes 
across the full span of MEA. Further, according to its ideal preferences, China will at 
very least be determined to compel the US to end military surveillance operations in 
uncontested EEZs around the mainland coast, Hainan, and Taiwan. China’s ability to 
secure and sustain all these objectives will require an enhanced deterrence capability 
of region-wide scope, including in GWP (enabled especially by its incorporation of 
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Taiwan). Such objectives at the very least imply the emergence of a bipolar hierarchy 
centred on China and the US/Japan.  
In a limited revisionist order, however, aspects of regional order would represent a 
compromise with US interests. The US and its allies would successfully uphold a 
right to passage their military through the South China Sea, and parts of the Yellow 
and East China Sea, without prior Chinese authorisation. While the US might 
voluntarily agree to respect no-go zones in closer proximity to the Chinese coast, 
China would guarantee it will not oppose free passage (and the right to defend such 
free passage) of non-Chinese military vessels through international sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs) penetrating the South China Sea and key straits. So long as 
such a compact were voluntary and based on genuine (rather than tactical) consent, 
space would be opened up for the negotiation of region-wide arms control and 
security cooperation on the basis of the emerging bipolar military-security hierarchy. 
While not necessarily marked by an absence of war, this scenario arguably represents 
the outer boundary of what could be consistent with China’s ‘harmonious world’ 
doctrine. 
Some of China’s apparent interest tendencies in regard to maritime jurisdiction, 
however, clearly would, if not compromised, require a more radical revision of the 
regional military-security hierarchy for their realisation. Any vision of regional order 
that entailed a Chinese capacity to enduringly exclude non-Chinese navies and air 
forces within the ‘first island chain’ down to the Malacca Strait implies (a) 
preparedness to fight a major great power war over the issue, or else (b) a belief 
(likely false) that neither the US nor Japan have the stomach for such a fight. To 
prevent the US from viably re-contesting Chinese unipolar control of MN and MS, 
moreover, China would need to take control of a large area of GWP to secure all 
major entry points into the area. Control of the ‘three seas’ accordingly implies a 
radical revisionist shift to Chinese unipolarity in MEA.  
Control of the ‘three seas’ and a capacity to defend the Malacca Strait would not, 
however, eradicate China’s vulnerability to economic blockade, but rather would be 
the most anticipatable grounds for other powers’ to implement one in the Indian 
Ocean. Thus for practical strategic reasons, at least, it is unlikely that China’s 
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geopolitical agenda in MEA will be prosecuted on radical revisionist lines, at least 
during the initial irredentist stages of its strategic expansion.  
7.3: China’s broader naval objectives 
In this section, I demonstrate an alternative method for applying the process and 
outcome stage indicators. In the preceding analysis, interest definitions and options 
could be specified to a considerable level of detail. The method used was thus the 
most reliable one of interactively simulating case-specific variables that are 
empirically known first, followed by the post-application of the indicators as a gauge 
of revisionist potential (if any). This is an explanation of possibilities proper, given 
that it is based on a detailed knowledge of real interest definitions and their 
motivational causes. 
In contrast, the following analysis is more limited in its case-specific knowledge base. 
In regards both to government policy and expression in the national discourse, 
Chinese objectives for naval expansion beyond MEA remain broad-brushed and 
under-specified. They are also relatively more remote and long-term goals, and the 
Chinese themselves cannot predict what their needs and circumstances might be at a 
later, more ready stage, given open system dynamics.  
As a result of these limitations, the previous method is supplemented here with an 
alternative one. The latter reverses the analytical sequence to pose the question: what 
would the interests of relevant states need to look like to match the criteria of the 
indicators? While a relatively more speculative exercise compared with the previous 
method, it is nonetheless argued here as appropriate and worth undertaking. This is 
because the hypothesising of interests is conducted according to a theory claiming 
knowledge about determinate and necessary conditions that are operative in all power 
transitions. The comparative limitation of analysis generated from this alternative 
method is that the contours and dynamics of future geopolitical sub-regions cannot be 
known or predicted in the absence of more finely specified interests. 
The possibility for Chinese revisionism in geopolitical regions beyond MEA is 
suggested from two main sources. The first is the more restrained expression of the 
232
official government position embodied in the previous two Chinese defence white 
papers (2008, chap V; 2010, chap III) which state that China is developing 
capabilities for ‘conducting cooperation [2008] (operations [2010]) in distant waters’. 
The second is the commonly expressed opinion in the national discourse that China 
needs to be capable of defending the passage of its seaborne foreign trade to (a) 
ensure the security of its core interests, and (b) attain a diplomatic leverage 
commensurate with genuine great power status. 
On the basis of the formulation in the official white papers alone, there is nothing to 
suggest that China’s extra-regional naval ambitions are necessarily revisionist. The 
formulation could easily be consistent with the status quo if the operations referred to 
were (a) token contributions to non-traditional security cooperation under the 
leadership of other powers, or (b) small operations to protect Chinese nationals in 
which more capable powers did not have any interest to deter or obstruct. 
The idea that China needs to be capable of defending its seaborne foreign trade is 
much more suggestive, albeit still lacking in open and unequivocal endorsement from 
the central leadership. For those who advance this argument, it is clear that the who 
which China potentially needs to be defended from are other major powers, primarily 
the US. Sea power advocates do not usually specify a precise direction for the 
proposed extra-regional naval policy. Common emphasis on the Malacca dilemma 
and China’s resource security suggests a concern primarily with the Indian Ocean 
extending to the Middle East and Africa. It is possible, however, that some advocates 
also have the passage of China’s trade with South America in mind. 
The capability to defend against trade blockades from major powers implies the need 
for a substantial deterrence capacity. Practically speaking, the most effective means of 
doing this would be to develop into (or part of) a countervailing pole in the oceanic 
military-security hierarchy. In the Southern Pacific, for instance, this would mean 
approaching the (presently) difficult target of reaching and sustaining quantitative or 
qualitative naval parity with the US in a bipolar structure of power.  
In the Indian Ocean, considerations of hierarchy are complicated by the rise, and 
potential revisionism, of India. The question of future Indian strategic independence 
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or alliance with the US is of equal significance as the potential for Chinese 
revisionism in this oceanic region (DeSilva-Ranasinghe 2011; Chandramohan 2010). 
In the event that India remained capably inferior and strategically subordinate to the 
US, the extension of a credible Chinese deterrence force across the Indian Ocean 
would be the only revisionist event in the region. Alternatively, if India were to 
surpass US capabilities operating in the area, whether as an independent pole or as the 
lead partner in an alliance with the US, India too would be a revisionist actor. It is 
thus possible to envisage a process of dual revisionism leading either to a tri-polar or 
new bipolar hierarchy.   
In regard to the prospects of a more radical revisionist Chinese agenda beyond MEA, 
such an option does not cohere with China’s contemporary pledges to respect the 
interests of other states and never pursue hegemony. Moreover, in order to have any 
chance of securing such an objective, China would need first to have achieved a 
similar radical revisionist outcome in MEA. Otherwise, it would easily be harassed 
and distracted by the US and its allies closer to China’s home territory.  
As suggested previously, the prerequisite for attaining a radical revisionist outcome in 
MEA would be an effective deterrence posture in the Indian Ocean to neutralise the 
threat of blockade. Even if the longer-term passage of events proceeded from Chinese 
limited revisionism in MEA, limited revisionism in the Indian Ocean, followed by 
radical revisionism in MEA; other powers would likely have the will, and if so, the 
options to stage a concerted resistance to any Chinese campaign to dominate the 
Indian Ocean. One major option would be investment in India’s rise and the latter’s 
possible willingness under such circumstances to house major joint India-US military 
bases. This would be to counter China’s advantage in controlling the inner lines 
connecting the Indian Ocean and West Pacific (ie. the South China Sea). Alliance of 
either of these powers with Indonesia, Australia, or other littoral states might also be 
options. Whatever the case, if existing interest tendencies of the US and India are 
sustained, China would have to fight a major war and destroy the combat naval forces 
of both these powers to realise a radical revisionist agenda in this area. 
A limited revisionist trajectory in the Indian Ocean has greater potential to follow a 
peaceful path. China has no exclusive sovereignty or maritime jurisdiction claims in 
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the Indian Ocean. As such, there should be lesser obstacles to negotiating stable arms 
control and great power security cooperation in this region than in MEA. In areas that 
are predominantly international commons, however, conflicts can still potentially 
arise if (a) one power or bloc attempts to establish exclusive control over particular 
geopolitical spaces, (b) one or more powers are unwilling to engage in arms control 
and cease open-ended production and fielding of new warships in the area, or (c) if 
the status quo power(s) are hostile to the newcomer, and physically contest a shift in 
the existing hierarchy. 
A China that continues to genuinely uphold the peaceful development paradigm 
would not be expected to attempt a policy of exclusive control within areas of 
international commons that would violate international law. For the US’s part, senior 
defence officials in recent years have spoken of US interest in forging an 
internationally collaborative ‘1000-ship navy’ to share the burden of securing the 
international public good of protecting international SLOCS (Cavas 2006; Committee 
on the “1000-ship navy” 2008).102  
Even so, adoption of an elastic policy both within and beyond East Asia would be a 
psychological challenge for a US that is accustomed to military-security primacy in 
many parts of the world. Shifts in the structure of deterrence and polarity of 
geopolitical regions have accompanying political implications. An effective 
deterrence capacity creates an ability to potentially inhibit or obstruct the ideal 
preferences and unilateral action of the other. In the Indian Ocean, Chinese and/or 
Indian revisionism would mean that unilateral or single-bloc military interventions 
become potentially much more risky or costly. Interventions in security crises around 
the Indian Ocean littoral, if or when they occurred, would be more likely to be joint 
ventures managed on the basis of a concert of powers. Peaceful power transition 
outcomes thus will depend just as much on a US capacity to accept the loss of former 
strategic and security advantages and the emergence of new vulnerabilities and 
constraints in an altered deterrence structure, as on the restraint of the revisionist 
parties.       
                                                
102 Note that the US currently has a 284-ship navy (Cronin and Kaplan 2012).
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7.4: Conclusion 
This chapter deployed an innovative method of ‘closed system rational simulation’, 
together with indicators from my alternative power transition theory, to assess the 
revisionist implications of contemporary Chinese interest structures. In addition to 
substantive case analysis, the chapter provided a demonstration of how to apply the 
theoretical indicators. Two different methods of application were advanced, the 
choice or balance of which depends on the degree of concrete case-specific 
knowledge that is attainable. An explanations of possibilities that employs a more 
comprehensive base of case-specific knowledge is less hypothetical and speculative 
than one in which general theoretical categories do all of the work, however soundly 
reflective of natural necessity the latter might be. 
An important lesson of the analysis is the need to avoid considering issues at the sub-
regional level in isolation from the whole-of-region level, and the whole-of region in 
isolation from a broader geopolitical context. It is not inevitable that the latter will 
have any significant relevance for the former. For instance, in the case of the limited 
revisionist outcome of German unification in the 1860s, the power transition was 
effected through developments in the sub-region of Germanic Central Europe only. 
Affairs in the sub-region of the Balkans were inconsequential to this at the time, and 
vice versa. In the case of MEA, however, there are many such inter-connections. Such 
inter-connections need always to be checked for in order to avoid misapplication of 
the indicators, and errors in the conclusions that would follow.   
In regard to substantive case analysis, application of our present theory and methods 
indicates that China’s contemporary geopolitical agenda in MEA at very least requires 
a limited revision of the regional military-security hierarchy for its fulfilment. In this 
case, the implied power transition not only involves a potential shift in the structure of 
deterrence across the maritime spaces of MEA, but rather is complicated by an 
extensive agenda of irredentist and maritime jurisdiction goals. The interactive 
analysis of interests on sovereignty disputes, in particular, indicates that in the 
absence of any voluntary renunciation of claims, resolution of these issues will likely 
be coercive, with conflict a real possibility. It might be possible for China and the US 
to avoid a direct military clash, at least in a limited revisionism scenario. Nonetheless, 
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a limited revisionist settlement as the pragmatic resolution to conflict(s) is also 
possible under certain initial interest premises. 
Radical revisionism in MEA would mean a Chinese ability to permanently exclude 
US and Japanese naval and air forces from operating and transiting within the ‘first 
island chain’. The existing interests of these powers, and the US ‘return to Asia’, 
suggest the unlikelihood of such a preference being realised through a process of 
peaceful (radical) retrenchment. A major great power war would likely need to be 
fought to attain this goal. In practical strategic terms, a decisive and conclusive 
outcome to the conflict would require (a) Chinese attainment of a strong deterrence 
posture in the Indian Ocean prior to such an attempt, and (b) a weakly committed US, 
and submissive and pacifistic Japan. A future China that remained genuinely 
committed to a ‘peaceful rise’, however, would never attempt such a gamble, and 
would be expected to make some compromise on those aspects of its existing 
maritime jurisdiction policy that imply such an exclusivist orientation. 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge two key limitations to the analysis in this 
chapter. First, while the real possibilities simulated are based on existing interest 
structures and interest definitions; in real world open system, such interests are 
subject to evolution, and sometimes major transformation. The above analysis will 
need to be periodically checked and, if necessary, updated and adjusted. Even so, 
analysis in the previous chapter provides grounds for considering contemporary 
Chinese interest structures as having a robust causal underpinning. Secondly, the 
analysis has been conducted on the basis of a closed system. To be relevant to the 
explanation of phenomena in real world open systems, we need to consider the 
potential conditioning effects of other significant causal structures and processes. The 
following chapter addresses the second of these limitations. 
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Chapter 8: Testing Competing Arguments 
This chapter subjects my arguments about Chinese revisionism and possibilities for 
war and peace in East Asia (established on the basis of a closed system simulation) to 
an open system ‘inter-theoretical evaluation’. The aim is to test these arguments, 
derived from my alternative power transition theory, through critically relating them 
to causal variables captured within three other theses that have been advanced to 
explain and/or predict the dynamics of East Asian security order. These include 
propositions about the causal impact of: (1) the material balance of power (advanced 
within variants of neorealism and in PTT), (2) economic interdependence (the 
cornerstone of liberal explanations of peace in East Asia), and (3) socialisation 
according to common international norms (as advanced by IR constructivists). 
The chapter has three main sections that sequentially integrate consideration of these 
alternative causal propositions – vis-à-vis my arguments – into a broader (though 
never fully complete) open system analysis. Each section follows an identical four-
step procedure, as follows: 
Explanatory theses: Each section begins with a summary of the main lines of 
argument advanced within the given explanatory paradigm. Both the general 
theoretical arguments and their specific applications to contemporary East 
Asian security order are articulated.
Existing impacts: A critical assessment is made of the evidence that is used, or 
can potentially be drawn upon, to support these explanations. 
Necessary conditions for future validity: Structural conditions that need to be 
present in order for the theoretical claims to be judged plausible or implausible 
within a given time-space specific context are articulated. Not all of these are 
identified within the actual theories themselves. 
Applying the CATB test: Finally, the CATB test developed in Chapter 3 is 
applied to assess the relationship of these alternative explanations to my own 
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theoretically informed arguments about Chinese revisionism. In addition to 
identifying zero-sum relations between explanations (trivialisation and 
breakdown), the analysis also explores possibilities for explanatory integration 
(co-existence and assimilation). In regards to the former, logical conditions for 
trivialisation or breakdown are laid out for both mine and the other theories. 
Both the integrative and zero-sum critical arguments are ultimately evaluated 
on the same qualitative criterion of natural necessity – that is, the presence or 
absence of a necessary connection between specified variables that is 
empirically supportable and logically coherent.  
Note that the analysis in this chapter marks the first occasion upon which the method 
of inter-theoretical evaluation is itself being demonstrated and tested. As a method 
designed to solve the more generalised problem in social science of explanatory 
evaluation in open systems (absent a recourse to practical experimental closures), we 
would expect any successful demonstration to yield novel and empirically persuasive 
insights about the means for (a) integrating the causal arguments of disparate 
theoretical paradigms, and (b) locating reliable and generally acceptable grounds for 
falsifying particular explanations. Arguments about the success of the following 
analysis in these regards are indicated in the conclusion of this chapter, the general 
lessons of which, however, are presented more systematically in the thesis conclusion. 
8.1: Material balance of power 
Explanatory theses 
In Part I of this thesis, IR theories that prioritise the distribution of economic and/or 
military capabilities as a causal variable impacting on the incidence of war and peace 
were subject to extensive critique. The idea that different forms of material 
distribution intrinsically and necessarily contribute to the probability of war or peace 
has been thoroughly rebutted. By contrast, in this section material balance of power 
arguments will be examined on a more contingent basis. To do this, we assume that 
the real necessary condition for potential conflict in a power transition (that is, 
physically incompatible interest definitions in an overlapping geographical space) is 
present, as is indeed the case in contemporary East Asia.  
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Two theses will be considered here. The first is the idea, common to all neo-realisms 
and PTT, that asymmetrical material power balances favouring a status quo state or 
coalition inhibit, at least temporarily, aggressive challenges to the international 
system. The opportunity/cost ratio is judged in these cases to be sufficiently 
prohibitive as to deter revisionist states from prosecuting interests whose objectives 
physically conflict with those of status quo states. On the basis of this assumption, 
analysts of East Asian security routinely conclude that US military primacy has been 
a leading cause of the relative peace and stability in the region during the post-Cold-
War period, despite the persistence of tense militarised disputes. 
The second explanatory thesis is dubbed here as the breakout thesis, and denotes the 
proposition advanced in PTT and MOR, in particular, that there is a relative 
capabilities threshold beyond which a revisionist is no longer inhibited from 
launching a challenge entailing a potential risk of great power war. In PTT, the 
threshold is a ‘zone of parity’ in terms of GDP per capita. In MOR, the threshold is 
reached when a revisionist state possessing superior or competitive ‘potential power’ 
(population and economic base) reaches or exceeds parity in ‘actual power’ 
(immediately available military resources).  
MOR assumes that all challenges to the status quo will ultimately be radical 
revisionist in aspiration. In contrast, advocates of defensive neorealism argue that 
radical challenges to the status quo are, from a security-seeking perspective, irrational 
and will be punished by the system (ie. by an opposing balancing coalition) (Waltz 
1979, chap 6 and 8). They argue that rational security-seeking states (viewed as the 
norm) will realise this and avoid such a course of action. Some degree of 
accommodative bargaining is deemed possible amongst such states (Jervis 1978; 
Glaser 1995). Defensive realists also argue that mutual possession of nuclear weapons 
in the contemporary world inhibits objectives that require victory in a war between 
great powers for their fulfilment (Waltz 1981). These arguments are further variants 
of the inhibition thesis. 
Existing impacts 
As argued earlier in the thesis, neorealism and PTT generally have not advanced any 
conception of the mechanisms through which states commonly interpret or reliably 
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respond to the signals of the shifting balance of power. To adequately defend their 
theses on a general cross-case basis, they need ultimately to demonstrate the existence 
and routine over-riding power (vis-à-vis competing instincts or beliefs) of relevant 
human psychological and social-psychological mechanisms/tendencies rooted in 
general human nature. While these sorts of hypotheses and evidence might also assist 
a defence of material power balance arguments in application to particular cases, they 
are not crucial in the latter analytical context. All that needs to be demonstrated is that 
the cultural belief structure of the revisionist or other states reflects some form and 
degree of realist logic. 
The discourse within China, and various actions of the Chinese government, suggest 
that both the inhibition thesis, and potentially the breakout thesis also, currently have 
causal validity. China’s commitment to its irredentist agenda, and expressions of 
frustration towards perceived infringements of its sovereignty by Japan, the US, and 
disputing parties within ASEAN, is unmistakable. Editorials appearing in the state-
owned Global Times in recent years have referred to a rising tide of anger and calls 
for punitive action towards other disputants within public online forums. At the same 
time, however, these editorials also argue that China can afford to take a patient 
approach to these issues as the longer-term opportunity/cost ratio of economic and 
military power shifts in its favour. The editorials express resolve and confidence that 
China will prevail on these issues when the time is ripe.103
It is evident too that China’s more assertive diplomacy since 2009 was in considerable 
part due to a widespread perception in China that the Global Financial Crisis shifted 
the balance of power in its favour (Lieberthal and Wang 2012). Peking University 
Professor Zhu Feng (2011) argues that this fostered an over-confidence that led China 
to push too far, acknowledging that China is partly to blame for the souring of its 
relations with many of its East Asian neighbours.104 As these countries have shifted 
closer to the US, and the latter has moved to reinforce its strategic presence and 
                                                
103 See for instance: ‘Besieging China may have int’l backlash’, 6 April 2012; ‘War games show 
hypocrisy of US intentions’, 17 April 2012; ‘China faces long-term regional annoyances’, 4 July 2012; 
‘Provocative neighbors disgrace themselves’, 16 July 2012; ‘Asia faces risky public opinion 
showdown’, 17 July 2012; ‘Time on China’s side over Huangyan spat’, 19 July 2012; ‘Diaoyu solution 
lies in strength and unity’, 20 Aug 2012. All accessed from: www.globaltimes.cn  
104 For a more muted and indirect criticism of China’s assertiveness in the same edited compilation as 
Professor Zhu’s article, see Wang (2011, 62-5).    
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leadership in East Asia, the Chinese government has made subtle moves to moderate 
its assertiveness, and re-establish calm in territorial disputes (ICG 2012a, section VI). 
A key move was the multilateral engagement with ASEAN in mid-2011 to reach 
agreement on the ‘Guidelines for Implementing the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea’ (Thayer 2011).105  
Meanwhile, China continues most years to register double-digit growth in its military 
budget. It is routine within the Chinese discourse, moreover, to point out or assume 
that China’s economic and military development will in future afford it greater 
advantage and leverage in its various territorial and maritime disputes. 
Necessary conditions for future validity 
For material balance of power arguments to be valid into the future, the cultural belief 
structure of the Chinese state will need to remain sensitively attuned, and generate 
modification of behaviour, in response to perceptions of advantage and disadvantage 
in comparative economic, military, and alliance trends. To establish that this is the 
case will require government statements, or else the state-owned media and 
mainstream Chinese discourse, to clearly reflect this sort of reasoning. Presuming that 
the interest structures underpinning China’s revisionist geopolitical agenda remain in 
place, we would expect also to see a continued materialised commitment to increasing 
the numerical and technological competitiveness of China’s offshore military 
projection. This in turn presumes that China’s economy will remain healthy enough to 
sustain large budgetary outlays for the military. 
In regards to the breakout thesis, we would expect China to be inhibited from actions 
entailing a risk of war with the US until it reached at least 80 percent of US 
GDP/capita (PTT); or a close parity of regionally projected military force between 
China and the US/Japan alliance (MOR).  
                                                
105 The negotiation of the ‘Guidelines’ did not represent any novel advance in addressing the dispute, 
however, but rather was a symbolic re-affirmation of the existing ‘Declaration’ (which itself is not a 
formal or binding ‘Code of Conduct’). 
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Applying the CATB test 
At the level of generalising theory, I argued earlier that my alternative theory offers a 
superior conceptualisation and account of general causation in power transitions than 
that provided by other theories. Part I has already demonstrated crucial flaws in the 
conceptual apparatus of PTT and in neorealist arguments about the causal properties 
of international anarchy and forms of polarity. Such conclusions, in effect, amount to 
charges of some degree of logical-empirical breakdown within these theories. 
When applied to particular cases, however, in which the generic cause of conflict as 
stipulated by my theory is present, these theories become relatively more 
complementary with mine. Firstly, as perspectives that all emphasise the importance 
of military-security variables for the evolution of future regional order; both my 
arguments about Chinese revisionism and various neorealisms would all be trivialised
or break down in the event that states ignored or abandoned existing geopolitical 
conflicts and military build-ups in favour of a sole focus on economic and non-
traditional security cooperation. Secondly, and more important, my theory is capable 
of assimilating both the inhibition and breakout theses, including in the event that 
these proved to be generalisable under certain conditions.   
According to my theory, state actions are determined by pre-formed perceptions and 
interest structures. While I argued that ideas derived from particular historical lessons 
and socio-political cultures foster variability in state motivations, it would not be 
inconsistent with this to accept the possibility that aspects of cultural belief structures 
might frequently be strongly influenced by general social-psychological tendencies. 
My arguments about variability would only break down if the same general and 
regular tendencies dominated all state motivation and perception (which the historical 
record demonstrates is not the case) (May et al. 2010; Lobell et al. 2009; Kaufman et 
al. 2007). By contrast, a thesis of variability in state interests and worldview could 
still assimilate a general thesis about how revisionist states perceive the costs and 
opportunities of the material power balance in contexts where bottom-line realisation 
of their agenda entails a risk of war with status quo great powers.           
If, alternatively, there were problems with such a general thesis, even on such a 
specific conditional basis, my theory would remain untroubled either way. Indeed, 
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whether atypical or routine, my theory would be able to explain any such ‘deviation’ 
in empirical testing. In this case, such deviation would consist of the influence of 
other acculturated beliefs (or those of individual leaders) prevailing over the 
hypothesised social-psychological tendency so as to alter the expected inhibition and 
breakout thresholds. If such deviation were common across cases, the general 
breakdown of these theories would become even more extensive than was implied in 
Part I.     
According to the open system perspective of my theory, it is prudent to treat general 
psychological expectations with great caution, given that even if they do exist, other 
perceptual or interest tendencies in a state’s motivational makeup might still 
potentially override them. On the issue of Taiwan, for instance, there are other 
cultural beliefs about strategy in China that need to be taken into account, and which 
mean that China is likely preparing for the contingency, if necessary, of a lower (that 
is, sub-parity) breakout threshold. Such beliefs include an understanding about 
asymmetries in motivation (Christensen 2001; Sawyer 2009), and the contemporary 
influence in the PLA and Chinese society of ancient Chinese ideas about the power of 
unorthodox fighting strategies to shock, surprise and out-manoeuvre a larger military 
force (Sawyer 2007; Sawyer 2006). 
If such potential for a lower breakout threshold is real, other components of a material 
balance of power explanatory framework (especially from within the richer 
explanatory palette of MOR) can nonetheless still be assimilated into an assessment 
of the practical feasibility of such a contingency. For although this contingency does 
assume a condition of sub-parity in either GDP, or immediately available 
conventional weaponry between China and the US; China’s ‘potential power’ base of 
population and its large-scale and increasingly sophisticated industrial infrastructure 
nonetheless provides a formidable mobilisation potential. China, moreover, has 
certain geographical advantages that the US and its allies cannot match. These include 
the combination of close proximity to Taiwan and an enormous continental depth 
from which to launch missiles and aircraft, and locate or shift weaponry/war vessel 
production and training sites.  
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Indeed, experts now believe that to defeat or thwart China in the air in a Taiwan 
conflict would unavoidably require taking the war to the Chinese mainland (Shlapak 
et al. 2009). This would lead to a major escalation in which US bases in Japan and 
elsewhere in the region would become legitimate targets in the eyes of China. One 
expert on contemporary and ancient Chinese military strategy suggests that residing 
Chinese agents in the US continental homeland could easily sabotage vulnerable 
water and energy infrastructure systems to devastating effect (Sawyer 2006; Sawyer 
2007, 393-99). Others have suggested that the use of tactical nuclear weapons might 
in extremis be preferable to the prospect of defeat from the perspective of China’s 
leadership (Bush and O’ Hanlon 2007, chap 8; White 2012, 78-81, 97-100).  
While the potential efficacy of these tactics are partly material in basis, the above 
assessments are also based on the perception of an asymmetry in the motivational 
power driving states on the issue. That is, a perception that Chinese discourse and 
behaviour demonstrates a greater willingness on China’s part to take risks, absorb 
pain, and make sacrifices to uphold its interests on the issue of Taiwan than the US 
would be prepared to do. Deterrence (or inhibition) of US intervention would 
accordingly be expected to occur potentially at a lower, sub-parity threshold.  
By contrast, on the issue of security order in the East and South China Seas, there are 
both material and motivational grounds for expecting that successful confrontation of 
major US interests in these areas would require China to develop a closer 
approximation of military parity. Motivationally, issues of freedom of navigation and 
alliance credibility have implications for the viability of the US’s broader 
international power position and overall grand strategy, and thus its interests here are 
more robust than is the case with Taiwan. Materially, China needs a greater quantity 
of sophisticated warships to contest and exercise control of these more extended 
maritime areas. Also, the greater distances involved mean that China does not have 
the same geographical advantages it does on Taiwan, and thus would be more equally 
exposed to the enemy’s disruption and harassment of its supply lines and areas of 
maritime control.106  
                                                
106 For an argument that ‘sea control’ (as opposed to ‘sea denial) will not be a viable strategy for any 
major power in a future East Asia, see White (2012, chap. 4). 
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In sum, while the causal influence of both asymmetries of motivational power and
various sources of material power can be captured within the purview of my theory, 
any evidence of the former in particular cases would tend to further shrink the scope 
of conditions under which the breakout theses of PTT and MOR can be reliably used 
as general predictive tools (trivialisation at very least). In the case of the rise of 
China, decisive empirical test conditions for the latter have yet to arise. Whatever the 
future of this particular case, however, it would seem that my theory is relatively more 
secure in its relationship to these other more materialist theories, and under a greater 
range of possible conditions, than vice-versa. 
8.2: Economic Interdependence 
Explanatory theses 
In IR, liberal theories of the pre-requisites for peace building and conflict prevention 
are founded on an explanatory triad that includes (a) the liberal-democratic peace 
thesis, (b) cooperation in formalised international institutions, and (c) high levels of 
economic interdependence. In explaining the relative peace that has prevailed in East 
Asia during recent decades, IR liberals have not had easy recourse to the first two legs 
of the triad. Several regimes in East Asia (including China) are not liberal 
democracies, and multilateral cooperation in the region is less formal, regulatory and 
legally binding in handling major security issues than the institutional cooperation 
conceived in liberal theory (Weissmann 2012, 28-31; Goldsmith 2007). Liberal 
explanations of peace in East Asia have thus focussed almost solely on the third 
thesis. 
The economic interdependence thesis argues that there is a significant correlation 
linking mutual trade dependence and a reduced probability of war, including cases 
where states are involved in unresolved militarised disputes. Proponents of this thesis 
have advanced several mechanisms through which this alleged causal link operates. 
Firstly, most studies that promote this thesis assume that once war erupts, trade 
relations between warring states cease or are largely reduced (Barbieri and Levy 
1999). Upon this basis, it is commonly argued that states with both high ratios of trade 
to GDP, and a high ratio of trade with their adversary, threaten the economic basis of 
their domestic legitimacy if they opt to engage in conflict. Public revenues and 
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employment may rapidly decline, and influential lobby groups from trade-dependent 
economic sectors pressure the government to strike a more accommodating 
bargaining posture in disputes (Mansfield and Pollins 2001).  
Another mechanism is the functionalist ‘spill-over’ thesis (Wan 2003; Weissmann 
2012, 29-31). According to this argument, expanding economic interactions increase 
both the level of people-to-people contact and mutual recognition of common 
interests between states. Problems of cooperation in one sector necessitate the spread 
of engagement as experts and stakeholders from other areas are brought in to 
contribute to finding novel solutions and to spread and maximise benefits for each 
side. Advocates of this thesis argue, in effect, that the spill-over effects of economic 
cooperation have a socialising impact that can potentially transform regional security 
order. As one scholar has put it: ‘ … economic interdependence and cooperation may 
… transform national purposes through learning. Decision makers may redefine 
national interests through exchange with their counterparts in other countries. Such a 
learning process may turn opponents of an international system into constructive 
participants – thus making the system more legitimate and durable’ (Wan 2003, 291). 
More recently, some scholars have posited an alternative mechanism in which 
economic interdependence is claimed above all to effect the dynamics of crisis 
bargaining (Morrow 2003; Gartzke 2003). According to this view, states with 
basically symmetrical two-way economic dependence can signal resolve in disputes 
with relatively greater efficiency and accuracy through indicating a preparedness to 
use trade sanctions that would hurt both sides. States with mutual trade dependence 
can thus compel each other to move towards a peaceful settlement of differences 
without escalating to a more dangerous level of brinkmanship such as full armed 
mobilisation. 
Finally, it has been hypothesised that the threat of turbulence in global financial 
markets may act as a further incentive for modern great powers to avoid open military 
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conflict.107 This thesis can potentially apply when many states impose minimal 
controls on capital in- and out-flows.  
Existing impacts 
Of all the theoretical arguments examined in this chapter, the impact of economic 
interdependence on East Asian security order is the most difficult to ascertain on the 
basis of existing evidence. Statistical data correlating the relationship between 
interdependence and peace/conflict is unreliable. On one hand, there remains much 
disparity in general cross-case assessments of this causal argument within the broader 
literature in regards to definitional frameworks, case-set selection, and, most 
importantly, in empirical findings (Mansfield and Pollins 2001; Barbieri and 
Schneider 1999; Barbieri and Levy 1999). On the other, it is possible to over-interpret 
case-specific evidence in East Asia of a correlation between the emergence of trends 
towards economic interdependence in during recent decades and a lowered incidence 
of inter-state war.108 Just because lingering militarised disputes in East Asia have yet 
to produce a hot war, does not mean it could not happen in future. Further, if war did 
break out between China and the US and/or Japan, the significance of the decades-
long correlation would immediately become void. In this case, the thesis could only 
be salvaged if it were proven that interdependence played a crucial role in motivating
the parties to cease hostilities at an early stage and return to negotiations. Substantial 
traces of such a rationale in government statements, official interviews, and 
authoritative voices in the national discourse would provide the necessary evidence 
for this. 
In regards to the notion that intensified regional economic interactions are 
transforming the interests and outlook of China in particular (Wan 2003), evidence is 
limited and ambiguous. The evolution of the official ‘peaceful development’ 
paradigm, which exhorts states to recognise their common destiny and cooperate in an 
interdependent globalised world, is the strongest evidence in favour of this view. We 
have seen, though, how the Chinese regime has built a logic of conditionality into this 
narrative, such that China’s self-defence of its irredentist agenda can be exempted 
                                                
107 A number of articles advocate this hypothesis as a potentially worthy focus in future research on 
interdependence and conflict (Gartzke 2003; Mansfield and Pollins 2001; Barbieri and Schneider 
1999). See also (Gatzke et al. 2001). 
108 For a major statistical analysis establishing such a correlation in East Asia, see Goldsmith (2007). 
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from the constraints that adherence to ‘peaceful development’ would otherwise 
impose. There is, moreover, no evidence that the degree of the regime’s resolve on 
territorial and maritime jurisdiction disputes has been diluted. On the contrary, in 
recent years the regime has shown a willingness to step up the assertion of many of its 
claims and risk incremental escalation of previously more dormant disputes. China 
continues to refrain from escalating disputes to the point that war is threatened. 
Whether this is more reflective of concerns about the economic fallout of potential 
conflict, however, or inhibitions arising from the perception of a premature military 
power balance, cannot presently be ascertained. 
Necessary conditions for future validity 
Three general conditions need to be met in order for economic interdependence to be 
considered as a plausible causal contributor to any future regional peace. First, 
relations of dependence must be two-way and roughly symmetrical. That is, severe 
curtailing of mutual economic relations needs to be capable of inflicting serious harm 
to the economies of both parties. In situations where dependence is asymmetrical, by 
contrast, the party with negligible trade dependency is freed from this source of 
inhibition, and can more easily use the trade relationship as an extra coercive 
instrument to push its agenda in a dispute. 
Measurements of asymmetry or symmetry at the level of a bilateral economic 
relationship alone, however, may provide less than the full picture. Indeed, 
assessments of the potential for economic harm on each side need to account for the 
broader network of trade relationships that their economies are embedded in, and risks 
of wider contagion. An asymmetric bilateral economic relationship between 
geopolitical rivals might be more symmetrical if conditions exist in which a rupture in 
the economy of the more dependent party could plausibly become a catalyst for a 
downturn in the broader regional or global economy. Such potential would need to be 
gauged partly in qualitative terms and consider such things as: the existence of 
enabling conditions for panic and volatility in global capital markets; the role and 
weight of the parties in multi-national production chains; and the availability or 
otherwise of alternative markets for production lines placed in limbo (Mansfield and 
Pollins 2001; Barbieri and Schneider 1999; Pan 2009). Such economic risks need, of 
249
course, to be perceived by the disputing parties in order to be causally viable as 
inhibitors of armed conflict. 
The second general condition is that a potential conflict must actually threaten to shut 
down or seriously curtail economic relations between the disputing parties. Most 
studies that advance the interdependence thesis assume such a causal relationship 
between war and trade disruption. Historically, however, there have been many cases 
in which warring parties continued to trade with each other (Barbieri and Levy 1999). 
For the interdependence thesis to be applicable, it must be demonstrated that the 
geographical location of the potential conflict zone will actually physically impede 
commerce between the disputing parties.  
In cases where the above conditions are fulfilled, one further general condition needs 
to be satisfied in order for the interdependence thesis to be considered plausible. For 
the purposes here, I will state it within the terms of a power transition context. That is, 
in regards to the hierarchy of interest priorities held by the revisionist state, the 
prospect of not fulfilling its geopolitical agenda (or particular interests within it) needs 
to be considered as more tolerable and less threatening than any potential 
consequences of economic deprivation in a conflict or its aftermath. The same applies 
for defenders of status quo interests (in those cases where the latter’s interests are 
actually in conflict with the revisionist power[s]). 
Applying the CATB test 
The latter general condition, in particular, indicates that in real world open system 
contexts, arguments about the role of economic interdependence need realistically to 
be assimilated into an ontology of states as corporate agents motivated by multiple 
interest structures. The argument essentially claims that under substantial conditions 
of interdependence, states will prioritise interests for economic stability above the 
ideal realisation of geopolitical objectives whose attempted fulfilment would risk a 
war with their major trading partners. Later on, we assess this claim in the East Asian 
context. Firstly, however, we examine whether the other two necessary conditions for 
the validity of the interdependence thesis are present, or potentially present, in East 
Asia.  
250
Firstly, symmetric versus asymmetric dependence. Overall ratios of trade (both 
exports and imports) to GDP are high in many East Asian states. Trade to GDP ratios 
as of 2010 for countries such as Vietnam (154.4%), Malaysia (177.6%), Thailand 
(138.2%), South Korea (107.3%), and Taiwan (132.2%), are much higher than for 
China (55.2%).109 From this we can see evidence of an asymmetry in the levels of 
overall trade dependence between China and several of the parties with which it 
disputes sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction.  
The growth in the trade relationship of these states with China has also seen 
substantial growth. Yet, in the cases of Vietnam and the Philippines (GDP to trade 
ratio of 68.2%), total trade with China remains at a similar level (Vietnam) or still 
behind (the Philippines) comparable ratios of trade with the US and Japan. In 
comparison, the ratio of Taiwan’s exports to China is almost three times greater than 
for these states (four times if Hong Kong is included), standing at 28 (or 40) percent 
of its overall exports.  
China’s own ratio of trade in these relationships is much smaller. Trade with Taiwan 
is highest at a still relatively small ratio of 3.92 percent of total Chinese trade, and 
2.83 percent of its exports (Weissmann 2012, 75). Such asymmetries suggest that 
China can potentially wield its economic power as a coercive instrument in these 
relationships in ways that the latter cannot effectively reciprocate. During the 2012 
standoff with the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal/Huangyan Dao, China displayed a 
readiness to use such advantages through restricting imports of Filipino tropical fruits 
and discouraging Chinese tourists from visiting the archipelago (ICG 2012b, 8). 
According to the International Crisis Group (2012b, 27), increasing the economic 
dependence of these countries on China is a key part of the latter’s strategy towards 
its disputes in the South China Sea.    
                                                
109 Unless otherwise specified, statistics in this section are cited from the country trade profile section 
of the World Trade Organization website. Accessed in August 2012, the figures are for the year 2010. 
See: http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx?Language=E  
The figures for China do not include Hong Kong, which has its own separate profile. As Hong Kong’s 
economy represents only 3.7 percent of the entire Chinese economy, this separation is judged, in most 
cases (and unless otherwise specified), as not creating a distorted picture for the purposes of my 
analysis here. 
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By contrast, the trade to GDP ratios for the major status quo powers of the US 
(27.8%) and Japan (30.9%), are considerably lower than for China. Further, the US 
and Japan are the destinations for a quarter of China’s exports, at 18 and 8 percent 
respectively. Japan is also the largest source of China’s imports (13.5 percent of total 
imports, including to Hong Kong). Translated into a percentage of China’s total GDP, 
exports to the US account for 5.25 percent, and Japan 2.55 percent (almost 8 percent 
combined). Imports from Japan are worth 4 percent of China’s GDP.  
The US is less dependent on Chinese trade, with the most significant figure being the 
import ratio of 20 percent (exports are at 7 percent). Exports to China accordingly 
comprise only 0.8 percent of America’s GDP; Chinese imports are higher at 3.3 
percent. Trade with China is relatively more important for Japan with export and 
import ratios both at around 25 percent (Hong Kong included).110 Exports to China 
thus comprise 4 percent of Japan’s GDP; imports 3.5 percent.  
In terms of an assessment of these figures alone, and at the level of the bilateral dyad, 
it would appear then that there is some asymmetry of trade dependence in favour of 
the US, and a closer parity of dependence between China and Japan. As indicated 
earlier, however, there are a range of other factors that can potentially impact 
assessments of symmetry and asymmetry, as well as the depth of economic 
dependence. Such factors are considered here as part of the analysis of the second 
necessary condition for the plausibility of the economic interdependence thesis – that 
is, the extent to which war over territorial disputes would impede trade in East Asia. 
At this point, we need to resume our assessment of the conflict scenarios that were 
identified in the simulations of the previous chapter. Firstly, in regards to Taiwan, it 
was suggested that if direct US military intervention were not forthcoming, there 
could emerge a contingency in which the geographical scope of a Cross-Strait conflict 
were limited to the local Taiwan area. The minimal purpose for a Chinese punitive 
military campaign would be to blockade Taiwan’s trade with the outside world. In 
turn, the basis for this would likely be that bilateral Chinese economic sanctions were 
not enough to yield the ROC government’s capitulation on the issue of Taiwan’s 
                                                
110 On the importance of including Hong Kong when measuring Sino-Japanese economic relations, see 
Pan (2009). 
252
sovereignty. The above statistics suggest that the latter action would not, on its own, 
be greatly disruptive to the Chinese economy.   
The greater question would be whether the decisions of the US to not directly 
intervene, and of China to limit the conflict’s geographical scope, were a product 
more of economic stability concerns or military power balance considerations. Any 
broader war, of course, would necessarily include the East and South China Seas. 
Accordingly, the remainder of this assessment focuses on these areas. 
Both the East and South China Seas (and especially the latter) are major trade 
thoroughfares. In assessing here the second general condition for the validity of the 
economic interdependence thesis much depends on the geographic location and 
disposition of disputed land features. Both the Spratly and Diaoyu/Senkaku groupings 
are clustered in specific portions of the Seas. The latter occupy a relatively small area. 
The former are more numerous and sprawled over a larger area, yet are still distinctly 
separated from other groupings by large swathes of maritime space. In the latter case, 
during a conflict, warships from China and Vietnam, in particular, would need to 
travel to and from the battle zone across sea-lanes carrying vast international trade 
shipments. Yet, it is not unthinkable that a war over Spratly involving only China and 
the other minor power disputants could be conducted without disrupting international 
trade flows in any major way. It is also possible to imagine a Sino-Japanese war over 
Diaoyu/Senkaku that is conducted within only the southern half or two-thirds of the 
East China Sea, with agreement that bilateral and international trade will proceed as 
per usual (with the exception perhaps of some strategically targeted sanctions) from 
the Japanese main islands to Chinese ports north of Shanghai. 
By contrast, any wars that are conducted across entire maritime spaces within 
Maritime Northeast and/or Southeast Asia will interrupt not only the bilateral trade 
relations betweens the warring parties, but also much of the broader intra- and inter-
regional trade conducted through East Asia. China, and other states’ trade relations 
with China, would be the most vulnerable to trade disruption in a broad maritime 
conflict. States along the periphery of these maritime spaces or beyond may still be 
able to establish lengthy detours in their mutual trade relations, albeit with additional 
253
transport costs. Any fighting in Greater West Pacific, however, would sever all 
commercial transit between Northeast and Southeast Asia.  
The US too would likely be affected if: (a) it could not efficiently find a substitute for 
Chinese imports at the same cheap prices that have long curbed US inflation; (b) if 
major US companies with production facilities in China (Pan 2009) could no longer 
make profits and were threatened with bankruptcy; or (c) if breakdown in trade with 
China pushed national economies in the region into recession, leading to a contraction 
of imports that spread the downturn to Europe and elsewhere, eventually affecting 
overall US trade. A prospective war whose potential scope of engagement threatened 
to obstruct all maritime trade flows to and from China would also affect patterns of 
shorter-term speculative investment in the absence of effective national capital 
controls. If some or all of these prospects are real, then the conclusion must be that the 
US is indeed more deeply dependent on the Chinese economy than a consideration of 
US-China bilateral relations alone would indicate. 
In light of these considerations, we can make the following conditional evaluations 
about the interdependence thesis vis-à-vis my arguments about Chinese revisionism. 
First, the interdependence thesis would appear as valid if war occurred in future 
between China and states that have an asymmetric trade dependence on China, but 
never occurred between China and the US or Japan (despite continued differences 
over Diaoyu/Senkaku). In this scenario, my arguments about Chinese revisionism 
could still largely co-exist with the interdependence thesis. The shift to a bipolar 
structure of military deterrence is still compatible with this scenario, as is an order 
based on a Chinese compromise with the US and Japan over security arrangements 
and norms within EEZs. Inexhaustible Chinese toleration of Japanese ‘effective 
control’ over Diaoyu/Senkaku would be the only case in which my analysis of 
Chinese interest priorities would be mildly contradicted and trivialised, in which case 
the overriding power of the interdependence thesis (or economic stability motive) 
would likely need to be acknowledged. 
If a Sino-Japanese war did occur over Diaoyu/Senkaku, but was limited in 
geographical scope to avoid disrupting trade, then the relative assessments for the two 
theories would be reversed. As an instance in which war did break out between major 
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states with symmetrical trade dependence, it would comprise an example of 
breakdown in the existing formulation of the causal logic of the interdependence 
thesis. Considered in terms of conditioned causation, however, it could be argued that 
the motivational tendencies associated with interdependence still apply. The very act 
of deliberate limitation of the conflict would be an indication of the causal power of 
economic stability motives. The decision of the US to not directly get involved and 
avoid escalating the conflict would likely also be driven by a desire to avoid 
jeopardising the transit of commerce in Northeast Asia and beyond. In this scenario, 
any re-formulation of the interdependence thesis that assimilated a conception of 
conditioned causation within open systems (as opposed to the existing focus in the 
literature on testing uniform cause-effect statements) could quite easily be adapted to 
co-exist with my arguments about the causal power of other interest structures. As 
was the case with material balance of power arguments, this would likely need to take 
the form of hypotheses about certain general social-psychological tendencies. 
By contrast, any war whose geographical scope were sufficient to disrupt all trade 
with China, and for a protracted period of time, would count as an unambiguous 
example of breakdown in the interdependence thesis. Such an outcome would indicate 
that, in certain cases, territorial and geopolitical interests can be underpinned by 
political motivations with the power to override any imperative for economic stability. 
Salvaging the interdependence thesis as a generalisable theory would require re-
casting it in radically more conditional terms. 
Within my analysis too, a protracted great power conflict in Maritime East Asia that 
disrupts all China trade is not especially likely. Such a possibility can nonetheless be 
explained within my framework, and according to my case-specific conceptualisation 
of the interest structures driving relevant states. Still, given that economic welfare 
goals are so central to the contemporary interest structures of China, the US, and other 
regional states, my analysis also expects that interdependence is more likely than not 
to exercise some form of conditioning effect on these states’ behaviour towards 
territorial and geopolitical disputes. 
Both the interdependence thesis and my conception of multiple state interest 
structures can anticipate and explain how economic interdependence could potentially 
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deter escalation to a regional great power war in East Asia. Each theoretical outlook, 
however, generates differing expectations about how such a deterrence power might 
affect the prospects for war or peace in disputes over territorial sovereignty. The 
difference is that the interdependence thesis treats the economic stability imperative 
as a universal overriding motive, whereas my theory expects that the relative 
motivational power of this imperative can differ across cases, and also between states 
within the same case (asymmetric motivation).  
Thus, when proponents of the interdependence thesis advance the hypothesis that 
interdependence provides an especially efficient means for signalling resolve in crisis 
bargaining and compelling a move towards peaceful negotiation (Morrow 2003; 
Gartzke 2003), the pacifying effect of this mechanism depends on a state of 
motivational equivalence between the states concerned. The hypothesis can 
potentially break down, however, if at least one of the states really is prepared to 
endure a disruption of trade over the dispute. In practical terms, the main problem 
with the hypothesis is that it could encourage dangerous bluffing. For if a state of 
interdependence pertains between the two sides, and state motivations are essentially 
alike in their hierarchy of priorities; then all the US would have to do, for instance in a 
crisis over Taiwan or Spratly, is indicate a resolve to endure trade disruption, 
regardless of whether this were true or not. China would then get the hint and return 
to a posture of shelving disputes. 
But if one of the states really is prepared to endure trade disruption, then signals that 
the other side feels the same way may not make any difference to the former’s cost-
benefit calculations. The state that was bluffing might then be placed in the dilemma 
of either being compelled to fight an unwanted war, or suffering the humiliation and 
undermined credibility involved in backing off.  
In the case of East Asia, this dilemma would be relatively easy to exploit, as the 
political geography of the region is such that any Chinese initiation of conflict with 
minor power third parties can place the onus of potential trade disruption on the US. 
That is, China could initiate a military clash in a localised area that would only 
become a wider conflagration if the US and its allies decided to intervene. The 
decision to disrupt trade would be all the US’s to make. Moreover, China might be 
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prepared to take this risk despite also being eager to avoid disruption of regional 
trade, on the calculation that the US has less at stake on these issues than China, and 
so will not be willing to light the larger fuse.  
The interdependence thesis (which highlights the motive for economic stability) thus 
suggests a further reason why deterrence of US intervention in territorial conflicts 
(including this time those beyond Taiwan) might be expected to kick in at an, at least, 
numerically sub-parity stage in the regional military balance. On the basis of this 
reasoning, China would only need to be capable of prolonging an indecisive shooting 
match within the ‘first island chain’, without necessarily being able to win a war, in 
order to deter US intervention. According to my definition of deterrence parity, 
however (see Chapter 4), once China is so capable, the regional military-security 
hierarchy will likely already be approaching close to a bipolar parity (pending a 
similar capability in GWP).  
Of course, if such deterrence extended to an unwillingness of the US and Japan to 
repel any Chinese initiation of an attempt to attain control of the waters within the 
‘first island chain’, my arguments about the power of American and Japanese interests 
other than aversion to economic setback would at very least be trivialised. In the 
event this scenario occurred, it would appear as an unusual case in which 
interdependence was capable of simultaneously inhibiting war, without inhibiting 
aggression against the major strategic interests of other great powers. Such a scenario 
is judged here as highly unlikely, however.  
Overall then, and under most of the scenarios considered above, the interdependence 
thesis does not seem to provide grounds for any major revision of my theoretically 
informed assessment about possibilities for Chinese revisionism and war or peace in 
East Asia. The tendencies that the former points to, however, do appear to reinforce 
incentives for mutual great power restraint and accommodation over direct military 
confrontation, escalation, and war. To be operative, though, such incentives, and 
associated strategic thinking, need to be perceived by the leadership of the states 
concerned. While the interdependence thesis is vulnerable to breakdown if this is not 
the case, my own theory and case analysis of particular interest structures has the 
means to explain outcomes either way.  
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8.3: Socialisation 
Explanatory theses 
The final explanatory paradigm to be integrated into our inter-theoretical evaluation 
consists of arguments about socialisation according to common international norms as 
advanced by various IR constructivists.111 Analysts that apply this explanatory focus 
to security studies aim to (a) track the development of common identity formation and 
community-building between states, and (b) assess the impact of these variables on 
conflict prevention and peace building independent of material variables such as the 
military power balance and economic interdependence (Acharya 2003).  
In regards to East Asian security order, social constructivist analysis has focused 
mostly on the development of a Southeast Asian political and security community 
through the modality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
(Acharya 2001; Kivimaki 2001). As ASEAN has been at the centre of the 
development of pan-East Asian regionalism over the past two decades, the question of 
whether, and to what degree, the foreign policy priorities of a rising China too are 
being transformed through processes of socialisation has become widely recognised in 
the literature as an important one. Despite this recognition, however, few studies have 
attempted to systematically advance and evaluate such a claim in terms of a clear 
causal model (Johnston 2003; Weissmann 2012; Qin and Wei 2008). For critical 
realist, Milja Kurki, the likely explanation for this would be that many IR 
constructivists eschew talk of causation in favour of so-called ‘constitutive’ 
approaches because, like positivists, they too associate causation with the overly 
narrow Humean concept of causality (Kurki 2008, chap 4). 
Alistair Iain Johnston (2003) and Mikael Weissmann (2012) have arguably gone the 
furthest (albeit independently of each other) in articulating various ingredients for a 
causal model of the mechanisms and processes through which socialisation might 
effect Chinese foreign policy behaviour. A key aim of Johnston’s work was to address 
the deficit in many constructivist accounts about the micro-processes through which 
international socialisation influences state identity and security outlooks. He asks the 
                                                
111 For a general theoretical argument on this, see Wendt (1999).
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question – who is being socialised? – and answers by saying that it is initially only the 
official and unofficial individual participants in regular regional dialogues that are 
subject to any substantive influence. These participants, to whatever extent they are 
converted, then have the task of advancing their case within China’s domestic policy 
debates and persuading political leaders in the face of competition for influence from 
other factions. 
Johnston identifies two basic mechanisms of socialisation as persuasion and social 
opprobrium/shaming. He defines these terms as follows:  
Persuasion involves the non-coercive communication of normative 
understandings that is internalised by actors such that new courses of action 
are viewed as entirely reasonable and appropriate. Social pressure, opprobrium 
… is different. The actor desires to maximise social status and image as ends 
in themselves … The process of choosing to act in prosocial ways is an 
instrumental or “consequentialist” one, not one governed by appropriateness 
per se. (Johnston 2003, 113-4)    
The focus of most constructivist analyses of East Asian security order, including 
Johnston’s, is on persuasion. In other words, these scholars look for evidence of 
genuine internalisation of norms and transformation of state identity and security 
interests.  
The particular norms in question are embodied in the so-called ‘ASEAN way’. 
Weissmann (2012, 33) summarises the four pillars of the ‘ASEAN way’ as: (1) the 
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, (2) the non-use of 
force to settle disputes, (3) decision making through consensus, and (4) informal 
diplomacy. The first two pillars are institutionalised in ASEAN’s ‘Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation’,112 which most non-member regional states, including China, have 
now acceded to. The latter two pillars are the principles through which diplomacy in 
organisations with ASEAN at the centre is conducted (eg. ASEAN+3 [APT], the 
                                                
112 The text of the Treaty can be accessed at: http://www.asean.org/1217.htm  
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ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF], and the East Asian Summit [EAS]). Institutionalised 
informality might be the best way of describing these arrangements. 
For Weissmann, the various diplomatic modalities that have developed through 
application of these principles form important socialisation mechanisms that 
contribute significantly to peace building and conflict prevention in the region. 
Weissmann places a particular premium on the role of regular elite interactions and 
the long-term cultivation of personal networks of trust linking officials, retired 
officials, and well-connected academics across various states (2012, 37-49).  
Diplomacy in the region is conducted along two tracks, one official (Track I) and the 
other non-official (Track II), that are nonetheless linked through these personal 
networks. Track II provides a means through which disputes and differences can be 
broached between the parties, whilst avoiding direct confrontation at the official level 
where government leaders may be compelled into a hardening of their position that 
sabotages the prospects for compromise or stability. In Track II forums, participants 
can explain their governments’ positions in a non-confrontational atmosphere. 
According to Weissmann (2012, 38): ‘Even if this process does not necessarily 
increase the level of agreement, it at least constitutes a learning process, whereby an 
understanding of the other’s perceptions and interests increases. Consequently, the 
risk for miscalculations and misunderstandings is reduced.’  
Track II diplomacy is also viewed as an effective means for identifying areas of 
common ground and pre-negotiating agreements between states on disputed issues 
without the pressure of public exposure. Away from the spotlight of formal 
diplomatic settings, non-official government representatives are also provided space 
to explore and test reactions to policy innovations on difficult issues. According to the 
‘ASEAN way’, upholding and sustaining the process through which consensus is 
sought is an end of utmost importance in itself. 
Existing impacts 
There is much evidence to suggest that the norms of the ‘ASEAN way’ have 
influenced China’s foreign policy behaviour over the past two decades. ASEAN’s 
non-confrontational diplomacy and consensus decision-making were able to allay 
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Chinese leaders’ initial reservations about regional multilateral forums being a 
potential means to gang up and isolate China on territorial disputes, namely Taiwan 
and the South China Sea. Since the mid-1990s, China has become actively involved in 
regional multilateral cooperation and dialogue (Shambaugh 2004/05). After the East 
Asian financial crisis, in particular, Chinese leaders began to see their country’s active 
involvement in regional trade and financial cooperation through ASEAN+1 and APT 
as a means of projecting an image of benign intentions and good neighbourliness. The 
efforts yielded a free-trade agreement with ASEAN, and a series of APT financial 
swap agreements to increase the region’s autonomy in future financial crises. In 2005, 
China adhered to the consensus principle through tacit acceptance of an expanded 
regional membership for the inaugural EAS meeting (to include India, Australia, and 
New Zealand), despite its previous diplomatic efforts to prevent this (Qin and Wei 
2008, 129-36).  
On security, participation in the ARF brought Chinese negotiators in contact with the 
discourse of ‘common security’, ‘confidence-building measures’ (CBMs), and 
‘preventative diplomacy’. Johnston (2003) argues that the language of Chinese 
submissions on security issues to the ARF began to increasingly reflect this discourse. 
Participation in the ARF gave the impetus for China’s practice of producing a bi-
annual defence white paper, and has shaped its understanding and practice of CBMs, 
joint military exercises with other states, and cooperation on non-traditional security 
issues. The development of the PRC’s ‘new security concept’ during the mid-1990s 
seems also to be correlated in time with China’s initial participation in the ARF. 
China’s participation in these ASEAN-based diplomatic modalities appears to have 
inspired China’s parallel initiative to develop the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
as a forum in Central Asia for multilateral political, security, and economic 
cooperation (Shambaugh 2004/05). 
While China’s disputes with the ROC on Taiwan and Japan in the East China Sea 
have been kept outside the ambit of regional multilateral diplomacy, China has made 
some concessions to the latter in handling the South China Sea issue. While still 
insisting that the various disputes be negotiated bilaterally, China nevertheless 
acquiesced to a process of multilateral dialogues on the issue in Track II workshops 
(Weissmann 2012, chap 4). After almost a decade, China and the ASEAN countries 
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reached official agreement on and signed the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). A decade later, as tensions on the issue re-
emerged, ‘ASEAN way’ diplomacy was mobilised to reach agreement in mid-2011 on 
the long-stalled (and largely symbolic) ‘Guidelines’ for implementing the DOC 
(Thayer 2011). Weissmann (2012, chap 3) has also shown the importance of elite 
personal networks and ‘ASEAN way’ diplomatic modalities for negotiating the 
sensitive process between the CCP and KMT that established the modus vivendi for 
the current détente in Cross-Strait relations. 
Yet, given the evidence of China’s military build-up, its regular pronouncements of 
‘indisputable’ sovereignty and recent growing assertiveness in territorial and 
jurisdiction disputes in the East and South China Seas; a crucial question arises as to 
whether the above behaviour reflects genuine persuasion, or else a tactical conformity 
that serves more instrumental purposes. Indeed, if China has been concerned largely 
about opprobrium effects that might provoke a region-wide containment of its 
interests before it is capable of effective counter-actions, then arguments about the 
military and economic power balance between various states may carry more 
explanatory weight than arguments about socialisation. My theory could also explain 
any such opprobrium concerns. That is, it would demonstrate that China is aware of 
the role of positive and negative prestige in augmenting and diminishing the 
geopolitical power position of states.  
Necessary conditions for future validity 
Despite the difficulty of ascertaining the depth of China’s internalisation of ‘ASEAN 
way’ norms in the present, there are conditions under which this may be clearly 
gauged in future. Such an assessment must be centred on China’s behaviour in its 
territorial and jurisdiction disputes, as well as their aftermath. There is potential for 
conflict between unilateral interests and common social norms in regards to these 
issues. The fact that ideal realisation of at least the territorial sovereignty claims 
would most feasibly require victories in war, is potentially in conflict with ‘ASEAN 
way’ principles of avoiding the use or threat of force, and maintaining restraint until 
consensus is reached. By contrast, if there were no potential conflict between social 
norms and individual interests, the causal impact of socialisation would be more self-
262
evident. The consistent maintenance of good form in social interactions would be 
sufficient evidence that states accept the appropriateness of the common norms. 
The causal impact of socialisation in cases where individual interests are potentially 
in conflict with social norms can be evaluated according to both ‘strong’ and ‘mild’ 
criteria. The ‘strong’ criteria would obtain in any situation where (a) the means to 
fulfil a state’s interests would violate social norms, and (b) the state is materially 
capable of getting its way or mounting a viable challenge on the issue in question – 
yet (c) the given state opts to make a sacrifice and abandon its unilateral interest, or 
else maintain a perennial posture of self-restraint and self-denial. Such courses of 
action would provide perhaps the strongest confirmation of the socialisation thesis. 
They would indicate that the state has come to view protecting the integrity of the 
common normative order as an overriding priority.  
It would, however, be unrealistic to argue that this criteria is necessary for the future 
validity of the socialisation thesis. As with economic interdependence, allowance 
needs to be made for significant conditioned causation effects. Accordingly, under the 
‘mild’ criteria, some isolated anomalies or deviations from socially acceptable 
behaviour could still be absorbed. In this case, two criterion can be drawn upon to 
evaluate the plausibility of the socialisation thesis.  
The first criterion is that in situations where a state gains through means that violate 
the social order, the state makes efforts in the aftermath to return immediately to a 
condition of normalcy. If a state’s behaviour after the period of norm violation were 
consistent once again, or even more so, with previously established normative 
expectations, and regardless of any increases in relative power, then it is likely that 
the state has internalised common norms on the basis of persuasion.  
The second criterion applies where issues under dispute are complex and potentially 
enable more than two basic either/or zero-sum outcomes. In such a situation, we 
would expect that any norm violations would be followed by efforts to compromise 
with and compensate the interests of other social members on the basis of principles 
and procedures that do conform to good social form. 
263
Applying the CATB test 
In conducting the following test, it is assumed from the outset that (a) the reasons and 
socio-political pressures currently underpinning China’s irredentist agenda will 
continue to exist, and (b) these are incapable of being transformed through processes 
of international socialisation and foreign persuasion. Rather, if transformation of this 
interest structure ever does occur, the most feasible enabling condition would be a 
major liberalisation of the Chinese public sphere in which all aspects of Chinese 
history were freely exposed to the scrutiny of open rational-empirical inquiry and 
contested interpretation. At present, there are no observable tendencies to indicate this 
is a likely development.  
On this basis, it would appear that in the case of the rise of China within East Asia, 
the ‘strong’ criteria for assessing the efficacy of socialisation may prove difficult to 
fulfil indefinitely. China’s leaders are greatly driven by an imperative to maintain the 
political stability and cohesion of the Chinese state, which governs 1.3 billion people 
(a number more than double the combined population of the other countries of East 
Asia). Under the ‘strong’ criteria, Chinese leaders would withstand intense domestic 
pressure and criticism, risk intra-party and/or public revolt, and be prepared to 
sacrifice their own political career and legacy, rather than act to enforce China’s 
contested sovereignty when materially more capable of doing so. Previous analysis 
and evidence presented in this thesis suggests this is unlikely. When faced with any 
immediate and pressing dilemma between upholding either its internal or external 
legitimacy, domestically acculturated CCP leaders will likely be prepared to prop up 
the former at the expense of the latter. If the ‘strong’ criteria were perpetually 
fulfilled, however, this would trivialise my arguments about the motivations 
underpinning China’s irredentist agenda (represented especially by the first and third 
of the regime’s core interests). 
Under the ‘mild’ criteria, some violations of regional norms about the proper conduct 
for managing disputes can still be squared with the socialisation thesis. In the present 
case, both of the two ‘mild’ criteria potentially apply. First, disputes in the East and 
South China Seas are sufficiently complex as to be able to conceive of settlement 
outcomes that are not purely zero-sum. We have seen in previous analysis, however, 
that the terms under which compromise agreements over the delineation of EEZs 
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could be reached may be difficult for China to negotiate in its domestic politics. For 
the socialisation argument to be validated, in the aftermath of any victorious wars 
over disputed land features, China would need to immediately signal its intention to 
conduct follow-up negotiations over zones of maritime jurisdiction according to 
norms and procedures of the ‘ASEAN way’. That is, negotiation over EEZs would be 
non-coercive, and any Chinese military and economic extension into maritime areas 
beyond the territorial seas of Spratly or Diaoyu would be suspended indefinitely until 
consensus were reached on jurisdictional divisions. This would be one basis upon 
which my arguments about the motivational force of China’s maritime irredentism 
could co-exist with the socialisation thesis as part of an integrated explanation. 
Whether or not China pushes a case based on ‘historic rights’ in the South China Sea 
will be a litmus test for the socialisation thesis. Given that all other disputants, and 
most other regional states, do not recognise such a claim as valid under international 
law; any Chinese inability to defer to a regional consensus on this issue would, at very 
least, trivialise the socialisation thesis. The same would likely apply to any Chinese 
insistence that Spratly and Paracel generate their own EEZs, in the event that broad 
regional opinion was averse to this also. If China attempted to impose either of these 
preferences through military and/or economic coercion, one would have to conclude 
that the socialisation thesis was approaching a point of breakdown. It would be a clear 
case of domestic sources of socialisation and legitimacy trumping international ones.  
Beyond an application to the disputes themselves, the socialisation thesis might also 
be validated on the basis of the other ‘mild’ criterion – that is, a decisive return to 
normalcy in the procedures of regional diplomacy in the aftermath of war or dispute 
resolution. This is perhaps easiest to imagine on the basis that any wars that occurred 
were limited in scope to the contests over land features, with all maritime jurisdiction 
rights negotiated according to ‘ASEAN way’ norms. In the scenarios in which China 
unilaterally imposes ‘historic rights’ and/or EEZs off islets, though, it is still possible, 
even in these instances, to set out what a return to normalcy would entail.  
It would mean that, despite China’s substantial increase in relative power as a result 
of its expanded military presence across the South China Sea, China would 
nevertheless return to a model of negotiation on the basis of consensus, equality 
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between sovereign states (regardless of discrepancy in size), non-coercion, and 
ASEAN centrality. If most regional states wanted a continued US strategic presence 
in East Asia on a permanent basis, then China would defer to this consensus and not 
resist it. Once China had satisfied its territorial integrity interests, it would henceforth 
refrain from resorting to economic or military threats (both overt and covert) to split 
emerging consensuses on issues where its preferences differ with the majority of 
smaller states. In other words, once a power transition had been effected, the future 
development of the region would be largely liberated from realpolitik pressures and 
tendencies. Pending the successful implementation over time of an effective arms 
control regime in the region between the China and the US/Japan alliance, 
geopolitical security would eventually become merely an issue of background 
maintenance. 
If such an outcome were to eventuate, it would, first of all, give considerable credence 
to many of the pledges embodied in China’s ‘peaceful development’ paradigm (albeit 
not necessarily the ‘peaceful rise’ pledge itself). It would also provide another basis 
upon which the socialisation thesis could co-exist with my arguments about Chinese 
revisionism.  
Of course, it is not obvious how such an order could emerge if it were preceded by a 
coercive imposition of expansive maritime jurisdiction rights in the South China Sea. 
China would likely hope that the promise of economic rewards and a stake in joint 
development and security of the area might motivate defeated rival claimants to drop 
their rancour, lessen their misgivings about a breach of trust, and return to previous 
forms of diplomatic engagement with China. If this happened, and a return to 
normalcy ensued, we would conclude that any breakdown in the socialisation thesis 
was limited and only a temporary affair. If it did not happen, and China decided it had 
an interest in keeping ASEAN weak and divided (or defunct), with its individual 
members often pressured through coercion towards accepting Chinese preferences on 
various issues, then the breakdown of the socialisation thesis would prove more 
complete and enduring. In the event of the latter, the ensuing debate in IR would 
likely come to revolve around whether China’s behaviour was being driven more by 
timeless power political and security motives, or a particular domestic socio-political 
culture.  
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8.4: Conclusion 
In this chapter, an innovative method of inter-theoretical evaluation, constructed on 
the basis of the critical realist concept of causation, was pioneered through application 
to the present case analysis of the rise of China. The primary aim of the evaluation 
was to assess how my previous arguments about possibilities for Chinese revisionism, 
and war or peace in East Asia, hold up when critically related to the causal arguments 
advanced within other existing explanations of Asian security order. As an inter-
theoretical test, however, it provided for an equally probing critical assessment of the 
conditions of validity for the other three explanatory paradigms. Indeed, general 
understanding of the scope conditions of these theories has arguably advanced a step 
further through exposure to a critique based on natural necessity and an open system 
ontology.  
Given I argue that power transitions can be potentially peaceful as well as war-prone, 
none of the other theories are capable of negating the possibility, in principle, for 
future Chinese revisionism. The implications of the theories rather extended mainly to 
the issue of possibilities for war, or otherwise, associated with China’s irredentist 
agenda.  
A key finding of the chapter is that, when challenged on an inter-theoretical basis, the 
analysis generated by my theory appears generally to be more vulnerable to 
trivialisation than to breakdown (falsification proper). That is, while there is much 
empirical evidence to show that the interest structures I identify exist ontologically 
and significantly influence state behaviour; under simulated conditions of 
trivialisation, ideal fulfilment of China’s irredentist agenda remains perpetually 
inhibited by motivational structures prioritised by the other theories.  
Any charges of breakdown in my arguments would most likely fall within the 
ontological and mono-theoretical stages of theory evaluation. So long as no 
fundamental logical-empirical flaws are detected in my conceptions of both Chinese 
interests structures and of the universal determinate features of power transitions, my 
theory-informed arguments will likely continue to avoid complete breakdown and 
irrelevance in the course of inter-theoretical testing. If this is the case, then this would 
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in part be because my theory and analysis has a certain built-in flexibility on the basis 
of an understanding of conditioned causation in open systems. Such flexibility is, in 
practice, prone to generating and pinpointing a range of variable (yet finite) 
possibilities, rather than making uniform predictions. 
By contrast, the formulations of several of the other explanatory theses were found to 
be potentially vulnerable to breakdown under some simulated conditions of 
interaction with the interests underpinning regional territorial and jurisdiction 
disputes. In some cases, it was found that such breakdown could be ameliorated in the 
event that the theories were revised and assimilated to an ontology of multiple interest 
structures and conditioned causation in open systems. That is, rather than fixating on 
the relationship between a particular cause and particular effect (eg. parity-war; 
interdependence-peace), various identified causal structures can alternatively be 
conceived as exercising a range of potentially significant limiting, constraining or 
enabling effects on conflict/peace under varying conditions. On this basis, 
possibilities for co-existence with my arguments in integrated explanations often 
became plausible.  
In other scenarios, however, the simulated breakdown was more the result of a 
hypothesised motive (eg. economic stability; upholding the integrity of common 
norms of international conduct) failing to manifest any form of anticipated effects 
(even conditioned causation ones) in the behaviour of the states involved. At present, 
however, these latter possibilities do not stand out as especially likely. 
Ultimately, of course, it is only the course of events in the real world that can confirm 
or falsify the realism of any of the various pathways simulated in the analysis of this 
chapter. The question this raises about the predictive/non-predictive status of the more 
open system simulations of this chapter will be addressed in the next. It is important, 
though, to acknowledge here two potential reservations about the above analysis. 
First, proponents of critiqued theories may believe that I have misrepresented their 
arguments in some ways, or that I have been insufficiently probing and critical 
towards my own theory and case analysis. Second, one also needs to be open to the 
possibility that others will advance arguments about the conditioning effects or over-
riding power of other causal structures beyond those considered in this chapter. The 
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process of inter-theoretical evaluation, in other words, will be an ongoing one whose 
ultimate verdict does not lie in this particular study. It is maintained here nonetheless 
that the method pioneered in this chapter promises to remain a highly useful medium 
for assessing any critical counter-claims to the conclusions I have reached here.     
269
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
This thesis has critically examined theories of power transition with reference both to 
the historical record and the rise of China. The analysis of the thesis proceeded 
through three major steps: from a critique of the weaknesses and limitations of 
existing theories; to the establishment of an alternative theory and methodology for 
the study of power transitions based on critical-realist principles; and finally to an 
application of the latter in a future-oriented case analysis of the rise of China. 
In this concluding chapter, I complete two final tasks. First, in section 9.1, I 
summarise and reflect on the theoretical and methodological innovations developed in 
the thesis. I structure this task according to the three levels of theory evaluation 
advanced in Chapter 3. That is, I summarise the various contributions that have been 
made within the thesis at the ontological, mono-theoretical, and inter-theoretical 
levels respectively. In addition, I reflect on the contributions offered for broadening 
the range of methodologies for conducting prospective or future-oriented analysis.  
My other aim in this conclusion is to consider the potential practical or 
‘technological’ uses of these innovations for advancing the quality of policy debate 
and deliberation on real-world prospective cases of power transition, such as the rise 
of China. In section 9.2, I offer arguments as to how the theory and methodologies 
deployed in the case analysis of the rise of China in Part II, and the findings so 
generated, are capable of fulfilling this objective. 
9.1: Theoretical contributions 
Ontological level 
The initial contribution made at this level was the introduction of the critical-realist 
concept of causation itself to a subject matter that has previously been theorised on a 
more positivist and (brute) materialist basis. Critical realism bases its very concept of 
causation on ontology (that is, real causal powers that are expressed as the finite 
tendencies of structured entities and mechanisms) rather than epistemology (the 
perception of uniform event regularities that is the universal criterion for causal 
propositions in positivism). Critical realism also advances a crucial ontological 
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distinction between open and closed systems. Critical realists argue that positivists 
within social science advance a doctrine of causation that is too narrow, and that 
applies chiefly to phenomena generated within controlled experimental closures, of 
which most social science (and not least IR) cannot replicate.  
My critique of PTT and MOR in Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated some key limitations 
of applying positivist causal assumptions to open-system contexts. Correlations 
between forms of material power distribution (PTT’s ‘zone of parity’; MOR’s 
‘unbalanced multipolarity’) and the incidence of major war were found to be 
indicative (on a contingent basis, moreover) of symptomatic conditions rather than 
generative causes. The theories are correct in highlighting the causal powers that lie in 
the monetary and productive resources accumulated through national economic 
growth and development (PTT and MOR), as well as in military technologies and 
geography (MOR chiefly, but also some PTT theorists such as Lemke). The ontology 
of my theory assimilated and adapted many of these insights.  
Both theories also recognise that economic and military resources are essentially tools 
that are deployed by motivated human agents. However, internalisation of positivist 
notions that (a) regularity and (relative) invariance are of greater causal significance 
than sources of variability, and (b) that quantifiable indicators provide the most (or 
only) tangible demonstration of causal efficacy, leads these theorists to under-theorise 
and/or over-simplify state motivation. Both theories, moreover, embody the common 
bias within IR positivism towards a ‘brute materialism’ that is sceptical of the 
scientific status of cultural and ideational analysis. 
In Chapter 3, I used critical realism to demonstrate not only the possibility for 
ideational analysis to be both tangible and causal, but also the determinate role of 
such factors in the formation of state motivation, and, as a corollary of this, in the 
determination of war or peace in a power transition. Underpinning such propositions 
is my claim about interest structures as a distinct ontological category. Interest 
structures are a major sub-set of the shared ideas that determine the integrity of states 
(and/or groups and factions within them) as corporate agents with emergent causal 
impacts on their individual members.  
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I argued that interest structures could be considered as tangible causal entities on three 
counts. First, they contain numerous specific material referents in the form of 
preferences or aversions towards (in this case) existing geopolitical configurations, or 
revisionist proposals for physical change of such configurations. Second, we know 
through the findings of neuroscience that ideas and beliefs represent real organising 
structures in the brain. Critical realists draw on Aristotle’s typology of causes to argue 
that ideas exercise their causal power through comprising important parts of the 
‘material/formal’ pre-dispositions that determine human action. Third, public 
communication through the currency of ideas is a necessary condition of action for 
corporate agents. Most corporate actions thus pursue goals that are consciously pre-
formed and articulated, rather than unconsciously or impulsively undertaken. 
Consequently, state motivation is not as unknowable and uncertain as MOR presumes 
(including in such non-transparent political regimes as the contemporary PRC). 
In contrast to existing theories of power transition, our notion of interest 
structures/complexes advances an open system concept of state motivation that 
acknowledges states as motivated by multiple, and sometimes conflicting, goals and 
values. The definition and relative priority of interests, moreover, are determined as 
much by varying cultural perceptions (lessons of history), ideologies, and domestic 
inter-group relationships, as by the influence of the brute material circumstances 
states find themselves in. State interests and motivations, accordingly, need to be 
investigated for their particular case-specific attributes, and in all their complexity, in 
order to attain adequate explanation and understanding of state behaviour (past, 
present, and potential).  
In Chapter 8, it was indicated that wider assimilation of this open-system ontology of 
multiple interest structures could potentially facilitate greater theoretical integration in 
the discipline of IR. Many (mono-) theories in IR posit or assume some form of 
dominating motivation that over-rides the motives posited in other theories, either 
routinely or at critical moments. My thesis advocates against a sole focus on this 
approach and suggests the need to explore also the incidence and frequency of more 
compromised or altered (yet still causally significant) expressions of hypothesised 
state motives.  
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Mono-theoretical level 
The central causal propositions of the two mainstream theories of power transition – 
namely, the ‘zone of parity’ thesis (PTT); arguments about the varying war 
propensities of different polarities and, in particular, the catalytic role of a ‘potential 
hegemon’ (MOR) – are general regularity statements defended on the basis of 
historical probability. This thesis indicated two major common weaknesses in these 
causal arguments. First, on the basis of a natural necessity test (that is, logically and 
empirically supportable critical reasoning about the existence or absence of necessary 
connections between variables), I argued that material power distribution indicators 
were highly dependent, or symptomatic, variables on the path towards war initiation. 
Moreover, whether such distributions actually function as symptoms of war potential, 
rather than just as an altered deterrence hierarchy, is similarly contingent on the 
presence or absence of physically incompatible and irreconcilable geopolitical 
interests which, in most cases, can be tangibly identified well prior to the power 
transition itself. 
The second common weakness is that the derivation of cross-case historical event 
regularities generates a genuine problem of induction when applied predictively to 
phenomena that operates in an open system. Both PTT and MOR claim to have the 
empirical support of most historical cases from the past 200 years where relevant data 
sets are attainable. Even so, there have been some anomalous events. For instance, 
Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor represents a deviation from the conflict initiation 
threshold stipulated in PTT’s zone of parity thesis. The limited and dependent 
military-security posture of European powers in the post-Cold War period deviates 
from MOR’s expectations of competitive and de-stabilising state security behaviour in 
a condition of (potential) multipolarity. To the extent that America’s peaceful 
surpassing of Britain in the Western Hemisphere represents a deviation from MOR’s 
‘potential hegemon’ thesis, Mearsheimer himself provides a suite of counteracting 
material conditions to explain the offsetting of war expectations. In light of the 
general influence of cultural factors and open-system dynamics, I would argue further 
that we cannot predict the future ratio of anomalies to confirming cases in regard to 
the above theses. Accordingly, there can be no fixed probability ratio for the power 
transition war threshold (PTT) or war likelihood (MOR) arguments of these theories 
(were such a ratio useful for case analysis in the first place). 
273
Nonetheless, when conceived more conditionally as breakout thresholds for those 
revisionist powers whose interests potentially conflict with those of status quo 
powers, the core arguments of PTT and MOR do have some basis in natural necessity 
(see Chapters 2 and 8). That is, it is reasonable to infer that a rising state who is 
prepared (however conditionally) to risk major war with the existing or previous 
dominant powers in a regional system, will only do so once its relative material 
capabilities and potentials provide a realistic chance that it might prevail. Given that 
most historical cases of conflictual power transitions support this inference, it seems 
prudent to take such an insight seriously. Note, however, that the zone of parity and 
potential hegemon theses are, in this adaptation, reduced to representing a more 
dependent and malleable tendency in the chain of causation (given, in addition, the 
possibilities for sub-parity conflict initiation as a result of asymmetries in motivation 
and/or risk propensity). As such, these theories do not provide any fundamental or 
independent basis for making reliable predictions or projections of future possibilities 
for war or peace. 
By contrast, the general propositions of my theory are more determinate and 
fundamental. On the basis of reasoning about natural necessity, Chapter 5 established 
an invariant three-stage causal sequence that applies universally to all power 
transitions, and which locates the primary source of the process, as well as war and 
peace, in the emergent interest structures and perceptual outlooks of revisionist and 
status quo states. At the same time, however, the theory specified a finite, yet 
substantial, range of variability in the possible interactive processes (war, conquest, 
control, deterrence, alliance, negotiation) and order outcomes (limited/radical 
revisionism, preservation/restoration of status quo) that power transitions can 
potentially embody (see also Chapter 4).  
Such variability is not just possible on account of cultural and normative variation. It 
is also physically possible. As I argued in Chapter 4, modern military technologies 
have increased the scope for revisionist expansion, even in continental regions, to 
proceed through modalities other than territorial aggrandisement. Thus it is possible 
for entire regional military-security hierarchies to change through a shift in the 
balance of deterrence alone (unilaterally or in alliance). The non-territoriality of 
norms in the world’s oceans and other designated ‘high seas’ provides a further 
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condition of possibility for peaceful, and consensually based, revisionism in the 
maritime domain. 
While the general features of my theory are more wide-ranging and determinate than 
is the case with existing theories, they still do not amount to a predictive model. My 
theory is, nonetheless, highly useful for future projection purposes in that it is argued 
to provide an accurate and comprehensive explanatory template of the workings of, 
and generic possibilities for change in, power transitions. Most notably, the 
definitional content of the theory’s ‘interactive process’ and ‘order outcome’ 
indicators enables us to (a) tangibly identify the revisionist potential (or otherwise) of 
a state’s geopolitical interests at an early pre-transition stage, and (b) clarify some 
important conditions under which their interactive logic with status quo interests 
implies certain power transition processes and outcomes and not others. The theory 
also provides guidelines for investigating and assessing the motivational robustness or 
stability of state interest structures. The theory is thus intended to be a disciplined 
guiding and ordering framework, rather than a simple predictive substitute, for the in-
depth empirical investigation of particular cases. 
As a general theory of power transition, its claims can potentially be falsified through 
reference to any historical case. For the determinate features of the theory, in 
particular, to continue to be treated on this basis requires them to be evidently valid in 
every possible test case.  
Inter-theoretical level 
The chief contribution at this level was the development and initial demonstration of 
the method of ‘inter-theoretical evaluation’ itself. The method (developed in Chapter 
3, with further specifications in Chapter 8) was designed to address critical realism’s 
shortfall in not specifying any clear criteria for how to evaluate competing causal 
claims in open systems when there is no recourse to experimental arbitration (which is 
the norm in social science). Just as the problem critical realism raises about the need 
to develop appropriate models of explanation for open systems is of general relevance 
for the conduct of social science, so accordingly is my proposed solution to the above 
shortfall.  
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The method of inter-theoretical evaluation, or ‘CATB test’, consists of four 
contrasting qualitative criteria according to which differing causal explanations of 
overlapping empirical phenomena can be related to each other and evaluated. Two of 
these criteria (co-existence; assimilation) represent a more positive or benign result 
for a given theory subjected to an inter-theoretical test. The other two (trivialisation;
breakdown) represent mild and strong forms of zero-sum evaluation outcome (that is, 
where one explanation is found to be stronger or weaker than another). With the 
exception of breakdown (which is the category of falsification proper), the other three 
evaluative criteria allow for, and can be used to indicate, possibilities for integrated 
explanations between initially disparate theoretical paradigms. The method is 
designed for use in both historical and prospective case analyses. I applied it to the 
rise of China in Chapter 8.   
The CATB test is both an embodiment and extension of the critical realist 
understanding of causation. On one hand, arguments about the complementary or 
conflicting relations between explanations are to be based on, and judged according 
to, an over-arching natural necessity criterion (the existence or absence of necessary 
connections between variables). On the other, the method operationalises the 
conceptual distinction introduced in this thesis between ‘ideal-type’ and ‘conditioned’ 
causation.  
The concept of ‘conditioned causation’ is especially crucial to the workings of this 
evaluation method (see section 3.6). The concept extends upon the critical realist 
insight that, in open systems, a particular causal mechanism may be ‘possessed 
unexercised’ or ‘exercised unrealised’. Given that in IR most causal propositions 
relate in some way to particular types of motives that drive actors’ behaviour, an 
‘ideal-type’ formulation of the objectives such motives embody is frequently 
necessary for distinguishing and clarifying such causal claims. What the concept of 
‘conditioned causation’ does, however, is direct attention towards the possibility of 
discovering some significant alternative behavioural effects (compromised or 
strategic) that can be generated from the same motive structure as the result of 
interaction with other causal tendencies in an open-system environment (including 
other internal motivations of an actor).  
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The concept of conditioned causation supplies three key advantages to the CATB test 
as a method for testing competing explanations. First, combined with an ontology of 
multiple interest structures, it provides a sound realist basis through which to discern 
opportunities (or otherwise) for integrating different causal factors emphasised across 
disparate theoretical paradigms. Second, it cautions against too readily dismissing 
explanatory theses when their ideal-type effects fail to reliably manifest. In the case of 
the ‘economic interdependence’ and ‘socialisation’ theses considered in the case 
analysis of the rise of China, for instance, Chapter 8 showed that a failure of these 
mechanisms to prevent conflict over territorial disputes would not necessarily equate 
to their complete causal insignificance or falsification. Indeed, it is plausible in such 
cases that these theses might potentially only be trivialised (that is, prove to be less 
powerful vis-à-vis other motives than initially posited), yet continue to co-exist as 
significant causal factors that limit the scope of conflict and disruption to regional 
peace and cooperation.  
Third, and as a result of the above, allowance for conditioned causation enables us to 
more precisely and reliably locate the conditions for falsification, or breakdown, of 
hypothesised causal structures. General theories that allow only for ideal-type or 
uniform cause-effect relations (when X, then Y), and that do not provide for potential 
conditioned causation effects, will of course be falsified each time their ideal-type 
hypotheses contradict with empirical reality. In case analysis, however, important 
causal factors might be unnecessarily rejected if no effort is made to consider possible 
conditioned causation adaptations of apparently ‘falsified’ causal arguments. When 
valid, moreover, allowance for conditioned causation (on the part either of the 
theorists themselves, or else analysts applying a theory to a specific case) can 
potentially relocate the rejection threshold, and extend (or salvage) the explanatory 
power of a theory.  
Prospective analysis 
Critical realism argues that the scope for reliable prediction of the course of events in 
open systems is narrow in the immediate term, and unviable beyond this. Yet, with its 
concept of causation based on the determinate or finite tendencies of relatively 
permanent structures, critical realism points the way to an alternative and legitimate 
means of future projection.  
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In this thesis, I demonstrated the viability and merits of qualitative rational 
simulation. In Chapters 7 and 8, I used closed- and open-system variants of this 
method respectively. The closed-system variant (CSRS; developed in section 3.6) 
aims to draw out and demonstrate the real possible effects of particular causal 
structures motivating an agent through a logical simulation of how they would affect 
behaviour in the absence of inhibiting or conditioning variables.  
As a surrogate for experimentation, the credibility of any such ideal-type simulations 
depends on the establishment of a sound and falsifiable empirical justification for the 
existence of the relevant motive structure in the present. In regard to the subject of 
international power transitions, this means being able to demonstrate the connection 
of any causal claims to real state interest structures. The validity of claims about 
interest structures in turn depends on the accuracy and verifiability of (a) the analyst’s 
definition of their ideational content, and (b) their account of the reasons and socio-
political forces that underpin a given interest structure’s motivational robustness, 
stability or fragility. In Chapter 6, arguments about contemporary Chinese interest 
structures were developed according to these latter criteria. 
CSRS is especially useful for analysing conflict logic and the potential future effects 
of as-yet unrealised goals. In situations where conflicting interests and values are 
evident (however major or trivial), and where material and social obstacles inhibit an 
agent’s goals, the expression of the latter will, at least temporarily, often remain 
indirect and strategic (that is, embody ‘conditioned’ rather than ‘ideal-type’ 
causation). In such situations, CSRS is useful for anticipating and clarifying terms of 
potential conflict, and possibilities for future change (including accommodative 
outcomes), well before they really manifest and/or reach crisis point (that is, if they 
ever do in an open-system world). In Chapter 7, the simulation of interacting 
geopolitical interests conducted via CSRS was further enhanced by the guidance and 
structure supplied by my generic power transition model. 
As a closed-system form of analysis, CSRS does not predict the incidence and timing 
of events, but rather explains the possibilities embedded in particular causal 
structures. The predictive/non-predictive status of the rational simulation method 
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when applied to the more open-system analysis of Chapter 8, however, is admittedly 
more ambiguous. The latter analysis is more inclusive, and indeed purports to account 
for all major variables that have been hypothesised in the mainstream literature as 
relevant to the explanation of East Asia’s contemporary security order. As such, it 
might seem predictive in the sense that so long as no major exogenous shocks occur 
(such as a pandemic or meteor strike that ends the prospects of an ‘Asian century’, or 
the economic and socio-political collapse and/or fragmentation of the PRC); then at 
least one of the projected pathways, and its associated explanation(s), ought to be 
vindicated if the analysis as a whole is to avoid falsification and being revealed as 
purely speculative.  
I would tend to agree with this view in cases where such methods are used to map the 
possible trajectories and options for an immediate-term crisis or negotiational process 
that has already begun to emerge in reality. However, the fact that the projections in 
this study presume the possibility of a longer time scale undermines, at present, the 
viability for them to be treated as predictive in this sense also. Qualitative rational 
simulation is necessarily conducted on the basis of existing trends at the time of a 
given study. In open systems, however, the causal underpinnings of such trends, 
including for interest structures, can potentially evolve in unanticipated ways and 
transform over time. As such, the analysis and projections may need to be periodically 
updated to account for any consequential shifts in the overall configuration or balance 
of variables. Until or unless this happens, though, the projections in this study are 
nonetheless viewed here as revealing real tendencies and potential implications of 
existing evidence-based trends. 
9.2: Implications for policy analysis    
In applying a presently non-mainstream social-scientific paradigm in IR (critical 
realism) to the study of mainstream IR subjects (power transitions; the rise of China), 
this thesis pre-occupied itself quite extensively with complex theoretical and 
philosophical issues – both for purposes of critique, and theory/methodology building. 
Nonetheless, the underlying objective of these endeavours remains practical in 
orientation; that is, a desire to help advance the quality and reliability of the 
explanatory basis for policy debate and deliberation on the rise of China.  
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In Chapter 1, I argued in paradoxical terms that the initial increase in analytical 
complexity and abstraction involved in employing critical realism would, once 
applied to case analysis, have the payoff of significantly raising the level of 
clarification and de-mystification of real-world causal complexity. My innovations 
fulfil this promise on two fronts. First, my theory, in clarifying the causal sources and 
finite (yet variable) mechanics of the power transition process, brings greater order 
and coherence to our understanding of the range of possibilities, and accordingly the 
generic options, in power transitions. Second, I have demonstrated my method of 
inter-theoretical evaluation to be capable of substantially clarifying the terms of inter-
relationship between diverse causal variables that are usually treated in a separate 
modular fashion rather than interactively. Both of these tools, if accepted as sound, 
help the analyst to efficiently order and evaluate the plethora of case-specific 
empirical information, and, as I shall argue, to more reliably anticipate and define the 
policy options and choices implied in existing trends. 
The possibility for policy choice arises from the open-system perspective embedded 
in my theory and methodology. Such a framework would not frequently be expected 
to generate singular predictive pathways, and certainly not beyond an immediate- or 
near-term time scale. More specifically, however, I argued that certain details of the 
interests of the great powers in East Asia remain sufficiently ambiguous and under-
determined to allow for meaningful deliberation on the possibilities, or otherwise, for 
a compromise accommodation on the region’s future military-security order.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the process of prospective analysis, policy deliberation, 
and adjustment of priorities that states undertake on an ongoing basis is itself a key 
variable in the causal equation that determines the direction of events. In the 
remainder of this section, I insert my analytical framework, and the findings of its 
application to the rise of China in Part II, hypothetically into this process. I do so to 
demonstrate first-hand how the use of my framework can potentially improve upon 
existing conceptions of the policy choices (dilemmas, trade-offs, and opportunities) 
confronting China and the US in particular as they lead and negotiate the much 
anticipated power transition in East Asia. 
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China 
Chapters 6 and 7 highlighted some conflicts between the way China defines its core 
interest of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its ‘peaceful rise’ and ‘harmonious 
world’ doctrines. In light of the escalation in regional maritime sovereignty disputes 
during recent years, the potential for conflict could be deduced from an examination 
of issue-specific variables alone. The Chinese government is itself aware of such 
potential, and has long prepared its own rationalisations for justifying any future 
resort to arms over these issues (see section 6.3). What my theory does is provide a 
means for placing particular issues within an integrative analysis of regional military-
security order as a whole.  
A key finding of the simulations that deployed my theoretical indicators in Chapter 7, 
and one not immediately obvious, was that maximal realisation of China’s existing 
suite of irredentist and maritime jurisdiction claims in East Asia would require a 
radical revision of the regional military-security hierarchy to Chinese unipolarity for 
its fulfilment. In light of the existing interests of other states, moreover, it is most 
likely that such an outcome would need to be facilitated by a major great power war. 
This raises an issue for China about the relative priority that it places on particular 
components of its territorial agenda.  
The regime appears prepared to forgo a purity in its peaceful rise pledge if competing 
claimants on sovereignty disputes do not eventually defer to China’s standpoints any 
other way. In regard to the future upholding of pledges within the peaceful 
development paradigm (PD) beyond ‘peaceful rise’ itself, however, the key issue is 
China’s policy on maritime jurisdiction. Indeed, this is an issue upon which the 
integrity of China’s ‘harmonious world’ and ‘never pursue hegemony’ policies may 
stand or fall.  
In regard to jurisdiction delineation: China’s claims to EEZs extending from 
Spratly/Nansha and Paracel/Xisha, its potential ‘historic rights’ claim in the South 
China Sea, and assertion of a maximal continental shelf claim in the East China Sea 
are not only opposed by many other regional states; they are also all in varying ways 
contestable under international law. China’s current interpretation of the military 
transit rights of other states in EEZs also lacks unambiguous backing from 
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international law in counter to America’s opposing policy. According to the 
‘harmonious world’ doctrine, we would expect these issues to be amenable to the 
types of compromise indicated in Chapter 7. Analysis in Chapter 6 indicated why the 
regime takes an uncompromising stance on all its outstanding sovereignty claims. The 
regime’s imperative to sustain the vulnerable credibility of its ‘One China’ doctrine 
need not, however, encompass the PRC’s jurisdiction claims as well.  
In more positive terms, abandonment of legally dubious ‘historic rights’ and ‘island’ 
EEZ rights claims in the South China Sea, as well as willingness to compromise in the 
East China Sea, could provide an opportunity for China to better signal benign long-
term intentions. As Chapter 8 demonstrated, it would also be a means to signal the 
credibility of its broader internalisation of ‘ASEAN way’ norms, despite the potential 
for breaches of the latter over sovereignty disputes. 
Other resources within my theoretical framework illustrate how China could adjust its 
regional geopolitical policy so as to more tangibly signal a commitment to the values 
of PD, and better reassure other states. According to my third hypothesis about war 
and peace in power transitions, for instance, an ultimately stable and peaceful 
outcome in Maritime East Asia (MEA) will require recognition of the legitimacy of 
other great power poles in the region. Chapter 7 showed that prosecution of an 
exclusive maritime security policy within the ‘first island chain’ would imply a desire 
to render American power and alliances in the region ineffectual and redundant. Such 
a prospect, moreover, conflicts with the aversion of numerous other states in the 
region towards the idea of unbalanced, and potentially hegemonic, Chinese power 
(given the coercive economic leverage it would enable).    
If China’s leaders are serious about the values embodied in PD then, they will need to 
start promoting, domestically at first, the idea of a bipolar structure of deterrence as 
the outer limiting objective for China’s military rise in East Asia. At present, there are 
reasons (see discussion on arms control below) why it might be premature to use this 
formulation diplomatically. The reverse formulation, however – that is, explicitly 
ruling out a future bid for unipolarity in MEA – or perhaps simply the concept of an 
order based on a ‘balance of power’, may not bring the same complications, and could 
be useful for the time being.  
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Note that, according to my simulations, bipolarity in MEA is only feasible on the 
basis of an inclusive Chinese security policy within the ‘first island chain’ that 
provides some recognition of the right of free military transit for other regional 
powers, as well as joint security cooperation in legally overlapping jurisdictional 
zones such as the eastern section of the East China Sea. ‘Bipolarity’ based on 
exclusive spheres of interest inside (China) and outside (US) the ‘first island chain’ 
would be neither a peaceful nor genuine bipolar policy, given that, in practice, it 
would most likely require a removal of the US as a contending pole in the West 
Pacific. 
United States 
Despite America’s existing hard- and soft-power advantages in the region, and its 
resolve to reinforce these advantages through its ‘return to Asia’ and ‘60-40’ policies, 
China’s gradually rising military power means that the US too faces the prospect of 
some difficult future strategic choices or trade-offs.  
If China’s current development trajectory is sustained, the capacity to, at least, 
prolong a military stalemate against the US and its allies within the ‘first island chain’ 
will be in reach over the next decade. Attainment of such a capability will 
dramatically shift the cost-benefit ratio, in particular, of US intervention in conflicts 
over territorial disputes (see Chapter 8). US involvement would mean a 
geographically wider conflict and, most likely, a disruption of sea-borne commerce 
that, if sustained, could trigger a regional and/or global economic downturn. The US 
also faces some peculiar dangers of escalation in a Taiwan conflict due to its 
asymmetry in motivation on this issue vis-à-vis China. 
    
As Chinese power grows then, the US will likely increasingly be faced with an 
incentive to stake the credibility of its regional power more decisively on conflict 
localisation, and freedom of passage, rather than direct intervention in sovereignty 
conflicts where China would be motivated to fight hard against the US despite serious 
economic risks. Given the association China makes between its irredentist sovereignty 
interests and fundamental regime stability, moreover (see Chapter 6), US willingness 
to directly fight China on these issues would be perceived as a greatly hostile act. As 
such, intervention on these issues might also risk jeopardising the prospects for an 
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enduring compromise settlement on, and longer-term pacification of, military-security 
order in East Asia.  
Arms Control
According to my theory, for geopolitical regions that are not unipolar to be genuinely 
stable and peaceful, there needs to be an enduring consensus on the structure of 
deterrence amongst the great power poles. My theory thus identifies conventional 
arms control as the ultimate task for a peaceful power transition that revises the status 
quo towards a new bipolar or multipolar order. 
In regard to existing discourses and deliberations on the rise of China, the issue of 
arms control has been off the radar, primarily due to the shrouding effect of numerous 
nearer-term and unresolved conflicts of interest. From the US perspective, there is 
evidently a consensus towards sustaining deterrence of conflict over territorial 
disputes involving China as long as possible. Delaying the day of reckoning in this 
way has the function of holding out for the, at present, unlikely prospect that major 
political change might occur in the PRC and cause China to reconsider these issues. 
As a policy that requires reinforcement or extension of existing military advantage, 
however, it is not commensurable with arms control. Conversely, any Chinese 
diplomatic advocacy of bipolar arms control (which, at present, would mean a 
legitimised period of catch-up for China, or a US scale down) would be threatening to 
the US and most other regional states so long as China continues to advance interests 
that imply a potentially exclusive security policy within the ‘first island chain’.  
In practical terms, the issue of arms control cannot be broached diplomatically until 
such time as the above issues are resolved between China and the US. Despite 
existing impediments to this, however, if the leaders of these powers do aspire to a 
longer-term peaceful co-existence, the effects of existing policies in enabling or 
inhibiting any future efforts at arms control can nevertheless be factored into 
contemporary policy debate and planning.  
I anticipate at least three potential challenges in regard to arms control that are worthy 
of consideration in the present. The latter two of these derive directly from my 
theoretically informed analysis in Part II. 
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First, any viable arms control agreements or legitimation of gradual Chinese catch-up 
will require agreement on, and cooperation with, some extraordinary procedures of 
international inspection and verification. Second, if China simultaneously is gradually 
extending its navy into the Indian Ocean, the arms control regime will need to 
establish a consensus and include provisions for cooperation beyond East Asia. One 
possibility might be to negotiate separate (yet inter-locking) phased parity targets for 
(a) permanently deployed forces in MEA (based on the two poles of China and the 
US-Japan alliance), and (b) forces that are flexibly deployable between MEA and the 
Indian Ocean (US and China only). A subsequent third consensus (involving India) on 
permanently deployed forces in the Indian Ocean might emerge at a later date. 
The third challenge is the most formidable of all: such schemes will only be possible 
if the other negotiating parties trust that China will not capitalise on any legitimised 
catch-up targets and challenge the US when stronger. This is the problem of tactical 
versus genuine consent anticipated within the discussion of my third hypothesis in 
Chapter 5.   
According to my theory, the latter problem does not arise simply because any state in 
China’s position would be expected to renege on the terms of an arms control regime 
once it has caught up, and then pursue dominance (as MOR would assume). Rather, 
the problem arises in this particular case from the way China defines aspects of its 
geopolitical interests (namely, those relating to maritime jurisdiction), as well as the 
deep ambivalence expressed in the Chinese national discourse towards the legitimacy 
of America’s strategic presence in MEA. On this basis, my analysis in Chapter 7 both 
identified, and took seriously, the possibility that achievement of deterrence parity (or 
limited revisionism) first in MEA, then in the Indian Ocean, would be the most viable 
pre-requisite for China to mount a later challenge for unipolar dominance in MEA.  
The trust barrier that this could produce vis-à-vis the ultimate prospects for regional 
arms control is potentially great. According to my theory, however, there is a way to 
differentiate between tactical and genuine consent to geopolitical agreements. This 
does not involve simply relying on diplomatic rhetoric and the terms of agreements, 
which states can adhere to duplicitously and are thus potentially misleading. Rather, it 
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involves assessing the consistency and durability of the friendly or hostile attitudes 
expressed towards particular states within a national discourse, both officially and 
unofficially. This suggests that one of the most significant steps China can take in the 
present, as part of a longer-term preparation of conditions conducive to the building of 
a ‘harmonious Asia’, would be to explicitly and consistently promote the idea, in its 
internal foreign policy narrative and discourse, that the US is a legitimate constituent 
element of the regional strategic order. In making such a resolution, China would not 
only reduce the scope for potential conflict, and endless strategic rivalry, with the US. 
It would also allay the security anxieties of most other states in the region, a 
development without which the notion of a future ‘harmonious Asia’ is unthinkable.  
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